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MUSIC, TEXT, & CULTURE IN *Ancient Greece*

edited by

Tom Phillips &
Armand D'Angour

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IN ANCIENT GREECE

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Edited by
TOM PHILLIPS
and
ARMAND D'ANGOUR

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Preface

This volume originates in a workshop that took place in June 2013, and a conference that took place a year later. We would like to express our gratitude to the John Fell Fund for making these events possible, and to Jesus College, Oxford for providing an atmosphere congenial to discussion. The spirit of lively debate and co-operative engagement that pervaded those meetings has carried through the process of preparing the volume for publication, and we are very grateful to the contributors for their patience and efficiency. Georgina Leighton and Charlotte Loveridge steered the volume through the press with attentiveness and skill, and the final product was considerably improved by the editorial interventions of Tim Beck and Albert Stewart. Numerous other scholarly conversations have informed the volume, but we are particularly indebted to Emily Dreyfus and Pauline LeVen for their comments on the introduction, and to the readers of the press for their suggestions about the shape and substance of the book as a whole.

A.J.D.
T.R.P.

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List of Abbreviations

CBS	Catalogue of the Babylonian Section, University Museum, Philadelphia.
CEG	P. A. Hansen (ed.), *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca* (Berlin, 1983–9).
DAGM	E. Pöhlmann and M. L. West (eds), *Documents in Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford, 2001).
D-K	H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I–III (Berlin, 1974).
Dr	A. B. Drachmann (ed.), *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, I–III (Leipzig, 1903–27 [reprinted Stuttgart, 1997]).
FGrH	F. Jacoby et al. (eds), *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* (Leiden, 1923–).
K-A	R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin, 1983–).
LfgrE	*Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen, 1979–).
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, I–VIII (Zurich/Munich, 1981–99).
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. Mackenzie (eds), *A Greek–English Lexicon* (ninth edn, Oxford, 1940).
MSG	K. von Jan, ed. *Musici scriptores Graeci: Aristoteles, Euclides, Nicomachus, Bacchius, Gaudentius, Alypius* (Leipzig, 1895).
PEG	A Bernabé (ed.), *Poetarum epicorum Graecorum testimonia et fragmenta* I (Leipzig, 1987).
PMG	D. L. Page (ed.), *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962).
PMGF	D. L. Page and M. Davies (eds), *Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Oxford, 1991).
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Amsterdam, 1923–).
S-M	B. Snell and H. Maehler (eds), *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis* (Lepizig, 1984, 1989).
TLG	*Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (University of California, 1985–).
TGrF	R. Kannicht, S. Radt, and B. Snell (eds), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, I– (Göttingen, 1971–2004).
UET	Ur Excavation Texts (London, 1928–).
VAT	Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin (Vorderasiatische Abteilung. Tontafeln).
Wehrli	F. von Wehrli (ed.), *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar* I–X (Basel and Stuttgart, 1969).

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Introduction

Music, Text, and Culture

Tom Phillips

This volume addresses two issues central to the study of ancient Greek performance culture. The first is the narrow but methodologically problematic question of the role played by music in performed poetry. The second is broader: how did the ancients understand the relationship between music, poetry, and performance, and how did reflection on music relate to other areas of ancient intellectual life? While the second has received considerable attention, the first, despite its obvious importance, remains thinly formulated and little understood. There are obvious and intransigent reasons, both institutional and evidential, for this interpretative blindspot. Perhaps more clearly than any other area of scholarship the study of music in ancient Greece exemplifies both the benefits and the problems of increasing scholarly specialization. Recent years have seen scholars produce works of great technical sophistication that have vastly increased our understanding of ancient instruments, modal systems, and musical scholarship,[1] and yet the difficulty of the material these works address has meant that music has generally remained something of a closed book to mainstream literary scholars. Formidable evidential problems also beset those interested in the role music played in performance culture, especially in the archaic and classical periods. While inscriptions and papyri furnish considerable evidence

[1] See e.g. West (1992b); Barker (2007); Hagel (2009); Creese (2010). For an accessible overview of ancient musicology see Barker (2014).

for musical culture in the Hellenistic period and beyond,[2] our evidence for the music of Homer, the tragic and comic choruses, and the choral genres of the sixth and fifth centuries, not to mention the various forms of monody and popular songs, is for the most part exiguous. As a result, it has become a scholarly topos to pair an emphasis on music's importance to performance poetry with acknowledgement of our ignorance of its workings.[3] On the other hand, the social, ritual, and political contexts of poetic performance in the classical period are better represented in our evidence, and great advances have recently been made in studying performance 'in the round', as a phenomenon that intersects with various other social factors.[4] The social environments in which music was composed, performed, listened to, and debated are consequently much better understood than they were a generation ago.[5] One implication of this volume, however, is that classical and archaic poetry, and the ancient sources that bear on it, still have much to tell us about how music worked in the archaic and classical periods, even though interpreting the evidence requires a precarious mixture of imagination and caution.

A central aim of the chapters collected here is to make connections between musicological scholarship and the issues that have traditionally concerned students of ancient literature. Especially pressing in this respect is the need to develop a better understanding of how music and texts combined in performance, and it is this to which the essays in the first half of the volume are largely devoted.[6] The 'music' of our title and the use of 'music' in these opening remarks goes against the terminological grain of recent scholarship

[2] On Hellenistic and later musical scholarship see e.g. Prauscello (2006).

[3] See e.g. Gentili (1988) 31.

[4] For classical choral lyric Calame (2001) is foundational; more recently see e.g. Kowalzig (2007); Athanassaki and Bowie (2011); Fearn (2011); Kowalzig and Wilson (2013). On tragic choruses see especially Gagné and Hopman (2013); for responses to choral culture in Plato see Prauscello (2013a), and the essays in Peponi (2013a). For musical culture more generally see Murray and Wilson (2004) and Yatromanolakis (2011).

[5] Cf. Csapo (2004) on the New Music; Power (2010) on the history of citharodia.

[6] For other recent moves in this direction see e.g. Wilson (2005); Hall (2006) 288–320; Goldhill (2013); Phillips (2013); Gurd (2016): see further Porter (this volume) 217 n. 36. Nooter (2012) analyses the shifts between spoken and sung utterance in Sophocles; on the role of sound in poetry, looking especially at the voice, see Butler (2015) 82–7.

on performance culture, which has tended to ground discussion of ancient musico-cultural phenomena in terms such as *μουσική* or *μολπή*.[7] The manoeuvre of employing these ancient terms has the value of highlighting the cultural differences between ancient and modern music, especially as regards the 'seamless complex of instrumental music, poetic word, and co-ordinated physical movement'[8] that comprised *μουσική* in ancient performance culture. Our use of 'music' is not meant to signal a move away from considering musical elements (the sounds of instruments, vocal melodies, etc.) as part of performance totalities, but rather to recalibrate what analysis of the musical element of *μουσική* entails. A persistent concern of the first half of the volume is to isolate phenomena such as melody and rhythm and consider them as distinctive evidential strands, enabling them subsequently to be integrated into more holistic analyses of performance. This more discrete treatment of *μουσική* enables the distinctiveness of musical elements to emerge more clearly, but it also promotes greater attention to how the verbal and the musical interact.

This terminological choice and the interpretative manoeuvre that it reflects are paralleled in contemporary reflection on the use of multiple media in artworks. Discussions of mediality—the properties and qualities of the media in which artworks are constructed—has addressed various artistic phenomena. A particular concern has been the elucidation of relations between different media within a single artwork. Another subject of focus has been the formal features of one medium being transposed into or reworked in another.[9] Verbal descriptions of music, and the adoption in novels of structuring devices borrowed from music, have received considerable attention.[10] In one sense, discussion of such interactions corresponds to what classicists have long been doing in their treatment of phenomena such as ecphrasis, but the specific terms in which these discussions are framed also prompt us to reconsider the ways in which we think about the relationships between media in artworks.

One of the animating principles of studies on mediality is the 'recognition that the arts and media should not be studied in their

[7] See e.g. Murray and Wilson (2004).
[8] Murray and Wilson (2004) 1.
[9] Defined as 'transmediality': for a discussion see Kattenbelt (2008) 23–4.
[10] Cf. Wolf (2002) 23–5 for discussion and further references.

own historical developments and with their own rules and specifications, but rather in the broader context of their differences and co-relations'.[11] This mirrors to some extent the emphasis on a more contextually grounded approach to archaic and classical Greek poetry, which has emphasized that poetry is not a type of language that belongs to its own separate realm, but needs to be seen in relation to ritual practices, socio-political discourses, and the plastic arts. Yet in emphasizing both 'differences and co-relations', the study of mediality provides a (necessarily provisional) framework for addressing both the combination and disaggregation of media within an artwork.[12] Works that include or are realized through multiple media can be analysed in terms of the 'fusion' they create,[13] but can also be understood as creating medial interactions that change the significance of individual media.[14] Crucially, an intermedial approach resists conceptualizing artworks in terms of a critical programme in which the semantic is posited as the privileged model to which musical, rhythmical, and other non-verbal aspects of an artwork are subordinated, a tendency which has been common in critical writing from antiquity to the present.[15] In attempting to do justice to the shifting multifariousness of the relationships between music and text, semantics and prosody, the chapters in this volume share the focus, if not always the language, of mediality studies. They highlight instances of music and rhythm 'imitating' or reinforcing semantic content,[16] but they also explore moments at which texts'

[11] Kattenbelt (2008) 20.

[12] For a concise overview of different relations between media see Kattenbelt (2008), and for more extended discussion Wolf (2002). Particularly germane to the concerns of this volume are the comments of Wolf (2002) 17 on 'intracompositional intermediality', which he defines as 'a direct or indirect participation of more than one medium of communication in the signification and/or semiotic structure of a work or semiotic complex'. For further theorization on the relations between words and music and further references see the essays collected in Bernhart (2012).

[13] Wolf (2002) 20.

[14] Cf. Kattenbelt (2008) 25, using 'intermediality' to refer to 'co-relations between different media that result in a redefinition of the media that are influencing each other'. Such 'redefinitions' may be more or less radical depending on the nature of the media involved: Kattenbelt compares Kandinsky's *Bühnenkompositionen*, in which the interplay of arts included within the whole was grounded in their perceived independence, with Wagner's conception of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* in which music was given primacy.

[15] See further Phillips (this volume) 74–9.

[16] See e.g. the chapters by D'Angour and Psaroudakes in this volume.

auditory dimensions assert, or are understood as having, a distinctive autonomy.[17]

When combined with traditional philological approaches, the conceptual tools provided by theorization about mediality can enable a more granular analysis of how words and music interact in poetic texts, but they are also ripe for extension in the light of the medial complexities of particular texts, as Andrew Barker's discussion of 'potential intermediality' in Plutarch demonstrates.[18] Equally, media theory furnishes readers with a critical idiom that has greater typological than descriptive or interpretative resources.[19] This is highlighted by the fact that the problem of finding adequate vocabulary with which to register the emotive effects and interpretative challenges created by 'multimedial' artworks is especially pressing in the case of ancient culture. In addition to the challenge of translating and understanding ancient aesthetic terminology and intellectual frameworks,[20] we also have to grapple with our relative lack of relevant acculturation. A contemporary reader of a poem entitled 'Bob Dylan's Minnesota Harmonica Sound' can be expected to have an intuitive grasp of the subject derived from frequent encounters with the music, mention of which will usher in, for such a reader, a set of memories and personal associations which inflect their participation in the poem's imaginative world.[21] When reading ancient texts in which music plays a part, we are at best less familiar with the relevant parallel phenomena, and at worst almost totally in the dark. The sounds of the aulos, the shape of rhythmical phrases, and the tones of voice employed in singing about intense emotional experiences

[17] For the former see especially the chapters by Phillips and Thomas, for the latter those by Peponi and Porter in this volume.

[18] Pp. 249–55.

[19] The discussion of *Stimmung* by Peponi (this volume, esp. 167–8, 172–4) exemplifies this. As conceptualized by Plato, the *Stimmung* of lyric poetry is multimedial in the sense of being created by prosody and the dynamics of the individual voice. What makes this *Stimmung* distinctive in its philosophical context, however, is not its multimedial aspect per se but its production of 'atmospheres' that are both all-pervasive and indeterminate, and Plato's response to the critical problem these atmospheres create.

[20] See D'Angour (this volume) 48; Phillips (this volume) 74–81.

[21] Lachlan Mackinnon, *The Jupiter Collisions* (Faber & Faber, 2003). The poem itself, however, makes no explicit reference to its titular subject. This obliqueness opens up various ways of construing the relationship between the 'sound' in the title and the poem's soundscape, dominated by 'the wind that seemed to be always blowing' and the whistling of freight trains.

would all have contributed powerfully to the experience of listening to a Euripidean choral ode. Ancient readers, even those of periods fairly remote from Euripides' own time, would have brought to a reading of the same ode a much greater familiarity with these phenomena than their modern counterparts,[22] for whom they pose ascendingly complex problems of reconstruction and interpretation. We can never hope to hear ancient poetry as the ancients did. But in scrutinizing the effects created by interactions between music and text, the chapters in the first half of the volume aim to deepen our understanding and imaginative engagement with this aspect of poetry, as well as to connect these interactions with wider interpretative questions.

Although they do not attempt to offer an overarching theory of the relationship between words and sounds, these chapters share a focus on the two-way nature of the relationship between music and texts. The volume begins with an essay that examines this relationship against a historical backdrop that reaches back to the third millennium BC. John Franklin argues that the tuning system the Greeks applied to the lyre derived ultimately from Assyrian and Babylonian models. Franklin tracks this 'epicentric' model, which used the central string (μέση) as the basis for determining the tunings of the others through the archaic and classical periods, and finds signs of its influence persisting into later antiquity.[23] As well as being richly suggestive for melodization in the archaic period, Franklin's exploration of the epicentric model demonstrates the effects of musical practice on other cultural activities.[24]

Despite the variations in the contexts, genres, and communicative strategies of the primary texts under discussion in the next four chapters, a basic dynamic recurs: as Armand D'Angour and Stelios Psaroudakes demonstrate in detail, music affects how individual words and phrases are understood, while the verbal structures inflect how their melodies, rhythms, and instrumental accompaniment affect listeners. As well as allowing a richer appreciation of the formal structures of the texts under discussion, this approach

[22] See also Barker (this volume) 251–2 on the challenges ancient readers faced in conceptualizing descriptions of musical performances.

[23] See e.g. pp. 44–5 on Plutarch's treatment of the lyre's boundary strings (lower, middle, and upper) as Muses.

[24] See esp. pp. 43–4.

enhances our understanding of musical affectivity. Rhythms and musical phrases create and participate in small-scale textual effects,[25] but the cultural associations of individual instruments and melodic forms enable musical accompaniment to affect interpretation in a way that is all the more telling for being formally distinct from the texts' verbal content. Depending on the context of the utterance, musical accompaniment can play a crucial role in directing listeners' interpretation of ethical, psychological, and political issues.[26]

Another feature of these chapters informed by a focus on the medial distinctiveness of performance poetry is their examination of the boundaries between musical and non-musical elements. On the reading of Pindar's dactylo-epitrites advanced in Chapter 3, rhythm is a powerfully affective element, but also 'signifies' in ways that are not readily graspable in terms normally applied to verbal meaning.[27] Similarly, Oliver Thomas's interpretation of the *Medea* shows that music could contribute to the characterization of choral utterance and act as a vehicle for implicit authorial comment on the chorus's propositions and arguments.[28] All four chapters envisage authors composing musically complex works that presuppose a high level of critical sophistication among listeners, and entail modes of understanding alert to both the distinctions and continuities between the musical and verbal elements of performance poetry. As such, these analyses illustrate what can be gained from the manoeuvre outlined above of uncoupling *μουσική* and music. At the same time, their focus on phenomena in which sound and sense combine also highlights both the importance and the provisionality of the categorical distinctions employed by ancient and modern criticism.

As well as offering new ways of thinking about the texts in question, the approaches explored in these chapters contribute to larger and enduringly difficult questions about music's ontology and function. Thinkers ancient and modern have debated the role of sound in

[25] On the role played by rhythm in framing responses to poetry see e.g. Thaut (2005) 5; London (2002) 532–3; Prauscello (2013b) 258–9. For discussion of rhythm in ancient Greek poetry see Edwards (2002), esp. 62–98; more recently, see the essays in Celentano (2010).

[26] Cf. Kramer (1990) 269–70 on music as 'a participant in, not just a mirror of, discursive and representational practices', with the further discussion of Scher (1997) 14–15.

[27] Phillips (this volume), esp. 89, 95–7.

[28] See esp. pp. 112–18.

producing semantic meaning,[29] whether music can be understood to function like a language,[30] whether music can represent objects, emotional states, or concepts,[31] and whether the terms used to discuss linguistic meaning are fundamentally inapposite to the description of music. Although theoretical engagement with these debates is not a principal aim of this volume, the interpretations of ancient poetry elaborated throughout intersect in various ways with the wider questions with which these debates are concerned. Music's representational capacities, for instance, are a recurring issue. The mimetic aspect of music is a commonplace of the ancient sources, but a particular feature of the readings collected here is that they illustrate the multidimensional complexity of how mimesis actually worked in performance. From one musical instrument masquerading as another, to a melody suggesting the interpretative shortcomings of a chorus' viewpoint, or rhythmical sequences embodying ideas of abstract order, the range of mimetic resources at work in these texts resists unitary conceptualization.[32] Study of texts from the kind of multimedia perspective utilized in these analyses allows further meat to be put on the bones of ancient sources that discuss musical mimesis, but also enables engagement with modes of mimesis not documented by ancient critics.

The second half of the volume addresses directly the issue of how the ancients responded to and conceptualized music. The chapters range widely in time and subject matter, discussing how concepts of musicality and sound are manipulated, discussed, and challenged across a variety of rhetorical, philosophical, and critical texts. Some

[29] The distinction between sound generated by instruments or other types of accompaniment and the sound of language itself is particularly important in this respect: see especially Porter (this volume) for ancient literary critics' interest in this issue.

[30] See e.g. Coker (1972) for the argument that music can convey concepts, a position which can be seen as a reconfiguration of the ancient position which held that music could represent character: see e.g. Destrée (this volume) 192 discussing Arist. *Pol.* 8.1340a18–28.

[31] See e.g. Davies (1994) 1–49, particularly 48. Koopman and Davies (2001) argue for an 'expanded' notion of musical meaning; see Kivy (2007) for a statement of music's resistance to meaning in the linguistic sense. Some important objections to the notion that music can have a representational function include Scruton (1976) and Davies (1994). See Dreyfus (2013) 167–8 for a succinct assessment of the problems with treating music as a representation of propositions that can be conveyed through language.

[32] See e.g. Ch. 6, pp. 112–15, and 95–7.

chapters focus on how ancient philosophers and literary critics responded to the theoretical issues posed by the conjunctions of music and text, while others examine aspects of music's broader cultural significance and the influence of musicology on disciplines such as literary criticism. For all their variations in subject and methodology, however, these chapters convey a vivid sense of the intellectual challenges music posed to ancient audiences (and readers). In antiquity as much as today, music was a feature of everyday life, and yet (in some of its forms, at least) had a capacity for disturbing and delighting listeners in ways that strained conceptual categories. One function of this volume is to draw out continuities and contrasts between ancient and modern theorizing about and experience of music; identifying continuities in how music is conceived and debated is a means (albeit provisional) of bridging the cultural divide that separates us from antiquity. Equally, we can sometimes identify similarities in melodic practice between ancient and modern texts which suggest that the responses of (at least some) ancient listeners may not have been very different from types of response with which we are familiar.[33] But in highlighting contextual and intellectual differences between antiquity and today, the volume also enables a more focused understanding of what made ancient musical culture distinctive.

The traffic between music and texts pivots around a fundamental tension: despite its mimetic capacities, music's significational resources differ from those of a language. Although music can be conventionally or critically framed as a representational mode, the nature of its function is such that it always tends towards exceeding determination in purely semantic terms.[34] At the same time, however,

[33] Caution is of course required in guarding against projecting our own assumptions about such practices back onto antiquity, but the formal parallelisms are often suggestive: see D'Angour (this volume) 61, 71–2 for continuities between the generation of affect through melodic shape in ancient and modern music.

[34] This has often been phrased in terms of the resistance of musical experience to being captured in language. See e.g. Shepherd and Wicke (1997) 143, who argue that 'music theory and music analysis are quite different and distinct in the character of their *thinking* from the character of musical *experience*. They cannot "reach out" to musical experience in any convincing or useful manner'; see also Jankelevitch (2003) 71–6, 102–3. Cf. however the remarks of Cook (2001) 189–90. Gurd (2016) addresses this problem from a different angle by examining the tension between 'noise' and 'sound' in Greek poetics, the former being the irreducibly material element that always threatens to overrun the constraints imposed by the formal systems which produce the latter.

it is open to being marked by verbal meaning.[35] This dialogue, in which music both invites and resists accommodation to the semantic,[36] is in part a product of the conditions in which music is produced. When an aulos is played during a tragic choral ode, an invitation to conjoin, or at least to relate, sound and semantics is inscribed into the structure of the performance. A particularly complex instance of this relationship is the subject of Naomi Weiss's essay on the syrinx in Euripides' choral odes. Drawing on a distinction elaborated in contemporary sound studies between the actual sounds made by instruments and how these sounds are imagined by listeners, Weiss shows that the aulos could momentarily represent the syrinx, allowing Euripides to mobilize the cultural associations of both instruments, and the tensions between them, for a variety of dramatic ends.

While Weiss focuses on how sound-making is represented, and on the interpretative frames choral odes project for themselves by means of these representations, other essays explore how interactions between sound and meaning are informed by the differences between their communicative modes. These interactions, with their potential for turbulence and disruption as well as for the sensory reinforcement of semantic content, are crucial to what the ancients termed music's 'ethical' dimension. Music's capacity to express emotions and to engender emotional responses has been a central concern of ancient and modern theory.[37] Yet while modern musicologists have tended to focus their attention on formal questions relating to what (if any) emotional or conceptual content music can convey,[38] the emphasis in

[35] Cf. e.g. Kramer (1990); Cook (2001) 178–9.

[36] Cook (2001) 187–8 suggests that 'the instability of music as an agent of meaning' derives from the fact that, although music can express nuance, 'the necessary interpretative decisions' for judging such nuance are not given by the music itself. This position can be compared with Peponi's remarks on Plato (this volume, 174–8); for further discussion see Phillips (this volume) 87–9.

[37] Issues of emotiveness and ethical force are central to Plato's remarks about music: see e.g. *Rep.* 410a–412b, 423d–425a, *Lg.* 653c–660d.

[38] Debate about musical emotiveness is closely connected to questions about its representational functions. The modern bibliography on this subject is vast. Foundational is Hanslick (1974) (first published 1854); his arguments have often been taken to hold that music is a purely formal system without representational capacities, but see the remarks of Cook (2001) 174–5. Cooke (1959) understands music as an emotive language with certain basic constituents whose emotional resonance persists through different instantiations. For responses to this, see Davies (1994) 25–6 with bibliography.

ancient thinking is frequently directed at the consequences of music's effects on its listeners. Part of Plato's response to this problem is the subject of Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi's essay, which traces a tension between semantics and musical affectivity that runs through Plato's discussion of lyric poetry in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Peponi argues that Plato's privileging of the semantic element is informed by anxiety about the tendency of rhythmic and harmonic features of such poetry to overwhelm the verbal. On Peponi's reading, Plato is particularly sensitive to lyric song's capacity to bring about scenarios in which the non-representational dimensions of poetic performance come to predominate, creating atmospheres and moods that threaten the mimetic transparency on which, on Plato's view, the efficacy of valid poetic communication depends. His decision, in the *Laws*, to include music in the category of those representational arts that have a prominent visual component (*τέχναι εἰκασταί*) can therefore be seen as an attempt, not entirely successful in theoretical terms, to control 'the non-representational potential of *melos*'[39] by subordinating it to a schema in which signification and mimesis are sovereign.

Pierre Destrée tracks a very different response to the problem of music's autonomy in Aristotle's thinking about 'music for leisure'. Rather than attempting to construct a medial hierarchy in which music is subordinate, Aristotle argues that music can be enjoyed as an activity pursued in leisure (*πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν*),[40] which is an end in itself, insofar as this type of music is 'an activity through which our "theoretical" intelligence exercises its power'.[41] Andrew Barker's chapter on Plutarch *Quaest. conv.* 7.5 focuses on similar issues in the intersections of musical theory and performance culture in the Second Sophistic. In discussing Plutarch's account of the aulete's performance, and the responses that it occasions, Barker argues that he uses the story to stage a dialogue between competing ways of conceptualizing musical performance, using Platonic and Aristotelian intertexts to guide readers' understanding of the issues at stake. This chapter exemplifies a sociotextual approach to the representation of music that has greatly illuminated the interpretative conditions within which ancient listeners operated.[42] In explicating the intertextual sophistication of Plutarch's narrative, Barker's reading shows that musical performances still

[39] Below p. 177.
[40] For discussion see Destrée (this volume) 183–4.
[41] See p. 201. [42] Wilson (1999) is exemplary.

carried a powerful ideological charge in later antiquity. The critical terms within which such performances were conceptualized were subject to debate in ways that continued and extended the debates explored by Peponi and Destrée.

More oblique, but no less culturally significant, relationships between music and literature are to the fore in James Porter's discussion of sound in Hellenistic literary theory, which traces the attempts of Cicero, Longinus, and the Hellenistic *κριτικοί* to theorize the musicality of language itself, the quality of which, for the 'euphonist' theorists at least, was the determining criterion of literary value. On Porter's reading of these critics, poetically realized sound is a paradoxical phenomenon, located in a series of concrete moments, yet producing an overall structure that cannot be grasped in terms of any one of these instances. As well as illustrating the vital importance of a materially-focused auditory aesthetics to Hellenistic literary thought,[43] Porter brings out another dimension of music's cultural importance by stressing 'the common sources of literary and rhetorical criticism in the ancient theory of music and of poetry as music'.[44]

Taken as a whole, this volume emphasizes the variety of musical effects at work in ancient poetic texts and the productive volatility of music's place in intellectual culture throughout antiquity. As well as building on previous scholarship, it sketches some new directions for research: much remains to be said about the connection between rhythm and meaning, about the influence of music on literary criticism, and the methodological problems involved in conceptualizing the emotive effects of ancient music, to name but a few of the areas ventured into here. Although they develop fresh insights into their subject matter, and suggest approaches that could be developed further, the analyses collected here do not aim at being methodologically programmatic. Indeed two implications of the volume are that ancient 'musical texts' and texts about music require multiple and overlapping interpretative approaches which draw on various intellectual disciplines, and that such approaches need to be closely attuned to the specific texts (and contexts) that they address. Many

[43] Considerations of performance are also important to Porter's treatment of the 'euphonist' literary critics, whom he sees as motivated in part by the need to reanimate performance texts that readers of later times accessed primarily through books.

[44] Pp. 216.

readers will doubtless find these formulations unsurprising: stated thus, these interpretative parameters reflect an approach to cultural phenomena that has been prevalent across various regions of literary and cultural criticism in recent decades, and would probably be endorsed by most scholars as guidelines for all manner of interpretative practices.

Yet this volume also suggests that ancient music poses challenges to this model. While some texts can be productively examined with an analysis that sees music as a handmaiden to language, there are other moments at which musical texts require a recalibration of established literary critical procedures. Various chapters in this volume highlight points at which 'multiple and overlapping interpretative approaches' do not necessarily entail the development of coherently heterogeneous readings, but serve to focus attention either on tensions within the texts under discussion, or gaps in our means of understanding them. Analyses such as those in the second half of the volume demonstrate that the ancients wrestled with these tensions and gaps just as much as modern readers, and the questions opened up by close engagement with poetic texts suggest that more work remains to be done in articulating modes of criticism that will do justice to the complexity of ancient musico-poetic culture.

Partly because of the range of the material it covers, therefore, and partly because of the varying interpretative challenges posed by its subjects, this volume does not offer unitary, much less straightforward, answers to the questions posed at the outset. Instead, it constitutes a series of interpretative gestures that both clarify and complicate the terms on which such questions might be approached. Readers will note that the essays employ a wide range of literary critical, musicological, and socio-cultural modes of analyses; each entails problems and opportunities that should stimulate further debate. Thematic diversity is also apparent. The centrality of music to Greek cultural life means that its influence is felt across genres, practices, and contexts: its imagined echo in the lawcourt and scholar's study is no less powerful than its fully realized sound in the theatre or symposium, and its affective range in relation to different types of subject-matter matches the generic variety of Greek literature itself. In tackling this variety of material and methodology, the volume offers templates with which scholars across a range of disciplines might think further about how consideration of music could enrich their engagement with ancient culture.

Part I

Interpretation

1

Epicentric Tonality and the Greek Lyric Tradition

John C. Franklin

In 1996, as a doctoral candidate at University College London, I set out to compare Greek and Indic music terminology.[1] I had learned some basics from West's recent *Ancient Greek Music* (1992), including the early importance of the lyre and its middle string (μέση) that served as some kind of tuning and/or tonal center. I had also encountered an old proposal by Fox-Strangways that some early Indian ideas—including a central scale-degree *madhyama* and microtonal intonations—might be cognate with those of Greece via Indo-European inheritance.[2] But I soon stumbled upon a more recent suggestion that *madhyama* could rather be a relic of a *Mesopotamian* tuning and/or tonal conception that featured a complete diatonic/heptatonic tuning cycle.[3] This system, reconstructed from a handful of relevant tablets by Kilmer, Gurney, and others mainly between 1960 and 1970, went back to the Old Babylonian period (*c.*2000–1600) and

[1] This paper derives from three talks: 'The Epicentric Arrangement of the Archaic Heptachord', Ionian University, Corfu, Greece (7/2007); '*The Middle Muse:* An Overdue Book', *Music and Text in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, June 29–30, 2013); 'East Faces of Early Greek Music', American Philological Association annual meeting, MOISA panel (1/2015).

[2] Fox-Strangways (1914) 142.

[3] Kilmer (1971) suggested several parallels to specific Sanskrit terms which, as far as I know, have yet to be addressed (though the possible relevance of *madhyama* was noted by Widdess (1995)). The best general discussion I have found of a potential Indo-Mesopotamian link is Picken (1975) 601ff.

beyond to Sumerian tradition.[4] I immediately shifted my comparative study to these texts, and eventually argued (2002b) for vestigial echoes of the Mesopotamian system in Greek lyre practice of the Archaic period (*c.*750–500), aspects of which can be deduced from later sources.[5] I also proposed an historical and cultural scenario in several stages for this transmission and the subsequent evolution of what I saw as a syncretism with inherited Greek musical traditions (especially epic).[6] But despite a quick contract with Oxford for a monograph called *The Middle Muse*,[7] further research and feedback from colleagues soon convinced me that my historical apparatus was inadequate and inaccurate at several junctures. Wishing to provide credible context(s) that would bolster, not undermine, the technical arguments, I began to examine various historical and cultural 'moments' in more detail—a process that has lasted fifteen years, culminating in a study of divinized temple-instruments in the ancient Near East and their imprint on Kinyras, the mythological lyre-king of pre-Greek Cyprus.[8] With this I can finally return to the technical material with which I began—although here too significant revisions are now necessary given recent advances in our understanding of Greek tonal history, thanks especially to the intervening work of Stefan Hagel.[9]

The present paper is a stopgap until I complete *The Middle Muse*, or a summary statement should that never come to pass.[10] I shall first

[4] For the key texts and early reconstruction, see esp. Kilmer (1965); Gurney (1968); Wulstan (1968); Kilmer (1971); further subsequent literature reviewed in Kilmer (1997); to the corpus one must now add the heptatonic 'star-text': see references in Franklin (2015) 41 n. 148. Sumerian background: Kilmer (1965) 261; Shaffer (1981) 82–3; Krispijn (1990); Gurney (1994).

[5] The preliminary comparison of Lasserre (1988) was marred by faulty arguments and cursory knowledge of the literature, often relying on outdated texts and very speculative musicological interpretations (more detailed critique in Franklin (2002b) *passim*). Nevertheless Lasserre did offer some interesting suggestions, and concluded merely with an appeal for honest reinterpretation of early Greek musical history.

[6] Franklin (2002b). [7] For the title, see further p. 44.

[8] Franklin (2015). [9] Hagel (2009).

[10] In the latter bittersweet event, Chapters 1, 6, and 8–10 of Franklin (2002b) contain technical interpretative arguments not developed elsewhere, and would still be worth consulting (despite many adjustments I would now make). The remaining chapters are now largely obsolete; but since they are unfortunately published online (by UCL), I would redirect potential readers to later papers that elaborated, refined, and corrected ideas worth keeping. For Chapter 2, see Franklin (2002c); Franklin (2008); Franklin (2012) with historical modifications sketched in the present paper; Chapter 3, Franklin (2004) and Franklin (2011); Chapter 4, Franklin (2006) and

present the key primary texts and arguments that I believe make some connection between the early Greek lyre tradition and the Mesopotamian tonal/tuning system unavoidable.[11] I shall then briefly sketch the evolution of my approach to the historical situation, surveying the contextual studies alluded to above and offering new suggestions. A closing discussion will relate the 'Middle Muse' to this volume's central topic—music and text.

EPICENTRIC TONALITY BETWEEN GREECE AND MESOPOTAMIA

The discovery of a very early diatonic tuning/tonal system in Mesopotamia fatally undermined previous a priori evolutionary assumptions about Greek tonal history. Winnington-Ingram's *Mode in Ancient Greek Music* (1936) had established the belief—still accepted by West, Barker, and others when I began—that the earliest tunings of which we hear were 'defective', the Greeks not 'achieving' until the late fifth or fourth century the complete diatonic conception that underlies the Perfect System and the Aristoxenian pitch keys (*τόνοι*).[12] But the Mesopotamian texts now showed that a complete diatonic cycle had been elaborated 1500 years and more earlier. This comprised seven diatonic/heptatonic tunings that could be generated by tuning string-pairs to resonant/consonant[13] 'fifths' (3:2) and 'fourths' (4:3), and knowledge of how to convert one tuning to the next by 'clearing' the unique tritone in each (that is, adjusting one of its strings to another fifth or fourth, thus 'displacing' the tritone to a new location). It is essential to realize that, while the tablets may give the impression of systematic

Franklin (2015); Chapter 5, Franklin (2003); Chapter 7, Franklin (2002d); Franklin (2002c) 446–9; Franklin (2003) 303–6; Franklin (2005) 13–22.

[11] It is not possible here to discuss fully all relevant textual and interpretative issues involving these tablets. For my own assumptions, if not otherwise clarified here, please see Franklin (2002b) especially Chapter 6.

[12] Winnington-Ingram (1936); cf. Franklin (2002d) 669–72.

[13] 'Consonant' is derived from Latin *consonans*, a calque for Greek *σύμφωνος*. By a convention going back to Aristoxenus, the word was applied only to the 3:2 'fifth' and 4:3 'fourth'. But these stand at the head of a continuum of such relationships (5:4, 6:5, 7:6, and so on), for which the more general 'resonant' is emerging as a scholarly term: see Crocker (1997); Franklin (2005) 12–13; Hagel (2009) *passim*.

theoretical elaboration, the whole cycle is derived quite naturally from a few definite physical/auditory phenomena, each with its own unique sonic identity (Figure 1.1).[14] The experience of sound was fundamental, as we are reminded by the Greek terms for consonance, *σύμφωνος* ('speaking together') and the early alternative *συνᾷδον* ('singing together', Heraclit. 10 D-K, etc.).[15] In Greece too, I argued, diatonic lyre tunings, again created through constructing consonant intervals—what Aristoxenus calls 'taking through consonance' (*ἡ λῆψις διὰ συμφωνίας*),[16] though the aural experience was expressed from earliest times by a metaphor of 'joinery' (*ἁρμονία* and relations)[17]—must have been much older than generally believed.[18] First, Aristoxenus, drawing on a musicians' tradition, explicitly states that the diatonic was the oldest and most natural of the *γένη*.[19] Second, his 'first principle'

[14] For Greek perceptions of the diatonic as the 'most natural' tuning, see Franklin (2002d) 672–3.

[15] For stimulating observations on the primacy of sound, see Crocker (1997)—in my view a seminal methodological essay despite the scathing response of Gurney/West (1998). Note that in both Greek and English the terms 'fourth' (*ἡ* [sc. *συμφωνία*] *διὰ τεττάρων*) and 'fifth' (*ἡ διὰ πέντε*) involve a revealing *hysteron proteron*, referring as they do to the number of scale degrees comprised by each when the process of tuning by 'fifths' and 'fourths' is taken to its ultimate, diatonic/heptatonic conclusion. But these intervals have an aural identity anterior to and independent of that process (Figure 1.1). There is no Akkadian equivalent for 'fifth' and 'fourth' (each unique pair of strings standing three, four, five, or six strings apart, counting inclusively, has its own name in CBS 10996 and the Retuning Text UET VII 74: Crocker (1978)).

[16] For *ἡ λῆψις διὰ συμφωνίας*, see Aristox. *Harm.* 55–6; cf. Eucl. *Sect. Can.* 17 (162.1ff.); Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 38.1145b–c; Ptol. *Harm.* 1.16 (39.14ff.); 2.1 (44.1ff.); 2.9 (62.1ff.); Aristid. Quint. 2.14 (80.2–3).

[17] For *ἁρμονία* etc., see further pp. 31–2. *Ζεύγνυμι* and its relations are also relevant, e.g. *διάξευξις* ('disjunction' of tetrachords) and even the lyre's *ζυγόν*, since the resonant/consonant tuning of strings, arrayed along the yoke, constituted a further aspect of the instrument's physical 'harmony'; cf. the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 50–1 (*καὶ πήχεις ἐνέθηκ', ἐπὶ δὲ ζυγὸν ἤραρεν ἀμφοῖν, / ἑπτὰ δὲ συμφωνοὺς ὀίων ἐτανύσσατο χορδάς*); Aristophanes' description of the old, drunken Cratinus as a worn-out, slack-stringed lyre with gaping joints/'harmonies' (*ἐκπιπτουσῶν τῶν ἠλέκτρων καὶ τοῦ τόνου οὐκέτ' ἐνόντος / τῶν θ' ἁρμονιῶν διαχασκουσῶν*, *Eq.* 532–3); and probably Timoth. *Pers.* fr. 15.224–225 (*PMG* 791), of Terpander. *Διάτονος* itself may accord with the construction metaphor, as the word, along with *διατόν(α)ιον*, was also used of 'bonding courses in a wall', joists, and the like; cf. LSJ s.vv. with references, adding *Inscriptions de Délos* I/3 290 and III/5 1417. Carpentry also seems to underlie Akk. *pitnu*, for which see Kilmer (1965) 262–5; Kilmer (1971) 132; Franklin (2002d) 677.

[18] Further technical argument: Franklin (2002c); Franklin (2002d); Franklin (2003) 303–6; Franklin (2005) 13–22.

[19] Aristox. *Harm.* 19: *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ πρεσβύτατον αὐτῶν θετέον τὸ διάτονον, πρῶτον γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις προστυγχάνει, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ χρωματικόν, τρίτον δὲ καὶ ἀνώτατον τὸ ἐναρμόνιον, τελευταίῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ μόλις*



Figure 1.1. Oscilloscope readings of two tones at unison, the 3:2 'fifth', the 4:3 'fourth', and so on through the 9:8 wholetone (Gk *τόνος*).

(*ἀρχή*) of 'continuity' or 'cohesion' (*συνέχεια*) required that a properly formulated heptatonic scale (*μέλος ἡρμοσμένον*) conform to minimum diatonic conditions by having every note respond by a consonant fourth and/or fifth to a note four or five degrees away; since this principle is most consistently valid with diatonic tuning, the rule must be *derived from* diatony, which therefore stands in relation to the chromatic and enharmonic as genus to species (even if Aristoxenian theory itself used

μετὰ πολλοῦ πόνου συνεθίζεται ἡ αἴσθησις ('Now, the diatonic must be put down as the first and oldest of them [sc. the *genera*], for the nature of man comes across it first, and afterwards the chromatic, and third and finally the enharmonic, for it is the last to which the perception grows accustomed—and with difficulty at that, after much labor'). That this idea is not merely a priori speculation (Nagy 1990: 100–1) is shown by Aristoxenos' appeal to musical tradition (*ὑπολαμβάνεται ὑπὸ τῶν μουσικῶν*) in deriving the enharmonic of Olympos from the diatonic (fr. 83 = Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1134f–1135b). See further Franklin (2002d) 672–3 (with other sources for the diatonic as 'most natural'), 691 (Olympos); Franklin (2002c) 447–9.

the term *γένος* for all three).[20] To put it another way, the 'family' of which the three *γένη* are parallel offspring is heptatony; but diatony is the heptatony par excellence and imposes its 'continuous/cohesive' structure upon the other two *γένη*. *Συνέχεια* must be understood against the unambiguous literary and iconographical evidence that lyres were normally equipped with seven strings in the Archaic period, with Mycenaean and even Minoan antecedents.[21]

While diatonic tuning may seem natural enough to have arisen independently in Greece and Mesopotamia, further parallels are, in my view, too specific to be coincidence. These are fourfold, and reveal a consistent theoretical and practical perspective that I would call epicentric tonality. On the Mesopotamian side (Figure 1.2):

1. The strings are named and numbered in relation to a central pitch, that is 1–2–3–4–5–4b–3b–2b–1b (where 'b' reflects the qualification 'of the back strings').[22]

[20] Aristox. *Harm.* 29: *ὑποκείσθω δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑξῆς κειμένων φθόγγων κατὰ μέλος ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ἤτοι τοὺς τετάρτους [τοῖς τετράσι] διὰ τεττάρων συμφωνεῖν ἢ τοὺς πέμπτους [τοῖς πέντε] διὰ πέντε ἢ ἀμφοτέρως* ('And let it also be laid down that, for notes which are "continuous" along a scale [*μέλος*, sc. *ἡρμοσμένον*]—in each genus—either every fourth note is consonant at a fourth, or every fifth note is consonant at a fifth, or both'). *Harm.* 54: *οὐ δεῖ δ' ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αὔταρκες τὸ εἰρημένον πρὸς τὸ ἐμμελῶς συγκεῖσθαι τὰ συστήματα ἐκ τῶν διαστημάτων· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει συμφωνούντων τῶν φθόγγων κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἀριθμοὺς ἐκμελῶς τὰ συστήματα συνιστάναι, ἀλλὰ τούτου μὴ ὑπαρχόντος οὐδὲν ἔτι γίγνεται τῶν λοιπῶν ὄφελος. θετέον οὖν τοῦτο πρῶτον εἰς ἀρχῆς τάξιν οὗ μὴ ὑπαρχόντος ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ἡρμοσμένον* ('It is essential to realize that the aforementioned [sc. principle] does not guarantee that systems will be properly assembled from intervals. For nothing stops a tuning from being put together improperly even when the notes are consonant according to the aforementioned numbers [i.e. every note being consonant by a fourth or fifth or both with every fourth or fifth note from itself]; but if this condition is not fulfilled, there is no use bothering about the rest: and so this must be made the first principle, without the fulfilment of which the attuned scale [*τὸ ἡρμοσμένον*, sc. *μέλος*] is destroyed'). See further Franklin (2002c), esp. 446–7; cf. Franklin (2002d) 670, 673; Franklin (2005) 19; as prefigured in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 51–2, see Franklin (2003) 303–6.

[21] For literary sources, see Franklin (2002d) 686 and notes 44–5, 47; Franklin (2005). For the issue of heptatonic continuity in the Aegean from the Late Bronze Age, see further pp. 27–35.

[22] This is most clearly seen in the text U.3011 which, though a Neo-Babylonian tablet from Ur, was shown to reflect much older tradition by the duplicate fragment N.4782 (Nippur, *c.*1800–1500): Kilmer (1960); Kilmer (1965); official publication as UET VII 126 (Gurney (1974); Finkel/Civil (1982); cf. Kilmer (1997).



Figure 1.2. Graphic representation of the Mesopotamian tuning cycle UET VII 74.

2. A sequence of seven diatonic tunings, attested by the 'Retuning Text' (UET VII 74, Ur, *c.*2000–1600) and several others,[23] begins from one called 'middle', which is itself tuned beginning from the middle string.[24]
3. This middle string is the only one which does not change in pitch throughout the complete heptatonic/diatonic cycle.[25]

[23] The seven tunings' order is also found in a Middle Assyrian (*c.*1100) song-catalogue from Assur (VAT 10101 col. viii.45–52), which matched the surviving sequence in the Retuning Text and permitted the latter's restoration. For this tablet, see Ebeling (1919) no. 158; Ebeling (1922); Kilmer (1965) 267; Kilmer (1971) 138; Bayer (2014) 24, 32–5.

[24] Kümmel (1970) perceived the crucial relationship between the tuning names and the named string/interval from which each tuning is generated via 'taking through consonance' (at least theoretically, that is, within the system's own nomenclature).

[25] This assertion remains valid even if the Retuning Text is to be restored beyond the seven distinct tunings, which would then require the central string to be raised or lowered (for this issue, see Gurney (1968) 232–3; Wulstan (1968) 221; Duchesne-Guillemin (1969) 12; Gurney (1994), 102ff.). For it would remain the case that the central string does *not* move across the seven standard tunings, which inevitably constitute a self-contained system, regardless of any further uses to which they were put.

4. In the one largely intact specimen of the Hurrian hymns from thirteenth-century Ugarit, which use a local form of the Mesopotamian (Akkadian) interval names somehow to map out harmonic progressions, the middle string (5) and two others (2, 4b) connected to it by a direct chain of consonance featured rather more prominently than the others.[26] This observation is crucial for establishing that the epicentric structure/nomenclature of strings, intervals, and tunings was no mere artifact of theory and/or scribal tradition, *but had some bearing on performance*.[27] This deduction is corroborated by the Hurrianized form of the Akkadian terms, which indicates a considerable period of oral transmission;[28] and the fact that this collection

[26] On the 'downwards' reading that is now generally accepted, i.e. with string one as highest in pitch, the relevant pitches of the *nid qabli* tuning may be represented as 3b(F)-4b(**G**)-5(**A**)-4(B)-3(c)-2(**d**)-1(e), with lowercase letters representing a higher octave (it is worth pointing out, however, that on the old 'upwards' reading, strings 1-2-3-4-5-4b-3b in *qablitu* tuning would yield the conjunct heptachord of Greek theory). For a thorough and subtle statistical analysis of interval frequency in the Hurrian hymns and the modal/tonal implications of interval *sequences*, see Hagel 2005b (with references in 297 n. 27 for the 'downward' interpretation). My own more Cromagnon count of interval and string frequency, prepared for a lecture in February 2003 (at CAARI), yielded the following figures (those marked with * leave out 10 *ishartu* as a possible scribal error [the figure may seem anomalously high]; strings 2b and 1b are not separately counted, as being octave-repetitions of 1 and 2 [as seen in the Retuning Text and CBS 10996]). Interval Frequency with percentage of attested total: *qablitu* (2-5): 3+3+3+4+2 = 15 = 20.82% • *shalshatum* (1-6): 2+2+4+4+2+2=16 = 22.21% • *ishartu* (2-6): 10 = 13.88% • *seru* (7-5): 1+2+2+1+1+1=8 = 11.10% • *rebutu* (2-7): 1+2+1+1+2 = 7 = 9.72% • *titur ishartum* (3-5): 2+4 = 6 = 8.33% • *kitme* (6-3): 2+1+1 = 4 = 5.55%. • *sirdu* (4-6): 1+1 = 2 = 2.78% • *nid qabli* (4-1): 1+1 = 2 = 2.78% • *embubu* (3-7): 1 = 1.39% • *titur qabli* (2-4): 1 = 1.39%. String Frequency with percentage of attested total (derived from Interval Frequency: each interval consists of two strings, but the same string can appear in more than one interval): **2**: 15+7+[10] +1 = 33 (*23) = 22.92% (*18.55%) • **5**: 15+8+6 = 29 = 20.14% (*23.70%) • **4b** [10]+2 +16+4 = 32 (*22) = 22.22% (*17.74%) • **3b**: 7+8+1 = 16 = 11.11% (*12.90%) • **1**: 16+2 = 18 = 12.5% (*14.51%) • **3**: 6+1+4 = 11 = 7.64% (*8.87%) • **4**: 2+2+1 = 5 = 3.47% (*4.03%). Note the infrequency of *nid qabli*, though that is the interval from which one would (theoretically) begin to achieve this tuning. Instead, the most prominent ('repeated') strings are 5, 2, and 4b—a set that may be compared with the common disjunctive tunings of Greek tradition, where the central string (*μέση*) is separated by a whole-tone from its neighbour *παραμέση*, as are strings 5 and 4b in *nid qabli* tuning; similarly 2 and 5 are separated by a fourth, as are *μέση* and *ὑπάτη*, the lower boundary of early Greek lyre-tuning. In other words, the tones of the consonant framework are emphasized, as is not surprising.

[27] For the Ugaritian hymns, see esp. Hagel (2005b).

[28] Hagel (2005b) 293 n. 22.

of hymns was archived according to the practical criterion of tuning, and therefore saw active liturgical use at Ugarit.[29]

These features find the following counterparts in the early Greek lyre tradition:

1. an epicentric arrangement inherent in the string names themselves, most explicitly acknowledged by Aristotle (Figure 1.3),[30] but equally implicit in the use of 'highest, middle, and last', by Plato and others, as a shorthand for the complete stringing of the lyre;[31]
2. statements in the Aristotelian *Problems* and later Dio Chrysostom that the middle string (*μέση*) was the first to be tuned and the others were tuned to it (for the *Koine Hormasia*, see p. 41);[32]
3. that *μέση* was the only string that, if its pitch were changed after the instrument was tuned, would spoil the overall attunement (*τὸ ἡρμόσθαι*);[33]

[29] The recovered hymns, so far as we know, were all in the *nid qabli* tuning. The same organizing principle is seen in the song catalogue VAT 10101 mentioned above. Cf. Franklin (2015) 97 (where *qablītu* in n. 47 is a lapse).

[30] Arist. *Metaph.* 4.1018b26–29: *τὰ δὲ κατὰ τάξιν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πρός τι ἓν ὡρισμένον διέστηκε κατά τινα λόγον, οἷον παραστάτης τριτοστάτου πρότερον καὶ παρανήτη νήτης· ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κορυφαῖος ἔνθα δὲ ἡ μέση ἀρχή* ('Other things [sc. are called prior or posterior] with respect to arrangement. These are whatever things stand at intervals according to some numbering with reference to some defined point. For instance, the second-man-in-line is before the third-man-in-line, and *παρανήτη* is before *νήτη*: in the one case the chorus-leader is the starting point (*ἀρχή*), in the other the middle-string (*μέση*)'. My diagram favours *παραμέση* over *τρίτη*: for this issue, see n. 73.

[31] Pl. *Rep.* 4.443d: *ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα* ('Just as three boundaries of tuning (*ἁρμονία*)—*νεάτη*, *ὑπάτη*, and *μέση*—and whatever others happen to be between them'). For this trope, see further Zaminer (1984).

[32] Dio Chrys. 68.7: *ὥσπερ ἐν λύρᾳ τὸν μέσον φθόγγον καταστήσαντες ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτον ἁρμόζονται τοὺς ἄλλους· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδεμίαν οὐδέποτε ἁρμονίαν ἀποδείξουσιν κτλ.* ('And as in the lyre, one must establish the middle tone, and then tune the others to it; otherwise, they will never display any *ἁρμονία*'). For the relevant Aristotelian *Problems*, see nn. 33 and 34.

[33] Ps.-Arist. *Prob.* 19.36: *Διὰ τί, ἐὰν μὲν ἡ μέση κινηθῇ, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χορδαὶ ἠχοῦσι φθεγγόμεναι, ἐὰν δὲ αὖ ἡ μὲν μένῃ τῶν δ' ἄλλων τις κινηθῇ, κινηθεῖσα μόνη φθέγγεται; ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἡρμόσθαι ἐστὶν ἁπάσαις, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μέσην ἁπάσαις, καὶ ἡ τάξις ἡ ἑκάστης ἤδη δι' ἐκείνην; ἀρθέντος οὖν τοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ ἡρμόσθαι καὶ τοῦ συνέχοντος οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν. μιᾶς δὲ ἀναρμόστου οὔσης, τῆς δὲ μέσης μενούσης, εὐλόγως τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐκλειπόμενον· ταῖς γὰρ ἄλλαις ὑπάρχει τὸ ἡρμόσθαι* ('Why is it that, if *μέση* is changed, the other strings also sound spoiled, whereas if *μέση* remains while one of the other strings is changed, only the changed string is spoiled? Is it



Figure 1.3. Epicentric arrangement of traditional Greek heptachord, according to Aristotle.

Drawn by Bo Lawergren and originally published in B. Lawergren (1998) 'Distinctions among Canaanite, Philistine, and Israelite Lyres, and their Global Lyrical Contexts', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 309, 41–68.

4. that μέση was often repeated in 'worthy melodies' (τὰ χρηστὰ μέλη)[34]—a loaded expression invoking traditional practice anterior to the fifth-century New Music.[35]

because for all the strings being in tune consists of having some relation towards μέση—and the pitch of each is already [sc. established] through that string. Thus, when you take away the cause of their being-in-tune and that which holds them together, it no longer appears to be the same. But if one of the strings is out of tune while μέση maintains its pitch, it makes sense for that string alone to be left out of the tuning, since the being-in-tune persists for the others').

[34] Ps.-Arist. *Prob.* 19.20: *Διὰ τί, ἐὰν μέν τις τὴν μέσην κινήσῃ ἡμῶν, ἁρμόσας τὰς ἄλλας χορδάς, καὶ χρῆται τῷ ὀργάνῳ, οὐ μόνον ὅταν κατὰ τὸν τῆς μέσης γένηται φθόγγον, λυπεῖ καὶ φαίνεται ἀνάρμοστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην μελῳδίαν· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν λιχανὸν ἤ τινα ἄλλον φθόγγον, τότε φαίνεται διαφέ ρειν μόνον, ὅταν κἀκείνῃ τις χρῆται; ἢ εὐλόγως τοῦτο συμ βαίνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ χρηστὰ μέλη πολλάκις τῇ μέσῃ χρῆται, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ πυκνὰ πρὸς τὴν μέσην ἀπαντῶσι, κἂν ἀπέλθωσι, ταχὺ ἐπανέρχονται, πρὸς δὲ ἄλλην οὕτως οὐδεμίαν* ('Why is it that, if someone moves μέση, after tuning the other strings, and uses the instrument, it grates and sounds out of tune, not only when it comes to μέση, but also during the rest of the melody; yet if someone changes λιχανός or some other note, then the instrument appears to be out of tune only when someone uses that string? Is this only to be expected? For all good melodies make frequent use of μέση, and all the good composers . . . if they depart from μέση, quickly return to it, as they do to no other string').

[35] For this part of the historical framework, see Franklin (2013) with further references. The surviving Greek technical tradition relates mainly to developments originating with the New Music: Hagel (2009) as a whole. For the movement more

While these parallel features are certainly not *identical*, I believe they are sufficiently close, and too particular, to be dismissed as coincidence. Indeed the hypothesis is made more believable precisely by several major differences—the lack of any counterpart to the Akkadian interval names, the systematic dichordal analysis to which they were attached, and the nine-stringed Sumerian expression of the heptatonic tonal phenomena versus the early Greek insistence on seven, that magical minimum[36]—since one should hardly expect complete correspondence between two musical cultures separated by so many miles and centuries. We must allow for considerable vagaries of transmission and tradition in several cultural/historical stages, within what must have been largely oral/aural environments.[37]

HISTORICAL SKETCH

Anyone who accepts *some* connection between the Mesopotamian tuning/tonal system and the early Greek lyric tradition is left pondering the historical and cultural circumstances that might account for this startling phenomenon—not to mention its implications for literary and mythological parallels between the two cultural spheres, especially those relating to or deriving from cult traditions.

generally, including socio-political and literary dimensions, Richter (1968); Wilson (1999); Wilson (2003); Csapo (2004); Power (2010) 500–54; D'Angour (2011) 202–6; LeVen (2014).

[36] The Retuning Text (in which strings 1 and 2 are doubled at the octave by 2b and 1b) and CBS 10996 (which features only strings 1–2–3–4–5–4b–3b and assigns them numbers between 1–7) show that the heptatonic nature of the tonal phenomena was clearly apprehended. Moreover the Akkadian name of string 4, 'Ea-Creator', being the only one distinguished by a divine epithet, seems to emphasize its position within a stretch of seven strings, not nine (Franklin 2006: 63). Carefully rendered seven-stringed harps in terracotta plaques of Old Babylonian date (Rashid 1984: 80–8 and figs. 62–4, 67, 72–5) indicate that, around when the Retuning Text was composed and/or copied, musicians were well aware that seven strings were sufficient for effecting all tuning phenomena of the diatonic cycle. Seven is indeed the minimum number for doing so. Considerations of 'economy' might thus account in part for the seven-stringed lyres of the Mycenaean and Archaic periods. But we must remember that the number seven enjoyed a kind of prestige in the Aegean lyric tradition, with clear Near Eastern parallels: Franklin (2006) 54–63; Franklin (2015) 40–1 and *passim*.

[37] For the oral/aural dimension of cult lyric at Ugarit, in which the Hurrian hymns with notation must have seen active liturgical use, see Franklin (2015) 97, 119, 448–9.

One must appreciate at the outset that much of the key Greek evidence either pre-dates Aristoxenus (our earliest substantially extant technical authority) or comes from sources like Plato, Aristotle, the Aristotelian *Problems*, and later Pythagoreanizing writers that perpetuate older traditional conventions against the more professional elaborations that began with the New Music in the later fifth century. In other words, we are dealing with an early stratum of Greek lyric practice that provided the foundation for, and persisted on the margins of, the complex apparatus of keys and notation with which the extant theorists are mainly concerned, and which was largely stimulated by advances in aulos music and design.[38]

Under the spell of Burkert,[39] I originally looked to the Orientalizing period (*c.*750–650) as a likely time for Greek exposure to the Mesopotamian diatonic/heptatonic system, and focused on a well-known fragment attributed to Terpander, the historical lyre-singer of seventh-century Lesbos who—as often with Archaic poets—became a magnet for various legends and traditional verse.[40] The couplet is evidently a professional transitional formula between two types of singing, addressed to an unnamed god—Apollo is an attractive candidate, but the verses may be usefully non-committal—for generic use in agonistic contexts:

> *σοὶ δ' ἡμεῖς τετράγηρυν ἀποστέρξαντες* (*v.l.* *ἀποστρέψαντες*) *ἀοιδὴν* / *ἑπτατόνῳ φόρμιγγι νέους κελαδήσομεν ὕμνους* (fr. 4 Gostoli).
>
> Putting aside four-voiced song, we shall sing / for you new hymns on the heptatonic phorminx.

West, building on L. Deubner, had used this fragment to support his theory of a four-stringed phorminx as the normal instrument of epic singers.[41] Accepting West's basic premise that *τετράγηρυς ἀοιδή* referred to 'epic melodization',[42] and the ancient interpretation[43] that *ἑπτάτονος φόρμιγξ* marked an innovation by 'Terpander' (or his age), I argued that the couplet reflected from and epitomized a real historical development—Greek exposure to a tradition of heptatonic/

[38] See now especially Hagel (2009); cf. Franklin (2002d) 673–93; Franklin (2013).
[39] Burkert (1992).
[40] For Terpander generally, see Gostoli (1990) (Introduction); Power (2010) (Part III). Traditional attributions: Beecroft (2008).
[41] Deubner (1929); Deubner (1930); West (1981).
[42] For this generic/terminological paradox, see Franklin (2004) 244–5; Franklin (2011) 532.
[43] Str. 13.2.4; Cleonid. 12 (*MSG* 202.8ff.)

diatonic tonality deriving from Mesopotamia. But there was an immediate complication, since seven-stringed lyres were also regularly found in Minoan and Mycenaean iconography. Attempting to harmonize all this evidence, I suggested that diatonic/heptatonic music, presumably on a Mesopotamian model, had first arrived to the Aegean in the Late Bronze Age, with its far-flung palace networks and exchanges of cultic personnel (since the Minoan and Mycenaean centres did form the western reach of this international economy).[44] The foreign artform disappeared, I proposed—like literacy—with the collapse of Mycenaean palace culture, leaving the field to a parallel, inherited tradition of epic lyre-singing (and non-heptatonic instruments) like that envisioned by West. The knowledge of diatony/heptatony was then re-imported (on the hypothesis) in the Orientalizing period, and the development was later assigned by popular memory to the famous Terpander as πρῶτος εὑρετής.

But I soon became dissatisfied with this double-importation scheme. Following S. Morris and others who, at that time, privileged Levantine avenues of influence over the so-called *via Anatolica*,[45] I had somewhat perversely downplayed Terpander's attested connections with Lydia, looking further east to the Neo-Assyrian period, and with some vague idea that Cyprus might somehow be important. In my viva, however, Burkert emphasized Lydia's position at the terminus of the Persian royal road (itself going back to Neo-Assyrian and ultimately Hittite times). So I began investigating what I came to see as a well-defined Greco-Lydian musical movement, with Lesbos playing a pivotal role.[46] Key features, I argued, were Lydia's known status as an Assyrian client state in the seventh century and its emulation of/response to elite Assyrian culture, a phenomenon otherwise well attested on the Empire's periphery. The most conspicuous sign of Lydia's participation in what Sargon called 'A Feast of Music'[47]—an active blending of regional music traditions as part of a more complex cultural program under the *pax Assyriaca*—is its use of harps in military ensembles,[48] the only contemporary parallel for which is Assyrian practice. These data are to be coordinated with

[44] Liverani (1990) remains a good introduction.

[45] Morris (1992). For the revival of interest in the 'Anatolian route', see e.g. papers in Collins et al. (2008), and now the grand synthesis of Bachvarova (2016).

[46] Franklin (2008).

[47] For the expression, see references in Franklin (2008) 201 n. 3.

[48] Hdt. 1.17.

Archaic Greek emulation of the Lydian high life (ἁβροσύνη is a key word here) including a sudden vogue for harps, often mentioned by the Archaic poets; note especially the tradition that Terpander modeled his βάρβιτος (the tenor lyre often used in the symposium) on the Lydian harp, called πακτίς by some Greeks.[49] Also deriving largely from this movement, I proposed, is the custom of reclining that the Greek symposium adopted in the Archaic period.[50]

Despite pinpointing a specific moment of Greco-Mesopotamian musical contact, well defined geographically and chronologically—one in which, moreover, Terpander himself was implicated—I had begun to doubt that heptatonic instruments really died out at the end of the Bronze Age. First, a well-known shard from Chania (Crete) came from a *post-palatial* level, indicating that the heptatonic art could survive independently of the palaces.[51] One obvious conduit here is religious lyric, given the known persistence of various cults from the Mycenaean period (I would now see the famous Lesbian singers like Terpander, for example, as one eventual outcome of the process: see p. 34). Second, the earliest Archaic examples of seven-stringed lyres were found in areas of Bronze Age continuity and diaspora, for instance Athens and Smyrna. There were, besides, rich mythological traditions surrounding the seven-stringed lyre and its divine and semi-divine practitioners (Hermes, Apollo, Amphion, Cadmus, Orpheus, Linus). These too, like the Greek myth-cycles overall,[52] exhibit regional patterns consistent with Bronze Age roots and Dark Age continuity. In a preliminary collection I first encountered the rich—and very early (third–second millennium)—Near Eastern evidence for the divinization of chordophones and other musical instruments, including the *kinnāru* of Syro-Levantine tradition (whence Kinyras of Cyprus and, indirectly and later, King David).[53] These were often associated with royal cult and the symbolic development of music in royal ideology and ritual poetics.[54] These

[49] Pind. fr. 125.

[50] This idea has found approval in two recent studies of the Archaic symposium: Baughan (2013); Węcowski (2014).

[51] Chania XM 2308, Late Minoan III: Maas/Snyder 1989, 2, 16, and fig. 2b. I owe this observation to Stefan Hagel (Summer 2002).

[52] Nilsson (1932). [53] Franklin (2006).

[54] Franklin (2015) (for comments about the [probably vital] relationship between divinized chordophones and the mobility of the Mesopotamian tuning system, see 40–1, 59, and 171), with Heimpel (2015).

points, I believe, cement the Late Bronze Age as the most viable single period for the importation of the Mesopotamian diatonic/heptatonic cycle in a form recognizably akin to that found in the tablets. The hypothesis can be further supported, in a general way, by abundant evidence for a musical aspect to the artisan mobility that is otherwise well documented for the Bronze Age palaces.[55] More specific support comes from dialectal variants of the string-names, implied or attested for both Thebes[56] and Argos[57]; these, when combined with the dominant Attic-Ionic forms of the musiocographers, should suffice to establish some form of second-millennium inheritance. It is essential, I believe, that the word *ἁρμονία* derives from—indeed preserves—a Mycenaean form, as shown by the sonant nasal's realization as *-on-*, not *-an-*.[58] It may even be that *ἁρμονία*, in the broad sense of 'musical tuning' (versus a specific *ἁρμονία* that results), once implied a cyclical conception of diatony/heptatony, given that Mycenaean *a-mo* (eventually /*harmon*/), 'a thing joined'—a word that is structurally anterior to *ἁρμονία*—had in that period developed the specialized and prestigious sense 'wheel'. *Ἁρμονία* might thus have been the 'musical wheel', each 'turning' of which (*τρόπος*?) generated a specific *ἁρμονία*.

My new conviction that the Greek diatonic/heptatonic tradition reached back to the Bronze Age was strengthened by two studies of a

[55] Franklin (2007); Franklin (2015), especially Part One.

[56] Aeolic variants are implied by two of the legendary gate-names of seven-gated Thebes, rendered by various non-Theban authors (going back to Aeschylus and Euripides; Berman: 2007) as *νήϊται* or *νήϊσται* and *ὕψισται* (canonical *νήτη* and *ὑπάτη*). Cf. Arcadian *νήατος*, LSJ s.v. *νέατος*; Hesych. s.v. *νήϊστα· ἔσχατα, κατώτατα* (which makes better sense of string position than gates in a circle).

[57] A third-century BC dedication from Argos (*SEG* 30.382; Kritzas: 1980) mysteriously but definitely (*pace* Mojsik 2011: 68 n. 2) lists the three boundary strings that epitomize the epicentric nomenclature, along with another called 'first' (A: *Νήτας* / *Μέσσας* B: *Ὑπάτας* / *Πράτας*. For *Πράτα*, see further p. 40 n. 98). There is no reason to assume that these names were reverse-engineered from the Attic-Ionic forms; rather, they vouchsafe the traditional character of the 'Doric' forms *ὑπάτα*, *μέσσα*, *τρίτα*, and *νεάτα* in Philolaus fr. 6b DK.

[58] I owe this observation to R. Janko (communication, 1998); for the phonology, see Ruijgh (1961), 204–6; cf. Franklin (2006) 55 n. 42; Franklin (2011) 533. Although *ἁρμονία* is not certainly attested in the sense 'tuning' before Lasus of Hermione (fr. 1 *PMG* 702), it probably does appear a century earlier in Sapph. fr. 70.9–11 ( ]*αρμονίας* ὃ̣[|]*αθην χόρον*, *ἄα*[|]ὃ̣*ε λίγηα*.[, where *χόρον* and *λίγηα* support a 'lyric' context). Also relevant are early musical applications of the poetic *ἀραρίσκω*, with contexts including lyre-construction (*Hom.h.Merc.* 50 *ἤραρεν*, with Franklin 2002a: 9) and 'joining together' song (*Hom.h.Ap.* 164: *οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρηρεν ἀοιδή*, of the Delian chorus), obviously implying careful achievement of purposeful pitches.

more general historical nature. In a paper for the Oxford Dithyramb conference in 2004 I re-assessed the chronological evidence for the practice of modulation (*πολυφωνία*, *καμπαί*, etc.), often associated with the 'New Music' of the later fifth-century and contrasted in our sources with a more ancient heptatonic artform.[59] I concluded, from several poetic passages and historiographical notices, that the basic techniques could be traced back as early as the sixth or late seventh century (Sakadas/Klonas), with the New Musicians representing a tertiary stage of evolution (following the intermediate innovations of Lasus, Simonides, and Pindar). Conversely, the practice of adhering to a single *ἁρμονία* had special links to early lyre practice according to a passage of ps.-Plutarch that must derive from Hellanicus' work on the Lesbian *γένος* of lyrists (including Terpander).[60] This ancient assertion, which one might otherwise suspect of being an historiographical construct, is strikingly corroborated for the Bronze Age Near East by the Hurrian hymns from Ugarit and the Middle Assyrian song catalogue VAT 10101 (see p. 23 n.23 and p. 36). The Bronze Age inheritance of the Lesbian *γένος* is nicely encapsulated in myths that the lyre and/or head of Orpheus wafted to Lesbos after his death.[61]

[59] Franklin (2013).

[60] [Plut.] *De mus.* 1133b (cf. 1137a–b): 'In general, the style of citharody practiced by Terpander persisted even unto the time of Phrynis as one which was altogether simple. For in the old days it was not allowed to make citharodic compositions like today, nor to transfer the *ἁρμονίαι* and the rhythms (sc. beyond their proper boundaries). For in the *νόμοι* they guarded the proper tuning for each.' For a defence of this tradition, see further Franklin (2002d) 698–9; Franklin (2012) 743–8 and *passim* with Franklin (2013) 217–18.

[61] For these traditions generally, see Pfister (1909–12) 213 n. 213; Power (2010) 390–1. I suspect, from a rough reconstruction of Hellanicus' *Karneian Singers* (Franklin 2012, esp. 29–30), that the historiographical 'master-myth' of lyric history in [Nicom.] *Exc.* 1—beginning with Orpheus and ending with Terpander—is an epitome of the 'Bronze Age' section of Hellanicus' work. Note especially the embedded hexametric fragment about Amphion—*Ἀμφίωνα τὸν Θηβαῖον, ὃς ἐπὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ χόρδων ἑπταπύλους τὰς Θήβας ᾠκοδόμησεν* (cf. Franklin 2006: 56 n. 46), recalling that there existed a verse-edition of Hellanicus' history (*FGrH* 4 F 85a = Athen. 635e). A key piece of the puzzle that has been neglected here is Bryennius *Harmonica* 1.1.54. Hellanicus' history has apparently also left an imprint on writers of the generation following its publication; note especially the *sphragis* of Timotheus' *Persae*, and the flurry of interest in the expression 'Asiatic kithara' (Euripides, Aristophanes, et al.). I gave a paper on this called 'Euripides and the Archeology of Music', at the conference *Music in Greek Drama: History, Theory and Practice*, May 28–9, 2011, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA. See also Franklin (2010) 'Hellanicus of Lesbos'.

These points suggest a re-interpretation of the Greco-Lydian musical movement already discussed. Rather than taking Terpander as symbolizing a seventh-century *re-importation* of the Mesopotamian musical knowledge as documented by the *Bronze Age* tablets, I would now posit *secondary* Greco-Lydian exposure to *contemporary* Mesopotamian and specifically Assyrian practice (itself probably a cosmopolitan conglomerate). The sudden prominence in the Archaic poets of harps (typically polychordal and certainly deriving from the East),[62] the two sizes of *αὐλοί* used in Alyattes' military band and apparently shown in a Neo-Assyrian relief,[63] and the cultural prestige of the Lydian court in the seventh and sixth centuries—these points all suggest that the modulatory techniques which began to emerge at just this time in Greece (the dates of Klonas and Sakadas match the Lydian ascendancy) were at least partially stimulated by wider-ranging musical fashions of the day. Importantly Terpander himself is implicated in traditions of 'polyphonic' growth beyond the ancient heptachord, including the same alleged scandal at Sparta otherwise suffered by the New Musicians Phrynis and Timotheus.[64]

But what then becomes of the idea that Terpander invented the seven-stringed lyre, which after all rests upon the traditional verses attributed to him? Iconographic record aside, the fragment's 'four-voiced song', with its clear antithesis to 'heptatonic *φόρμιγξ*', remains unexplained. And the sheer number of three- and four-stringed lyres in Geometric art, combined with abundant ethnographic analogies for epic 'melodization' using only a few pitches,[65] does rather strongly suggest that heptatonic lyres were not universal in the Dark Age.[66] My current working hypothesis is that praise-singers of the

[62] Franklin 2008, 201 n. 5.

[63] BM 124922: Rashid 1984, 126 and fig. 145, with Cheng 2001, 35, who also notes that 'long pipes' may be distinguished in Akkadian texts.

[64] Terpander: Ps.-Arist. *Prob.* 19.32 (on 'Dorian *νήτη*', related to other *Problems* on the transition from seven to eight strings: 19.7, 25, 44, 47); Plut. *Inst. Lac.*17.238c–d; Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1140f. Certainly relevant is Timoth. *Pers.* fr. 15.224–5 (*PMG* 791), although the point is obscured by textual and interpretative uncertainty; for the issue, see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1903) 27, 68–9; Aron (1920) 33–4; Janssen (1984) 153ff.; Gostoli (1990) test. 46 and 113–14; Hordern (2002) 242–3; Ercoles (2010) 122–4; Power (2010) 338 n. 58. Phrynis: Plut. *De prof. virt.* 84a. Timotheus: Plut. *Inst. Lac.*17.238c–d. Athenaeus also refers to the three times the Spartans rescued music: Ath. 628b. For the traditions about Sparta, see further Power (2010) 172–3, 340–1, 536 and n. 347 with earlier bibliography.

[65] See e.g. papers in Reichl (2000); cf. Franklin (2004).

[66] So rightly West (1992b) 52.

Mycenaean period elaborated inherited diction and metrical forms into extended heroic narratives, using a formulaic melodic language (and perhaps already lyre-accompaniment) of limited tonal scope.[67] Simultaneously a local version of the Mesopotamian diatonic tuning system was cultivated primarily in cultic contexts, in emulation of palatial practice in the Near East (with the cosmopolitan, syncretic hymns from Ugarit a vital analogy). In the Iron Age these parallel arts died or developed locally—both may have flourished on Lesbos—and were eventually 'recombined' in the pan-Hellenic trends of the Archaic period.[68] Thus we may explain the tradition that Terpander dressed the '*ἔπη* of Homer' in the '*μέλη* of Orpheus',[69] an idea that seems implicit in the Terpandrian fragment itself, where the poet's *φόρμιγξ*—a word with strongly epic connotations, versus the equally ancient *λύρα*[70]—is startlingly described as *ἑπτάτονος*, a technical epithet with clear melic overtones and probably meaning precisely 'diatonic' at this time.[71] This theory of regionalism followed by reconvergence—which is after all a well-known dimension of the general historical sequence—would allow the ancient, inherited heptatony of the Lesbian *γένος* to appear as a genuine novelty in other parts of Greece, and so justify the traditional interpretation of the verses credited to Terpander. After all, his reported professional activity, outside the immediate Lesbo-Lydian environment, transpires at Delphi and Sparta, which would place him before Dorian and Central Greek audiences—that is, at the interface of Bronze Age inheritance and the shifted demographics of the Early Iron Age.[72] This proposed syncretism of distinct epic and melic traditions in the seventh century (if not earlier) could also explain why the Archaic Greek heptachord incorporates names derived from fingers (*λιχανός*, *μέση*, *παραμέση*). West suggested that these might be a vestige of an

[67] Indo-European dimension of Greek epic melodization: West (1981); Franklin (2004).

[68] For these points see Franklin (2011).

[69] Alex. Polyhist. *FGrH* 273 F 77 (Ps.-Plut. *De mus*. 1132e–f), deriving from Heraclid. Pont. fr. 157 (Ps.-Plut. *De mus*. 1132c); cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom*. 1.16.78; *Suda* s.v. *Τέρπανδρος*. Cf. Franklin (2002c) 445–6 (allowing for the modifications to the historical scenario proposed above); Franklin (2004) 244–5.

[70] *Λύρα* is now indirectly attested at Mycenaean Thebes (TH Av 106.7): see with references Franklin (2015) 433–44 and n. 62.

[71] Franklin (2002d) 673–5.

[72] The generations of the Lesbian *γένος* that followed Terpander were also remembered especially for their performances at the Spartan Karneia: see Franklin (2012).

earlier nomenclature appropriate to an instrument of only three or four strings, each named from a finger.[73] He made this observation without reference to the overall epicentricity of the Greek heptachord, an issue with which he was not then familiar.[74] But this distinctive structure—an epicentric heptachord built around a nucleus of finger-names—might well reflect the fusion of epic and melic lyre traditions proposed here.[75]

MUSIC, TEXT, AND EPICENTRIC TONALITY

This section offers preliminary observations on a pair of complementary questions. What was the impact of epicentric tonality on poetic 'text', i.e. its musical form and realization in performance? And what traces has the epicentric heptachord, as a cultural artifact, left in Greek literature and the intellectual record more generally?

First there is the issue, for those who accept that Greek epicentric tonality does indeed derive in some form from the Near East, of 'what else' came along with it. Might we not have here a vital clue for understanding how various thematic elements of early Greek literature find Near Eastern counterparts, since in both spheres 'poetry' was often musical? True, some classicists' response to Martin West's catalogue in the massive *East Face of Helicon* has been that, after all, 'there's not that much there'; the proposed correspondences are usually not terribly specific, so that independent development may appear the simpler explanation.[76] For my part, such elusiveness is just

[73] West (1981) (noting only *λιχανός* and *μέση*). The historiographical tradition regarding the transition from seven to eight strings (see n. 64 above) is often concerned with the distinction between *παραμέση* and *τρίτη* and the history of these terms' usage, and that of conjunct and disjunct tetrachords constructed in relation to *μέση*. I suspect that *παράμεσος* and *τρίτος* were interchangeable designations for the same finger: see e.g. Galen *De differentia pulsuum* 8.544, lines 10–22.

[74] He did not discuss the Mesopotamian musical texts until West (1993–4), when he dismissed the parallel epicentric arrangements as likely to be coincidence; but when presented with the further parallels discussed above, he wrote 'Your main thesis, that "heptadiatonic" music came to Greece (indirectly) from Mesopotamia, I find quite plausible. This music is after all very much bound up with the stringed instruments that came from that direction' (communication, 28 April, 2000).

[75] See for now ch. 9 of Franklin (2002b).

[76] West (1997). Quotation: anonymous (communication, 2006).

what I would expect from the historical circumstances. The surviving texts are but the merest fraction of what was once composed in a multidirectional game of Chinese whispers (if one may use the expression) spanning huge distances and many centuries. And each participating culture would inevitably leave a distinctive imprint on mythemes and other motifs of otherwise 'international' circulation. Finally, if one places the most significant phase of 'contact' in the Late Bronze Age, as I would—since the period's palace networks promoted tightly focused elite cultural exchanges across large distances[77]—this allows for many centuries of subsequent, independent development on the Greek side, especially across the Early Iron Age and into the time for which we first have texts. I certainly do not wish to exaggerate the cultural links; I am in fact a minimalist, preferring the least intensive contact that will suffice to explain the data. It might be, for instance, that epicentric tonality was adopted by Aegean lyre-singers as being a maximally efficient—and available—conceptual technology for the varied musical application of heptatonic/diatonic tonal material, a scenario that is conceivable without requiring any 'higher', literary influence.

Still, the generic contexts for which the Mesopotamian tunings are attested offer striking correspondences with Archaic Greek lyric practice. The Middle Assyrian song-catalogue VAT 10101 (see p. 32) organizes a singer's repertoire of some 360 titles into thirty-two categories/genres of song, of which only two employed the heptatonic/diatonic tunings. Evidently the heptatonic/diatonic cycle had quite specialized application in the Near East, and we must not let the universality of heptatonic/diatonic scales in our own music mislead us into conflating these specific tonal constructions with 'music' generally in antiquity.[78] The songs called *šitru* are connected to choral, ensemble performance; here only two of the seven tunings appear (*embūbu* and *pītu*).[79] That the 'breast songs' (*irtu*) are personal love songs is indicated by the titles themselves; these use all seven of the tunings (some more than others).[80] Finally, the hymns from Ugarit show that the tunings could also be used for divine

[77] For the musical dimensions of this environment, see as a whole Franklin (2015).

[78] Even our 'atonal' music has an inescapably heptatonic/diatonic basis, since this provides the twelve tones to which it is limited.

[79] For *šitru(m)*, see now Ziegler (2007) 11, 13, and n. 35 with further references (superseding Kilmer 1971: 147; Kilmer 1997: 475; etc.).

[80] For *irtu*, see Held (1961) with Kilmer (1971) 138 n. 24; Kilmer (1997) 475.

hymns, at least in Syro-Hurrian lyric tradition.[81] Choral song, love-lyric, divine hymns—these are the great types of Greek lyre μέλος. Moreover, the relevant sections of VAT 10101 and the Hurrian hymns show that it was conventional for a song to remain within a single tuning,[82] something that we are told was basic to early Greek lyric.[83] This practice has important implications for the pre-history of musical 'ethos'—that topic of primary concern for Greek musical thinkers of the Classical period[84]—since clearly each tuning (and any mode derived therefrom[85]) must have had its own distinctive character. The foregoing collection of correspondences in genre and harmonic practice strikes me, once again, as too specific to be pure coincidence; together they provide good circumstantial support for the hypothesis of epicentric tonality as an early, supralocal approach to lyre-playing.

But even if one rejects an historical connection with the Near East altogether, it remains certain that heptatonic/diatonic tunings and an epicentric-tonal approach to their practical implementation were important elements of Archaic Greek lyric. These are welcome and rather concrete facts for any attempt to reimagine the musical dimensions of poetic texts, or 'reconstruct' performances, since they contribute strong new formal constraints—perhaps not permitting such specific recoveries as metre and rhythm, but still far better defined than passing internal references to 'Phrygian μέλος' and the like.[86] True, later historiographical allegations about e.g. the modulatory scheme of the τριμελὴς νόμος, or Sappho's use of the Mixolydian, do offer (potentially) precise harmonic information in a very few

[81] For the distinctive identity of Syro-Hurrian lyric (and its use of the *kinnāru*), see Franklin (2015) 96–104.

[82] Even if we suppose the occasional neighbouring modulation (as suggested by Hagel 2005b), a song remained harmonically identifiable as some specific tuning.

[83] See n. 60.

[84] See inter al. Anderson (1966); Rossi (1988); Thorp (1991); Pagliara (2000); Lynch (2013); Lynch (2016).

[85] I ought perhaps to clarify the difference between 'tuning' and 'mode' as I use them here. In Indian tradition, modes (*raga*) are distinguished from underlying tunings; the former are elaborations of the latter, which naturally has an influence on their development. I thus use 'mode' in a broader sense than its old application to octave 'species', which I here designate by 'tuning'. But neither term is quite exact for epicentric tonality, as I understand it, since this system both provided the 'species' and influenced the elaboration of mode (via its practical focus on μέση).

[86] Alcm. 126 *PMGF*; Stesich. 212 *PMGF*.

specific cases.[87] But if we may trust the sources, epicentric tonality was a quite *general* feature of early lyric. Alongside this we must probably set the regular custom of melodizing the pitch contour of poetic diction, a fairly consistent practice in the extant musical scores—especially those of a simpler, more traditional character—and already detectable, in some kindred form, in the accent patterns of epic.[88] (Whether we are to assume pre-composed and fixed melodies for Archaic lyric, or something more along the lines of composition-in-performance within fixed formal constraints, is up for debate.)[89] When epicentric tonality and 'accent-singing' are taken together, the possibilities for realizing Archaic melody become much more sharply defined. *Μέση* was like the sun around which the other strings revolved, giving to each its tonal force—what Aristoxenus would later call *δύναμις*[90]—and steadily reinforcing these relations through its frequent repetition. Admittedly we must still resort to guesswork about what exact tunings were favoured, and the kinds of traditional modes (*νόμοι*) that were developed from these. The most obvious candidates are the conjunct and disjunct 'Dorian' structures that are central to later theory, allowing for variations induced by devout insistence on seven strings.[91] By way of example Figure 1.4 gives a

[87] *Τριμελὴς νόμος*: Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1134a–b; cf. 1131f–1132a (= *FGrH* 550); cf. Franklin (2013) 223–4. Sappho/Mixolydian: Aristox. fr. 81 = Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1136.

[88] For the observable 'rules' governing melodization of accent, see West (1992b) 199–200, noting that the correspondence is especially strict in the Delphic paeans, with their archaizing tonal material. For Homeric accent patterns as a kind of melodic residue, see Hagel (1994).

[89] See further D'Angour (this volume).

[90] A key passage here is *Harm.* 47: 'Why is it that there is one interval between *μέση* and *παραμέση* and again between *μέση* and both *ὑπάτη* and as many others as do not change pitch, while it must be ruled that there are many intervals between *μέση* and *λιχανός*?' Here Aristoxenus betrays his knowledge of the old epicentric perspective—familiar to the lesser colleagues whose musings are reflected in the Aristotelian *Problems*—by imagining all possible intervals that might be taken with *μέση*, dividing them into those of fixed and variable size, as though this is how the problem would naturally be—or was in fact—posed (cf. *διὰ τί*, the familiar formula of the *Problems*). The connection between *μέση* and *δύναμις* is stated more clearly by Cleonides in his 'Aristoxenian handbook' (11, *MSG* 202.3–5): *ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς μέσης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν φθόγγων αἱ δυνάμεις γνωρίζονται, τὸ γὰρ πῶς ἔχειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν μέσην φανερῶς γίνεται* ('And the functions of the rest of the notes are known from *μέση*, for how each of them is clearly arises in relation to *μέση*'). See further Franklin (2002b) 274–7 (§10.29–33).

[91] Devotion to seven: see n. 36. In their textbook, form these are respectively E-F-G-A-Bb-c-d and E-F-G-A-B-c-d-e. With only seven strings the disjunct 'heptachord' often included 'Dorian *νήτη*', thus creating a 'gap' of a third (E-F-G-A-B-c-e,



Figure 1.4. 'Recomposition' of Sappho 1, illustrating epicentric tonality and accent-melody in conjunct heptachord E-F-G-A-Bb-c-d.

recomposition of Sappho 1, adhering to epicentric tonality, accent contour, and the textbook conjunct heptachord.

But one can hardly doubt that much greater variety existed. Heptatonic/diatonic tuning in itself imposes well-defined parameters, and while we need not insist that all Archaic *ἁρμονίαι* were of this type, it would be musically naive to deny that the melic poets could distribute tones and semitones wherever it suited their purposes via *ἡ λῆψις διὰ συμφωνίας* (along with any microtonal shadings that may have been fashionable).[92] There will thus have been some *de facto* overlap with

E-F-G-A-B-d-e). (The modern values E-F-G etc. are a conventional means of illustrating relative pitch in ancient tunings, with lower case denoting a further, higher octave; equal temperament is not implied). Key sources here are Philolaus fr. 6b and several Aristotelian *Problems* (see n. 61). But we should be cautious about overgeneralizing from this material (Philolaus himself was clearly aware of the tone/semitone grid behind his 'gap': see Franklin 2002b, ch. 8).

[92] For tuning by consonance as a usual preliminary to microtonal shadings (*χρόαι*), see generally Franklin (2005).

the seven diatonic tunings of the Mesopotamian cycle, whether or not Greek lyrists of the Archaic period (still?) understood the progression from one to the next in precisely the way that is documented by the Retuning Text.[93]

Until now I have left the surviving musical scores out of consideration. The relevance of these much-later documents to the Archaic epicentric tonality alluded to by our sources is complicated by the facts of Greek musical development. The original epicentric structure was first compromised in the fifth century when additional strings began to be added. Several ancient lists of 'string-adders' survive, but these are artificial constructions of very limited direct value.[94] Much more important is the ancient historiographical debate about the original distinction between *παραμέση* and *τρίτη*; this must relate to the addition of a standard eighth string by *c.*480–460, to judge from ceramic evidence and a tradition that Simonides added the eighth string or *τὸν τρίτον φθόγγον*.[95] Although Ion of Chios sang of his remarkable eleven-stringed instrument, and lyres with ten–twelve strings are indeed sometimes shown in fifth- and fourth-century vase painting,[96] lyre-singers seem to have settled on a new standard of *nine* strings. This has not been well-appreciated until Hagel's recent work; we have been distracted by the two-octave, rather *αὐλός*-driven Perfect System that Aristoxenian theory used as a reference structure in its set of thirteen (later fifteen) keys (*τόνοι*); for this used only eight unique string names (the ancient seven, plus *τρίτη*) in its central (historically 'lyric') octave around *μέση*, qualified as needed for referring to higher and lower tetrachords (e.g. *ὑπάτη ὑπατῶν*).[97] But several sources do attest one further string called either *ὑπερυπάτη* or *διάπεμπτος*.[98] Both

[93] If the 'transmission' goes back to the Mycenaean period, considerable changes of perspective may have developed in the intervening centuries. I thank Stefan Hagel for useful comments on this point (Corfu, 7/2007).

[94] These are surveyed by Hagel (2009) 80–7.

[95] Pliny *Nat.* 7.204; *Suda* s.v. *Σιμωνίδης*. Cf. Franklin (2002d) 686 n. 45.

[96] For various thoughts on Ion of Chios fr. 32 West, see Levin (1961); Comotti (1972); West (1992a) 25–6; West (1992b) 227, 357; Hagel (2000) 52–3; Franklin (2002d) 687–8, 693–4; Power (2007); Hagel (2009) 377–8. Ceramic evidence: West (1992b) 63.

[97] The *τόνοι* are a series of self-contained Perfect Systems whose *μέσαι* were staggered at semitone intervals. For the development of this system, see now Hagel (2009), ch. 1.

[98] West (1992b) 224 n. 14, tentatively took *Πράτα* ('first') in the Argive inscription *SEG* 30.382 (see n. 57) as a further alternative for *ὑπερυπάτη*/*διάπεμπτος*. If this is right, one must assume the superimposition of a non-epicentric perspective, like the

names are clearly accretions to the early heptachord's epicentric nomenclature, and yet are only meaningful in relation thereto. Whereas the superlatives ὑπάτη ('topmost') and νήτη ('last') clearly marked original physical limits on the lyre's crossbar,[99] ὑπερυπάτη ('above the topmost') still assumes that one's orientation is outwards from μέση in the way that Aristotle treated as normal.[100] Similarly, διάπεμπτος shows that this string's usual (perhaps exclusive) function was to form a 3:2 fifth below μέση. This created an overall span of a ninth, so that the ancient 'Lydian' (once known as 'Dorian')[101] octave E-F-G-A-B-c-d-e—central to Greek music theory—was given a lower extension to D by practising lyre-singers. The prize document here, and our source for the term διάπεμπτος, is the so-called *Koine Hormasia* (roughly 'Common Procedure'), which Hagel has recently shown to be a fragment of an instruction manual for tuning a nine-stringed κιθάρα through several diatonic tunings, of which only the initial Lydian and its modification to the adjacent Hypolydian survive. This remarkable document vitally attests the survival of epicentric tonality down into the Roman period, for the tuning procedure begins by establishing μέση with further intervals taken διὰ συμφωνίας throughout.[102] It also lets us integrate the Mesomedes hymns and the Seikilos song into our history of epicentric tonality. For while these pieces are ideally suited to a lyre of nine strings tuned precisely as in the *Koine Hormasia*,[103] yet none employs μέση ('A') as a tonal center in the way described by earlier sources. This function is served rather by ὑπάτη ('E) in the *Invocation of the Muse*, *Invocation of*

linear presentation of octaves species or the Perfect System in the musicographers. The third-century BC date makes this possible in an age of theory and musical literacy; but why then do the inscriptions make a point of including the epicentric boundaries Νήτα, Μέσσα, and Ὑπάτα? Hagel (2009) 27 n. 80 and 287 n. 68 suggests taking πράτας rather as a gloss or description of the adjacent ὑπάτας, with reference to this string's function as an independent, non-epicentric tonal centre (paired at a fifth with παραμέση) in three of the Mesomedes pieces (see further p. 42).

[99] West (1992b) 221 with sources in n. 9.

[100] See n. 31.

[101] As Hagel has shown, the (ancient) characterization of this octave as 'Lydian' rather than the expected (and more ancient) 'Dorian' derives from several stages of development in the notation/key system: see ch. 1 of Hagel (2009).

[102] Hagel (2009) 122–34. Μέση itself is taken from προσλαμβανόμενος, an octave lower; but as Hagel rightly argues this must be a reference tone given by e.g. αὐλός, voice, or some other instrument which the lyre needed to accommodate.

[103] The vocal melody occasionally exceeds this range, but octave counterparts exist within the central compass of the instrument.

Calliope and Apollo, and *Hymn to the Sun* (*DAGM* 24–7); or by λιχανός ('G') in Seikilos (*DAGM* 23), the *Hymn to Nemesis* (*DAGM* 28), and as a secondary tonality in the *Hymn to the Sun*. As Hagel rightly argues, in reference not only to these pieces but also the evidence of Ptolemy, such 'displacements' are related to the permanent addition of ὑπερυπάτη/διάπεμπτος, which presented a new tonal axis of D-A-d alongside the old E-A-e; this helped accommodate modulations to other modes with less retuning than in former times, and this in turn probably encouraged the emergence of new modal norms.[104] Nevertheless, the *Koine Hormasia* documents clearly that μέση 'never ceased being acknowledged as the "leader"'.[105] And this is corroborated by Mesomedes himself, whose name should mean something like 'counseled by *Μέση*' (compare e.g. Diomedes)[106]—a remarkable testimony for understanding the lyre-singers' relationship with their instruments (see p. 44–5).

The long-enduring importance of μέση for establishing tonal values—and hence of the epicentric perspective itself—is further seen in the various microtonal measurements that theorists offered over the centuries for the basic Lydian/Dorian octave and its three γένη (diatonic, chromatic, enharmonic). These figures, which the sources express as ratios between successive degrees—many rather abstruse—have often been supposed to owe more to mathematical tidiness and/or fantasy than musical reality. But an analysis of cross-relationships—that is, when the given figures are used to calculate ratios between *non-successive* scale degrees—reveals that in many cases non-adjacent notes are related to each other by much less abstruse ratios like the audibly resonant 5:4 and 6:5 thirds. Moreover, in many cases these intervals are constructed in relation to μέση. The two most striking examples are the enharmonic of Archytas, our oldest such authority (early fourth century BC); and the chromatic of Didymus (first century AD, Figure 1.5).[107] It may still be that some of these specific numbers are indeed products of theoretical ingenuity.[108] Even so, the general emphasis on μέση shows that such mathematical schemes were still responding to an important musical reality.

[104] Cf. Hagel (2009), ch. 4. [105] Hagel (2009) 134.
[106] I owe this observation to S. Hagel, communication June 2013.
[107] For the various other schemes not illustrated here, see the diagrams in Franklin (2005), building upon Barker (1984–9) 2.46–52.
[108] Cf. Hagel (2006).

	h	*ph*	*l*	*m*	*pm*	*t*	*pn*	*n*
h	1	0.9373	0.8997	**3:4**	**2:3**	0.6249	0.5998	**1:2**
ph	1.0668	1	0.9598	**4:5**	0.7112	**2:3**	0.6399	0.5334
l	**10:9**	1.0419	1	**5:6**	0.741	0.6946	**2:3**	0.556
m	**4:3**	**5:4**	**6:5**	1	**8:9**	**5:6**	**4:5**	**2:3**
pm	**3:2**	**1.4061**	**1.3496**	**9:8**	**1**	**0.9373**	**0.8997**	**3:4**
t	**1.6003**	**3:2**	**1.4398**	**6:5**	**1.0668**	**1**	**0.9598**	**4:5**
pn	**1.6673**	**1.5628**	**3:2**	**5:4**	**10:9**	**1.0419**	**1**	**5:6**
n	**2:1**	**1.8746**	**1.7994**	**3:2**	**4:3**	**5:4**	**6:5**	**1**



Figure 1.5. Didymus' chromatic *γένος*, expressed in matrix showing ratios between all string pairs, with decimal figures replaced by resonant/epimoric ratios (3:2, 4:3, 5:4, etc.) where applicable.

From around the same time as Didymus come two formulations of the Harmony of the Spheres deriving from the multiform Pythagorean tradition, one in Nicomachus' *Encheiridion*, another in the *Excerpts* attributed to him. In both, the seven strings, each assigned to a heavenly body or celestial sphere, are listed in sequences that, though slightly different from one another, alike respect the epicentric order—note especially their agreement on *μέση* as the Sun—thus showing that this was the essential organizing principle:

Nicom. *Ench.* 3:

2. *νήτη*/Selene-Moon
   4. *παρανήτη*/Aphrodite
      7. *παραμέση*/Hermes
   5. *μέση*/Helios-Sun
      6. *λιχανός*/*ὑπερμέση*[110]/Ares
3. *παρυπάτη*/Zeus
1. *ὑπάτη*/Kronos

[Nicom.] *Exc.* 3[109]

2. *νήτη*/Selene-Moon
   5. *παρανήτη*/Hermes(?)
      7. *τρίτη*/Aphrodite(?)
3. *μέση*/Helios-Sun
   6. *ὑπερμέση*/Ares
4. *παρυπάτη*/Zeus
1. *ὑπάτη*/Fixed Stars/Kronos

[109] This passage presents several uncertainties and variants acknowledged by the text itself. My question marks next to *παρανήτη* and *τρίτη* reflect the author's correct hypothesis of scribal error, although it is not immediately clear which god should go with each, since Nicom. *Ench.* 3 cannot be used as a parallel without circular argument (*τὴν δὲ παρανήτην οὐ κατὰ τὸν Ἑρμῆν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, ἀτάκτως, εἰ μὴ γραφικὸν εἴη τὸ πταῖσμα . . . τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην*). He also offers an alternative association for *ὑπάτη*, either Kronos or *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς* (sc. *σφαῖρα*), and mentions a version with strings/planets in opposite order. For further related material, see Jan (1894); Zaminer (1984) 7–8, 21–5; Hagel (2005a).

[110] *Ὑπερμέση* is an alternative designation in these texts for *λιχανός*, and was presumably favoured for more clearly eliciting the epicentric structure; whether it has an equally traditional basis is unclear.

These structures must be related to the report of Boethius, alluding to the lost book of Nicomachus, that Terpander completed the heptachord in imitation of the seven planets.[111]

With these remarkable cosmological visions we move from our first question, the relationship between epicentric tonality and music/text, to the second, its broader impact on the Greek intellectual—even spiritual—imagination. Most striking of all, to my mind, is the treatment of *Μέση*, *Ὑπάτη*, and *Νήτη*—the trio of boundary strings that is a shorthand for the epicentric heptachord[112]—as Muses at Delphi according to Plutarch in the second century AD (whence my title *The Middle Muse*).[113] At first glance this may seem a late and whimsical artifice. Originally I took it to be an example of what in ethnomusicology has been called 'museum effect'—intentional preservation of older musical forms/ideas within a special social space, theoretically protected from the innovations of a musical mainstream.[114] In our example, Greek cultural memory of an essential technical aspect of early lyric would have been enshrined, appropriately, at the sacred site of Apollo (that Delphi was regarded as the centre of the world might also be relevant). But the third-century BC Argive inscription mentioned above[115] shows that Plutarch's string-Muses were no one-off conceit at Delphi, but represent a broader set of conceptions with much older roots in Greek lyric practice. The assignment of a divine power to individual musical tones is of course also found in Plato's Myth of Er, where a separate Siren revolves (n.b.) upon each and every tone of the cosmic *ἁρμονία* (doubtless diatonic as in the *Timaeus*).[116] But Muses are especially interesting for their implications of music-cognition—of a reverent, contemplative relationship between musician and instrument in which the lyre itself plays an active, even dominant role.[117] Recall that Apollo's own reaction, in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, to his brother's new, seven-stringed

[111] Boeth. *De inst. mus.* 1.20 (206.10f.): septimus nervus a Terpandro Lesbio secundum septem scilicet planetarum similitudinem.

[112] See nn. 31 and 57.

[113] Plut. *Quaest. conviv.* 744c, 745b; cf. Ps.-Censor. *De mus.* 6.610.1f.

[114] For the term, Nettl (1985) 28.

[115] *SEG* 30.382: see n. 54.

[116] Pl. *Rep.* 617b5–6: *Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον*; cf. Philostr. *Imag.* 1.10.15.

[117] In the *Hymn to Hermes*, the singer's subservience to lyre is also expressed in erotic terms. It arouses in Apollo *ἔρος ἀμήχανος*, 'inescapable love' (434; cf. Hermes as 'deviser', *μηχανιῶτα*, 436), that melic trope for love as a cause of grief, with the lover enthralled to the beloved. Hence at 447 *τίς Μοῦσα ἀμηχανέων μελεδώνων*; will be a

lyre was 'Who *is* this Muse?' (*τίς Μοῦσα*; 447). Hermes responds (482–4) by characterizing 'her' (*λύρα* is also feminine) as a teacher:

> *ὅς τις ἂν αὐτὴν*
> *τέχνῃ καὶ σοφίῃ δεδαημένος ἐξερεείνῃ*
> *φθεγγομένη παντοῖα νόῳ χαρίεντα διδάσκει*
>
> Whoever, learned in skill and wisdom, enquires of her, she teaches, uttering all sorts of things pleasing to the mind.[118]

The Delphic and Argive string-Muses must represent a similar conception. But they preciously specify what exactly gave the seven-stringed lyre its 'teaching' properties. The epicentric Muses lead the lyrist—recall that *μέση* was sometimes called *ἡγεμών*[119]—into a treasure house of ideas and inspiration, provided they be cultivated with the devotions of 'skill' and 'wisdom'. The name of Mesomedes (see p. 42), and our new understanding of the *Koine Hormasia*, show that the string-Muses were more than a Delphic museum-piece in Plutarch's day—though perhaps one may still detect an antiquarian flavour in their limitation to the three boundaries of the old heptachord in an age of nine-stringed instruments and modulation-keys.[120]

Thus we find that epicentric tonality, besides its welcome contribution to our understanding of tonal and melodic phenomena, adds considerable down-to-earth texture for our attempts to grapple with the relationship between singer and song. Familiar translations of *ἁρμονία* as a 'pattern of notes', 'attunement', and so on are accurate so far as they go, but promote an overly abstract understanding of tonal 'material' that ellipses the complex and intimate intercourse between lyrist and his or her tangible interface with 'god-spoken song' (*θέσπις ἀοιδή*). The early profundity of such conceptions is best seen in the practice of divinizing instruments that is richly attested for the

double-entendre, 'Who is this Muse who *causes* inescapable cares'—inverting the traditional motif that music can *cure* cares (Hes. *Th.* 98–103; *Hom.h.Ap.* 182–93; both passages envision choral song to lyre-music). The theme reaches its climax (and resolution) when Hermes characterizes the lyre as a clear-voiced courtesan (*ἑταίρη*) whom Apollo can hold in his arms and engage with expertly (*εὐμόλπει μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχων λιγύφωνον ἑταίρην / καλὰ καὶ εὖ κατὰ κόσμον ἐπιστάμενος ἀγορεύειν*, 478–9).

[118] Compare the description of Linus in Hesiod fr. 306 M-W (*PEG* T 3): *παντοίης σοφίης δεδαηκότα*. For these passages, see further Franklin (2006) 61–2; Franklin (2015) 6 and n. 32, 307 and n. 159.

[119] [Arist.] *Prob.* 19.33; [Plut.] *De mus.* 1135a.

[120] Recall that *Πράτα* in the Argive inscription *might* classify *ὑπερυπάτη* as a fourth Muse: see n. 98.

Bronze Age Near East (but with close parallels in some African traditions).[121] The LM III Chania pyxis with its musician, oversized lyre, and bird-epiphany clearly expresses an equally awesome encounter with musical divinity.[122] Would such ideas have seemed archaic in sixth- and fifth-century Greece? I would not underestimate the religious intensity of Pindar's opening invocation, in *Pythian* 1, of Apollo's 'golden phorminx', characterized by the poet as the true leader of his choral song and dance.[123] And by now we should be well justified in supposing that Pindar, like other early Greek poets who must have invoked their instruments in this way,[124] was ever-conscious of the epicentric heptachord as a medium through which his musical mind would attain the song for which he prayed.[125]

[121] Franklin (2015) 6, 22–3, 231–5, 309–10, and *passim*. [122] See n. 51.

[123] Pind. *Pyth.* 1.1–4: *Χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἰοπλοκάμων / σύνδικον Μοισᾶν κτέανον· τᾶς ἀκούει μὲν βάσις ἀγλαΐας ἀρχά, / πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ σάμασιν / ἁγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς ἐλελιζομένα* ('Golden phorminx—Apollo's and the dark-tressed / Muses' joint possession—whom the dance-step heeds, the beginning of festivity, / And singers obey your signs / When thrumming you fashion beginnings of chorus-leading preludes'). For this apostrophe as a late echo of ancient ideas about the (divine) voice of (divine) instruments, see Franklin (2015) 235.

[124] Compare Psalm 57:8–9 and 108:1–3, with Franklin (2015) 163–4.

[125] We should stay alert for further literary allusions. Zaminer (1984) assembled an array of promising possibilities in his study of the *ὑπάτη-μέση-νήτη* trope that call for re-examination. The following may also be noted as potentially relevant: Theog. 1–4; Heraclit. fr. 10 DK ([Arist.] *De mundo* 5.396b7); Philolaus fr. 6a and 6b, the connection between which has seemed obscure (note that Zaminer 1984: 25 treats fr. 17 as relevant to *μέση*); Scythinus fr. 1 West (Plut. *De Pyth. orac.* 402a; cf. Burkert 1972: 320 and n. 107, 335–6); there are probably also connections with ideas of 'middleness', the *μεσότης* of Plato and Aristotle (cf. Franklin 2002b: 253 §9.37).

2

The Musical Setting of Ancient Greek Texts

Armand D'Angour

Scholarly examination of the few surviving ancient Greek musical documents has allowed musicians to form a reasonable sense of the way the rhythms and melodies were intended to sound in practice. However, while many investigators have drawn on the work of ancient theorists to explain the musical features evident in the documents, few have attempted to consider specific ways in which the music itself—that is, both the rhythms and melodies that can be derived from the texts and markings in the documents—may be related to the words that in most cases it accompanied or adorned. In this chapter I propose to offer some suggestions about how the musical expression attached to, or reconstructed to accompany, three specific sets of texts may have been intended to contribute to their significance and effect in practice, and to ask what conclusions might emerge from them regarding the continuity or otherwise of ancient practices of rhythmicization and melodization.

The texts in question comprise the opening lines of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, with the accompanying melodic element derived from the pitch-accents of the words; part of a chorus from Euripides' *Orestes* with ancient musical notation preserved on papyrus; and the 'Seikilos song' inscribed on a 2nd-century AD grave stele from Asia Minor.[1] These texts date from different periods spanning around a thousand years, but they have in common the fact that all were

[1] *Orestes* fragment, Seikilos stele: *DAGM* (no. 3) 12–17, (no. 23) 88–91.

originally conceived, like the vast majority of poetry in archaic and classical Greece, as sung music—words and music combined. They will also have been subject to specific instrumental and performance realizations of different kinds at different times, for which evidence is solely circumstantial. In practice it is bound to have varied, depending on the particular occasion of performance and the resources available to performers.

We find virtually no comments in the work of ancient authors regarding the aesthetic and phonic effects of a particular song or passage of song such as these texts represent. While ancient discussions abound regarding the ethos and effects of *μουσική* in general, and of the ethical and, to a lesser degree, aesthetic effects of different modes or instruments, one searches in vain for the description or analysis in musical terms of any substantial poem or text. The passage in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing in the first century BC, analyses the musical effects of some lines of Euripidean choral song is uncommon enough for it to be accorded the status of a 'document of ancient music' in its own right.[2] But in the writings of earlier authors, even those of musically-engaged thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle and harmonic theorists such as Aristoxenus, there is no similar commentary that might allow us to understand better the way the melody or rhythm of, say, an ode of Pindar or a Sophoclean chorus were heard in ancient times. Rare and passing mention is found in classical writers about the musical effect of the works of composers such as the tragedian Phrynichus of Athens, who 'was always sipping on the nectar of ambrosial melodies (*μέλη*) to bring forth sweet song (*φέρων γλυκεῖαν ᾠδάν*)';[3] or such as Tynnichus of Chalcis 'who never composed a single poem that one would think worth mention other than the paean which everyone sings, virtually the most beautiful of all songs (*μέλη*), simply (as he says himself) an invention of the Muses'.[4] But nowhere do we find an articulation of the reasons why particular *μέλη* should be honoured for such qualities as sweetness or beauty, let alone a description of the specific musical features that might be thought to bring about such responses.[5]

Having an understanding of how a particular song or piece of music sounded is not the same as having a sense of how it was heard by listeners in ancient times. For the latter purpose, the

[2] *DAGM* 2, pages 10–11.
[3] Ar. *Av*. 748–51 (cf. *Vesp*. 220).
[4] Pl. *Ion* 534d5–e1.
[5] Cf. D'Angour (2015) 189–92.

comic parodies of the dramatists' songs in Aristophanes' *Frogs* offer valuable if partial (and, given the context, unstraightforward) evidence for the way the effects of melody or rhythm in specific instances might have been received by contemporaries.[6] Otherwise we are largely dependent on authors of the Roman period and later for scattered and unsystematic insights into the musical impact of songs or poetic compositions. Thus Dionysius of Halicarnassus illustrates the way specific Homeric verses were felt to deploy rhythmical effects;[7] Pollux (2nd century AD) preserves details about the structure and intended effects of the *Pythikos nomos*, a purely instrumental piece for the *aulos*;[8] and Aelian (early 3rd century) records how the sixth-century statesman Solon of Athens, entranced by his nephew's performance of a *μέλος* of Sappho, asked to be taught it 'so that I may learn it and die'.[9] In Aelian's story neither is the poem in question identified nor the precise basis of Solon's enthusiasm. It is therefore unclear how far the reported response should be thought to relate to the words of the *μέλος*, rather than to its rhythmic or melodic expression or to the particular vocal and instrumental virtues displayed on the occasion (though it is likely to have depended on a combination of all these factors). Aelian's account further exemplifies how the attempt to find musical commentary on a particular text is impeded by the tendency of ancient authors to conflate words and music when commenting on the effect of *μουσική*, a term which in classical times comprised both equally.[10] By the time a critic such as Longinus could present a descriptive interpretation of a specific song by Sappho, the musical dimension is submerged, and his treatment of a substantial portion of the poem deals exclusively with the way style and imagery achieves sublimity.[11]

What accounts for ancient authors' apparent lack of interest in recording and preserving the specific melodies that formed such a large part of their musico-literary heritage? The effects of melody, while generally considered secondary to that of rhythm, were not a

[6] Ar. *Ran.* 1264–95, 1309–63.

[7] Dion. Hal. *De comp.* 20 (see Phillips in this volume with further references). Aristides Quintilianus 69–75 (which may contain material drawn from Aristoxenus) also analyses Homeric verses for rhythmical effects.

[8] Poll. 4.84; cf. Strab. 9.3.10.

[9] Aelian ap. Stob. 3.29.58.

[10] For an approach to the distinction of words and music in ancient discussions of *μουσική*, see D'Angour (2015).

[11] [Long.] *De subl.* 10.1–3.

negligible aspect of a song's power in ancient ears.[12] But while the musical realization of a song might have made a considerable difference to its actual reception, the absence of comment on the nature of a particular melodic line or passage confirms that only in rare cases was the tune considered to be a dominant or even particularly memorable feature.

In fact, ancient philosophers and musical theorists dwell far less on *μέλος* than on *ἁρμονία*, the structure of pitches from which an individual *μέλος* would have been derived.[13] Classical poet-composers and singer-performers, for lack of a system of vocal notation (probably invented in the fifth century BC), will in most cases have employed variable, orally transmitted melodic motives conforming to appropriate *ἁρμονίαι*.[14] As with oral folk music traditions universally, melody is likely to have been employed, for the most part, in a flexible and relatively free fashion.[15] Consequently, non-notated melodies, including most sung texts until around the mid-fifth century, would rarely have been felt to be determinate or to carry authorial status. Rhythm, however, being a function of the syllabic quantities of words, was at the author's command; and during the earlier period of Greek musical history it was considered of greater importance than melody.[16] But equally, given that the rhythms that arose from words—iambic, dactylic, paeonic, and so on—rapidly became conventional within their generic contexts, their musical effects in a particular song or passage were apt to attract comment only if, for instance, they were heard as unusual or wilfully unconventional (as in the case of the extended Euripidean melisma on *εἰλίσσετε* parodied by Aristophanes).[17]

[12] West (1992b) 129–30 cites comments on the importance of rhythm vis-à-vis melody; but numerous passages of ancient poetry suggest a play on words between *μέλη*, songs, and *μέλει*, 'it matters': D'Angour (2005) 99.

[13] While prepared to discuss the ethos of different *ἁρμονίαι* at length, Plato was suspicious and dismissive of the effects of *μέλος*; see Peponi in this volume.

[14] For example, Aristotle (*Pol.*1342a32–b12) relates that Philoxenus was 'forced' to use the Phrygian *ἁρμονία* when composing music for a dithyramb: D'Angour (2011) 207.

[15] Nettl (2005) 113–15. This is an uncontroversial point for ethnomusicologists, but it bears repetition, as the standard model for modern Western music is to privilege 'the music' in its own right.

[16] Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1138bc. How rhythm worked in non-vocal music is a matter of speculation, but some evidence may be extracted from theorists or derived from poetic sources (see e.g. Phillips 2013).

[17] Ar. *Ran.* 1314, 1349. This kind of comment may be distinguished from observations (explicit or implicit) about unusual or contrived metrical usage, such as we

In consequence of these and other factors, it is left to modern interpreters to try to recreate from theoretical statements, documentary indications, and ethnomusicologically supported assumptions how the phonic effects that can be extracted or imaginatively reconstructed from musical texts may have contributed to the expression of a particular passage of ancient poetry and song. In this respect, it is curious to note that little scholarly effort has been expended on explicating even such well-known aspects of ancient music as its rhythms in relation to whole texts or extended passages of poetry, in the way that literary scholars and philologists standardly offer 'close readings' of such texts, or that students of classical music might provide a bar-by-bar analysis of a sonata or a song. This comparison draws attention, however, to the repetitive quality of ancient rhythms and the subtle differences between similar metrical patterns; and it highlights the difficulty of finding an adequate non-technical vocabulary to describe the effects of rhythm and melody, both in general and specifically in the ancient context. Since our task is not simply to illustrate the way music was attached to the texts but to ask what difference it made to the words, we may be required not only to pay close attention to subtle rhythmic and melodic differences but to find a new repertoire of descriptive terms.

MUSICAL EFFECTS IN HOMER

Homer's exploitation of the rhythmical features of the hexameter was recognized in antiquity and highlighted by ancient commentators.[18] However, the melodic features and effects of the sung epic can be reconstructed only by conjecture. M. L. West's pioneering hypothetical elaboration of 'the singing of Homer' was based on the following premises:[19] (1) the melodic contour of the vocal line followed the pitch inflections of Greek words, as recorded by Hellenistic accent-marks (including some anomalous accents that may be a

find in Hephaestion (*Ench.* 6) in relation to Sophocles fr. eleg. 1 and Critias fr. 4, and in Arist. *Poet.* 1458b5–15; D'Angour (1999) 123–5.

[18] See n. 7. [19] West (1981) 115–16, 121–2.

memory of sung notes);[20] (2) the singer's voice was accompanied note for note by a four-stringed *phorminx* with strings tuned to corresponding pitches;[21] and (3) the end of the verse invariably allowed for a breathing-space—and for the oral composer, a thinking-space—during which the strings of his lyre could be strummed.[22] Extrapolating from what we are told about the structure of Greek modal systems, West proposed that melody of the song would have utilized a sequence of four pitches that is found at the core of nearly all the later systems, to which the strings of the bard's instrument would have been tuned.[23]

The noteworthy subsequent analysis by Stefan Hagel of the incidence of pitch accents in Homer and other early epic poetry suggests that singers regularly aimed for a rising melodic shape in the early part of the hexameter verse and a falling melodic cadence at the end.[24] Hagel's tabulations show, in broad terms, that the melodic line standardly rises at the start, falls at a point around the central part

[20] The general accord of melody with word pitch is well attested in the majority of the surviving musical documents (which preserve other strands of musical tradition as well as this), and paralleled in cultures with pitch-inflected languages. The fact that the musical documents all date from post-classical times, and that the earliest papyri with music from Euripidean tragedy do not show accord with word-pitch, need not cause problems for this premise (see D'Angour 2006a: 279–80); there will have different melodic traditions from early times, for some of which (including solo instrumental and fixed-melody pieces) word pitch would have been irrelevant. See also Franklin (this volume).

[21] In addition to the parallels adduced by West, a good example of this practice may be found in traditional Ethiopian music using the *krar* (< *kithara*), where singers accompany themselves note for note and intersperse verses with strumming.

[22] West (2011) 137 compares Yugoslav oral practice, particularly one recording in which the singer 'rests his voice at the end of each verse, even when there is no syntactical pause'. This is less likely to have been the case with Homeric epic performance, where the melodization at verse-end was potentially more variable; in the former case, West (ibid.) notes, that 'there is almost always a fall on the final syllable, most commonly of a fifth'.

[23] West (1981) 123 gives a transcription in staff notation of the opening lines of the *Iliad* as they may have been sung by the bard, with the pitches specified (using conventional Western musical pitch appellations) as *e f a d′*; he has subsequently speculated that ('to limit the whole compass to a fifth') the pitches could have been *d e f a* (West 2011: 135). For the purposes of our discussion the exact notes are unimportant; and it is also clear that some instruments used in Homer's time would have had more than four strings.

[24] Hagel (1994); graves and acutes are considered equivalent for melodization, but circumflex accents, where the pitch rise was followed by a longer fall, are not. If both the latter required distinct melodic treatment from acutes, the technique of melodization will have produced effects of considerable refinement.

of the verse, then resumes a rise before a final cadential fall at the end of the verse. Far less frequently verses end on a high-pitched syllable; and in such cases, the following line tends to show a falling pitch around the third-foot caesura, allowing a parabolic arc of melodic phrasing that rises to the end of one verse to be completed halfway through the following verse. Since the occurrence of these features is statistically significant, they show that the way the text of epic was melodized is not a purely random effect of pitch accord, but one that will have involved a degree of conscious musical artistry aimed at shaping the melodic contours of the verse. Hagel's remarkable study and findings have yet to be fully appreciated and exploited by scholars;[25] but one immediate implication is that the singer might manipulate the pitch register at the end of a verse to emphasize, for instance, a significant word or idea, or might combine a prominent pitch at verse-end with a falling pitch contour at mid-verse to impart a melodically calibrated structure to a passage of song.

Accordingly, while one should not suppose that the precise melodic shape of every verse was the result of deliberate contrivance, Hagel's demonstration that the singer may have sought to create discernible melodic effects demands a closer look at the Homeric text to see how specific words and phrases might have been enhanced by their placement in the verse and the resulting melodic phrasing. Observation of the accentuation found at verse-end in the opening lines of the *Iliad* provides a striking impetus to such an investigation:[26]

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε,
πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν
οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο <u>βουλή</u>, 5
ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε
Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος <u>Ἀχιλλεύς</u>.

Here the first four verses end with on falling melodic contour, so that when an oxytone first occurs, at the end of the verse in line 5, it does

[25] For a concise account of the practical application to Homeric singing, see Danek and Hagel (1995) with their sung realizations at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/kal/sh/.

[26] The importance of verse-end melody may find corroboration in the number of anomalous Homeric accentuations that place a prominent accent (acute or circumflex) on the final syllable; of the nine examples given by West (2011) 13, all but two have anomalous *final* accents.

so to salient effect: the phrase *Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή* ('and the will of Zeus was fulfilled') is of clear programmatic significance for the epic. The three identical falling cadences at the ends of lines 2–4 could be sung, say, to the descending notes *a f e* (as might the final two syllables of *Ἀχιλῆος* in line 1); the fifth verse would have emerged with particular emphasis if the singer's voice and accompanying lyre notes ended it, in clear distinction to the previous lines, with a conspicuous rising phrase (e.g. *d a*) or a series of rising pitches (e.g. *e f a* on the last three syllables).

Line 5, however, is not the end of the *Iliad*'s opening programmatic 'statement'—a term that carries, of course, musical no less than literary significance. The final closural verse comes at line 7, where the two protagonists of the epic are formally introduced, side by side as it were, with honorific epithets—and again with a climbing final melodic phrase:

Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

The high-pitched ending of line 5 thus appears to have laid the ground for a similar melodic sequence of rising notes at the conclusion of the opening statement at line 7. This may indicate that the pitch at the end of line 5, shortly to be picked up by that at line 7, effected a kind of anticipatory closure.[27] It might have been sung to the same notes as final closural phrase in line 7, or may have been distinguished from the latter by using a different sequence of rising pitches. Either way, the pitch in these two verses will have risen prominently above the general level of the song, in contrast to the falling cadences at the end of the foregoing verses, suggesting that the singer could have been aiming to create a pattern of thematic markers through small melodic variations.

The melodic character of the *Odyssey*'s opening verses presents a striking contrast to the Iliadic opening. While the *Odyssey* as a whole exhibits closely similar frequencies of rising and falling verse-ends,[28] its opening lines are markedly different in this respect:

ἄνδρά[29] *μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλά*
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσεν·

[27] The notion is familiar to students of modern Western music who use terms such as 'half cadence', 'final cadence', 'imperfect authentic cadence', etc.; Caplin (1998) 45.
[28] Hagel (1994) 27. [29] For this accentuation see West (2011) 138.

πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ' ὅ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν,
ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων. 5
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἑτάρους ἐρρύσατο, ἱέμενός περ·
αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο,
νήπιοι, οἳ κατὰ βοῦς Ὑπερίονος Ἠελίοιο
ἤσθιον· αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἦμαρ.
τῶν ἁμόθεν γε, θεά, θύγατερ Διός, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν. 10

The end of the first verse, with its oxytelic (high-pitched final) syllable on πολλά, does not effect any kind of closure. Rather, the raised final syllable is noticeable, and picks up the repeated high notes of the emphatic opening word ἄνδρά. Both the meaning and melodic salience of πολλά reinforce the thematic importance of 'multiplicity', hammered home by the polyptoton of πολλῶν and πολλά (3–4).

The climbing melody at the end of the *Odyssey*'s first verse serves both musically and syntactically to invite a direct continuation into the second line. Here the pitch drops at the caesura with Τροίης, to foreshadow melodically, as it were with a 'half cadence', the completion of the song's opening melodic arc that comes to rest with a 'final' cadence in line 2, πτολίεθρον ἔπερσεν. The oxytelic first verse finds no echo until the end of line 4, where the final oxytone (θυμόν) recalls the melodization of the opening verse only to serve as a precursor to the closural cadence at line 5. Unlike in line 2, however, the musical phrase does not rest on a half-cadence at the midpoint of line 5, but remains at a high pitch (ψυχήν), coming to rest only at the end of that verse with νόστον ἑταίρων, a falling final cadence reminiscent of—but given the paroxytone ἑταίρων, perhaps blunter than—line 2. The following five lines continue with standard falling cadences of varied shapes, only for the melodic phrasing to be reversed at the very end of the cited passage with a prominent perispomenon, marking the closural, melodically emphasized, request to the Muse at line 10 to 'narrate [the story] also to us' (εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν).

It has long been recognized that the *Odyssey* begins with a noticeably different and more vigorously dactylic rhythm than the *Iliad*. The difference is signalled by the trochaic caesura in the first line and the unavoidable enjambment of the first two lines. But in addition to these distinct rhythmical features, we may now observe that the composer has arranged his phrases at verse-end to create a melodic shape that is unmistakably and, one might suppose, intentionally distinct from that of the opening statement of the *Iliad*.

An interpretation of verse-endings that proposes that a pitch rise at the end of a verse may be used in some instances as an indication of marked closure and in others as a means of creating continuity into the following verse risks being over-explanatory. However, the frequency with which an enjambed oxytelic line is followed by one with a barytone at the caesura partly mitigates this concern. The possibility arises that, in melodizing enjambed lines, singers will have carried on for two or even three lines without an intervening breath or instrumental flourish, or at least used a pause of lesser duration between enjambed lines than at the end of syntactically complete verses and closural phrases (oxytelic or otherwise) where a longer flourish might have been demanded. One might further speculate that rising enjambed lines (such as *Od.* 1–2) were melodized in a different manner from those with prominent closural accents such as the acute in line 4 and the perispomenon in line 10.

The general principle of 'significant melodization' that emerges from these examples clearly merits further examination. For this purpose we may here proceed with thirteen further verses from the *Iliad*'s beginning:

τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός· ὃ γὰρ βασιλῆϊ χολωθείς
νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὄρσε κακήν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί, 10
οὕνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα
Ἀτρεΐδης· ὃ γὰρ ἦλθε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν
λυσόμενός τε θύγατρα φέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,
στέμματ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
χρυσέῳ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ, καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς, 15
Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·
Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,
ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ἱκέσθαι·
παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι, 20
ἁζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνα.

At no point in this passage do we find a fully closural melodic leap such as we did earlier at line 7; rather, the whole passage is notable for enjambment, and the syntactical period does not come to rest finally until line 21. Melodic prominences on the final syllable of the last word of the verse, as indicated by an acute, grave, or (less frequently) circumflex, occur in six lines (as underlined above), all of which are followed by verses in which the syllable at the third-foot caesura is non-accented (also underlined).

Once again, the high pitches of different verse-ends may be seen to serve more than one function. Thus, the oxytelic line 9 both suggests an expressive 'rising' accentuation of χολωθείς ('roused to anger') and invites continuity through to the melodic fall on ὄρσε in line 10. The oxytone at verse-end of line 10 on λαοί, which comes at a point of non-closural pause, keeps the melodic tension of verse-endings at a high pitch. At the end of 12 comes the first, and melodically prominent, mention of 'Achaeans', whose oxytelic form (Ἀχαιῶν) is picked up by the oxytelic polyptoton (Ἀχαιούς, 15, Ἀχαιοί, 17) a few lines further on. The words form part of three successive oxytelic lines (15–17), where the melodic prominence of the terms that spell out, in different ways, 'the army of the Achaeans' (λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν) makes this referent more of a thematic focus in the passage than would the verse-end anaphora alone.

What provisional conclusions might we draw from this preliminary investigation of the possible effects of the melodization of Homeric song? Folk musical melodies universally tend to have an outwardly repetitive character and limited melodic range, and these tendencies are likely to have been exaggerated in works of unusual length such as Homeric (and other) epic.[30] The fact that Greek epic song is rhythmically characterized by the repetition of near-identical hexameter lines in succession does not, however, prevent the oral poet from having created a vast range of subtle effects by varying both intentionally and adventitiously the rhythmical resources available to him. Pending further statistical and practical examination, one might venture to claim that the epic singer deployed melodic phrasing with no less variability than he did rhythm, so as to make a discernible difference to his performance in at least three areas: to signal moments of special significance in his narrative, to reinforce or differentiate the syntactic connection between successive verses, and to impart a thematic substructure of melodic echoes to individual passages and to the overall pattern of his song.

[30] Monotonous, repetitive melodies and limited range are evident in Parry and Lord's recordings of Yugoslav epic song (excerpts are on the CD accompanying Lord (2000)); but how these songs sound to modern Western ears should not be confused with the way they are heard by those familiar with the living tradition.

THE CHORUS OF EURIPIDES

The centuries that followed Homer saw the introduction to Greece of new musical techniques and traditions. While folk music using conventional rhythms and employing melodic formulas that conformed to spoken Greek pitch contours must have continued throughout the period, more exotic, refined, and professional styles of music entered the repertoire. As lyric song, both choral and monodic, grew in range and popularity, the singing of Homer yielded to rhapsodic performances of the epic. Professional citharodes performed passages of Homer to their own lyre accompaniment, but the absence of the instrument in accounts and images of rhapsodes indicates that the original melodic realization of epic was being set aside in favour of declamation. It may be that, among the plethora of innovative melodic and rhythmic styles, the subtler effects of Homeric melodization were no longer heard or appreciated by listeners for what they were, and audiences' engagement with the dramatic narrative eclipsed the appeal of what may increasingly have seemed a monotonous and repetitive form of melodic expression.[31]

The most revolutionary change in musical style, the so-called New Music, was felt to have taken place between the middle and the end of the fifth century.[32] One key aspect of this revolution was the perceived violation of traditional styles of instrumental and vocal expression, an eventuality that has been linked with the need for progressive melodists such as Euripides to find a way, for the first time in Greek musical history, to notate exactly how a song should be sung.[33] It is hard not to see the influence of these developments on the earliest surviving substantial fragment of ancient Greek musical notation, Vienna papyrus G2315, which preserves a few words from a chorus of Euripides' *Orestes* of 408 BC accompanied by both melodic and rhythmical markings. The melodic line, which is preserved with both vocal and some interspersed instrumental notation, is notably

[31] The kitharodes who were associated with the singing of Homeric passages were evidently tarred with the same brush: Power (2010) 197, 237. See now also Franklin (2016) on Stesander.

[32] In D'Angour (2006a) I argue that the 'revolution' may not have been as sudden or as radical as is suggested by some of the sources.

[33] 'D'Angour (2006a) 282.

adventurous, and is generally thought to have been composed by Euripides himself.[34]

In the antistrophe of the first stasimon of *Orestes*, the chorus conveys its distress to Orestes by singing in the agitated rhythm of dochmiacs. I present the relevant passage below in its standard colometry (which differs somewhat from that of the musical papyrus), using square brackets to mark the lacunae and showing the melodic prolongation over two syllables of *ἐν* (345) and *ὡς* written out as on the papyrus (*ἐ-εν*, *ὡ-ως*). My translation aims, with some inevitable awkwardness, to match the position of significant phrases. I use bold print in both English and Greek to indicate moments where a high-pitched melody is notated, and a double underline where the notation indicates a falling melodic cadence. Here, then, the Chorus voices alarm over the avenging spirits of the murdered Clytemnestra, one of whom, it sings, is staining the royal house with:

your mother's blood—which makes you leap **in frenzy**!
Great good fortune is not lasting *for mortals*;
I lament, *I lament*.
Up like the sail 342
of a swift ship, some god shaking
overwhelms it in fearful troubles, as **of the o**cean's
rough and deadly waves, **in its bill**ows.

*ματέρος [αἷμα σᾶς, ὅ σ' ἀνα**βα**]**κχεύει**;*
ὁ μέγα[ς ὄλβος οὐ μόνιμο]ς ἐν βροτοῖς:
[κατολοφύρομαι κατολο]φύρομαι.
ἀνὰ [δὲ λαῖφος ὥς 342
τι]ς ἀκάτου θοᾶς τινά[ξας δαίμων
*κατέκλυσεν δ[εινῶν πόνω]ν **ὡ-ως πόν**τ[ου*
*λάβροις ὀλεθρ]ίοισιν **ἐ-εν κύ**μα[σιν.*

It is visually evident from the above how significant melodic moments of high pitch or falling cadence are distributed in the antistrophe. On closer inspection one finds that the final three syllables of line 339 (above in bold) are all set to a single repeated high-pitched note (*e*); the italicized final segments in lines 341 and 342 are set to a lower-pitched falling cadence (*b* – *a*♯ – *a*); the first three syllables of *ὡ-ως πόντου* are set to a high-pitched turn (*e d e*); while

[34] This is cautiously assumed by Pöhlmann and West (*DAGM* 3, p. 16); some scholars, including Rocconi (2003) 71, are less confident about the Euripidean provenance of the melody.

the first three syllables of *ἐ-εν κύμασιν* in line 342 describe a swooping arc from low to high and down again (*a*♯ – *e* – *b*♭).[35]

What is the rationale for this melodization? The same melodic notation evidently accompanied both strophe and antistrophe, and the melody shows no consistent conformity to Greek word accents.[36] This is not simply a function of strophic composition, which can accommodate a melodic line subject to the same harmonic structure (similar to the structure of notes used for Homeric singing) to produce a repeated melody with minor variations across verses and stanzas.[37] Here, however, the melodic line was clearly through-composed, and on a fundamentally different principle.

The rationale emerges from the way the earlier verses in the strophe (322–8) are melodized.[38] Composed prior to the antistrophe, it will obviously have generated the original melodization for both passages:

ταναὸν αἰθέρ' ἀμπάλλεσθ', ***αἵματος***
τινύμεναι δίκαν, τινύμεναι φόνον,
καθικετεύομαι καθικετεύομαι,
τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος 325
γόνον ἐάσατ' ἐκλαθέσθαι λύσσας
μανιάδος φοιταλέου. ***φεῦ μόχθων,***
οἴων, ὦ τάλας, ὀρε-εχθεὶς ἔρρεις

you who tread the spacious air, **her life-blood's**
penalty repaying, repay*ing murder*,
I beseech, *I beseech*: 325

[35] The notation is best interpreted as in the enharmonic, not the chromatic, genus (see DAGM 3, p. 16), even though Ps.-Psellus *On Tragedy* 5.39 states that Euripides diverged from previous tragedians in his use of chromatic (see D'Angour (2017), 436).

[36] *DAGM* 3, p. 16. The papyrus shows line 341 transposed to just before line 339, which affects how the melody might be interpreted; I take the transposition to be a scribal error (due to confusion arising from the melodic notes *Π Ρ Σ* repeated at the end of two lines) and have interpreted accordingly. Either way the overall relationship with pitch accents remains the same.

[37] Thus it is not the case that 'the fragment enables us to answer the much-debated question whether strophic lyric was subject to melodic as well as metrical responsion' (*DAGM* 3, p. 16). This fragment can only answer for itself, and may even be evidence for notated 'through-composition' being a Euripidean innovation; D'Angour (2006a) 280–1. For further discussion of Euripides' melodic practices see Thomas (this volume).

[38] I depart from the transcription in *DAGM* (p. 13) in supposing that the scribal error (see n. 36 above) requires us to return line 341 to its received position, transferring the melodic notation along with the misplaced text.

let Agamemnon's
son be allowed to forget the frenzies
of mad affliction. **Oh for the** toils
which you, poor man, **stretching out** for are lost.

The melodization here nicely supports the testimonies that point to the way Euripidean musical practice sought to enhance the dramatic impact of words by being imitative or expressive of words and emotions. Such imitiation seems evident in the falling cadence (*b* - *a*♯ - *a*) to which the last three syllables of the word for 'I lament' (*κατολοφύρομαι*, 341) are set; and this corresponds to the identically shaped and affectively similar 'I beseech' (*καθικετεύομαι*, 324) in the strophe. These words both follow phrase-endings which use the same falling melodic cadence to accompany the phrases 'for mortals' (*ἐν βροτοῖς*, 340) and its strophic counterpart '[repay]*ing murder*' ([*τινύμε*]*ναι φόνον*, 323). While the expressive function of the melody is not so evident in these phrases, the successive repetitions of the same cadential phrase, creating an aural reminiscence of the melody attached to 'I beseech' and 'I lament', serve to emphasize the dejected, lamentatory impression of the chorus's sentiments.[39]

The fact that a modern ear shares a sense of the dejection indicated by a falling cadence is striking evidence for considering Greek music a true ancestor of the Western musical tradition. It cannot be taken for granted that the shape-symbolism perceived by the modern ear was the same for the ancients; but while one must be cautious of importing modern reactions, there are grounds in this instance for acknowledging a historical continuity in the symbolism of melodic shape.[40]

Equally noteworthy is the possibility that the composer intended the thematically important word '(her) life-blood' (*αἵματος*, 322) to receive special emphasis from its melodic expression. The word's three syllables respond to the latter three of the antistrophe's *ἀναβακχεύει*, '(leap) in frenzy', which are set as a group to the highest note in the fragment, *e*;[41] but the latter has three long syllables, while

[39] In my discussion below of the Seikilos song I return to the question of the continuity of Western melodic shape from ancient music through to Gregorian chant and beyond.

[40] Langer (1976) 226–32 suggests features of the symbolism of musical shape (without noting that it may be culturally specific to Western musical experience).

[41] If the alternative transcription is assumed as in *DAGM* (see nn 36 and 38 above), the main corollary is that the high *e* falls at the end of *τινύμεναι φόνον* rather than *ἀμπάλλεσθ'*, *αἵματος*. While *φόνον* might be construed no less dramatically than

αἵματος is long-short-long (this more compact word will more easily have attracted the single pitch than the responding longer one, which might have been more likely to invite some pitch variation). Moreover, to express the sense of 'leap', this high note appears to represent a melodic upward leap of a large interval, perhaps of a fifth.[42]

A figure involving a similar upward rise from *a*♯ to *e*, followed by an immediate fall by a fourth to *b*♭, is imitatively used to melodize the effect of Orestes' 'stretching out' (ὀρε-εχθείς, 328) in the strophe. The text of the antistrophe to which this melodic expression attaches (ἐ-εν κύμασιν 'in the waves', 345) offers no imitative rationale, supporting the presumption that this distended, 'stretched-out', melodic figure was originally designed for the strophe. Two other features of the melodization of ὀρεχθείς are notable. First, the fact that the final accented syllable is pitched higher than the first syllable allows for a degree of pitch conformity, by-passing the 'stretch' effect of the intermediate syllable, to be felt. Secondly, the melodic rise on the second syllable creates an aural expectation that the singers are about to address Orestes by name, since in terms of sense Ὀρέστα, which rises tonally on the second syllable, might easily have taken the place of ὀρεχθείς. While the melody makes less expressive sense as an accompaniment for the subsequent 'in the waves', it serves again to create an aural reminiscence (as in the case of the repeated falling cadence on ἐν βροτοῖς etc. discussed above) of the melodic figure associated with 'stretching out' (ὀρε-εχθείς) in the strophe.

Another aspect of the compositional process might provide an explanation for why no imitative melodic emphasis appears to be placed, as we might have expected, on the words for 'up' (ἀνά, 342) and 'shaking' (τινάξας, 343) in the antistrophe. In each case, these syllables correspond to words in the strophe that are affectively neutral and would not obviously invite emphatic melodic expression—the first two short (unaccented) syllables of Ἀγαμέμνονος (325) and the third (accented) syllable of the word 'forget' (ἐκλαθέσθαι, 326). However, in addition to melody there were choric and

αἵματος, its position at the end of the repeated phrase with τινύμεναι, and the implication of upward movement connoted by the preceding ἀμπάλλεσθ', are both factors that incline me to hear αἵματος as having been accompanied by the high *e*.

[42] The lacuna at this point does not allow certainty: while the pitch level of the surviving text before the lacuna dwells at around a fifth below this note, other reconstructions (such as that by von Jan, for instance) might propose less dramatic intervals.

rhythmical resources available to Euripides' chorus to add impact to words, and in the case of both ἀνά and τινάξας a syllabic emphasis might have indicated by the latter means. Support for this notion is suggested by the precious markings preserved on the papyrus representing ictus, the beat that gave form to the chorus's singing and dancing: a diacritical point (στιγμή) is used to mark the upbeat (ἄρσις), indicating that the the downbeat (θέσις) fell on syllables where ἄρσις is not marked.[43] What these markings show confounds any expectation that the beat of the dochmiac metre coincided with the long elements of the basic metrical pattern.

The modern reader tends to stress the long elements in metrical patterns, thus reading the basic five-position pattern ˘ — — ˘ — as 'di **dum dum** di **dum**' with three stresses (in bold print) as in the mnemonic 'the **wise kangaroos**'; but there are in fact *two* places only in which an upbeat is specified by the ἄρσις mark, one on position 1 and the other on position 3, leaving the downbeat to fall (and arguably to create greater emphasis) on positions 2 and 4–5. This articulation makes the rhythm subject to two downbeats of unequal durations, 'di **dum** dum **di-dum**' (as heard in the mnemonic 'that **ol'** man **river**').[44] It is uncertain how far the use of an ἄρσις sign at this period represents a purely rhythmical convention indicating 'upbeat' (as it does in our next example, the Seikilos song), or whether it preserves a genuine record of the movement of singers' bodies or limbs as, for instance, they raised up and brought down their arms or feet in the dance. Either way, it is noteworthy that in the case of both ἀνά and τινάξας, the first downbeat (θέσις) of the dochmiac pattern in the verse coincides with the pitch-accented syllables of those words.[45] This suggests that, as a substitute for marking the pitch inflection with a melodic rise, the θέσις could have imparted to those syllables an emphasis, perhaps both aural and visual, marked by a stamp of feet. This would add an obvious expressive weight to τινάξας and ἀνά. The fact that the sense of ἀνά as 'up' is marked by a 'down' beat is not an objection to this supposition; a dynamically accented beat may be

[43] Anon. Bell. 1.85. [44] Cf. D'Angour (2006b) 491–2.

[45] We do not know the melodic accompaniment to λύσσας (326) or δαίμων (343), but it may be noted that in both cases the θέσις would have fallen on these disyllabic words, effectively coinciding with the paroxytone.

used to give a sense of the 'raised' syllable (as appears to be the case in the Seikilos song discussed below).[46]

There is no need to suppose that the enunciation of the vocal line was always tied to the insistently regular rhythm indicated by the ἄρσις and θέσις. One of the keys to the exciting impact of the New Music may have been the vigorous interaction between the complex patterns of rhythms arising from the disposition of the sung words and a dance-beat dictated by simpler alternations of up and down beats. Such complexity would have been no less attractive to the sophisticated composers and chorus-trainers than the redirection of traditional expectations of word-pitch accordance into different form of expression by means of vocal or bodily ictus as well as expressive melodization. The varied and complex interaction of beat, melodic line, and pitch-accent offered a wealth of possibilities for creative poet-musicians to enhance their words through musical settings.

THE SONG OF SEIKILOS

Over half a millennium after Euripides composed the exciting, innovative music for his *Orestes* chorus, the same symbols of vocal notation were used to record the short song recorded on the 'Seikilos stele'. Dated to around 150–200 AD, the song preserves precious testimony to the way ancient musical notation, both melodic and rhythmical, was applied, and to a style of melodization that would have been familiar to musicians at this early period of overlap between pagan and early Christian practices. The song represents not only one of the most complete of ancient musical compositions, it is also the most accessible to the modern ear. The reasons for this are worth noting. First, in marked contrast to Euripides' agitated and complex dochmiacs, the form of the song (technically a series of iambic dimeters with syncopation and resolution) falls neatly and explicitly (given the ictus-marks included above the melodic

[46] In addition to the examples in the above footnote, the θέσις coincides with a number of other pitch-prominences on other important words where the melodic setting conflicts (or may have conflicted) with word-pitch, e.g. δίκαν, φόνον (323), μόχθων (327), τάλας, ἔρρεις (328), ἀναβακχεύει (339), etc. It may be significant that fewer such coincidences occur in the antistrophe: the composer would not have attempted to replicate in detail the expressive effects used in the strophe.

notation) into two regular four-bar phrases, a pattern that has dominated Western musical phrasing for hundreds of years.[47] Secondly, the melody, which is diatonic throughout and centres on a repeated *a*, is both lightly repetitive and artfully varied.

Transcribable into modern notation in the key of D major as shown below (but with the dominant *a* acting as a kind of 'tonic' note), the Song of Seikilos sits at least as easily with modern Western harmonic and rhythmical notions as with ancient modal and metrical theory.[48] With the possible exception of the last two falling notes of the song (a coda whose function I consider below), the general melodic form is familiar, and in practice somewhat reminiscent of the melodic effect of Gregorian plainsong:[49]



The words to which the music is set have been regularly dismissed by scholars as slight and banal, and the song itself is often described somewhat pejoratively (e.g. as a 'ditty').[50] Yet the sentiment it expresses, though hardly original, represents a timeless maxim, dignified by no less a philosophical system than Epicureanism, which

[47] See in general Rosen (1998) 258–78: 'On the whole, it is clear that by the 1820s the four-bar period has extended its domain over musical composition' (261).

[48] Solomon's (1986) painstaking analysis would be even harder for the song's original composer to understand than it is for a modern reader. The transcription here uses the standard key-signature of D major (initially without the barlines that are standardly used to mark off the phrases). However, the tune is recognizably centred on *a*; all that prevents the designation of A major with *a* as the tonic is the G natural (though this clearly *functions* as a subtonic).

[49] Were it not for the provenance of the stele and its conformity to obscure epigraphic and notational conventions (some of which were not widely recognized until the twentieth century), on the basis of the musical style alone it might be suspected of being an accomplished nineteenth-century forgery. According to the Alypian tables the notation is nominally Ionian (or Iastian), whereas the melody itself is clearly in the Phrygian species, i.e. it can be played entirely on the white notes of the piano octave that span *d*-*d′*, taking *g* as the tonic in place of *a*. Moreover, according to classical theory, the scale created out of the disjunct tetrachords *E*-*a* and *b*-*e* would correspond to a mode whose tonal centre should be expected to be *b*; were this in fact the case the opening 'fifth' would not be a perfect fifth (as it is clearly intended to be, based on the tonic *a*) but an irrational interval slightly greater than a fifth.

[50] West (1992b) 301.

bears and attracts repetition in every generation.[51] Equally it is clear, as I will show in detail below, that the melody itself has been composed and presented with close care and attention. The elegiac couplet that serves as an epigraph to the song sets out Seikilos' proud claim to have set up the stone as 'long-lasting sign of eternal memory' (*μνήμης ἀθανάτου σῆμα πολυχρόνιον*).[52] It says much for the composer's musical skill that he makes his melody conform almost entirely to word pitches without ever allowing these to restrict in any discernible way the overall shape and gently alternating patterns of his melodic phrasing. But there are expressive melodic elements in this apparently slight composition which have been overlooked by scholars in their zeal either to patronize it or to subject it to excessive technical analysis.[53]

A piece with so consistent an accord with word pitch inevitably draws attention to the one or two occasions on which it diverges from that accord, and the most obvious example is the rising fifth with which the song begins. This has been explained as a 'conventional *incipit*', but the sole ancient parallel adduced for such a practice is the opening rising fifth of Mesomedes' short 'Hymn to the Muse' (*ἄειδε Μοῦσα*) composed in the earlier part of the second century AD.[54] One cannot comfortably posit a convention on so slim a base of evidence. Another explanation is available if we recall the use made by Euripides of ictus to represent what would otherwise be heard as a rise in pitch on an accented syllable. It makes perfect aural sense here for the first syllables of *ὅσον* and *ἄειδε* to bear a dynamic stress in place of a melodic heightening.[55] The same use of dynamic rather than melodic representation might be observed in the case of the other

[51] Cf. Horace's *carpe diem* (*C.* 1.11.8). As I write, the pop group 'Take That' perform their song *Shine* to international audiences, while the refrain in Sean Lennon's *Sunshine Lyrics* is another pertinent example.

[52] *σῆμα πολυχρόνιον* sets up a slight tension with *μνήμης ἀθανάτου* ('immortal memory'); the stone will eventually decay, but the memory will last forever. The musical author may also be playing on the technical meaning of *χρόνος*, a rhythmical beat, suggesting that the song to come contains many such *χρόνοι*, until '*χρόνος* itself brings it to a close' (a metapoetic gloss on the final phrase).

[53] After twenty-four pages of technical analysis, Solomon (1986) describes it as 'an "attractive melody" not without melodic inspiration' (479).

[54] *DAGM* 24.

[55] If 'the change from a primary pitch accent to a primary stress accent was . . . widespread by the middle of the second century BC' (Horrocks (2010) 111), it will have been well established by the time of Hadrian (whose freedman Mesomedes was).

apparent violation of pitch accent, in respect of ἐστί in the third line. The graceful melodic figure on the first long syllable incorporates a slight rise in pitch, but the ictus on the second syllable makes a more definite impact on the word's accentuation—which at this period, moreover, would have been heard in spoken Greek as a dynamic stress (a point to which I will return).[56]

Using the opening *a* as a melodic centre, Seikilos establishes with a rising fifth to *e* the harmonic framework of the melody to follow; out of its thirty-seven notes, only four fall below the 'tonic' *a* and none rise above the *e*. The rising interval of a fifth not only embraces the song's central melodic span, it imitatively 'spans' the word ὅσον—'so long as'—in a manner reminiscent of the imitative use of the interval by Euripides in the melodically distended setting of 'stretching out' (ὀρε-εχθείς).[57] Further expressive uses of melodic shape are evident throughout the song. At the end of the second phrase, λυποῦ ends with a falling melodic figure that symbolically imitates the sense of despondency inherent in the word's meaning. The final note of that phrase, the 'subtonic' note *g*, is melodically a half-cadence; so the listener grasps that the statement is not yet over—indeed, that we are only half-way through it. The third phrase illustrates the notion of life being for a 'little' span by beginning with a series of 'little' (i.e. resolved short) syllables (πρὸς ὀλίγον); while the last word of that phrase, ζῆν, precisely echoes the melody of the final syllable of the previous line and similarly ends on the subtonic *g*, reinforcing the sense that 'the end' is yet to come.

The final verse, which begins with the words τὸ τέλος, 'the end', is set to a series of notes that strike the ear as a simple rearrangement of those in the penultimate verse; yet they are subtly different, with the addition of a further infixed note (*b*). This allows for a stepwise upward progression of a pattern which maps the melodic shape of τὸ τέλος onto that of ὁ χρόνος at a higher pitch, melodically asserting that 'time' is the arbiter as well as the grammatical subject of the sentence. The final word ἀπαιτεῖ is melodized to strike a note of finality, even of doom. In contrast to the high, optimistic sentiments

[56] This suggestion obviates the need to posit a paroxytone accent for ἐστὶ (i.e. ἔστι), as assumed in West (1992b) 3–1 and suggested in *DAGM* p. 90.

[57] The sound and shape of the rising *hoson* has drawn comparison to the early chant *Hosanna Filio David*: Reese (1941) 115. Curiously, the surviving musical documents preserve other occasions on which a *hosanna* may be heard in some form, including the Euripidean ὅ σ' ἀναβακχεύει.

indicated by the high pitch and rising melody of *φαίνου* in the first verse, the 'demand' of time with its falling final pitches (to the lowest note of the whole piece, *E*) brings the hearer to a sober realization of the inevitability of ending.

The subtly imitative qualities of the melody are masterly, and never intrude on the musical integrity of the song. The artful compactness of the song's form also merits consideration, and our recognition of the changed pronunciation of Greek in the Roman era alerts us to a formal feature that has not been generally remarked on: the last syllable of each couplet of the four-line song is composed to give the effect of a rhyme. Pronounced correctly for their time, the words *ζῆν* ([zi:n]) and *ἀπαιτεῖ* ([ape:ti:]) at the end of the penultimate and final verses would have been heard, no less than *φαίνου* and *λυποῦ* in the opening verses, to create an unmistakable assonance. This feature significantly highlights the remoteness of this composition, with its rhyme scheme AABB, from classical poetic practice, where rhyme is never used in this way. Despite detectable elements of expressive continuity with earlier music such as we have mentioned, this alien intrusion on classical norms warns us that the use of the musical notation alone should not mislead us into supposing that the song was heard to operate according to traditional rhythmic canons any more than it conforms to classical harmonic theory.

Under these circumstances, it seems as anachronistic to analyse the song in terms of ancient musical theory and metrics as it would be to explain an artist's choice of colours of an ancient mosaic in terms of spectrographic frequencies. If the rhythm were, in fact, to be straightforwardly analysed as 'iambic dimeters', the standard scansion of the text might appear as follows:

Ὅσον ζῇς, φαίνου,	˘ — — | — —	*2 ia*
μηδὲν ὅλως σὺ λυποῦ·	— ˘ ˘ — | ˘ — —	*2 ia*
πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν,	˘ ˘˘ ˘ — | ˘ — —	*2 ia*
τὸ τέλος ὁ χρόνος ἀπαιτεῖ.	˘ ˘˘ ˘ ˘˘ | ˘ — —	*2 ia*

Setting aside the indications of beat and syllable duration on the stele, these verses are recognizably iambic in form. The lyric iambic metron is subject to transformations such as those created by syncopation (a missing beat, standardly indicated by ∧) and resolution (two short beats for one long). Complete with syncopations and 'bunched' resolutions, the rhythmical equivalence of each line invites more appropriate visual representation as follows:

˘ — ^ — | ^ — ^ —
— ˘ ˘ — | ˘ — ^ —
˘ ˘˘ ˘ — | ˘ — ^ —
˘ ˘˘ ˘ ˘˘ | ˘ — ^ —

Such an analysis, however, alerts us to practical complications. Without the *στιγμαί* to indicate a regularly spaced beat, the second line could represent (in 'scansion mode') the rhythm **dum** di di **dum** di **dum** [di] **dum**; that is, it might most easily be read *μηδὲν ὅλως σὺ λυποῦ* with stress accents on the long syllables (as underlined) and a compensatory shortening of the value of the double-short element (♩. ♬ ♩. ♪ ♩. ♩.).[58] In place of this offbeat rhythm, the duration-signs and *στιγμαί* show that the intended rhythm was one of evenly pulsed intervals, *μηδὲν ὅλως σὺ λυποῦ* (♩ ♪ ♪ ♩ ♪ ♩ ♩). Similarly, in the absence of *στιγμαί* the third and fourth lines might more readily be stressed on the second and fourth elements (with or without resolution) of each iambic metron, i.e. *πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν, / τὸ τέλος ὁ χρόνος ἀπαιτεῖ*. The apparently correct evenly stressed rhythm (*πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν, / τὸ τέλος ὁ χρόνος ἀπαιτεῖ*) may be restored by showing the staff transciption with barlines (which imply ictus at the beginning of a bar) in place of the *στιγμαί* used on the stone:



The result of reinforcing the ictus on the first syllable of each verse, however, is that the song is easily heard (particularly the last two phrases, as its nineteenth-century editor Carl von Jan perceptively noted) as falling into a trochaic rhythm i.e. — ˘ — ˘, a 'falling' rather than a 'rising' rhythm.[59] Moreover, the substitution of a choriamb (— ˘ ˘ —) for an iambic metron in the second line represents a rare metrical variant in classical verse (technically an 'anaclastic' iamb, in which the position of the first two elements ˘ — are reversed to — ˘).[60] Its presence here raises further questions about how securely the song can be analysed in classical metrical terms. The regular ictus and prolonged notes (it is better to speak of prolongation than the

[58] Cf. West (1982) 23–4. [59] Jan (1962 [1895]) Supplement p. 36.

[60] A possible (but not universally accepted) example of such anaclasis may be found in the first line of the 'Nestor's Cup' inscription (*CEG* 454).

traditional 'syncopation', which strictly speaking connotes a 'gap' in the rhythmic flow) suggest a different approach to rhythmicization from that of classical verse, albeit one which has elements of continuity. Rather than subject the song to heavy-handed metrical analysis, therefore, we might be better advised to trust the aural impression that the song produces, which is one of syllabic and phrasal balance reinforced by assonance, comparable to a familiar nursery rhyme:

> *Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall*
> *Humpty Dumpty had a great fall;*
> *All the king's horses and all the king's men*
> *Couldn't put Humpty together again.*[61]

Finally, however, one might wonder how the increasing dynamic stresses of the word accents in regular spoken Greek of the time (touched on above in the discussion of the melodization of *ἐστί* in the third phrase) might have interacted with the metre and phrasing. This becomes particularly acute in the fourth phrase of the song, where the dynamic accents of second-century speech would have fallen on syllables that do not coincide with the ictus implied by the *στιγμαί*. Taking dynamic stress solely into account, it would be more accurate to transcribe the latter part of the song with barlines placed immediately prior to the words *τέλος*, with the definite article *τό* acting as a kind of upbeat before the barline, i.e.:



Given the natural placing of stresses on the words in spoken Greek at the time of the song's composition, this may well be how the enunciation was perceived by the composer, and inscriptional indications may support this view: the placing on the stele of the *στιγμή* over the second syllable of *λυποῦ* in the second phrase has been 'corrected' by recent editors so that it falls in the centre of the diseme sign.[62] This

[61] Such a comparison may in the past have led to the song's being dismissed as a musical trifle. It is instructive to sing the Seikilos melody to the words of 'Humpty Dumpty', noting how the word 'fall' coincides with a melodic fall, the melody speeds up with 'all the king's horses', and the coda of the final bar strikes a note of dejection appropriate to the conclusion. While these melodic coincidences may be the result of felicitous chance, the effects are noticeable.

[62] *DAGM* p. 88, line 7; similar assumptions may have guided the editors' placing of the *στιγμαί* over *ζῆν* and *ἀπαιτεῖ*.

leads to an even and regular rhythmical interpretation of the verse, as shown in the staff transcription above. On the stele, however, the *στιγμή* is placed above the *ῦ* of *λυποῦ*. This may suggest that the author considered the ictus as falling on the second note to which that diphthong is set, as it would be if one sings the words in 'scansion mode' as earlier suggested (i.e. stressed on the long beats as *μηδὲν ὅλως σὺ λυποῦ*):



In practice, it is open to listeners to switch their perception of ictus to either manner of execution.[63] But when one attempts to sing the piece according to such dynamic accentuation while simultaneously preserving the notated *ἄρσις*, the resulting cross-rhythms give the performer a different (and arguably more interesting) sense of melodic movement from that achieved by stressing the words solely according to the regular alternation of ictus.

A corollary of this observation is that the composer will have been less prone than we are to hear the verses as rhythmicized in the regular sing-song way that may have contributed to modern scholars' dismissive characterizations of the piece. The rhythmical interaction between dynamic accent and ictus would not be the only anomalous feature of the song to modern ears. When the stele was first transcribed, the melodic drop by the interval of a fourth at the end of the song came as an unwelcome surprise to some modern musical commentators, who would have preferred a more familiar cadential close with reversion to the initial *a*. In terms of modern harmonic expectations, it is not unusual for a melody to end on the functionally dominant note of the scale (*e*), in this case that of the octave below the tonic. But here the explanation may be found in terms of the composer's attempt to create formal balance: as the opening interval is a rising fifth *a-e*, the closing interval matches it by being the falling interval *a-E*. As well as having an expressive purpose, then, the falling notes of the last word form an apt counterpart to the rising

[63] This is a phenomenon well known to listeners of classical music; one may for instance 'choose' when listening to a performance of Beethoven's *Moonlight Sonata* (1st Movt) to hear the triplets as stressed on any one of the three triplet quavers, even if the intended ictus is on the first.

notes of the opening word of the song. With the final phrase creating a fitting melodic response to the opening rising fifth, the song's octave range is brought to completion only with the song's final note. The ear easily accommodates the sense of closure afforded by the last note being the lower extremity of the octave *E-e*, for which the centrally placed *a* has provided the tonic centre throughout.

CONCLUSIONS

The particular qualities of Greek music, as demonstrated in examples that span nearly one thousand years, may be shown to have consistently affected the way texts were understood, performed, and received. From Homer through to Seikilos, a remarkable continuity is demonstrated in the relationship of words to sung texts that depends not solely on conventional rhythmical patterns and pitch accents but on the use of melody for expressive purposes. While the precise mechanisms for the use of melody, rhythm, and musical form for the purpose of textual enrichment varied widely across the centuries, many of the same characteristics and principles are evident in the singing of Homer, the choral expression of Euripides, and the song of Seikilos. They all involve the use of music for the heightening of the emotional and semantic qualities of the text, the patterning of thematically important elements, and the structuration of their songs.

All these elements are picked up in what is standardly taken to be the foundational expressions of modern Western music, the Gregorian chants that are first found in notated form in the ninth century AD. This brings us back to the question of whether we may validly attribute to the ancients an understanding and employment of melodic shape in expressive and thematic terms that are so immediately graspable by a modern Western ear. The answer seems to be that the earliest music of Greece exhibits elements of symbolic and affective, no less than geographical and cultural, continuity with the wellsprings of the Western musical tradition. This demonstrable fact allows us to return to the songs of ancient composers with renewed illumination and admiration for the way they used rhythm and melody to make a difference to their texts.

3

Words and the Musician

Pindar's Dactylo-Epitrites

Tom Phillips

Scholars have often acknowledged the extent to which our understanding of classical choral performances is constrained by our limited knowledge of music and dance, yet although the metrical structures of the poems provide us with a means of at least beginning to reconstruct the expressiveness of ancient songs, there has been surprisingly little sustained focus on the intersection between rhythm and semantics in our extant texts.[1] This chapter aims to make good this omission by addressing two aspects of Pindar's dactylo-epitrite epinicians in which metre and meaning combine to striking effect. I first consider rhythmical sequences with expressive or 'enactive' force,[2] in which significant interactions occur between rhythmical form and semantic content at the level of individual words or phrases. I then look more closely at the interweaving of sound and sense over a longer span of text, focusing on how stanzaic responsion in the opening two triads of *Pythian* 1 informs the poem's metapoetic

I would like to thank the audiences at the 'Music and Texts in Ancient Greece' workshop and conference for their responses to early versions of this chapter. I am also grateful to Armand D'Angour, Felix Budelmann, and Emily Robotham for their comments at a later stage. All translations are my own.

[1] See however Edwards (2002), and the comments of Dale (1969) 248–58 on metre and meaning.

[2] My use of 'rhythmical enactment' to describe this phenomenon is based on the parallel notion of 'stylistic enactment', for which see e.g. Silk (2007). In some of the cases I discuss, rhythmical enactment will be seen to work alongside other aspects of style: see e.g. pp. 84–7.

meditations.[3] The aim of these readings is to develop a more granular understanding both of Pindar's style and the experience of spectatorship. In attempting to meet the challenge of finding a vocabulary to describe and analyse this aspect of Pindar's poetics, and to throw an imaginative bridge across the cultural divide that separates modern readers from ancient audiences, we may begin from some instances of ancient scholars' thinking about poetic rhythm.

ANCIENT TESTIMONIES: OPENINGS AND PROBLEMS

Perhaps the most celebrated instance of ancient literary critics' interest in the expressive features of poetic rhythm is Dionysius of Halicarnassus' discussion of the narrative of Sisyphus' punishment at *Od.* 11.593–8. He begins by commenting on the expressiveness of the rhythms and syllabic structure of 594–6 (*καὶ μὴν Σίσυφον εἰσεῖδον κρατέρ᾽ ἄλγε᾽ ἔχοντα, / λᾶαν βαστάζοντα πελώριον ἀμφοτέρῃσιν*, 'And I saw Sisyphus bearing great pains, straining with both arms to move a huge rock'), arguing that 'the monosyllabic and disyllabic words leave many intervals between each other and imitate the time the action takes (*τὸ χρόνιον ἐμιμήσαντο τοῦ ἔργου*). The long syllables, which have a holding, delaying quality, give an impression of the weight and the difficulty of the deed (*αἱ δὲ μακραὶ συλλαβαὶ στηριγμούς τινας ἔχουσαι καὶ ἐγκαθίσματα τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ μόλις*)'. Then, describing phrases such as *λᾶαν ἄνω ὤθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον* ('he pushed the rock towards the crest', 596) he remarks that 'when considered in respect of their length, the rhythms portray the strain of his limbs and the dragging as he rolls his burden along and his propping up of the boulder'. Sound and sense then combine to provide a vivid impression of the rock rolling down the hillside in 598 (*αὖτις ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής*, 'and then again the pitiless boulder tumbled down to the plain'): 'doesn't the arrangement

[3] Relatively little attention has been paid to this phenomenon; an exception is Mullen (1982) 90–142, but his focus is on the structural role of the epode: see below n. 18. See also Phillips (2013) 53–5; Sobak (2013). For a catalogue of verbal and thematic responsions and doxography of previous scholarship on the subject see Stockert (1969).

of the words tumble down with the impetus of the rock, and doesn't the speed of the narration even outstrip the rock's movement' (*οὐχὶ συγκυλίεται τῷ βάρει τῆς πέτρας ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔφθακε τὴν τοῦ λίθου φορὰν τὸ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας τάχος*;).[4] Dionysius' reading testifies to the expressiveness attributed to rhythmical form and the critical care directed at its elucidation.[5]

The interrelation of sound and sense is also at issue in a less known but equally sophisticated analysis of rhythmical affectivity found in the metrical scholia to *O.*1. The analysis focuses on the use of a colon comprising six short syllables (˘ ˘˘ ˘ ˘˘) in the thirteenth line of the strophe (*Σ O.*1.metr., i Dr 14):[6]

> The thirteenth [sc. colon] is a proceleusmatic catalectic dimeter. In which observe a marvellous effect. For this rhythm is appropriate for swiftness (*ὁ τοιόσδε ῥυθμὸς ταχυτῆτι ἁρμόττει*), whence its name 'proceleusmatic'. But look now at how the brilliant Pindar has been found to reinforce such a rhythm throughout the poem so that it stands out, by successfully expressing speed in the meaning of his words. (*βλέπε τοίνυν τὸν σοφώτατον Πίνδαρον πῶς ἥλω ἐν οἷς τὸν τοιοῦτον ῥυθμὸν εὔσημον διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταχυτῆτα κατωρθωκὼς ἐν οἷς λέγει*): 'whence the much-spoken . . . ' (*ὅθεν ὁ πολύφατος*, 8), because of the speed of rumour; and 'mind with sweetest . . . ' (*νόον ὑπὸ γλυκυτάταις*, 19) because of the swift movements of the mind; and, 'when his father called' (*ὁπότ' ἐκάλεσε πατήρ*, 37), because of the speed of the call; and 'that into water on the fire' (*ὕδατος ὅτι τε πυρί*, 48) because of the ease of movement of the elements involved, the one rising, the other falling; and again, 'among the short-lived . . . ' (*μετὰ τὸ ταχύποτμον*, 66); and, 'me on the swiftest . . . ' (*ἐμὲ δ' ἐπὶ ταχυτάτων*, 77); and 'of Pelops, where of swiftness . . . ' (*Πέλοπος ἵνα ταχυτής*, 95), and in addition to these [passages] 'a god being a guardian' (*θεὸς ἐπίτροπος ἐών*, 106) because of the swift movement of the divine that exceeds even the dart of the eye.

[4] Parker (2007) is sceptical about Dionysius' reading, pointing out that the metrically remarkable feature of 598 is not that it is holodactylic, but that 'all the bicipitia except one are split by word end' (p. 298). However, she does not mention the sound pattern of the line, in which the repetition of *τ* and *δ* adds to the effect: although Dionysius makes no reference to this, its articulation of the line shapes the *σύνθεσις* to which he responds.

[5] Sound effects in language were theorized extensively in the classical period (see Porter (2010) 308–30), and were crucial to the 'euphonist' critics of the Hellenistic period: for an overview see Janko (2000) 120–89.

[6] In Snell–Maehler's colometry, this element is analysed as iambic as part of a line consisting of three iambic metra. On the ancient metrical analysis cf. Santé (2008) 58–9. For comments on the metre of *O.*1 in general cf. Mullen (1982) 178–84; Itsumi (2009) 142–3.

According to this commentator, Pindar has cleverly employed verbal phrases that convey ideas related to speed (*ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταχυτῆτα κατωρθωκώς*) to fit with the character of the rhythm.[7] The scholiast has pursued the effect across the whole poem, and saw rhythm and sense as combining to produce a 'marvellous effect'. The scholium is also notable for the range of relationships that it envisages between rhythmical form and semantic content: in some phrases, such as those of lines 66, 77, and 95, the rhythm reinforces the direct verbal references to speed, but in others the relationship is more complex. In *νόον ὑπὸ γλυκυτάταις* and *ὁπότ' ἐκάλεσε πατήρ*, for instance, the rhythm encourages the listener to impute speed to the concepts and actions signified, even though this dimension is not obvious at a verbal level. In these cases, rhythm supplements rather than reinforces semantics. By suggesting such complex interactions, the scholium provides a useful indicator of how subtly and variously rhythm and meaning can be related.[8]

The primary texts under discussion are especially marked instances of rhythmical enactment, and we should be cautious about inferring from these examples that such effects were perceived to be common by ancient readers.[9] Nevertheless, these readings are useful as pointers to the effects Pindar's poetry may have generated when performed, the terms of the analysis prompting us to imagine how such effects may have been augmented in a choral performance by gesture and instrumental setting. Yet the move from analysing rhythmical structures on the page to thinking about how they may have been bodied out in performance poses considerable problems.[10] The metre of a poem is not necessarily a sure guide to how it would have been performed,[11] as

[7] Itsumi (2009) 150–1 makes similar comments, although without reference to the scholium.

[8] Although there is of course no parallel for such a run of short syllables in the dactylo-epitrite odes.

[9] This is the only instance of such comment in the metrical scholia to Pindar. However, the characterization of the effect *θαυμάσιον* as does not imply that it is in itself unusual, but that it is 'wonderful' in its sophistication (cf. *σοφώτατον*). Cf. also Heracleodorus on change in rhythms as changing how an utterance is understood: Phld. *De poem.* 1.34 with the remarks of Janko (2000) 223 n. 8. For caution about metrical design for particular effects see e.g. Dale (1969) 258; West (1982) 39; Parker (2007) 297.

[10] In relation to Pindar see Mullen (1982), and more generally the cautionary comments of Dale (1968) 204.

[11] On the debate about whether rhythm and metre would have been identical in fifth-century poetry see e.g. Naerebout (1997) 202–6. Pöhlmann (1995) argues strongly for their non–identity. Even if identity of rhythm and metre did predominate,

syllabic quantities are only part of what constitutes rhythm as realized in performance: syllables can be sung with varying durations, so altering the tempo of the piece. In his analysis of poetic rhythms, Aristides Quintilianus states that 'rhythmical tempo is the quickness or slowness of durations' (*ἀγωγὴ δέ ἐστι ῥυθμικὴ χρόνων τάχος ἢ βραδυτής*), and his subsequent remarks make clear that such tempi could vary considerably both in form and effect. This proposition is further complicated by the role of what the ancients termed *ἄρσις* and *θέσις*, 'rise', 'up-beat', and 'placing', 'down-beat' respectively. These terms derive from the movements of the dancers; *θέσις* is heavier, and refers to the 'placing' of the dancers' feet, while *ἄρσις* refers to the lifting of the foot.

Aristides' comments make it clear that these movements played an important role in articulating rhythm (*De mus.* 1.13):

> Rhythm, then, is a system of durations put together in an ordered form (*ῥυθμὸς τοίνυν ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ χρόνων κατά τινα τάξιν συγκειμένων*). We call the modifications of these durations *ἄρσις* and *θέσις*, sound and silence. Notes as such, because of the lack of differentiation in their movement, leave the interweaving of the melody obscure and confuse the mind: it is the elements of rhythm that make clear the force of the melody (*τὰ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ μέρη τὴν δύναμιν τῆς μελῳδίας ἐναργῆ καθίστησι*), moving the mind part by part, but in an ordered way. *ἄρσις* is the upwards movement of a part of the body, *θέσις* the downwards movement of the same part.

The statement that 'the elements of rhythm . . . make clear the force of the melody' testifies to rhythm's importance: by altering *τὰ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ μέρη*, that is, by lengthening the duration of syllables, a performer or performers could alter the 'force' of a given metrical sequence. The use of *δύναμις* here clearly refers to the 'ethical' effects of different rhythms, a topos in ancient discussions of musical culture,[12] and a subject which Aristides discusses in the second book of his *De musica*. Here he presents a detailed explication of the analysis mentioned above, in which long and short syllables, and also different kinds of rhythmical arrangements, produce different effects (2.15):

however, it is possible that poets and performers could have introduced a certain amount of variation for aesthetic effect.

[12] See e.g. Ar. *Poet.* 1447a26–7 with Scott (2005) 157–8.

> *τῶν δ' ἐν ἴσῳ λόγῳ οἱ μὲν διὰ βραχειῶν γινόμενοι μόνων τάχιστοι καὶ θερμότεροι, <οἱ δὲ διὰ μακρῶν μόνων βραδύτεροι> καὶ κατεσταλμένοι, οἱ δ' ἀναμὶξ ἐπίκοινοι. εἰ δὲ διὰ μηκίστων χρόνων συμβαίη γίνεσθαι τοὺς πόδας, πλείων ἡ κατάστασις ἐμφαίνοιτ' ἂν τῆς διανοίας. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν βραχεῖς ἐν ταῖς πυρρίχαις χρησίμους ὁρῶμεν, τοὺς δ' ἀναμὶξ <ἐν> ταῖς μέσαις ὀρχήσεσι, τοὺς δὲ μηκίστους ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὕμνοις.*
>
> Of the rhythms in equal ratio, those composed from short syllables only are the swiftest and liveliest, while those which are composed of long syllables and slower and calmer, and those that are a mixture of both share in both qualities. If it happens that the feet are constituted out of very long durations, the calming effect on the mind is greater. On this account, we observe that short durations are useful in war-dances, mixed durations in dances of the middle type, and the longest in the holy hymns.

Later in the discussion, Aristides elaborates on the ethical effects of rhythms by comparing them to different 'styles of walking'; those who walk with equal steps of a good length approximate to spondaic rhythms, which are 'stable and manly in character', whereas short and irregular steps, like the corresponding rhythms, are indicative of irrationality and dissipation. For Aristides, 'rhythms whose tempo is swifter are livelier and active, those in which it is slow are relaxed and peaceful' (*τῶν ῥυθμῶν οἱ μὲν ταχυτέρας ποιούμενοι τὰς ἀγωγὰς θερμοί τέ εἰσι καὶ δραστήριοι, οἱ δὲ βραδείας καὶ ἀναβεβλημένας ἀνειμένοι τε καὶ ἡσυχαστικοί*). He regards the dactylic metra as 'more noble that all the others on account of always having a long syllable in the leading position' (*σεμνότερον γὰρ ἁπάντων διὰ τὸ τὴν μακρὰν ἀεί ποτε καθηγουμένην ἔχειν*).[13] These comments parallel those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for whom the spondee 'has great dignity and much solemnity' (*ἀξίωμα δὲ ἔχει μέγα καὶ σεμνότητα πολλήν*), while the dactyl 'is very elevated and most apt for beauty of expression' (*πάνυ δ' ἐστὶ σεμνὸς καὶ εἰς τὸ κάλλος τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἀξιολογώτατος*). Dionysius also comments that the epic hexameter owes much of its formal beauty to its dactylic component (*τό γε ἡρωικὸν μέτρον ἀπὸ τούτου κοσμεῖται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*). Despite the generalizing nature of these comments and their ethical slant, they provide a useful template for thinking about the affectivity of dactylo-epitrite.[14] Although we

[13] Aristid. Quint. *De mus.* 1.24.

[14] For general comments on dactylo-epitrite see e.g. Dale (1969) 53–60; West (1982) 69–76. For convenience, I use 'epitritic' to denote the combinations denoted by E and e in Maas' scheme. For a definition of 'epitrite' see West (1982) 70. The use of

should be wary of assuming that these later critics heard when reading the same effects that early audiences heard when attending performances, the rhythms' affective qualities are unlikely to have altered so much as to make such reflections entirely irrelevant to analysis of Pindar's epinicians as songs in performance.

Yet these passages also highlight the provisionality of our evidence. In Aristides' scheme, Pindar's poetry would be classified as *ἀναμίξ*, containing as it does a mixture of cola in which long and short syllables predominate. The metre's combination and juxtaposition of such cola is also suggestive, as I shall argue below.[15] Unfortunately, however, we do not know what kind of *ἄρσις* and *θέσις* patterns Pindar and his choruses employed. We are also in the dark about the type of 'durations' employed by fifth-century performers, and no simple correlation can be drawn between long syllables and stress patterns.[16] Moreover, attempts to analyse rhythm in Pindar's epinicians are complicated further by the poems' triadic form and the use of dance in choral performance. In addition to the role played by rhythmical sequences in articulating listeners' understanding of long, syntactically involved sentences and the development of complex ideas,[17] the final section of my argument will suggest some ways in which rhythmical responsion between and within triadic structures can be deployed to aesthetic effect.[18] However, even a brief glance at some of the names of dance figures that have come down to us reveals

this terminology should not lead us to reify these metrical building-blocks as compositional tools, or as modalities of reception for Pindar's fifth-century audiences. Both Pindar and his audiences are likely to have had a much more intuitive grasp of rhythmical constructs than would be implied by too systematic a retrojection of 'dactylo-epitrite' onto fifth-century compositional and interpretative mentalities. The value of the term lies in its heuristic benefits rather than in its historical accuracy.

[15] Cf. Dale (1969) 251.

[16] The musical notation on the papyrus of Euripides' *Orestes* shows that long syllables and *θέσις* do not always coincide; cf. Pöhlmann (1995), and D'Angour (this volume) pp. 63–4.

[17] A feature of rhythm that has received considerable attention in modern cognitive studies: see e.g Thaut (2005) 5 on rhythm as articulating patterns of meaning: 'discernible temporal distribution and organization of events in groupings imposed by a rhythmic structure [are] a way of imposing order and meaning onto the perceptual process'.

[18] The most thoroughgoing attempt to analyse the structural aspect of Pindaric triads is Mullen (1982). Central to his analysis is the notion of 'epodic arrest', based on the premiss that the chorus were stationary during the singing of the epode, whereas they moved to the left and right during the strophe and antistrophe. However, the sources that claim that epodes were sung when the singers were standing still

the problems posed by our lack of evidence for Pindaric choreography. Terms applied to the *σχήματα* of ancient dances, such as 'whirl', 'Pan's leg', and 'sword-dance',[19] hint at the richly mimetic dimension of dance, and at the complex performance realities that lie behind Plato's analysis of of *χορεία* in the *Laws*, in which he argues that 'no-one who is using his voice, whether in songs or speeches, can remain very calm in his body'. This results in the emergence of 'mimesis of what is said with gestures' (*μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων σχήμασι*), a practice that 'constitutes the whole art of dancing' (*τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύμπασαν*).[20]

Plato's claim for the mimeticity of all dance, and retrojections from later evidence to the practices of the fifth century, have rightly been questioned,[21] but the potential complexities of the relationships between words, rhythms, and gestures in performance should be borne in mind throughout what follows. The most important point to emerge from the preceding remarks, however, is that metrical

(collected at Färber (1936) ii 14–19, and discussed by Mullen (1982) 228–30) all date to after the first century AD, and have been considered an invention of that period; see e.g. Crusius (1888). In these late sources, dance has an astrological dimension, reflecting the movement of the cosmos (see e.g. iii 306 Dr), but there is no evidence for this idea in the classical period: on the connection between chorality and the heavens in early poetry see Ferrari (2008) 2–6. Mullen's attempts to infer choreography from choral language have been tellingly criticized (see Burnett (1984) 156–7), and some of his inferences, such as that the absence of movement from the epode would have allowed for the audience to be 'engaged all the more deeply with the sound and meaning of the song' (Mullen (1982) 92) do not stand up to scrutiny. Moreover, Mullen does not mention a significant piece of evidence against the presence of the notion of epodic arrest in Hellenistic scholarship. In his discussion of triadic construction at *Comp.* 19, Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes the point that composers could alter melody and rhythm in epodes but not from strophe to antistrophe (*περὶ δὲ τὰς καλουμένας ἐπῳδοὺς ἀμφότερα κινεῖν ταῦτα ἔξεστι*), but does not mention any difference in choreography between epode and the rest of the triad. Given that the differentiation of the epode is at issue, it seems unlikely that Dionysius would have omitted to mention the change to standing still had it been known to him. This conclusion further supports the argument that the standing epode was a construct of later scholarship. The recent application of epodic arrest to Pindar by Sobak (2013) does not take account of the criticisms levelled at Mullen's thesis.

[19] Recorded at Eust. 1166.10 on *Il.* 18.590, Hesych. s.v., Ath. 14.629f respectively. For analysis of *σχήματα* and a list of further such terms, see Lawler (1954) 151–4.

[20] Pl. *Leg.* 816a. Cf. Peponi (2009) 59–60; Prauscello (2013b).

[21] On mimeticity in general see Naerebout (1997) 109, and in peripatetic dance theory see Scott (2005) 158, who argues that Aristotle did not conceive all dances to be necessarily mimetic of 'character'. On the retrojection of later evidence see e.g. Lawler (1954); Naerebout (1997) 269–73; for an overview of the aesthetics of dance see Peponi (2015).

structures are best conceived as templates on which performers could have drawn in order to create musical, rhythmical, and gestural effects, rather than as self-sufficient phenomena.[22] My aim in the following analyses is therefore to note passages in which significant intersections between rhythmical and semantic structures may have been at work, and comment on the possibilities these create for performance and interpretation. These readings will suggest that while Dionysius and Aristides provide useful guidelines, greater complexities are likely to have been at work in the relation between rhythm and semantics than can be captured by the terminology employed by the ancient critics.

MICRORHYTHMICAL EFFECTS

The remarks of the critics quoted above suggest that epitritic cola might have sometimes been employed to convey and complement a sense of weightiness, slowness, or staticity, and there are numerous examples of such affectivity to be found in Pindar, especially in conjunction with period or stanza end. An example of a climactic epitrite with a force which ancient listeners (and readers) are likely to have recognized as possessing *σεμνότης* is *O.*8.44, *πεμφθὲν βαρυγδούπου Διός* (— — ˘ — — — ˘ —).[23] Here the analectic epitrite with long in anceps position complements the weightiness and grandeur of Zeus' thunder. At *P.*1.75, Pindar describes Hiero in a vivid metaphor as 'dragging Greece out of heavy enslavement' (*Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας*). Here the slow epitritic rhythm (— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —) complements both the notion of weightiness and connotes the effort involved in the 'dragging' metaphor. Equally, dactylic cola often occur in association with forms of movement, comparable to the scholiast's analysis of O1s13 described above. At *O.*3.3, in the phrase *ὕμνον ὀρθώσαις, ἀκαμαντοπόδων* ('raising a hymn for [horses] with untiring feet', — ˘ — — — ˘˘ — ˘˘ —), the three long

[22] The practical role played by the poet in rehearsing his chorus and overseeing the implementation of particular dance moves and other performance features is unclear; see e.g. the comments of Mullen (1982) 12–21; and Wilson (2000) 81–6 on choral training at Athens.

[23] The line is spoken by Apollo, and refers to a 'vision' (*φάσμα*) 'sent from loud-thundering Zeus'.

syllables of *ὀρθώσαις* offset the dactylic movement of *ἀκαμαντοπόδων*, the dactylic movement of which suggests the speed of the galloping horses. Similar is *O.*3.26, where a dactylic rhythm coincides with the description of Leto's 'horse-driving daughter' (*Ἰστρίαν νιν· ἔνθα Λατοῦς ἱπποσόα θυγάτηρ*: — ˘ — ˘ — ˘ — — — ˘˘ — ˘˘ —).

The phrasing of *ὕμνον ὀρθώσαις, ἀκαμαντοπόδων* also exemplifies another common feature of Pindar's rhythmical poetics, namely the contrastive juxtaposition of dactylic and epitritic movements. The scholium which glosses *ὀρθώσαις* explains the term as 'having raised up, elevated, and exalted the ode' (*ἢ ὀρθώσας καὶ ὑψώσας καὶ αὐξήσας τὸν ὕμνον*, *Σ O.*3.5c = i 107 Dr),[24] and it is easy to see this rhetoric of exaltation as reinforced by the 'great dignity and . . . solemnity' Dionysius sees at work in rhythms based on long syllables. The affectivity of this syllabic structure is heightened by contrast with the lighter syllables that follow. I now turn to three longer passages in which similar juxtapositions occur, in order to illustrate the range of effects that can be created by these techniques. The first the description in *Olympian* 3 of Heracles' visit to the Hyperboreans and his first glimpse of the olive trees that he will transplant to Olympia (31–2):

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ —

τὰν μεθέπων ἴδε καὶ κείναν χθόνα D – e

— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

πνοιαῖς ὄπιθεν Βορέα – D

— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ —

ψυχροῦ· τόθι δένδρεα θάμβαινε σταθείς. – D – e

Pursuing her [sc. the doe] he also saw that land beyond the blasts of cold Boreas; there he stood and marvelled at the trees.

There are several rhythmically suggestive phrases in this passage. The light movement of *ὄπιθεν Βορέα* fits the wind's motility, while the spondaic words *πνοιαῖς* and *ψυχροῦ* balance each other rhythmically and tonally, with perispomenon on the second syllable. Singers might have exploited this feature to imitate the sound of the wind,

[24] Cf. Porter (2016) 353, who discusses this passage as one of several in which later critics reuse Pindar's own lexis of elevation in order to figure him as a 'sublime' author. Catenacci (2013) 416–17 notes that the 'setting up' suggests 'una statua o un monumento ben visibile', comparing e.g. *I.*1.46. This interpretation follows that of *Σ O.*3.5b = i 107 Dr (*τὸ δὲ ὀρθώσας εἶπε μετενεγκὼν ἀπὸ τιθεμένων ἀνδριάντων ἢ ἀγαλμάτων*). On this reading, the connotations of staticity and weightiness in the rhythm would complement the verb's monumental connotations.

with the words' long syllables allowing the effect to be prolonged. Differently, the three long syllables of *θάμβαινε* stand in contrast to the lighter *τόθι δένδρεα*, the heavier, drawn out rhythm intimating both the gravity and temporal duration of Heracles' 'wonder'. By creating an analogy between Heracles' extended perception and the listeners' experience of the phrase that describes it, rhythm formalizes a moment of contact between two worlds.[25]

The simile with which *Olympian* 6 opens, in which the poem is compared to a building with 'golden pillars', provides another instance of heavier syllables accentuating a moment of significant perception. The poem's second line contrasts lighter and heavier movements: *κίονας ὡς ὅτε θαητὸν μέγαρον* (— ˘˘ — ˘˘ — — — ˘˘ —). As with *θάμβαινε* at *O.*3.32, the place of the three long syllables of *θαητόν* in the time of performance, juxtaposed with the surrounding dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, accentuates the 'marvellousness' of the object described by making the listener linger over it.[26] Also comparable is *N.*1.39–42:[27]

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

ἀλλὰ θεῶν βασιλέα D

— — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

σπερχθεῖσα θυμῷ πέμπε δράκοντας ἄφαρ. – e – D

— ˘ — — — ˘ —

τοὶ μὲν οἰχθεισᾶν πυλᾶν E

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

ἐς θαλάμου μυχὸν εὐρὺν ἔβαν . . . D d^2

But the queen of the gods, angered in her heart, immediately sent snakes. They went, the doors being open, into the wide recess of the bed-chamber . . .

[25] Rhythm here reinforces the expressive force of the syntactical structure. Cf. the comments of Catenacci (2013) 429 on line 32: 'il passagio asindetico, la brevità della frase e la costruzione participiale esprimono lo stupore e l'improvviso arresto della corsa di Eracle ammirato alla vista degli alberi'.

[26] Cf. the responding line in the fourth strophe (*ἔνθα οἱ ὤπασε θησαυρὸν δίδυμον*, 'where he gave him a twofold treasury', *O.*6.65) where the long syllables of *θησαυρόν* are emphasized by contrast, producing an effect similar to that of *ὀρθώσαις* (cf. n. 25).

[27] Cf. also *O.*6.22–5: *ὦ Φίντις, ἀλλὰ ζεῦξον ἤδη μοι σθένος ἡμιόνων, / ᾗ τάχος, ὄφρα κελεύθῳ τ' ἐν καθαρᾷ / βάσομεν ὄκχον, ἵκωμαί τε πρὸς ἀνδρῶν / βάσομεν ὄκχον, ἵκωμαί τε πρὸς ἀνδρῶν / καὶ γένος* ('O Phintis, yoke for me the mules' strength as swiftly as may be, so that we may drive the chariot on the clear path, and that I might arrive even at these men's lineage': – E – D/D – d^1/D – e –). Here the dactylic rhythms of *σθένος ἡμιόνων* and *βάσομεν ὄκχον, ἵκωμαί* match the 'swift mules' and the poetic journey, while the cretics of *τε πρὸς ἀνδρῶν / καὶ γένος* create a heavier crescendo which coheres with the sense of the imagined journey coming to an end.

The dactyls of *πέμπε δράκοντας ἄφαρ* and *ἐς θαλάμου μυχὸν εὐρὺν ἔβαν* coincide with the swiftness of the movement described, and frame the epitrite of *τοὶ μὲν οἰχθεισᾶν πυλᾶν*. The intersection of rhythm and sense in 41 creates an effect which might be compared with Dionysius' description of the 'holding, delaying quality' of long syllables, this quality here reflecting the staticity of the doors in contrast with the movement by which they are surrounded.[28]

These passages all involve a reasonably direct connection between the rhythms' associative forces and the primary qualities of the referents, yet there are also numerous passages in which the putative connections between rhythm and sense are less straightforward, and which caution against too simple a conception of how Pindar and his choruses may have constructed and exploited this relationship. Several connections of this sort are at work in *Olympian* 12, composed for the long distance runner Ergoteles of Himera.[29] As well as creating a series of complex interactions between form and meaning, aspects of the poem's rhythmical structure also form part of Pindar's appropriation of Homeric language.

The poem begins with a prayer to Zeus and *σώτειρα Τύχα*, 'by whom swift ships are guided on the sea, and rapid battles on the land, and assemblies that give counsel' (3–5):

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —	
τὶν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ κυβερνῶνται θοαί	E – e
— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ —	
νᾶες, ἐν χέρσῳ τε λαιψηροὶ πόλεμοι	E – d[1]
— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘	
κἀγοραὶ βουλαφόροι.	e – (D)

Both lines 3–4 describe entities that are 'swift', and yet do so in rhythmical phrases in which long syllables predominate. This general effect is given additional point by appropriation of Homeric vocabulary and metrical form. First, the phrase *θοαί* / *νᾶες*. The adjective is common in Homer, where it is often used of ships. It occurs five times in the nominative plural, but always with the noun preceding, as at *Il.* 11.666 (*ἦ μένει εἰς ὅ κε δὴ νῆες θοαὶ ἄγχι θαλάσσης*) and *Il.* 16.168 (*Πεντήκοντ' ἦσαν νῆες θοαί, ἦσιν Ἀχιλλεύς*).[30] In Homer, therefore,

[28] See p. 74.

[29] For an overview of the poem's wider socio-political context see Nicholson (2016) 237–61 with further references.

[30] Adjective and noun are separated at *Il.* 2.619: *νῆες ἕποντο θοαί, πολέες δ' ἔμβαινον Ἐπειοί.*

the phrase scans ¯ ¯ ˘ ˘, with the diphthong shortened by correption. By inverting the Homeric word order, Pindar produces a rhythm that is likely have sounded unfamiliar to audiences accustomed to the Homeric phrase. Moreover, on two of the occasions on which the phrase *νῆες θοαί* occurs in the *Iliad*, it is preceded by a verb in the passive with the same metrical shape as Pindar's *κυβερνῶνται* (˘ ¯ ¯ ¯): *ἠὲ φυλάσσονται νῆες θοαὶ ὡς τὸ πάρος περ* (*Il.* 10.309).[31] The difference in context is notable: whereas Pindar's line occurs as part of a prayer that affirms *σώτειρα Τύχα*, Homer's line is a question about the state of the Greek camp and ships, spoken first by Hector and then by Dolon after his capture. By contrasting guarding and guiding, ships on sea and on land, the transformation of the Homeric phrase accentuates the greater security brought by *Τύχα*.[32] The rhythmical departure from Homeric precedent in *θοαί* / *νᾶες* highlights the thematic differentiations at work.

In choosing an adjective composed of three long syllables (*λαιψηροί*), Pindar also seems to be deliberately mobilizing a tension between sound and sense, but metrical form is also being used to underscore literary appropriation. Not only is the adjective never used by Homer to describe war,[33] it is never employed by Homer in this case, and eight of its ten uses in the *Iliad* are in the neuter plural with a short final syllable: only once is it used in a form with three long syllables.[34] The adjective usually occurs in cases where there is a fairly strong coincidence of rhythm and sense, such as *Il.* 10.358 (*γνῶ ῥ' ἄνδρας δηΐους, λαιψηρὰ δὲ γούνατ' ἐνώμα*, a line that falls into spondaic and dactylic halves) and *Il.* 14.17 (*ὀσσόμενον λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα*).[35] Pindar's use of the adjective is therefore un-Homeric in its semantic application, grammar, and metrical form.[36] The word's

[31] This line is repeated at *Il.* 10.396.

[32] Cf. Silk (2007) 184: 'unlike in epic, the epithet here is also protreptic: ships are not "swift" *unless* steered by Tyche'.

[33] The adjective is only employed in the *Iliad*: is Pindar's use describing 'war' here given added point by his borrowing a word that is only used in Homer's war poem? In this respect it may also be significant that *νῆες θοαί* only occurs in the *Iliad*.

[34] Cf. *Il.* 21.278 *λαιψηροῖς ὀλέεσθαι Ἀπόλλωνος βελέεσσιν*.

[35] Cf. also *Il.* 20.93 (*εἰρύσαθ', ὅς μοι ἐπῶρσε μένος λαιψηρά τε γοῦνα*); *Il.* 22.24 (*ὡς Ἀχιλεὺς λαιψηρὰ πόδας καὶ γούνατ' ἐνώμα*).

[36] The phrase *ἀγοραὶ βουλαφόροι* is also Homeric, as noted by Catenacci (2013) 584, and provides another subtle contrast: the only time the phrase is used in epic is at *Od.* 9.112, where Odysseus is explaining that the Cyclopes do *not* have 'assemblies for council' (*τοῖσιν δ' οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες*).

rhythmical articulation serves less to mirror its meaning than to correlate with and highlight the complex indirectness of its signification.[37]

More straightforwardly, the enjambed *θοαί* / *νᾶες* may also suggest the pitching and rolling of a ship in the waves. Such an effect would reinforce the one already observed by Michael Silk, in which the rhythm of *πόλλ᾽ ἄνω, τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω* (6, — ˘ — ˘ — ˘ —) also suggests the image of a ship moving up and down in the water.[38] Moreover, O12s6 as a whole is a fascinating study in the effects Pindar obtains by juxtaposing dactylic and epitritic metra. The line involves a movement from epitrite to dactyl and back with long link syllables (E – D – E):

s6:
— ˘ — ˘ — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

πόλλ᾽ ἄνω, τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω ψεύδη μεταμώνια τάμνοισαι κυλίνδοντ᾽ ἐλπίδες·

a6:
— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

ἀντικύρσαντες ζάλαις ἐσλὸν βαθὺ πήματος ἐν μικρῷ πεδάμειψαν χρόνῳ.

s6: men's hopes roll up and down as they voyage across vain falsehoods.
a6: having encountered storms they exchange in a short time their suffering for great good.

In each case, rhythm accentuates meaning. In 6, the short syllables of *μεταμώνια* connote movement, while the epitritic rhythm of *τάμνοισαι κυλίνδοντ᾽ ἐλπίδες* echoes the earlier *πόλλ᾽ ἄνω, τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω*, reminding the listener, in conjunction with the verb *κυλίνδοντο*, of the image of the ship tossing in the waves. There may also be a subtle contrast between the long syllables of *τάμνοισαι*, which may combine with the verb's meaning ('cut') to indicate decisive movement, and the more 'up and down' rhythm of *κυλίνδοντ᾽ ἐλπίδες*. In the antistrophe,

[37] Silk (2007) 184: 'it evokes, metonymically, the swift feet of soldiers on the charge, but also looks ahead to the special "feet" of the victor'. It can also be taken in several senses: in addition to Silk's readings see the explanations of the scholia, according to which *λαιψηροί* can mean *κοῦφοι καὶ ἀνόητοι*, on the grounds that men behave without reason when fighting (*διὰ τὸ ἀνοήτως ποιεῖν ὁρμᾶν τοὺς μαχομένους*, *Σ O.*12.5a = i 350 Dr), or can refer to the speed with which 'anger' springs up in men, resulting in wars (*ὀξέως ἡ ὀργὴ διανίσταται τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐξ ἧς ὁ πόλεμος*, *Σ O.*12.5b = i 350–1 Dr).

[38] Silk (2007) 185. He also suggests a stylistic enactment of the theme of reversal in the shift from e – D in s1 to D – e in e1 (p. 179).

however, rhythmical shifts correlate with the notions of exchange and changes of fortune. While the heavier rhythm of *ἀντικύρσαντες ζάλαις* might suggest the weightiness and difficulty of the 'storms', the shift from dactyls to epitritic cola underscores the idea that suffering is 'exchanged' for good fortune,[39] formally enacting the poem's thematics of change and development.[40]

Although far from exhaustive, this survey suggests that the thematic connections between words and rhythms were a feature of Pindar's style, but it also makes clear the extent to which we need to grapple with the problems created by our forms of access to the poems in responding to Pindar's rhythmical poetics. Quite aside from the evidential issues outlined above and the inevitable provisionality of the readings I have offered, the act of writing about such passages, relying as it does on a process of excerption and analysis, cannot but (at least to some degree) misrepresent the effects these passages would have created in the expressive texture of the performance event.[41] Imaginative reconstruction requires an awareness of the subtlety and fleetingness of such effects, as well as the additional affectivity that would have been created by their mediation by music and dance.

My readings also raise deeper methodological problems. The passages I have quoted represent only a small fraction of the Pindaric corpus, and there are many sequences in Pindar where no such conjunctions are obviously apparent. On this basis, it might be argued that the passages I have discussed are 'the most felicitous of accidents'.[42] Although this objection neglects the point that the relative infrequency of such conjunctions would have made them more noticeable to audiences, it highlights the questions of when and on what grounds we should detect meaningful intersections of semantics and form. These questions can be addressed with reference to remarks by the musicologist Nicholas Cook on the vexed question of how music might be said to assume or to act as a conduit for 'meaning'. Cook resists seeing 'meaning' either as immanent in the structures and sounds of music, or as simply arbitrarily imposed on

[39] This correlation approximates semantic content (*ἐσλὸν βαθύ* occupies half of the dactylic metron) rather than mapping it exactly.

[40] For which see e.g. Silk (2007) 194–7.

[41] The passages I have examined are also likely to have been some of those in which the relationship between language and the other elements of the performance was most straightforward.

[42] West (1982) 39, discussing *Od.* 11.593–600.

the grounds that because a piece of music does not have propositional content it can 'mean' anything we want it to. Instead, he argues that, 'regarded as agents of meaning, musical works are unstable aggregates of potential signification',[43] which have the potential to be understood as bearing meanings as a result of its functions in particular circumstances.

He illustrates this with the example of the television advert in which 'shots of a Citroën ZX 16v powering its way up twisting country lanes are aligned with extracts from Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro* overture. Heard in this context, the energetic and expressive attributes of Mozart's music . . . cluster themselves around the car, transferring to it the qualities of power and verve and grace associated with them . . . The music seeks out the qualities of the car, and conversely the image of the speeding Citroën might be said to interpret the music. And so a composite meaning emerges, one which was immanent in neither the overture nor the car.' This example illustrates that 'music [is] never "alone", that it is always received in a discursive context, and that it is through the interaction of music and interpreter, text and context, that meaning is constructed, as a result of which the meaning attributed to any given material trace will vary according to the circumstances of its reception'. As a result, 'it is wrong to speak of music *having* particular meanings; rather it has the potential for specific meanings to emerge under specific circumstances'.[44] Poetic rhythms are different from the music Cook discusses, in that they arise in part from dispositions of words, and are therefore less separable from verbal signifiers than a Mozart melody is from a piece of film footage. Yet rhythmical structures can usefully be conceived as 'potential signfication[s]', insofar as their salience, significance, and form are contingent upon particular conjunctions of sound and sense. Relations between words and rhythms are unstable and multiple: a run of short syllables or a sequence of dactyls need not connote movement or speed, but may be heard in contexts that allow such associations to emerge.[45] But these associations are not arbitary, in that the meaningfulness of their relation to the properties of the rhythmical structure is conditioned by those properties and the perceptions they enable.

[43] Cook (2001) 188. [44] Cook (2001) 180.

[45] Cf. Stewart (2002) 79: 'sounds in poems are never heard outside an expectation of meaning'.

The instability and multiplicity of this relationship means that the mimetic and affective qualities of rhythmical form are likewise various. As well as highlighting the expressiveness of Pindar's poetics, my readings suggest that the notion of poetic mimesis directed towards objects in the world which we find in Dionysius and other critics only gets us so far in conceptualizing the poems' textures.[46] Although there are numerous passages in which rhythm is straightforwardly suggestive in relation to verbal meaning, rhythmical effects elsewhere do not so much relate to the properties of things conceived in an abstract or objective sense as combine with focalizing structures to give shape to intuitions about the world and momentary experiences of phenomena. The movement of *τοὶ μὲν οἰχθεισᾶν πυλᾶν* imagines the suspense felt by the focalizing viewer as well as the physical qualities of the doors, while Heracles' wonder-filled gazing at the olive trees in *Olympian* 3 correlates form and perception. In these moments, fleeting but intense points of contact are opened up between listeners' experience, the imaginative worlds of the poems, and the figures who inhabit them. Elsewhere, in phrases such as *θοαί / νᾶες* and *λαιψηροὶ πόλεμοι*, rhymical distinctiveness accentuates Pindar's idiomatic reconfiguring of epic language. Common to all of these analyses are emphases on the poems' appeals to the senses, and on rhythm as a vehicle for extra-verbal effects as well as a means of inflecting meaning.

STANZAIC INTERACTION: *PYTHIAN* 1

So far I have focused on small-scale effects, but in considering the description of the Muses and Etna's eruptions in the opening stanzas of *Pythian* 1, I explore how rhythm and meaning can be interrelated in larger structures, at the level of interaction between stanzas. Criticism of the poem has often noted the connections between Zeus, Hiero, Apollo, and Pindar himself as guarantors of cosmic, political, and poetic order,[47] and I shall argue that the rhythmical structure of

[46] Cf. however Porter (2016) 406–8 on Dionysius' reading of *Od.* 11.593–8, who argues that while Dionysius is working within a mimetic framework, 'he is more interested in the art than in the events or their mimesis'.

[47] See e.g. Too (1998) 19–22; Athanassaki (2009); Morgan (2015) 308–20.

the opening triads plays a crucial role in articulating their metapoetic discourse.

The tradition of remarking on the metrical sophistication of the Pindaric stanza goes back at least as far as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who contrasts the 'short strophes' of Sappho and Alcaeus with the longer periods used by Stesichorus and Pindar, which were 'divided into many metra and cola for no other reason that their desire for variation' (*εἰς πολλὰ μέτρα καὶ κῶλα διένειμαν αὐτὰς οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἔρωτι*).[48] We should not rest content with Dionysius' explanation, however. The use of more varied metrical structures opens up the possibility of greater interaction between stanzas than is possible in shorter strophes, where the sheer number of lines in the same metrical form makes it difficult for one line to be heard against or in relation to another across stanzas. In Pindar, by contrast, many individual metrical lines within a stanza occur only once in a given poem, allowing listeners to perceive responsions between stanzas, and in turn to recognize thematically significant connections between them.[49] While greater knowledge of Stesichorus would doubtless shed further light on the development of this technique,[50] Tyrtaeus' elegies provide a useful comparandum for the kind of effects generated by interaction between stanzas. It has recently been argued that Tyrtaeus often employs stanazic responsion for thematic effect, in order to develop ethical contrasts and articulate his arguments.[51] What will emerge from this analysis, however, is that whereas Tyrtaeus' 'stanzaic architecture' is chiefly a matter of thematic interaction at the verbal level, the greater metrical complexity of Pindar's poetry allows for the development of complex relations between rhythmical and verbal aspects of the poetry. Concomitant with 'division into many metra and cola' is an increase in rhythm's semantic agency.[52]

[48] *Comp.* 19.

[49] My arguments operate on the premise that audiences would have been able to perceive structural connections over short durations: identification of thematic and rhythmical parallels within triads and beween one triad and the next is likely to have been facilitated by the chorus' similar positioning and movement, as well as by their temporal proximity. Cf. You (1997) 363 on the ordering effects of rhythm, and the remarks of Prauscello (2013b) 258–9, 270–2.

[50] On verbal responsion in earlier poets see Stockert (1969) 26–7. For Stesichorus' use of dactylic metres see e.g. West (1982) 49–51; Pavese (1997).

[51] See especially Faraone (2006) 31–3.

[52] Cf. Mullen (1982) 91; Phillips (2013) 55–6.

Pythian 1 is structured in such a way that listeners hear the ecphrasis of Etna's eruptions in the second strophe within a rhythmical frame that has been occupied by the opening description of the Muses and Apollo, which spans the first strophe and antistrophe. This rhythmical structure complements the poem's verbal discourse by enacting song's power to order and remake its subjects.[53] For convenience, I reproduce here the relevant stanzas together with metrical analyses:

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

sA: *Χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἰοπλοκάμων* [1]

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

σύνδικον Μοισᾶν κτέανον· τᾶς ἀκούει

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — —

μὲν βάσις ἀγλαΐας ἀρχά, [2]

— — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ σάμασιν [3]

— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — ˘ — ˘ —

ἁγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς ἐλελιζομένα. [4]

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

καὶ τὸν αἰχματὰν κεραυνὸν σβεννύεις [5] 5

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

αἰενάου πυρός. εὕδει δ' ἀνὰ σκά-

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — —

πτῳ Διὸς αἰετός, ὠκεῖ-

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

αν πτέρυγ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν χαλάξαις, [6]

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

aA: *ἀρχὸς οἰωνῶν, κελαινῶπιν δ' ἐπί οἱ νεφέλαν* [1]

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

ἀγκύλῳ κρατί, γλεφάρων ἁδὺ κλάϊ-

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — —

θρον, κατέχευας· ὁ δὲ κνώσσων [2]

— — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

[53] For verbal responsion in the poem see Stockert (1969) 18, 36–7, 53, 60, 69, 84.

ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ, τεαῖς [3]

— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ —

ῥιπαῖσι κατασχόμενος. καὶ γὰρ βια-

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

τὰς Ἄρης, τραχεῖαν ἄνευθε λιπών [4] 10

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

ἐγχέων ἀκμάν, ἰαίνει καρδίαν [5]

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

κώματι, κῆλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνων θέλ-

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — —

γει φρένας ἀμφί τε Λατοί-

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

δα σοφίᾳ βαθυκόλπων τε Μοισᾶν . . . [6]

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

sB: . . . *τᾶς ἐρεύγονται μὲν ἀπλάτου πυρὸς ἁγνόταται* [1]

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

ἐκ μυχῶν παγαί· ποταμοὶ δ' ἁμέραισιν

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — —

μὲν προχέοντι ῥόον καπνοῦ [2]

— — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

αἴθων'· ἀλλ' ἐν ὄρφναισιν πέτρας [3]

— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — — ˘ —

φοίνισσα κυλινδομένα φλὸξ ἐς βαθεῖ-

— ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —

αν φέρει πόντου πλάκα σὺν πατάγῳ [4]

— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —

κεῖνο δ' Ἁφαίστοιο κρουνοὺς ἑρπετόν [5] 25

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

δεινοτάτους ἀναπέμπει· τέρας μὲν

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — —

θαυμάσιον προσιδέσθαι,

— ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — — ˘ — —

θαῦμα δὲ καὶ παρεόντων ἀκοῦσαι, [6]

Golden phorminx, just possession of Apollo and the violet-coiffed Muses, to which the footstep listens, the beginning of splendour. The singers obey the signs whenever you strum and strike up the openings of chorus-leading

preludes. You douse the spearing lightning of ever-flowing fire. Zeus' eagle sleeps on the sceptre, slackening his wings on both sides,

the lord of birds; you pour a dark cloud over his curved head, a sweet seal of the eyelids. Slumbering, he raises his rippling back, caught by your notes. And violent Ares, leaving behind his harsh spear-point, delights his heart in drowsing, and the darts bewitch the gods' minds with the skill of Apollo and the deep-girdled Muses . . .

. . . from whose [sc. Aetna] depths holiest springs of unapproachable fire belch forth. In the day lava streams pour forth a blazing stream of smoke, but in the darkness a rolling red flame carries rocks into the deep expanse of the sea with a crash. That creature sends up most terrible springs of Hephaestus' fire, a portent wondrous to behold, and a wonder even to hear of from those present . . .

The general thematic similarities between the strophe and antistrophe of the first triad are clear: both depict the power of music to calm violent impulses and enchant the mind. Moreover, responsion reinforces thematic connection between individual elements and creates interaction between them. One such instance is s3 / a3: *πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ σάμασιν / ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ, τεαῖς* (— — — ˘ — — — ˘ —). Here, responsion suggests a connection between the eagle's movement and that of the singers. Rather than indicating physical similarity between the referents, the setting of the second phrase in a rhythmical sequence marked by association with choral dance formally enacts the eagle's subjection to the music.[54] Similar is s5 / a5: *καὶ τὸν αἰχματὰν κεραυνὸν σβεννύεις / ἐγχέων ἀκμάν, ἰαίνει καρδίαν* (— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ —). Here again rhythmical parallelism underscores the similarity of the events they describe.

The verbal and formal congruence of the opening strophe and antistrophe throws into sharp relief the very different effect created by the contrasting subject matter of the first two strophes. Thematic contrasts across stanzas operate at a general level, with Typhos' activity opposing that of the Muses and Apollo, but also manifest themselves in numerous pairs of responding lines. The pattern of rhythmical responsion and semantic contrast begins in s2: *μὲν βάσις ἀγλαΐας ἀρχά / μὲν προχέοντι ῥόον καπνοῦ* (— ˘ ˘ — ˘˘ — — —). The

[54] Other instances of rhythmical significance: while the rhythm of *-ωθεν χαλάξαις* exemplifies a climactic epitritic movement in which heavy syllables accord with the referent, reflecting the drooping of the wings, the three heavy syllables of *ὠκεῖαν* emphasize that the 'swift' wings are now at rest.

former line is significant for setting up the connection between dactylic runs and the dancers' movements, which is continued in line 4 (s4). This association frames the occurrence of the rhythm in line 22, and stresses the semantic contrast between the glitteringly ordered movement of the 'celebration' and that of the 'flow of smoke'. Yet setting the latter line in this rhythm also conveys the sense of Etna's activity being transfigured by its realization in poetry, the rhythmical structure substituting for the amorphous physical reality of the smoke rising from the lava flows.[55]

Relations of responsion and contrast continue in s5–6: *καὶ τὸν αἰχματὰν κεραυνὸν σβεννύεις | αἰενάου πυρός. εὕδει . . . / κεῖνο δ' Ἁφαίστοιο κρουνοὺς ἑρπετόν | δεινοτάτους ἀναπέμπει* (— ˘ — — — ˘ — — — ˘ — | — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — —). The welling up of fire described in the second pair of lines contrasts with fire being quenched in the first strophe, but as in the previous example the rhythmical responsion forges a connection between the lines that helps to frame the latter's meaning with the associations of the former; by recalling the quenching of the thunderbolt, the rhythmical structure enacts the poem's containment of the dangerous energies that Typhos unleashes even as they are brought before listeners' imaginations.[56]

Perhaps the most telling of these responsional contrasts is s4. The line in the second strophe that describes 'in the darkness a rolling red flame carries [rocks] into the deep expanse of the sea with a crash', expressing the powerful violence of the eruption,[57] and vivified by alliteration and the dactylic rhythm (*φοίνισσα κυλινδομένα φλὸξ ἐς βαθεῖαν φέρει πόντου πλάκα σὺν πατάγῳ*, 24), repeats the rhythmical pattern of the line in the first strophe that describes the 'chorus-leading

[55] The responsion may also make the point that the *ῥόον καπνοῦ*, both as referent and sign, is not quite as disorderly and threatening as it might first appear: on this reading, the stylization of rhythm helps to bring out the order inherent in the referent.

[56] Ancient critics were sensitive to the visual power of the opening sequence as a whole: see e.g. the visually detailed exegesis of *πυρὸς ἁγνόταται* at *Σ P.*1.41b (ii 14 Dr), and the emphasis on the visual elements of the description of the eagle in *Σ P.*1.10a and 17b (ii 10, 11 Dr).

[57] It is likely that ancient audiences (and readers) will have reacted strongly to the onomatopoeia of the second strophe in particular. Several of the words used by Pindar are discussed in Philodemus *De poem.* 1 in relation to their euphonic effects: with *πόντου πλάκα* compare Phld. 1.122.18–19 *τοῦ 'πόντ[ου . . . . .] πλάκα'*: the source of the phrase is unclear; see Janko (2000) 335 for discussion. At Phld. 1.93.10–12 the Homeric phrase *ἐρευγομένης ἁλὸς ἔξω* (*Il.* 17.265) is discussed; cf. Pindar's *ἐρεύγονται*. With Pindar's *ἐλελιζομένα* compare the discussion of Homer's uses of *ἐλελίζω* at Phld. 1.107.

preludes' (*ἁγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς ἐλελιζομένα*, 4). The metrical structure (— — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ — ˘ — ˘ — — ˘ — — — ˘ ˘ — ˘ ˘ —) has a different expressive force in each case.[58] In the first strophe, the dactylic movement is co-ordinated with the energetic movement of the dance, while in the second it suggests the speed with which the 'flame' rolls the rocks down to the sea. The sound and rhythm of the second line are mimetically expressive, but insofar as responsion invites listeners to hear line 24 as echoing the structure of line 4 and hence attend to the formalizing effects of rhythmical structure, rhythm accentuates the separation of the text from the phenomena to which it refers.[59]

Further examples of such responsions could be cited,[60] and although our appreciation of the poem's performative qualities is necessarily diminished by our ignorance of the music and dance, their general effect is reasonably clear. By pointedly juxtaposing the Muses and Typhos, Pindar has created a structure that both imitates and contains the cosmic dissonance Typhos embodies.[61] The artful interlacing of semantic contrast and rhythmical responsion highlights how the song translates its subject matter into sensuous form, reshaping the dangerous primary qualities of Etna into the stylized beauty of rhythmically articulated language. Rather than simply 'weighing down' and containing Typhos, as Etna itself does (*πιέζει . . . συνέχει*, 19), the ecphrasis acts as both a representation of a real-world phenomenon and the production of an autonomous aesthetic

[58] These effects would have been enhanced by the chorus's gestures and dance steps, and although we cannot know what this would have entailed, several possibilities suggest themselves. The performance involves a marked gestural shift, with the chorus performing in a fairly neutral way in the first strophe (imitating choral dance, and therefore not needing to be especially imitative) and then shifting to more markedly imitative movements and gestures in the second. Alternatively, the very absence of such imitation during the description of Etna may have reinforced the theme of aesthetic transformation by framing the eruptions in the same physical expressions used in the first strophe. Regardless of the precise nature of the chorus' movements, their bodily disposition would have acted as a conduit for the imposition of the framing effect of rhythm and music, and therefore have involved more than 'mimesis of what is said with gestures' (Pl. *Lg.* 816a) in which dance functions as an extension of vocal utterance. For this notion of dance see Peponi (2009) 59–60.

[59] Cf. Porter (2016) 408 on ancient critical engagement with the separation of text and referent.

[60] See e.g. P1s6, where responsion reinforces the thematic similarity between the verses in the strophe and antistrophe.

[61] On the relationship between Etna as a physical environment and the poem's configuration of political space see Currie (2012) 297–9; Morgan (2015) 318.

construct; the very descriptive and affective intensity with which the text establishes its mimetic connection with its referents is simultaneously the means by which it transfigures them.[62] As such, the ecphrasis generates affective force not just through its imagery of height, overwhelming physical power, and cosmic dissonance,[63] but also through the movement by which it constitutes its own formally distinct domain decoupled from its real-world entanglements.[64] Yet even as musical and rhythmical structure translates Typhos into an aesthetic totality and enacts the poem's imposition of order onto its materials, the subject matter threatens to overrun the mimetic form being imposed on it.[65]

While this dynamic can be read as a formal correlative of the poem's simultaneous attempt to transcend the conditions of its emergence and its acknowledgement of the ongoing ethical, political, and military challenges to which Hiero and his citizens are subject,[66] the musical and verbal totality of which it forms part also has wider consequences for listeners' self-conception. The description of Etna as 'a wonder even to hear of from those present' (*θαῦμα δὲ καὶ παρεόντων ἀκοῦσαι*, 26) draws on aesthetic vocabulary.[67] Like the scene it describes, the poem is a 'wonder' to be admired, but despite the importance of physicality to the audience's reaction,[68] this 'wonder' entails a form of response that goes beyond the somatic pleasure, somnolence, and bewitchment created by the Muses' performance

[62] On mimesis as representation and production see e.g. Halliwell (2002) 16–19, and the discussion of Peponi (2009) 64–5. Cf. also Currie (2012) 296 for Pindar's discourse as a response to contemporary volcanic activity.

[63] For these features as markers of the sublime in ancient Pindaric criticism see Porter (2016) 350–60: on the connections between the volcanic imagery at [Long.] *De subl.* 35.5 and *P.*1 see Phillips (2016) 74–5.

[64] See e.g. Culler (2015) 34–7, 229 on lyric as aiming at the performative constitution of events.

[65] See Fitzgerald (1987) 144–7 on the relationship between liquid imagery, music, and violence in the opening stanza.

[66] On the poem's relation to its context in this respect see e.g. Athanassaki (2009), Morgan (2015) 345–6.

[67] See e.g. Morrison (2012) 131; Phillips (2016) 150–2. The language of *θαῦμα* recalls, for instance, the description of the Delian Maidens at *Hom.h.Ap.* 156 (*πρὸς δὲ τόδε μέγα θαῦμα, ὅου κλέος οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται*). Cf. also Morgan (2015) 319 on the connection between Etna as a 'heavenly column' (19) and Pindar's use of monumental imagery to characterize his poetry.

[68] The opening *πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ σάμασιν* hints at the impact of the poem on listeners' senses: they, like the 'singers', will 'obey' the music in having their response to the poem shaped by it.

(ἰαίνει καρδίαν / κώματι, θέλγει φρένας). In order for the tension between rhythm and language in the second strophe and its structural relation with the first triad to emerge, listeners are required to make connections between parts of the poem, attend to the subtle interaction within the performance of bodily and noetic elements, and to construct inferences about the wider significance of structure. Rather than being passive recipients of bodily affect in the manner of Typhos and the Muses' audience, Pindar's listeners are simultaneously subjects of enchantment and interpreters of form.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has focused on the interrelations between words and their rhythmical frames. In part, this method is dictated by the absence of definite knowledge of dance moves and musical accompaniment. Whatever these elements consisted of, however, the relationship between words and rhythm would have been a constituent feature upon which performers would have drawn, and can therefore offer valuable clues about what performances would have looked, sounded, and felt like, even if our approximations of this are necessarily limited. Yet even seen on their own terms, the relations between words and rhythms have a great expressive and interpretative richness. The above readings have highlighted the varieties of rhythmical enactment at work in Pindar's poetry, ranging from relatively simple conjunctions of form and semantic content, to the more subtle effects created when rhythms are employed to accentuate an image or to encourage a particular way of understanding a word or phrase.

Although Pindar's techniques have long been recognized as a development from the simpler structures seen in earlier poets such as Alcman and Stesichorus,[69] less attention has been paid to the role of metrical complexity in opening up possibilities for the interaction of verbal and rhythmical forms. Greater intrastanzaic variety allows for the development of intra- and intertriadic relations between individual lines, which in turn allows for interaction between these

[69] See e.g. Mullen (1982) 91; West (1982) 60; Davies and Finglass (2014) 47–52.

lines that adds to their significance. The 'love of variety' attributed to Pindar and his contemporaries by Dionysius has numerous consequences for how the poems construct and project meaning. Use of authors such as Aristides Quintilianus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus as guides to the affectivity of choral poetry needs to be supplemented, I have argued, by close attention to the variousness with which rhythms and words interact. Perhaps most importantly, I hope to have recovered something of Pindar's extraordinary sophistication as a musical as well as a verbal artist, and to have demonstrated that attention to this aspect of his texts is not only interpretatively rewarding, but can also bring us a little closer to the τέρψις of his early listeners.

4

Music in Euripides' *Medea*

Oliver Thomas

Among the major developments in the study of Greek tragedy of the last forty years has been the increasing tendency to regard our texts as the written residue of a multifaceted performance, where they combined with acting, movement, etc. to give more than the sum of the parts. Within this trend, however, scholars have made only limited progress in analysing the contribution of music—naturally enough given our scanty sources.

In several plays, the distribution of musical versus spoken sections appears deliberate. For example, in his *Electra* Euripides saved up the 'recitative' sound of anapaests for the entrance of Clytemnestra (line 988), and contrasted the sparse use of music in lines 1–1146 (*c.*22 per cent of lines accompanied) with the dénouement as the characters respond to Clytemnestra's assassination (lines 1147–1359, *c.*71 per cent accompanied); the soundworld shifts with the plot. More ambitious approaches have tried to find patterning of rhythms within a play's musical sections, or to analyse the politics of which characters are given song.[1]

Perhaps the most stimulating insight into Euripides' music has come from contextualizing it within the increasing musical professionalization and change of *c.*440–380—the so-called 'New Music'. Of the composers associated with these developments in antiquity, Euripides is one of the most senior, and Csapo (1999–2000) has

I am grateful to Oliver Taplin, Pauline LeVen, Patrick Finglass, David Creese, Judith Mossman, and audiences in Southampton, Oxford, and Newcastle for their advice.

[1] See e.g. Scott (1984); (1996); Chiasson (1988) for rhythmic patterning; Hall (1999) for singing and social status.

argued persuasively that he was no reactive dabbler in an elitist avant-garde. Rather, the new styles were popular (though easily pilloried), and Euripides' experimentation with them can be dated before 420, i.e. before much of the evidence for developments in dithyramb. Csapo studies in particular Euripides' use of actors' monodies and duets, trochaic recitative, astrophic choruses, and the tendency for these forms to be assigned to female or non-Greek characters in emotional situations. These practices distinguish Euripides from Sophocles, so far as we can tell.

In this paper I shall argue that Euripides already in 431 was engaged with the discourse and possibly the practice of musical novelty, in a different way from the features discussed by Csapo.[2] The second half of the paper will discuss what characters within the *Medea* say about music. Before that, I shall discuss and defend the plausibility of a difficult testimonium in Athenaeus, which appears to say that the play was innovative in its treatment of melody.[3] These two issues have been studied separately before, but connecting them will enhance our appreciation of both: the passages of *Medea* will support Athenaeus' testimony, at least to the extent that they chime remarkably well with it; and Athenaeus' testimony, if correct, affects the way in which the passages of *Medea* should be interpreted.

ATHENAEUS' TESTIMONY

The testimonium for the *Medea*'s musical practice is embedded in two passages of Athenaeus, where characters discuss an intriguing dramatic work by Callias of Athens (7 276a, 10 453c–454a; cf. 10 448b).[4]

[2] Contrast also Weiss's demonstration (this volume) that throughout his extant works Euripides played with the instrumental possibilities where his auloi-accompanied chorus discusses a mythological syrinx-accompanied dance.

[3] The evidence for tragic melody, apart from Dionysius of Halicarnassus' discussion of the chorus's opening words in *Orestes* (*De comp.* 11 = *DAGM* no. 2), and the Orestes Papyrus (*DAGM* no. 3), is scattered and potentially distorted by the systematizations of harmonic theory from Eratocles on (see e.g. West (1992b) 184–5).

[4] Significant discussions include Pöhlmann (1971); Rosen (1999); Ruijgh (2001); Smith (2003); Gagné (2013). Koller (1956), D'Angour (2006a) 281–2, and Phillips (2015) accept them—more easily than I do—as evidence for Euripides' melodic practice. Phillips considers its possible ramifications for the portrayal of Echo in the *Andromeda* of 412.

At the start of Book 7 Cynulcus mentions the number of potential puzzles in Clearchus of Soloi's work *On Brainteasers* (*griphoi*), and gives an example:

> εἰ δ' ἀπιστεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ βιβλίον κεκτημένος οὐ φθονήσω σοι, ἀφ' οὗ πολλὰ ἐκμαθὼν εὐπορήσεις προβλημάτων. καὶ γὰρ Καλλίαν ἱστορεῖ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον γραμματικὴν συνθεῖναι τραγῳδίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ποιῆσαι τὰ μέλη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν Εὐριπίδην ἐν Μηδείᾳ καὶ Σοφοκλέα τὸν Οἰδίπουν.
>
> If you don't believe me, my friend, I do own the book and will happily lend it to you. You will learn much from it, and have a good store of posers. For instance, he records that Callias of Athens composed a tragedy which was *grammatike*, and that it was on the basis of it that Euripides wrote the melodies and delivery[?] in the *Medea*, and that Sophocles wrote his *Oedipus*.[5]

This information is indeed puzzling, as Cynulcus says. Is this the famous Athenian writer Callias? If so, what is a comedian doing writing a tragedy? Is *grammatike* a predicative adjective ('a tragedy which was lettered') or an object complement ('a tragedy *Learning One's Letters*'), and what would either entail? Assuming from these two puzzles that it was not a normal tragedy, could it have been a major influence on two such canonical tragedies as *Medea* and *Oedipus* (*Tyrannus*, as specified later)?

Athenaeus raises these questions only to abandon them immediately: he sets us a brainteaser, then suspends the solution until the middle of Book 10.[6] There Aemilianus Maurus, in moving the discussion on from drinking-culture, proposes an enquiry about sympotic brainteasers, 'not in the manner of the work entitled *Lettered Tragedy* by Callias of Athens' but proceeding from a definition of brainteasers to comic discussions of them and eventually to the forfeits for failing to find a solution (448b).[7] The host Larensi(u)s responds with a disquisition which starts from and repeatedly returns to Clearchus' *On Brainteasers*, which is clearly Athenaeus' main source.[8] In particular,

[5] I discuss below the construction of *grammatike* and whether διάθεσις does mean 'delivery'. For Clearchus see Wehrli (1948); Tsitsiridis (2013).

[6] Similarly Smith (2003) 315.

[7] Aemilianus' wording *τὴν . . . ἐπιγραφομένην γραμματικὴν τραγῳδίαν* still leaves the work's title ambiguous, in a way I cannot translate. As with Cynulcus' wording (above), it could also mean 'the tragedy entitled *Learning One's Letters*'. But it will presently become clear that the play was not a 'tragedy', so that word must be part of the title.

[8] 448c–e, 452c, 452f, 454f, 455b, 457c (followed by a lengthy paraphrase from Clearchus' *On Proverbs*). Athenaeus is also our main source for Clearchus' *Περὶ*

Larensius' information on Callias overlaps with what Cynulcus explicitly drew from Clearchus—notably the claim that he influenced both *Medea* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Clearchus distinguished seven types of brainteaser (448c). Larensius does not list them all, but he subsequently mentions that in *On Proverbs* Clearchus made one category of brainteaser 'things pertaining to the study [*θεωρία*] of letters and syllables' (457e). To this would belong Castorion's *Hymn to Pan* (composed of interchangeable iambic metra containing eleven letters each) and Lasus' asigmatic hymns, which Larensius cites just after Callias (454f, 455c). Probably Callias' play, with its versified alphabets and syllabaries, and characters describing letter-shapes, fell into this category.[9] Interestingly, Larensius cites an alternative title *Γραμματικὴ Θεωρία*, *Studying Letters* (453c).[10] This title may explain Maurus' implication that Callias conducted an unmethodical 'enquiry' into *griphoi*.

Larensius goes into more detail than Cynulcus. Callias' prologue involved a character reciting the Ionic alphabet, and was followed by a chorus based around the chanting of consonant-vowel syllables which characterized primary education in the larger centres:[11]

> *ὁ χορὸς δὲ γυναικῶν ἐκ τῶν σύνδυο πεποιημένος αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἔμμετρος ἅμα καὶ μεμελοποιημένος τόνδε τὸν τρόπον·*
>
> *βῆτ' ἄλφα βα, βῆτ' εἶ βε, βῆτ' ἦτα βη,*
> *βῆτ' ἰῶτα βι, βῆτ'*
> *οὖ βο, βῆτ' ὖ βυ, βῆτ' ὦ βω,*[12]

φιλίας, *Γεργίθιος*, *Ἐρωτικά*, *Περὶ βίων*, and *Περὶ ἐνύδρων*, and a major source for his *Παροιμίαι*.

[9] I believe one can safely infer that the fragment at 454a, where a woman describes the shapes *ΨΩ* as the start of a name she is ashamed to be 'swollen' or 'pregnant' with (cf. *ψώα* 'stench'), is also from the *Lettered Tragedy*. As Slater (2002) 127 notes, *ΨΩ* is thematic in that it also featured as the last syllable of the chorus discussed below; he also observes that *Ψ* and *Ω*, as newcomers to the Attic alphabet, are aptly figured as a bastard child.

[10] None of the examples in LSJ s.v. *θεωρία* III.3 mean 'spectacle', and I doubt that sense here. This title might itself pun on the sense 'sacred embassy' (in that the performers have come to offer their play to Dionysus), but there is no sign that the plot involved an embassy.

[11] Syllabaries in antiquity: Rix (1991) Cr 9.1 (Etruscan, *c.*650); Pl. *Plt.* 277e–278c; *Crat.* 424bc; Quint. 1.1.26–31; Morgan (1998) 59; Cribiore (2001) 172–3.

[12] The colometry is speculative. Consonant-names are either trochees or long monosyllables; metrical responsion requires elided trochees and monosyllables followed by hiatus. *ζξψ* appear not to have closed the preceding syllable (cf. West (1982) 17). The distribution of short syllables suggests iambic or trochaic metre. This suggests *βᾱ*, *βῑ*, *βῠ*, to give ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ ‒. Given the rarity of ˘ ‒ ˘ in

> *καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἀντιστρόφῳ τοῦ μέλους καὶ τοῦ μέτρου γάμμα ἄλφα, γάμμα εἶ, γάμμα ἦτα, γάμμα ἰῶτα, γάμμα οὖ, γάμμα ὖ, γάμμα ὦ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συλλαβῶν ὁμοίως ἑκάστων· τό τε μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέλος ἐν ἀντιστρόφοις ἔχουσι πᾶσαι ταὐτόν, ὥστε τὸν Εὐριπίδην μὴ μόνον ὑπονοεῖσθαι τὴν Μήδειαν ἐντεῦθεν πεποιηκέναι πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέλος αὐτὸ μετενηνοχότα φανερὸν εἶναι.* (453de)

> As for the chorus of women, he has composed it metrically from paired letters, together with the following type of melody:
>
> *Bet'-alpha ba, bet'-e be, bet'-eta bē,*
> *Bet'-iota bi, bet'-*
> *o bo, bet'-u bu, bet'-ō bō.*
>
> And again in a responsion [*antistrophos*] of tune and metre, *gamma-alpha*, *gamma-e*, *gamma-eta*, *gamma-iota*, *gamma-o*, *gamma-u*, *gamma-ō*, and so on for each remaining set of syllables: they all have the same metre and melody in responding stanzas [*antistrophoi*]. Hence Euripides not only is suspected of having composed his entire *Medea* from that source, but has patently borrowed the tune itself.[13]

Larensius specifies that what influenced Euripides was Callias' opening chorus, whose melody Athenaeus presupposes his readers will be able to supply from their schooldays. Larensius emphasizes that the melody repeated in each stanza, hence disregarding the natural accentuation of consonant-names (e.g. *βῆτα* vs *κάππα*) and the normal avoidance of hiatus (to allow e.g. *μῦ εἶ με*).[14] Such simplifications do seem plausible for a classroom and mnemonic context. Callias' chorus caused a (mere) suspicion that 'the *Medea* in its entirety' was based on it, while Euripides 'patently borrowed the tune itself'.

There follows a comment about Callias' influence on Sophocles. 'And people say that Sophocles, after hearing this, took the license of dividing his poetry by its metre[?] (*διελεῖν . . . τὸ ποίημα τῷ μέτρῳ*).' This is exemplified, in the manuscripts, by a deformation of *OT* 332–3. The comment is shown to be parenthetical by the reversion

trochees until Euripides' *Helen* (West (1987) 52–5), this is best interpreted as eight iambic metra. There was probably at least one licentious elision (see below, n. 15), the best place for which seems to be after ‒ ˘ ‒ ˘ ‒ ‒ (Dale (1968) 72). The reconstruction by Ruijgh (2001) 260–1, 293–8 is inadmissible, since his view that our text of Athenaeus is an abbreviation, to which one can liberally restore small words, has been superseded (Letrouit (1991); Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén (2000)).

[13] The first use of *ἀντίστροφος* with a genitive is unusual. For *ἐν ἀντιστρόφοις* cf. [Arist.] *Prob.* 19.15 918b13. *μεταφέρω* is either 'transfer' or 'modify', but recognizably—hence 'borrowed'.

[14] Hiatus is also admitted around the letter-names in Callias' prologue (453d).

in the next sentence to the topic of antistrophes, which is not relevant to Sophocles' passage since that is spoken.[15]

> διόπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τὰς ἀντιστρόφους ἀπὸ τούτου παρεδέχοντο πάντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς τὰς τραγῳδίας.
>
> Hence later people, apparently, all borrowed antistrophes into their tragedies from this source.[16]

Thus Callias' use of antistrophes is the key point on both sides of his alleged influence on Euripides. Clearchus evidently knew that metrically corresponding antistrophes occurred in earlier tragedy, so the emphasis is on Callias' repetition of melody as well as metre, which I shall call 'melodic responsion'. The emphasis implies that melodic responsion features within the claims which are crucial for us—(i) that Euripides clearly borrowed *τὸ μέλος αὐτό* from Callias' chorus, and (ii) that there was reason to suspect that the influence of that chorus extended throughout the whole *Medea*; Cynulcus' counterpart claim spoke of the pervasive influence on Euripides' *μέλη καὶ διάθεσιν*. Where exactly is melodic responsion relevant here? If we make it part of claim (i), we need to attribute to *μέλος* a sense like 'technique of melodization', and to envisage some second influence which Callias might have exerted on *Medea* as a whole—perhaps covered by Cynulcus' word *διάθεσις*, but quite unclear in its nature. More plausibly, melodic responsion is part of claim (ii), *μέλος* in claim (i) simply means 'tune', and *διάθεσις* ('organization, delivery') is a suitably cryptic way for Cynulcus to allude to melodic responsion.[17]

[15] Compare Larensius' aside on Stesichorus at 451d. Sophocles' lines do contain an *ἀντίστροφος* in the sense 'crasis' (*Σ* Ar. Pl. 3), but Larensius can hardly switch meanings so abruptly. Perhaps Clearchus explained the point about Sophocles clearly. I would restore the quotation from *OT*: the manuscripts' deformation, 'I shall cause grief neither to myself nor to you if convicted of this', is plausibly an attempt to suit meaning (not form) to context, in that it could represent Sophocles asking for leniency. *διελεῖν* refers to word-divisions at 453c, f, and *OT* 332 *ταῦτ'* is (probably along with *OC* 1164 *μολόντ'*) the most striking instance in Greek drama of elision at verse-end. I infer that Callias' chorus exhibited a similar anomalous elision. Similarly Ruijgh (2001) 315–18. Smith (2003) suggests very differently that Clearchus' point was the appearance of letter-names within tragic language (e.g. *ταῦ* in *ταῦτ'*), but why would anyone have chosen *OT* 332–3 to exemplify this pervasive feature of language? I do not understand how Smith (2003) 326 takes *διελεῖν . . . τὸ ποίημα τῷ μέτρῳ* and its connection to the quotation.

[16] I have taken *τούτου* like *τοῦτ'* in the previous sentence; it might also refer to Callias or Euripides.

[17] D'Angour (2006a) 276–82 does take *μέλος* as 'technique of melodization'. Hense (1876) understood *διάθεσις* to refer to speaker-divisions within the fifth stasimon, but

Interim conclusions: (i) Larensius says that Euripides clearly borrowed Callias' tune; (ii) Clearchus said that Euripides perhaps borrowed Callias' practice of melodic responsion throughout *Medea*. Corollary: Clearchus supposed that previous antistrophic stanzas corresponded in metre and rhythm (and probably tempo and mode and perhaps choreography) but were melodized in some other way, probably with stricter regard for accent-patterns. We have no other evidence about how (for example) Pindar and Aeschylus set their antistrophes.[18] Composing a tune which both followed accents and was recognizably the same in strophe and antistrophe would be restrictive, even if an audience's perception of 'sameness' allowed slight variations (as with metre).[19]

So far we have been concerned with interpreting what Athenaeus and Clearchus meant. But were their ideas about earlier musical practice correct? I shall argue that something valuable can be extracted from them, whereas some scholars have interpreted claims (i) and (ii) as the worthless result of catastrophic misunderstanding.

I think two main ideas have motivated this belief. The first is that Larensius dates Callias 'shortly before Strattis' (fl. *c.*400), which is imprecise if he was active before 431, especially given the more obvious chronological landmark of Aristophanes. This has led to three further arguments for distinguishing a second, otherwise unknown Callias: Athenaeus consistently speaks of 'Callias of Athens' when talking about the *Lettered Tragedy* but of 'Callias' when talking about the famous comedian; the play's use of the Ionic alphabet

they do not obtain in 'all' the *Medea*. Ruijgh (2001) 273–4 took διάθεσις as the general structure of prologue, chorus, episodes alternating with stasima etc., but *Medea* is not especially innovative in this respect. For 'delivery' see LSJ s.v. διάθεσις I.2b.

[18] Dale (1968) 204–6 admits our ignorance but inclines to think that antistrophic music normally included melodic reponsion; similarly West (1992b) 209–12. Koller (1956) believes Clearchus, but the alleged support from Plato and Aristoxenus (pp. 23, 28) is based on misreadings. For principles by which several later composers correlate pitch and accent see Cosgrove and Meyer (2006); cf. Winnington-Ingram (1955) 64–73.

[19] With melodic responsion, the principle that an accented syllable bears the (equal-)highest note in its word would often constrain two syllables to the same pitch, e.g. the second and third syllables of A. *Pers.* 65 πεπέρακεν ~ 73 πολυάνδρου. Other tendencies, such as the avoidance of a rise in pitch during a circumflex and of a fall in pitch during an acute, would constrain e.g. *Pers.* 67 γείτονα ~ 75 θεῖον ἐ-. D'Angour (2013) 206–8 conjectures that early composers accommodated accents to a 'repeated' melody by admitting a few swaps in the sequence of pitches; cf. D'Angour (this volume) at n. 15.

points to a date around 403; and the *Lettered Tragedy* is not in the *Suda* entry for the famous Callias (κ.213). However, none of these arguments is weighty. Positing a second Callias does not stop the reference to Strattis being odd, since only here is Strattis used as a chronological landmark. The insistence on Callias being 'of Athens' here can be ascribed to Clearchus' influence; when Athenaeus cites Clearchus for 'Epaminondas the Theban' (13 590b), there is no question of postulating an otherwise unknown Epaminondas. Inscriptions demonstrate that the Ionic alphabet was widely known in Athens from *c*.450. And we do not know how soon after Clearchus the *Lettered Tragedy* was lost, or the origins of the *Suda*'s information. These are slender grounds for cloning a comedian.[20]

The second factor which seems to underlie scholars' scepticism is a sense that Callias influencing Euripides is preposterous. Here, however, one must avoid discarding the baby with the bathwater. Both our central claims involve saying *propter hoc* where the evidence almost certainly admitted only *post hoc*. But such a slide is not uncommon in the Greeks' obsessive imposition of an inventor-and-influence teleology on the history of music.[21] Furthermore there is evidence that all three of Clearchus, Larensius, and Athenaeus are using the topic of brainteasers to set puzzles for their respective audiences.[22] This playful *mise-en-abyme* means we should expect that some claims will appear in a form more paradoxical than was warranted by the sources on which they were based. Hence a viable

[20] If Callias test. 4 is indeed about him (as accepted in K-A and Millis and Olson (2012) 225–7), it gives two further titles not mentioned in the *Suda*. For more detailed summaries of either side of the debate outlined in this paragraph, see Ruijgh (2001) 269–71; Gagné (2013) 304 n. 21. An alternative rationale for the mention of Strattis will be mentioned below.

[21] For this way of thinking see Barker (2014), particularly on Heraclides and Aristoxenus.

[22] For Athenaeus see p. 101 on Cynulcus' mention of Callias. For Clearchus see p. 108 on his treatment of Callias' prologue. Larensius makes a puzzle out of his three references to forfeits for failing to solve a puzzle, though editors have not understood this. At 10.448e Larensius describes the forfeit vaguely ('they used to drink the cup') and challenges Ulpian to make sense of it. At 457c he specifies that the cup was diluted, and again poses a question based on his paradoxical phrasing ('What punishment was undergone . . . if in fact they used to drink a diluted cup?'); Dobree's tentative <ἅλμῃ> κεκερασμένην, 'diluted <with brine>' (1833, 329), accepted by Kaibel (1923–5) and Olson (2006–12), produces a question which non-sensically answers itself. In fact, only at 458f–459a does Larensius finally (ἤδη) reveal the solution to the paradox—that the cup was diluted with brine and had to be downed.

model of claim (ii), for example, is that Clearchus believed that Euripides in 431 was the first tragedian to use melodic responsion, and suggested (wrongly but characteristically) that he got it from Callias, who had used it earlier under special circumstances. One need not discard the basic belief along with the dubious suggestion. As for claim (i) about 'the tune itself', I see no reason to rule out a priori the idea that Euripides did adapt a schoolroom chant, doubtless for a shocking and significant effect.[23] Unfortunately, we are not in a position to narrow down where in the *Medea* such an effect is most likely to have been deployed. I shall therefore leave this issue aside and focus in what follows on the more tractable question of melodic responsion.

The grounds for doubting Clearchus' testimony thus exist but are not forcing. Even if granted, such scepticism can be fleshed out into more or less plausible models. To take an example, Pöhlmann (1971) 239 and Rosen (1999) argued that Callias was an unknown later comedian of *c.*400, who made an absurd joke about how a quotable (hence earlier) play by Euripides had 'copied' (hence followed) the musical tactics of the present performance. This model not only entails a dubious second Callias, but also either that Clearchus knowingly promulgated an absurdity, or that he was confused by an obvious joke in a source with which he engaged very carefully. This engagement is clear especially from his treatment of Callias' prologue, where the speaker named the twenty-four letters, probably represented as the twenty-four choreuts as they are introduced to the audience. Ruijgh (2001) 286, 289 reports the principal manuscript at this point:

> *πρόλογος μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ὃν χρὴ λέγειν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων διαιροῦντα κατὰ τὰς πάσας γραφὰς καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν κατασ-τροφικῶς ποιουμένους εἰς τάλφα, βῆτα, γάμμα, δέλτα, εἶτα, θῆτα, θεοῦ γὰρ εἰ γε ἰῶτα, κάππα, λάβδα, μυ, νυ ξει το ου πει ρω σιγμα ταυ υ παρον φει χει τε τω ψ εἰς το ω.*[24]

[23] A roughly comparable manoeuvre could be Mahler's inclusion of the children's round 'Bruder Martin' in the third movement of his First Symphony. This is unconventional (and flagged as such by the instrumentation) and demands interpretation: see e.g. Roman (1973); Jung-Kaiser (1997) 115–25. An alternative interpretative move in our case is to think that Larensius/Athenaeus is emboldening a more nuanced statement in Clearchus.

[24] Ath. 10 453cd. The sense probably began 'Its prologue is composed from letters. People must recite it by dividing it into words according to the side-markings, and by making it end by reverting to alpha.' Then there is a quotation largely composed of the alphabet in order, with several difficulties of detail.

This passage is clearly corrupt, for example in its accents and treatment of the sequence *εἶ ζῆτα ἦτα*. In particular, *πάσας γραφάς* must be emended via 453f: 'Which one must divide in reading according to the *παραγραφάς*, just as before.'[25] The manuscripts' markings above the letter-names are a reasonable guess at what these 'marks beside' looked like in Clearchus. They indicate how to 'divide' the text, i.e. to extract words from unspaced majuscule. If the letter-names were originally written out, as in the manuscript, the reader would not need these *paragraphai*, since the unproblematic sequence . . . *ΑΛΦΑΒΗΤΑΓΑΜΜΑ* . . . would clarify even the pitfalls of . . . *ΝΥΞΕΙΤΟΟΥΠΕΙΡΩ* . . . . Rather, the manuscript's *ψ* (not *ψεῖ*) is the last trace that in Clearchus the reader was faced with mouthfuls like . . . *ΚΛΜΝΞΤΟΟΠΡ* . . . from which one had to extract trimeters by reading the marked letters as letter-names. Clearchus thus converted Callias' prologue into a riddle for his readers.[26] Such engagement makes it difficult to believe that Clearchus misunderstood a glaring anachronistic joke.[27] Furthermore, creating textualized riddles from source-material is quite different from promulgating a potentially confusing joke, and Clearchus' high-minded comments on the closeness of brainteasers and philosophy (457c) make it unlikely to me that he perpetrated the latter.

Welcker (1832) 152 already hinted at a more attractive explanation for how Clearchus could have radically misjudged Euripides' music. I mentioned that Larensius' dating of Callias via Strattis calls for an explanation. One might infer that Clearchus originally cited Strattis before or à propos Callias. Then one possibility is that Strattis in his *Medea* lampooned Euripides by saying something like 'Do you remember Callias' show with that repetitive chorus? That's where Euripides got his tunes from for *Medea*.' Such a comment, in a comedy, need not have picked on *Medea* because it did something musically remarkable. (Equally, however, such an innovation could

[25] Ruijgh (2001) 287–8 accepts *πάσας γραφάς* as 'complete letter-names', without giving a parallel; in his treatment of 453f he bizarrely suggests *κατὰ τὰς <πάσας γραφὰς>* alongside *<κατὰ τὰς> παραγραφάς* (ibid. 319–20).

[26] Clearchus' intervention here is emphasized rightly by Smith (2003) 318–20. Athenaeus duplicates it: his audience, like Clearchus', face a reading puzzle; Larensius' (aural) audience, like that of Callias, have that puzzle resolved for them.

[27] Clearchus also had ready access to information about dramatic dates if he wanted to check, since his relationship with Aristotle is considered to have extended into the latter's mature period (e.g. Tsitsiridis (2013) 4–5).

have been precisely Strattis' point, or Clearchus might have mentioned Strattis for an unconnected reason.)

To summarize, there are models which allow one to discredit Athenaeus' testimony. They require one, I think, to hypothesize fragments of Old Comedy and to attribute a dim reading of them to Clearchus, whose remains (largely mediated by deipnosophists, admittedly) are a lively read with little evidence of sloppiness.[28] Such models cannot be falsified. However, I have argued that there is also a viable model which allows (with external justification) that the claims in the testimonium has been affected by *post hoc ergo propter hoc* thinking, and that their surprise-value may have been increased in transmission, and leaves a late fourth-century scholar with some reasons for believing that Euripides' *Medea* was the first tragedy to use melodic responsion.

Faced with these alternative approaches to Athenaeus, let us turn to see whether anything in the text of the *Medea* favours one over the other.

MUSICAL DISCOURSE IN *MEDEA*

The first passage which raises the theme of musical novelty is the nurse's parting comment at *Med.* 190–203. The chorus have arrived at the sound of Medea's indoor cries, and suggested that the nurse should fetch her for a therapeutic chat.[29] The nurse doubts that Medea will accept, since she is refusing advice (184–9), and adds:

σκαιοὺς δὲ λέγων κοὐδέν τι σοφοὺς 190
τοὺς πρόσθε βροτοὺς οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις,
οἵτινες ὕμνους ἐπὶ μὲν θαλίαις
ἐπί τ' εἰλαπίναις καὶ παρὰ δείπνοις
ηὕροντο βίῳ τερπνὰς ἀκοάς·
στυγίους δὲ βροτῶν οὐδεὶς λύπας 195

[28] On scientific matters, however, see Plu. *Fac. Lun.* 920e *πολλὰ τοῦ Περιπάτου παρέτρεψεν* 'He subverted many Peripatetic ideas' (fr. 97 Wehrli).

[29] In 175 the proposed conversation is metaphorically called an *ὀμφά* (roughly, a divine prophetic voice). The chorus may thereby cast their advice in the terms of another form of music, namely sung hexameter prophecies; the metaphor would contrast with Aegeus' actual advice from Delphi later in the play.

ηὕρετο μούσῃ καὶ πολυχόρδοις
ᾠδαῖς παύειν, ἐξ ὧν θάνατοι
δειναί τε τύχαι σφάλλουσι δόμους.
καίτοι τάδε μὲν κέρδος ἀκεῖσθαι
μολπαῖσι βροτούς· ἵνα δ' εὔδειπνοι 200
δαῖτες, τί μάτην τείνουσι βοήν;
τὸ παρὸν γὰρ ἔχει τέρψιν ἀφ' αὑτοῦ
δαιτὸς πλήρωμα βροτοῖσιν.

You'd not be wrong to call former mortals maladroit and not clever at all, since they invented songs at festivities, at banquets, and alongside dinner-parties as sounds bringing pleasure to our life, whereas no mortal discovered how to stop Stygian pain with the Muse and with songs on many strings—pains from which deaths and terrible misfortunes overturn households. Yet these are what it profits mortals to cure with singing. Why do they vainly strain their cries where the dining is fine? After all, the satisfaction of the dinner is already present and intrinsically brings mortals pleasure.

The nurse dismisses former musical inventions (194 ηὕροντο, 196 ηὕρετο) which accompany commensality, and implicitly calls for a new, analgesic style.[30]

Old and new here can take their bearings from two possible deictic centres—the dates of performance and of action. There are two reasons to accept the level on which the nurse's comment is a metapoetic provocation by Euripides to his audience. First, she discusses singing rather than spoken conversation, and this points to the dramatic stylization by which the chorus sings its part. Secondly, she addresses a vague masculine second person (190 λέγων), rather than the female chorus, and this would have helped the original audience position themselves as addressees. Pucci (1980) 24–32 pressed this metapoetic approach furthest, and saw in this passage Euripides' proto-Aristotelian definition of tragedy as the genre of psychological catharsis.

However, tragic metapoetics do not steamroller characterization.[31] The comments unavoidably come across to the audience also as those

[30] The nurse's three words for commensality cannot be sharply distinguished, but combine to cover a full range of contexts from public festivals to formal dinners (e.g. for a marriage) to smaller private affairs. Vox (2003) 831–2 compares Stesichorus fr. 172 Finglass-Davies. The nurse therefore targets a wide range of genres (ὕμνοι in 192 need not mean 'hymns' specifically).

[31] Compare Torrance (2013) 268: 'the metapoetic strategies used allow for two levels of meaning, making sense within the fiction but also serving as markers of artificiality'.

of a nurse in the legendary period, and one who seems to know very little about what she is talking about. She has glaringly elided various genres not connected to commensality—notably threnody which is often conceived as a source of comfort—and the Greek cliché that music did banish angst.[32] By focusing on commensal contexts for song she speaks of occasions from which nurses would have been socially excluded.[33] The nurse's musicological limitations may be confirmed by the clear parallels between her words and Medea's comments at 298–9:

> σκαιοῖσι μὲν γὰρ καινὰ προσφέρων σοφά
> δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοὐ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι.

For if you proffer new pieces of cleverness, to the maladroit your nature will appear useless and not clever.

Four concepts from the nurse's words—invention, uselessness, lack of cleverness (σοφός), and being maladroit (σκαιός)—recur together, just a hundred lines later. But whereas the nurse decries a set of musical inventors as useless and maladroit rather than clever, Medea decries the maladroit who see clever inventors as useless and lacking cleverness. If Medea is right, the nurse appears both maladroit (in judging inventions as useless and lacking cleverness) and hypocritical (in labelling the inventors as themselves maladroit).[34]

In summary, by giving the nurse's words metapoetic force while undermining her authority, Euripides leaves us in a quandary about how to interpret his own musical aspirations. The passage will turn out to prime us both for self-reflexive comments about music, and for their interpretative complexities.

[32] The cliché: Hes. *Th.* 55 with West (1966); Crane (1990) suggests that Euripides and his audience might have rejected the cliché, though this is different from the nurse neglecting it. Actual therapeutic uses of music have a marginal presence in sources from the late fifth century on: West (2000) 55–66. Pleasure from threnody: e.g. *LfgrE* s.v. γόος B4.

[33] The nurse mentions 'songs on many strings' (196–7), not as a future innovation which she expects to have therapeutic potential but as a pre-existing state which has failed to be therapeutic. As Mossman (2011) notes, the usage contrasts with Plato *Rep.* 1.339cd, where use of 'many strings' goes hand in hand with frequent modulation as a dangerous innovation. I hesitate, on the basis of just two passages, to interpret the nurse as incorrectly designating traditional music using a term associated with cutting-edge music.

[34] Other readings of the intratext are of course possible. One could be more cautious of Medea's rhetorical goals, or acknowledge that the nurse judges past inventions by their results, whereas Medea's targets judge their novelty per se.

The second key passage is the first half of the first stasimon, where the chorus sing—under Medea's gaze—a remarkable response to the first episode, in which they listened to Medea's speech about the humble social position of women, promised to keep silent if an opportunity for revenge should arise, witnessed the exchange with Creon, and heard Medea's plan for violent revenge:

ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί, [str.]
καὶ δίκα καὶ πάντα πάλιν στρέφεται·
ἀνδράσι μὲν δόλιαι βουλαί, θεῶν δ'
οὔκετι πίστις ἄραρε,
τὰν δ' ἐμὰν εὔκλειαν ἔχειν βιοτὰν στρέψουσι φᾶμαι· 415
ἔρχεται τιμὰ γυναικείῳ γένει·
οὐκέτι δυσκέλαδος φάμα γυναῖκας ἕξει. 420

μοῦσαι δὲ παλαιγενέων λήξουσ' ἀοιδῶν [ant.]
τὰν ἐμὰν ὑμνεῦσαι ἀπιστοσύναν.
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἁμετέρᾳ γνώμᾳ λύρας
ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδὰν 425
Φοῖβος ἀγήτωρ μελέων· ἐπεὶ ἀντάχησ' ἂν ὕμνον
ἀρσένων γέννᾳ. μακρὸς δ' αἰὼν ἔχει
πολλὰ μὲν ἁμετέραν ἀνδρῶν τε μοῖραν εἰπεῖν.

The springs of sacred rivers are running uphill, and justice and the universe are turning backwards: men's counsels are deceitful—pledges of the gods no longer hold fast—and tales will turn my life around to have good repute. Honour is coming to the womanly race: no longer shall a tale of unpleasant din constrain women.

The Muses of aged singers will leave off harping on *my* infidelity. For it was not within our mind that Phoebus, leader of melodies, bestowed divine song to the lyre, since I would have sounded a song in response to the species of males. The long ages have much to say of our lot and of men's.

The world is topsy-turvy: men are abandoning their oaths; honour and repute are coming to women, and future music will have to treat male and female infidelity even-handedly.

Like the nurse, the chorus call for a revolution in music from which they have been excluded—here a revolution of content and social effect, rather than psychological effect. The implication that traditional poetry confers repute and honour upon men puts epic and epinician among the targets, and the dactylo-epitrite metre supports both connections.[35]

[35] Hopman (2008) 157 notes that Medea featured in early epic Argonautica stories and in *Pythian* 4.

The words *ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδάν* / *Φοῖβος* (425–6) are a specific allusion to *Od.* 8.498 *θεὸς* [Apollo: cf. 8.488] *ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδήν*, and indeed Demodocus' best-loved song is about the infidelity of Aphrodite. *ἡγήτωρ* (426) is mostly confined to epic. Epic did indeed discuss female infidelity (e.g. of Helen and Clytemnestra; more generally in Hesiod's *Works and Days*); but the contraction and correption of *ὑμνεῦσαι* (423) may point also to the dialect of iambus and so of Semonides' misogyny.[36] Jason accidentally adds a further target during the second episode, when he cites the *ὕμνοι* (as in 192, 427) of his fellow-Argonaut Orpheus as ideal songs whose power would nevertheless not compensate for a loss of honour (542–4). Orpheus' assassination by barbarian women was a common fifth-century story, and he turns (by the Hellenistic period at least) into a misogynistic pederast.[37] Euripides works him in to represent lyre-playing as a male preserve, and to connect this world with Jason's honour-code which will come unstuck, thanks to another barbarian woman.

However, the chorus's rhetoric cannot straightforwardly be endorsed. Their radicalism takes linguistic shape when they attribute separate *βιοτή*, *γένος*/*γέννα*, *γνώμη*, and *μοῖρα* ('life', 'race/species', 'mind', 'lot') to the two sexes, rather than to the human species as a whole; 'I' repeatedly means a monolithic 'womankind'. A more conservative audience's suspicions are enhanced by the palpable shallowness in their argument. Since they begin with a proverbial *adynaton*, their predictions seem anchored in fantasy. They concentrate on the 'deceitful counsels' of men, after a speech emphasizing Medea's intention to use deceit—a female speciality (408–9)—against Creon and Jason. Their inference from the existence of male oath-breaking (by Jason) to imminent honour for women is unsubstantiated. Medea's presence casts doubt on how far they believe their own words. Further objections arise from outside the characters' realm of knowledge. Even if this ode and the first pair of the second stasimon do discuss male infidelity, the tragedy as a whole will certainly not bathe women in glory. The claim that lyre-playing is

[36] For the linguistic detail see Mastronarde (2002) on 423, 426–7.

[37] See in general Gantz (1993) 721–5. Death by Thracian women: Aeschylus' *Bassarids* in Ps.-Erat. *Cat.* 24, *LIMC* Orpheus section IV. His lyre-playing pitted against Sirens: A.R. 4.891–917. Pederasty after failing to rescue Eurydice: Phanocles fr. 1; Ov. *Met.* 10.78–11.43 (leads Thracian women to kill him).

an exclusively male preserve had for the audience at least one famous counter-example in Sappho.[38] And so on.

Confirmation that the chorus deserve scepticism comes in 1085–9, where they backtrack on their rhetoric in response to Medea's anguished monologue. This time Medea is not watching since she has ominously followed her children indoors; some audience members may well expect her to kill them immediately, during the chorus's words.[39] They say: 'I have often approached harder debates than women should . . . '

> ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν Μοῦσα καὶ ἡμῖν, 1085
> ἣ προσομιλεῖ σοφίας ἕνεκεν,
> πάσαισι μὲν οὔ, παῦρον δὲ γένος
> (<μίαν> ἐν πολλαῖς εὕροις ἂν ἴσως)
> οὐκ ἀπόμουσον τὸ γυναικῶν.

> But since we too have a Muse who accompanies us for the sake of our wisdom[40]—not all of us, but small is the tribe of women (perhaps you would find one among many) who are not unfamiliar with the Muses— . . .

. . . I declare: the childless are more fortunate than parents; they circumvent efforts which may well turn out fruitless.' The references to women's relationship with the Muses and to a female γένος recall the first stasimon. But though the point here is still radical—young Greek women rejecting motherhood—the rhetoric has lost the polarization of musical men versus unmusical women, begins with an apology for earlier bold claims, and is syntactically embarrassed. Their glaring avoidance of Medea's situation suggests that their horror at her plan is a factor in their climbdown.[41]

So far I have argued that the first stasimon predicts a content-based revolution in music in terms which are heavily ironized. What if Clearchus was right to believe that Euripides was innovating through widespread use of melodic responsion? The first stasimon would be a crucial moment either to introduce the effect or to confirm that it was not an isolated strategy of the parodos. Either way, the coincidences

[38] On female musicianship in Greece see e.g. Snyder (1989); Greene (2005); Vazaki (2003) treats fifth-century Athens; Pomeroy (1977) treats Hellenistic developments.

[39] In the event, she waits to revel in the messenger's report of the princess's death. But at 1065 she expresses confidence that the death is underway, and gives us no reason to expect that she will await confirmation.

[40] Either 'because we have wisdom' or, as Kovacs (1994), 'to promote wisdom in us'.

[41] Cf. Mossman (2011) 332–5.

between form and content would be remarkable. The *adynaton* chosen implies a confusion in the natural states of up and down.[42] The repetition of *πάλιν στρέφεται . . . στρέψουσι* suggests the word 'antistrophe' itself. *ἀντηχέω* is both 'to counter in singing' but also 'to sing responding frequencies'.[43] And the first line of the antistrophe, 'The Muses of aged singers will leave off . . .', is the perfect sentiment to accompany formal innovation.[44]

These coincidences of content would still leave us in a similar quandary about how to interpret Euripides' musical comments. The late Ian MacAuslan suggested to me that Euripides, by making the melody sound 'wrong' (cf. 420 *δυσκέλαδος*?), could reinforce the chorus's claim to have been excluded from (lyre-)music. More plausible, I think, is to attribute the potential topsy-turvy melodization to the characters, as a means of imitating content in melody, as is found elsewhere in Greek musical documents.[45] Melody would still contribute to undermining their ideas, in that the audience remains simultaneously aware of the disjunction between Euripides' musical innovation in form versus the chorus's prediction of musical innovation in content, which Euripides will not provide.

The final key passage for our purposes is the first strophic pair of the third stasimon, which occurs just after the chorus have witnessed Aegeus offering Medea a refuge in Athens, and then heard her plan to kill her children to exact revenge on Jason.

Ἐρεχθεΐδαι τὸ παλαιὸν ὄλβιοι	[str.]	
καὶ θεῶν παῖδες μακάρων, ἱερᾶς		825
χώρας ἀπορθήτου τ' ἄπο, φερβόμενοι		
κλεινοτάταν σοφίαν, αἰεὶ διὰ λαμπροτάτου		
βαίνοντες ἁβρῶς αἰθέρος, ἔνθα ποθ' ἁγνὰς		830
ἐννέα Πιερίδας Μούσας λέγουσι		

[42] Pherecrates' character Music describes Kinesias' innovative modulations in terms of a similar confusion of left and right: fr. 155.11–12.

[43] So of sympathetic frequencies in the Aristotelian *Problemata* (19.24 919b16).

[44] For the uses of 'new' and 'old' in musical discourse of the period see e.g. LeVen (2014) 87–101. Phonetic correspondences between strophe and antistrophe are discussed, rather haphazardly, by Irigoin (1988). These may have reinforced the audience's perception of melodic responsion.

[45] See e.g. in Limenius' *Paean*, the double-peak on 2 *δικόρυφον*, the chromatic run in 16 *αἰόλοις*, and the echo of it in 17 *πετροκατοίκητος Ἀχώ* (numeration follows *DAGM* no. 21). Cf. D'Angour (this volume). Cosgrove and Meyer (2006) 74–5 interpret the deliberate *opposition* of melody and accents in *DAGM* no. 17 (second-century CE setting of a threnody for Ajax) as expressing pain.

ξανθὰν Ἁρμονίαν φυτεῦσαι·

τοῦ καλλινάου τ' ἐπὶ Κηφισοῦ ῥοαῖς [ant.] 835
τὰν Κύπριν κλῄζουσιν ἀφυσσαμέναν
χώρας καταπνεῦσαι μετρίας ἀνέμων
ἡδυπνόους αὔρας· αἰεὶ δ' ἐπιβαλλομέναν 840
χαίταισιν εὐώδη ῥοδέων πλόκον ἀνθέων
τᾷ Σοφίᾳ παρέδρους πέμπειν Ἔρωτας,
παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργούς.

Children of Erechtheus, prosperous of old, and offspring of the blessed gods, you from the sacred and unsacked land who feed on wisdom most famous, and ever step in luxury through the air most bright—where once, they say, the nine pure Pierian Muses planted blonde Harmonia;

and they make it known that as the Cyprian drew water at the streams of fair-flowing Kephisos, she breathed over the land the breezes of winds, measured and blowing sweetly, and that she ever places a fragrant garland of rose-flowers on her hair, and sends to sit by Wisdom her Cupids, collaborators in all forms of virtue.

The chorus presents Athens as largely sublimated from human needs.[46] The Athenians feed not on food but on *σοφία*—which includes the skill of the musician. They tread air not soil. Their stability is stressed not only by *ἀπορθήτου* ('unsacked', 826), but by the self-responsion of 'land' and 'ever' (826/837 *χώρας*, 829/840 *αἰεί*). The Athenians are autochthonous children of Erechtheus and gods; even Aphrodite and the Cupids are desexualized; the Muses 'plant' Harmonia without male reproductive involvement.[47] The ideology of autochthony and the tropes of the Golden Age make this an unchanging, pristine Athens.

Clearly the ode has metapoetic potential. Harmonia is a native Athenian, and Euripides' song instantiates her; Pucci (1980) 117 adds that Euripides' Athenian *σοφία* is nourishing. However, Euripides is not simply allowing Athenian choreuts to praise their homeland and audience. Yet again the characters are given ideas which seem suspect

[46] My reading resembles that of Nimis (2007). Swift (2009) 371–5 focuses on the stasimon's ironic engagement with *locus amoenus* tropes. For food, sex, and deterioration as markers of the human condition in Hesiod's Prometheus myth, see Vernant (1974) 177–94.

[47] The Muses (~ the liberal arts) are logically prior to and generate Harmonia (musical attunement). The Greek could conceivably mean that Harmonia (social attunement) planted the Muses, instead of them being born from Zeus' affair with Mnemosyne.

from the audience's perspective and even from their own. The comments on Aphrodite and Sophia seem superficial considering the ambivalence of these forces in the surrounding play, and the representation of Aegeus as both sexually unfortunate and dim-witted.[48] The audience would not have advocated stepping ἁβρῶς ('in luxury', 829), aerobatically or otherwise, and knew that Athens was no longer 'unsacked'. Harmonia's vegetal birth skirts the lust of her normal parents Ares and Aphrodite.[49]

Thus once again the characters' thoughts are undermined both within the terms of the plot, and by the audience's broader chronological perspective. As with the first stasimon, accepting Clearchus' testimonium would again contribute to the ode's meaning conveniently. If Euripides was using melodic responsion, the musical form would, in the very act of performance, deconstruct and expose the ideological forcedness of the changeable/unchangeable opposition on which the chorus's ideas, including their picture of Athenian Harmonia, are premised: Euripides' Athenian melody innovates by repeating.[50] We have no evidence as to whether Euripides was innovating here in *harmonia* considered narrowly (e.g. use of the chromatic genus, or of modulation), but I do not think it would be hard for an audience to take Harmonia as also governing the adaptation of her intervals to accents.

There is, however, a supplementary aspect to Euripides' potential melodic innovation and its performative contradiction of the Corinthian women's description. Immediately after their idealization, the chorus wonders whether this city 'of sacred rivers' (846 ποταμῶν ἱερῶν) will receive Medea. This clearly echoes ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν from the first stasimon. As I noted above when discussing lines 1085–9, Medea's plan to kill her children has distanced the chorus from her. In line with this, they here switch their earlier focus from the social confusion of Jason's oath-breaking to that of Medea's intended infanticide, and suggest that Medea's arrival will have an

[48] See e.g. Hall (1997) 103; Keen (2009) 628–9 seems too generous.

[49] The audience has been put in mind of Demodocus' song about them at 425 (see p. 113). Hesiod *Th.* 933–7 provides a less scandalous version of how they begot Harmonia.

[50] For a deconstructionist approach to the ideology of autochthony see Loraux (2000), esp. 60, 111–24. Relatedly, Torrance (2013) 224 suggests that *Medea*'s recurrent words for novelty are a metapoetic comment on Euripides' innovation (if indeed it was one) of having Medea kill her children.

equal potential to turn Athens' rivers backwards, and to confound the pristine Athenian Harmonia, in the sense of socio-political attunement, which they have just outlined. This implication allows us to tie in the final strand of the play's musical imagery, the widespread Greek metaphor of civic attunement. At 306–8, Medea continues her complaints about the lack of respect accorded to inventors by asking Creon what *πλημμελές* (literally 'off-tune') suffering he fears from her, then rephrasing the question in terms of injustice. Medea's innovative thinking, in Creon's mind, threatens to introduce a disharmony of crime into the political attunement of Corinth. Later, this disharmony is revealed to redound on Medea herself too. At 1008 the tutor describes Medea's wail as 'not concordant' (*οὐ ξυνῳδά*) with the news which elicited it, namely that the princess has accepted Medea's fatal gifts—the point of no return. At 1269 the chorus predicts that the gods will send pollution 'concordant' (*ξυνῳδά*) with the crimes of kin-murderers. The juxtaposition of this claim with another wail—that of Medea's children indoors—points, as the tutor had, to the intrinsic discord of Medea's plans which harmonize not with her satisfaction but with the unmusical wailing of her and her children. The exodos leaves us with Medea accused repeatedly of pollution and heading off to live with Aegeus at Athens. In this light, lines 846–50 reveal the chorus's idealization of Athens to be a hyperbole calculated to oppose stable *sophia* to Medea's innovating cleverness, an unsacked city to a wrecker of three governing families, a pure Aphrodite and virtuous Cupids to a passion which leads to pollution, Harmonia to a force of intrinsic disharmony—in short, to magnify the risk to Athens which Medea poses.[51] The performative contradiction, if the first strophic pair used innovative melodic responsion, would then not simply be a matter of showing up the chorus's naivety, but a means of making present in music the breakdown which they foresee, and which they now appreciate may derive from Medea's pollution rather than (as in the first stasimon) from men breaking oaths.

I tried first in this essay to clarify some issues in the slippery testimonium in Athenaeus. I argued that, although certain models in which Clearchus made a gross mistake are reasonable and cannot

[51] Jason implies her pollution at 1346, 1371, 1393, 1406. On the risk of her heading to Athens (as she reminds us at 1384–5), see Sfyroeras (1994/5). Buchan (2008) 24 sees the chorus's Athens as a 'nostalgic fantasy . . . whereas the real city is one that still reverberates with the consequences of Medea's arrival'.

be disproved, they are no more plausible than a model in which Clearchus had justification for thinking that Euripides made a significant innovation in tragic melody in the *Medea*, by employing melodic as well as metrical responsion, and as a corollary by divorcing melody from pitch-accents. Secondly, I have argued that musical discourse is an undervalued but carefully thought-out theme in the *Medea*.[52] Others have not considered the testimonium in relation to this material, but it turns out that of the three main passages the first can be taken as programmatic of Euripides' handling of the theme, while the other two are enhanced by the hypothesis of melodic responsion. The nurse in her parting comment misguidedly longs for innovation in the realm of music's psychological effect, and so primes us for both self-reflexive musical comments and difficulties in interpreting their degree of dramatic irony. The chorus in the first stasimon naively predict innovation in the realm of Greek song-culture's gender-bias. The hypothesis of melodic responsion fits the language of the first strophic pair remarkably well, and it could be interpreted as the Corinthian women choosing inverted melodic contours in order to express the inversion of the world-order and to effect the break from musical traditions which they are predicting. Most complex is the third stasimon, where the chorus project an idealised, innovationless image onto Athenian Harmonia, before questioning whether Athens could receive the disharmony of a child-killing Medea. Again the hypothesis of melodic responsion interacts intelligibly with the song, showing up the forcedness of the chorus's view of Athens, which at first seems simply naïve but is then revealed as a hyperbole calculated to bring home the risks which Medea poses to Athenian stability. If only Clearchus had offered some assertions about how Euripides introduced his innovations—a few 'wrong notes' at a time, or in a sudden revelation (e.g. on the words 'The Muses of old singers will leave off . . . '), or in any number of possible ways: we might then be able to evaluate the hypothesis more cogently. As it is, doubtless some readers will still prefer to reject the testimonium. I hope that I have at least convinced them that the melodies of the *Medea* should not only be on musicologists' wish-lists, since their interaction with the theme of musical innovation probably had far-reaching implications, for example for how

[52] I alert readers also to the recent comments on this theme in Gurd (2016) 124–8, which unfortunately I saw too late to incorporate fully into my analysis.

the audience would assess the chorus' development over the first three stasima.[53]

I would like to end by mentioning two modern productions whose composers have been moved—presumably without Athenaeus' help—to reinforce the first stasimon's claims with melodic novelty. The Japanese director Yukio Ninagawa chose this moment to switch from recognizably Japanese musical idioms to an orchestral arrangement of Handel's *Sarabande* from HWV 437.[54] Along with this musical upheaval, Medea and several chorus-members pull 'streams' of red ribbons from their mouths, which Smethurst (2002) 13 explains as in part a reversal of a kabuki trope where faithful girls place ribbons in the mouths of their boyfriends. Secondly Annie Castledine's Greek production in Cambridge in 2007 set Medea amid a chorus of Edwardian suffragettes. Just before the first antistrophe, the composer Elspeth Brooke had the chorus break out of Greek into English and sing the first verse of the suffragette anthem 'The March of the Women'.[55] These modern theatre-practitioners, if I have been on the right track, have taken advantage of a performance opportunity in Euripides' text which readers had forgotten about for centuries.

[53] I do not have space here to work into my reading the possible interaction of melodic responsion with another feature of *Medea* which shows that it was 'through-composed', namely Euripides' limited metrical palette. All five stasima consist of two strophic pairs, and in the first four a dactylo-epitrite pair is followed by a predominantly Aeolic one; dactylo-epitrite and Aeolic are also combined in the antistrophic part of the parodos. The handling of dactylo-epitrite rarely ventures beyond hemiepes and epitrite elements, while the Aeolic sections return insistently to the colon x — ⏑⏑ — ⏑ — —, and incorporate iambs and dactyls in recurring ways.

[54] My information about Ninagawa's long-lived production is based on Smethurst (2002) here p. 12, and on two clips currently available on Youtube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQXkmRYag94 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTD17KkJ9TQ). Smethurst refers to Corelli's *La Follia*, which is a more ornamented version of the same folk-dance as Handel's piece.

[55] Words by Cicely Hamilton, music by Dame Ethel Smyth, date 1910.

5

Mesomedes' *Hymn to the Sun*

The Precipitation of Logos *in the* Melos

Stelios Psaroudakes

The *Suda* informs us that Mesomedes of Crete was active as a composer in the time of Emperor Hadrian, who reigned from 117–138 AD. Initially a slave, he was freed by the emperor, became a celebrated poet and composer during Hadrian's reign, and continued to be well known in later imperial times. A cenotaph was erected in Rome in his honour about a century later by Emperor Antoninus (Caracalla, who reigned 198–217 AD).[1] A number of other ancient authors refer to Mesomedes, while the manuscript tradition has brought down to us nine of his song lyrics and three (or possibly four) of his songs.[2] This chapter focuses on one of his surviving songs, the *Hymn to the Sun*. Other pieces in this volume explore texts whose music has not survived, or about whose musical setting we have only the scantiest information.[3] As in the case of the 'Seikilos song',[4] the survival of the words and melody of Mesomedes' composition give us the opportunity to look in detail at their interaction.

[1] *Suda* μ.668 s.v. *Μεσομήδης* (Adler 3:367.8).

[2] For a brief biographical summary see West (1992a) 384, and for a more extended account Bélis (2003a). For a possible attribution to Mesomedes of the 'Berlin paean' (*DAGM* 166–9, No. 50), see Bélis (2003b) 556.

[3] See esp. Phillips, Thomas, D'Angour (this volume).

[4] D'Angour (this volume) pp. 64–72.

Ὕμνος εἰς Ἥλιον		*Hymn to the Sun*[6]	
Χιονοβλεφάρου πάτερ Ἀοῦς,	1	Father of Dawn with the snowy	[a]
ῥοδόεσσαν ὃς ἄντυγα πώλων		eyelashes, who, the rosy chariot at	
πτανοῖς ὑπ' ἴχνεσσι διώκεις,		the foals' soaring steps you drive,	
χρυσέαισιν ἀγαλλόμενος κόμαις		delighting in your golden hair	
περὶ νῶτον ἀπείριτον οὐρανοῦ		about the limitless back of the sky	
ἀκτῖνα πολύστροφον ἀμπλέκων		twining your ever-circling beam,	
αἴγλας πολυδερκέα πάναν[5]		the thread of radiance	
περὶ γαῖαν ἅπασαν ἑλίσσων,		round the whole earth winding,	
ποταμοὶ δὲ σέθεν πυρὸς ἀμβρότου		while rivers of immortal fire	
τίκτουσιν ἐπήρατον ἁμέραν.		give birth to lovely day.	
Σοὶ μὲν χορὸς εὔδιος ἀστέρων	11	For you chorus serene of stars	[b]
κατ' Ὄλυμπον ἄνακτα χορεύει		dances—Lord of Olympos,	
ἄνετον μέλος αἰὲν ἀείδων		a leisurely song ever singing	
Φοιβηίδι τερπόμενος λύρᾳ		delighting in Phoibos' lyre,	
γλαυκὰ δὲ πάροιθε Σελάνα	15	and the pale Moon in front	[c]
χρόνον ὥριον ἁγεμονεύει		leads time and season on	
λευκῶν ὑπὸ σύρμασι μόσχων·		with her white heifers' drawing;	
γάνυται δέ τέ <σ>οι νόος εὐμενὴς	18	and your benevolent heart is glad,	[d]
πολυείμονα κόσμον ἑλίσσων.		as it keeps the richly arrayed	
		universe revolving.	

Using highly poetic Doric diction, Mesomedes here paints a magnificent picture of the Sun god, who with reins in hand leads his brilliant chariot as he, master of the universe, rises gently to the dome of the sky;[7] while at the same time the moon Selene, tired and pale,

[5] *Πάναν* in *DAGM* 97 but *πάγαν* in *DAGM* 96; *πάναν* ('thread') in West (1992b) 304–5 and West (1992a) 10; *παγὰν* in Pöehlmann (1970) 16, 17.

[6] Translation based on that of West (1992a) 304–6. For an alternative English translation see Landels (1999) 256.

[7] The metope in relief from the Temple of Athena at Ilion in Austin (2005) 208 vividly portrays the scene. For comparable, earlier, iconography on the rising Sun see the red figure crater attributed to the Leningrad Painter depicting Helios (sun disc over his head) on his chariot as he travels from East to West over the sea (dolphin) in Kakrides (1986b) 227 fig. 101; the red figure calyx crater depicting Helios on his chariot amidst the stars, appearing as boys, plunging into the sea as he rises in id., 197; and the Apulian crater attributed to the Painter of the Underworld depicting Helios, Eos, and Phosphoros journeying over the sea in id., 231 fig. 104. For Eos spreading her saffron robe over the face of all the earth cf. *Il.* 24.695, *Ἠὼς δὲ κροκόπεπλος ἐκίδνατο πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν.*

abandons the heavens on her oxen-driven chariot.[8] The stars unite their voices in song accompanied by the lyre: a hymn to the glory of His Lordship. The god's heart is filled with joy and euphoria, struck by the effervescent cosmic beauty.

What remains to be seen is how the composer dresses his words in musical sounds (notes, durations, syntax, phrases, motifs, cadences, etc.) and what use he makes of melorhythmic devices. In the following analysis, based on the reading by *DAGM*, each line of text is shown with the natural syllabic quantities marked below it;[9] above the verse are the note sign/s ascribed to each syllable (*sēmeia*), and above those the durations (*chronoi*) of the signs[10] with their 'modifications' (*chronōn pathē*).[11]

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ ⌙ –
C C C C I C P C Φ∩C (∩ proposed by *DAGM* instead of / in V)
Χι-ο-νο-βλε-φά-ρου πά-τερ Ἀ-οῦς, 1
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ υ – –
Φ M M M M I C Φ MI∩ M
ῥο-δό-εσ-σαν ὃς ἄν-τυ-γα πώ-λων 2
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

[8] The red figure pyxis lid attributed to the Painter of the Lid in Kakrides (1986b) 225 fig. 100 shows most imaginatively the endless 'chase' between Helios and Selene. For another two other depictions of Selene, see the red figure Boeotian calyx crater attributed to the Painter of the Paris Judgement of Paris depicting Selene (moon crescent next to her head) on her chariot travelling over the sea (dolphin) in Kakrides (1986b) 230 fig. 103 and the red figure kylix attributed to the Brygos Painter depicting Selene (full moon over her head, two stars on either side) on her chariot in id., 229 fig. 102. In none of the aforementioned Selene depictions are the animals associated with her oxen, as described in Mesomedes' hymn, but horses, with or without wings. Apart from horses and oxen yoked to Selene's chariot, deer are also mentioned in mythology (Kakrides (1986b) 230).

[9] σ for light/*bracheia* (pronounced in one unit of time), and Σ for heavy/*makra* syllable (pronounced in two units of time when 'in rhythm').

[10] υ for a single unit (*monosēmos*); – for a double unit (*makra disēmos*); ⌙ for a triple unit/*makra trisēmos*.

[11] Dot (*stigmē*) for upbeat (*arsis*), absence of dot for downbeat (*thesis*). *Arsis* and *thesis* are two of the four 'modifications' (*pathē*) of durations (*chronoi*), according to Aristides Quintilianus *De mus.* 1.13 (see Winnington-Ingram 1963: 31.9–10), the other two being sound (*psophos*) and silence (*ēremia*). The *leimma* (∩) indicates prolongation of the note duration by a time-unit. Thus, a long syllable (Σ) sung to one note, say Φ, will last two units of time (Φ/Σ = –), while the same syllable sung to a note followed by the leimma will last three units of time (Φ∩/Σ = ⌙); see l. 1, above.

$\dot{-}$ υυ $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ ∟ –
M IM I I Π M I Z∩ Z
πτα-νοῖς ὑπ᾽ ἴχ-νεσ-σι δι-ώ-κεις, 3
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

$\dot{-}$ υυ $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ –
M ZM Z I M <*I*> *I M Z I* (<*I*> added by *DAGM*)
χρυ-σέ<u>α</u>ι-σιν ἀ-γαλ-λό-με-νος κό-μαις 4
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ υυ
M I Z I M I Π Φ C *P PC*
πε-ρὶ νῶ-τον ἀ-πεί-ρι-τον οὐ-ρα-νοῦ 5
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{\upsilon}\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ –
C*P M* C *M M M M M I M*
ἀκ-τῖ-να πο-λύσ-τρο-φον ἀμ-πλέ-κων, 6
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{-}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ υ– υ υ
I⁻ *M P M I Z I MP∩ P* C (∩ proposed by *DAGM* instead of / in N)
αἴ-γλας πο-λυ-δερ-κέ-α πά-ναν 7
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

$\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ ∟ –
C *P M M M* C *R Φ M∩ M* (∩ added by *DAGM*)
πε-ρὶ γαῖ-αν ἅ-πα-σαν ἑ-λίσ-σων, 8
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

$\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ –
M I Z Z Z Z Z E I E Z
πο-τα-μοὶ δὲ σέ-θεν πυ-ρὸς ἀμ-βρό-του 9
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{-}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ –
P M I Z Z I M P <*I*> C (<*I*> added by *DAGM*)
τίκ-του-σιν ἐ-πή-ρα-τον ἁ-μέ-ραν. 10
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{-}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – υ –
C *Φ C P M M M P P C*
Σοὶ μὲν χο-ρὸς εὔ-δι-ος ἀσ-τέ-ρων 11
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

$\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ – $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\upsilon}$ ∟ –
M I M M I P M I Z∩ Z (∩ added by *DAGM*)
κατ᾽ Ὄ-λυμ-πον ἄ-νακ-τα χο-ρεύ-ει 12
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ ⌙ –
Z Z M Z Z M Z I E∩ Z (∩ added by *DAGM*)
ἄ-νε-τον μέ-λος αἰ-ὲν ἀ-εί-δων 13
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ –
M I Z Z M I P Φ Z Z
Φοι-βη-ί-δι τερ-πό-με-νος λύ-ρᾳ. 14
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

υ̇υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ υ– –
CP M M M C P M MI∩ M
Γλαυ-κὰ δὲ πά-ροι-θε Σε-λά-να 15
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ ⌙ –
I M I M M P M I Z∩ Z (∩ added by *DAGM*)
χρό-νον ὥ-ρι-ον ἁ-γε-μο-νεύ-ει 16
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

υ̇υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ υυυ –
MI Z I M I Φ C PMP C
λευ-κῶν ὑ-πὸ σύρ-μα-σι μόσ-χων· 17
(Σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ υυ υ –
C C C C C C P C PΦ P M
γά-νυ-ται δέ τέ σοι νό-ος εὐ-με-νὴς 18
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ Σ)

υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ – υ̇ υ̇ υυυ –
M I Z I M I Φ C PMP C
πο-λυ-εί-μο-να κόσ-μον ἑ-λίσ-σων. 19
(σ σ Σ σ σ Σ σ σ Σ Σ)

Metrically speaking, there is a sequence of two types of colon consisting of paroemiacs and apocrota.[12] These cola have the same form to begin with but differ in their endings. Both comprise lyric anapaests,[13] apart from the pentaseme ending (σΣ) of the apocroton:[14]

σσΣ σσΣ σσΣ Σ	paroemiac	⏑⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑⏑ – – ‖
σσΣ σσΣ σσΣ σΣ	apocroton	⏑⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ – ‖ ‖ = period end

[12] The latter was a common metrical form in the second and third centuries AD: West (1992b) 305 n. 8.

[13] Pöehlmann and Speliopoulou (2007) 139.

[14] West (1992a) 305 with n. 8; Pöehlmann and Speliopoulou (2007) 139–40.

The first question to be tackled is how the metrical quantities of the syllables are treated in the melodic rhythm. Do they maintain the temporal values they have in speech, or are at least some of them changed by being either prolonged or shortened? An answer may be given by examination of the rhythmical notation. The observed rhythmical features involve the allocation of:

1. a monoseme note to a short syllable;[15]
2. a diseme note to a long syllable;[16]
3. two monoseme notes to a long syllable.[17]

The most interesting rhythmic feature, however, is the allocation of a triseme temporal value to the first of the two long syllables of the ending of the paroemiacs. This is done in three different ways, either by (1) allocating one triseme note to it,[18] or (2) one monoseme note followed by a diseme note,[19] or (3) three monoseme notes.[20] In this way, the endings of the eleven paroemiacs last as long as the endings of the eight apocrota, both endings being of a pentaseme duration. In the second case, that of the two notes (*υ–/Σ*), the diseme length is notated with the use of the leimma (*∩*), a rhythmic symbol which indicates the protraction by a monoseme duration of the note to which it is appended.[21] This observation raises a further question: why mix two different cola, one with a tetraseme and another with a pentaseme (metrical) ending, if the intention is to equate their rhythms after all, especially if the use of a second type of colon will not at the end offer any rhythmic variety to the song? In other words, the prolongations of the long syllables at the ends of the paroemiacs are not made for any aesthetic effect, since they all occur at the same place in the cola; they seem only to offer a regularization of the rhythm.

We are fortunate to possess practically the whole of the song text (verbal and musical), and thus have before us the complete scale of the piece. The melodic symbols are found as a group in the Lydian

[15] *υ/σ*, e.g. l. 1: P/*πά* (in *πάτερ*).
[16] *–/Σ*, e.g. l. 1: C/*ρου* (in *χιονοβλεφάρου*).
[17] *υυ/Σ*, e.g. l. 3: *IM/νοῖς* (in *πτανοῖς*).
[18] *∟/Σ*, e.g. l. 3: *Z∩/ώ* (in *διώκεις*).
[19] *υ–/Σ*, e.g. l. 7: *MP∩/πά* (in *πάναν*).
[20] *υυυ/Σ*, e.g. l. 17: *PMP/μόσ* (in *μόσχων*).
[21] What we do not encounter in this song are: the allocation of a diseme note to a short syllable (*–/σ*), or of a monoseme note to a long syllable (*υ/Σ*)—in any case, there is no way this could be notated –, or of a diseme note followed by a monoseme note (*–υ/Σ*).

tropos, its diatonic variety.[22] In a rising sequence they are: *RΦCPMIZE*, an eight-note scale spanning an octave, from the *par-hypatē hypatōn* (R) to the *tritē diezdeugmenōn* (*E*).[23] The song begins on *hypatē mesōn* (C), a note which occurs most frequently in the melody, and which also happens to be the very last note of the piece, creating to our ears the impression that the note functions as a tonal centre.[24] Every line/colon, is treated as a melodic phrase, which usually ends at the *hypatē hypatōn* C, or the *diatonos mesōn* M. A few phrases end on *paramesē* Z.[25]

In section *α*.1–5 (*Χιονοβλεφάρου–οὐρανοῦ*), there is a gradual rise of the tonal level of the melody, from phrase to phrase,[26] from the beginning of the piece to the end of l. 5 (*οὐρανοῦ*), which, one might say, paints in sound the progressive rise of Helios' chariot across the heavens (Figure 5.1). Although this part (the first five lines) comprises a melodic unit, the same is not true for the corresponding semantic unit, which continues to the next line (l. 6) and is integrated at the end of it (*ἀμπλέκων*). In other words, melodic cadence (end of l. 5) and semantic close (end of l. 6), in this first part of the hymn, do not coincide. Perhaps the exact correspondence of the two phrases (melodic and semantic) is sacrificed to the description in sound of the movement of the Sun's chariot: the melody *must* reach its peak at the word *οὐρανοῦ*, a word standing for the apex of the heavenly dome.

In part *α*.6–10 (*ἀκτῖνα–ἁμέραν*) a second melodic cadence (end of l. 7 *πάναν*), also does not find a corresponding semantic close, the latter being delayed by a whole line (the end of l. 8, *ἑλίσσων*). However, at the next firm melodic cadence on the tonal centre C (end of l. 10 *ἁμέραν*) the meaning is also completed. The melodic phrase which begins on l. 8 (*περὶ γαῖαν*) rises tonally and 'swells' like a wave in l. 9 (*ποταμοί*) upon an insistently repeated *Z*, before it gently

[22] For the musical signs (*sēmeia*) of the fifteen *tropoi systēmatikoi* of the Alypian notation system, see *MSG* 367–406, and for the *Lydios diatonikos tropos*, ibid. 368–9.

[23] For the names of the notes (*dynameis*) in the tropos see West (1992b) 222 fig. 8.1.

[24] So Winnington-Ingram (1936) 42; Hagel (2009) 289.

[25] Winnington-Ingram (1936) 43 comments: 'Although the principal notes are standing notes, there is little emphasis on the tetrachord. Indeed to the modern ear it seems that a feeling for the triad is clearly shown; comp. Nemesis and Seikilos.'

[26] Numbers at the top of Figure 5.1 signify the beginnings of lines/cola.

and sweetly makes an inescapable cadence on the tonal centre C (*ἁμέραν*).[27] Thus the gestation of the day has come about; the rivers of fire have at last given birth to light, and the melodic tension caused by the insistence of Z has resolved to peace and quiet.[28]

In the next section (*β*, ll. 11–14, *Σοὶ–λύρᾳ*), a second melodic unit begins with l. 11. The climate here is changed: it becomes joyful and encomiastic of the god. The melody begins low, at *hypatē hypatōn* (C), and soon rises to the level of *paramesē* Z (l. 12), the note appearing insistently during the next two lines (ll. 13, 14). These lines give a sense of the lively movement and excitement generated by vivid song and dance, representing to aesthetic effect the words *χορός*, *χορεύει*, *ἀείδων*, *τερπόμενος λύρᾳ*. The melody manifests an agitation and a swirling typical of joyful dance. The melodic phrase unexpectedly, with a high leap up from below (*ΦZ*), hits *paramesē* (Z) again, a note insistently visited in this section—leaving an image, it might seem, of the dancer's foot raised up and hanging in still air.

A third melodic unit (*γ*) seems to begin with l. 15 (*Γλαυκὰ*), and finish, together with the corresponding verbal meaning, at the end of l. 17 (*μόσχων*). In this part, Selene is described seated on her chariot, which is drawn along the sky by white oxen. Three melodic phrases make up this section, closely related to each other tonally, giving the impression of a unit. The melody emanates quietness, calm, and tiredness, states which are appropriate to the recovering Selene, but also to the feeling of night.[29] Here for the first time the last but one syllable of the ending scheme *ΣΣ* is given to three (as opposed to one or two) notes. There follows a deep melodic cadence which echoes the sinking of the Moon. Why is it only now, in the penultimate line of the piece, that the composer chooses to employ three monoseme notes, one may wonder? An attempt to answer this question will follow shortly.

[27] This feeling is generated if the two successive falling intervals are rendered in performance in a gentle and sweet vocal character. Winnington-Ingram (1936) 42 characterizes the break at *ἁμέραν* as 'important'.

[28] The 'clearly dissonant tritone' (Hagel (2009) 237) ZP at the junction of lines 9 and 10 contributes significantly to the generation of these emotions.

[29] The rendering of the first *α* of *Σελάνα ας υ–/α*, creates a 'yawning' effect, if the voice is gently slurred during performance, as it ascends from the first note to its close neighbour. Also, the falling melody which concludes the section, performed in a hesychastic manner, will vividly convey the 'sleepy' atmosphere.

The last melodic unit (δ, ll. 18–19, *Γάνυται–ἑλίσσων*) constitutes an expression of courtesy towards the sun god (Helios), who experiences delight as he rotates the fair world through space. The two melodic phrases of the unit are in close tonal relationship with each other, with the second seeming to answer to the first. They both move and develop at a low level, despite the momentary upward 'wave' of the second phrase (beginning of l. 19), leading the song back to where it started from, the *hypatē hypatōn* C, the tonal centre. Mesomedes chooses to rhythmicize *ἑλίσσων*, a word which expresses a whirling motion, in three monoseme notes. This is what he does just two lines previously with *μόσχων* (17). Undoubtedly, the use of the triple motif suits well the notion of the rotating world, but it also functions as a closural signal—this motif has not been used thus far—a winding up of the whole *melos*, drawing the listener's attention to the fact that the song is about to end.[30] In that case, it may very well be that the three-note motif in the earlier phrase (l. 17) prefigures the ending, because the use of the motif there is not justified aesthetically, not being connected to the meaning of the word *μόσχων*. Thus, the triple motif seems to have been intentionally kept by the poet for the end, a final gesture from his stock of aesthetic surprises.

Some concluding remarks may be offered about the hymn's stylistic traits. Short syllables are always set to a short note (*υ*/*σ*), and long syllables either to a diseme note (–/*Σ*), or to two monoseme notes (*υυ*/*Σ*). It is only the penultimate (long) syllables of the paroemiacs which are extended to a triseme value, receiving either a single triseme note (⌙/*Σ*), or a monoseme and a diseme (*υ*–/*Σ*)—never in the reverse order, –*υ*—or three monoseme notes (*υυυ*/*Σ*). Only some of the signs of the (Lydian diatonic) tropos are employed, and only of the *meizon systema* at that; no use of the *syneimenon* tetrachord is made. A predominant tonic centre seems to be the *hypatē mesōn* (C), for not only does the piece start and finish on this note, but all the major melodic cadences occur on it (at ends of ll. 5, 8, 10, 11, 17). Secondary melodic endings occur on the *diatonos mesōn* (M) and the *paramesē* (Z). In general, melodic phrases and colon endings coicide.

[30] An 'end signal', in ethnomusicological terms.

There is a strong tendency of imitation in the music of the verbal content ('word painting'): gentle and steady rise of the melodic line in response to Helios' rising chariot (ll. 1–5); melodic tension and release in consonance with the 'gestation and birth' of day (ll. 9–10); a joyful, undulating melodic line for the chorus of the stars, as they sing and dance in praise of the god (ll. 11–14); a sleepy, 'yawning' (*υυ––/Σελάνα*) melody as Selene retreats to her chambers (ll. 15–17); a triumphant, 'trumpeting', monotone melodic ending (*υυ–υυ–/γάνυται δέ τέ σοι*) in accord with the joyful mood of the god, as he proudly confronts the universe (*υυυυ–/ἑλίσσων*), flooded with his light (ll. 18–19). On two occasions, a strong melodic cadence (on the dominant tonic centre C) precedes the corresponding verbal phrase by a whole colon (melody end at 5 vs phrase end at 6; melody end at 7 vs phrase end at 8). In this phrase, diction seems to be sacrificed in the service of the music. The mimetic aspects of *melos* in this composition are broadly similar to those at work in the 'Seikilos song' and, more distantly, in the chorus of Euripides' *Orestes*. Seeing these three texts alongside each other offers a tantalizing glimpse of continuities in how ancient composers in widely different eras drew on melodic resources to produce similar, or at least comparable, mimetic effects.

The musical meaning of this hymn is perhaps revealed only by a musically expressive rendering in performance.[31] It may be therefore that the present hymn was composed as a recital piece, rather than a ceremonial solo by a cantor or a priest (as Barker has suggested), in which case the musical setting would have been less noticeable or significant.[32]

[31] For a brief discussion of the ethnomusicological terms 'composition' and 'performance' style, see Psaroudakes (2010) 60.

[32] Barker (2002) 148. Along the same lines, West (1992a) 384 finds the *Hymn to the Sun* a rather 'limited and uninspired' piece of music, and observes 'no perceptible correlation of melody to meaning'. Landels (1999) 205 also thinks that Mesomedes 'would have been a quite insignificant figure but for the strange quirk of fate by which some of his music has survived in manuscript, copied out many times at various dates'. Mathiesen (1999) 57 decribes Mesomedes' hymns as 'extremely simple, exhibiting no modulations . . . and very little rhythmic variety and melodic distinction'. Hagel (2009) 87 n. 98 calls Mesomedes' hymns 'simple music', no doubt on similar grounds, that is, lack of formal complexity. Anderson (1980) 196 is even more derogatory: 'it is all the more to be regretted that neither his poetry nor his melody suggests any ability to rise beyond mediocrity'. However, as regards at least the poetic diction of Mesomedes, Easterling and Knox (1999) 853 attribute to it 'grace and subtlety: his art is a product of a sensitive talent'.

(a)



Figure 5.1. Melodic diagram of Mesomedes' *Hymn to the Sun*.

(b)



Figure 5.1. Continued.

(c)



Figure 5.1. Continued.

(d)



Figure 5.1. Continued.

(e)



Figure 5.1. Continued.

Part II

Theory, Reception, Contexts

6

Hearing the Syrinx in Euripidean Tragedy

Naomi Weiss

In 1927, nine years after Claude Debussy's death, the editor of his previously unpublished solo flute piece, *La Flûte de Pan*, changed its title to *Syrinx*. The music was originally composed as incidental music for Gabriel Mourey's dramatic poem *Psyché*, and seems to belong in Act Three, following the stage direction 'Sometimes they [the nymphs] stop [dancing] completely, amazed, listening to the syrinx of invisible Pan, moved by the song that escapes from the hollow reeds' ('Par moments elles s'arrêtent toutes, émerveillées, écoutant la syrinx de Pan invisible, émues par le chant qui s'échappe des roseaux creux').[1] The music they hear is actually that of the flute representing the sound of the god's panpipes, his syrinx, which is also sometimes referred to as a flute in Mourey's text. The change of the piece's title is commonly thought to refer to a myth that had little to do with Mourey's play—the story of the nymph Syrinx, who, running from Pan's amorous advances, is transformed into reeds, from which he fashions his instrument.[2] But the title also encourages us still to hear the flute as the god's syrinx, so that, even without the dramatic

[1] Mourey, *Psyché* III.1. On the dramatic context of Debussy's *Syrinx*, see Fulcher (2001) 132–3. It is clear from Debussy's correspondence with Mourey that the piece was intended to be heard at a particular moment in the play: in a letter dated 17 November 1913 he writes, 'So far I have not found what is needed . . . since a flute singing on the horizon must at once contain its emotion! . . . Tell me, please, very exactly, the lines after which the music comes in' ('Jusqu'à ce jour je n'ai pas encore trouvé ce qu'il faut . . . pour la raison, qu'un flute chantant sur l'horizon doit contenir tout de suite son emotion! . . . Dites moi, je vous prie, très exactement, les vers après lesquels la musique intervient').

[2] As told in Ov. *Met.* 1.689–712; Longus 2.34; Ach. Tat. 8.6.

context, the music can create a mimetic effect, a conflation of two different but conceptually related instruments.[3]

A similar sort of instrumental mimesis must have regularly occurred in the classical Athenian theatre, where, though the aulos (not a flute, but a double reed pipe) usually provided the musical accompaniment to the songs of both actors and choruses, other instruments could be evoked as well. This phenomenon may have been particularly common in performances of the dithyramb and satyr play: in Pindar fr. 70b, one of the few surviving examples of the dithyramb, there is a very vivid acoustic and visual image of the 'whirlings' of drums and noise of castanets (*ῥόμβοι τυπάνων, / ἐν δὲ κέχλαδ[εν] κρόταλ'* . . . , fr. 70b S-M 9–10), yet the genre by this point was 'decidedly aulodic';[4] in Sophocles' *Inachus*, which seems to have included a scene in which Hermes lulls the many-eyed giant Argus to sleep by playing on his syrinx, the music to which the chorus react could have been represented by that of the aulos, the standard instrumental accompaniment.[5] This is not to say that other instruments would never have appeared in the Theatre of Dionysus at Athens: the fragments of Sophocles' *Ichneutai*, for example, include a long passage in which the satyr chorus fearfully responds to the sound of the chelys lyre, which could have been represented by the aulos, but may instead have been produced by a loud, concert kithara lyre offstage instead.[6] This might have occasionally happened in tragedy as well, especially in plays in which a particular role required the playing of a lyre (or at least the illusion of it): Sophocles, playing the title role in the first performance of his *Thamyras*, apparently 'took up and played the kithara';[7] a kithara might also have been used

[3] Debussy creates the impression of panpipes in other compositions as well, especially those which concern faun figures, such as the first piano duet in *Six Epigraphes Antiques*, of which the theme is 'Pour invoquer Pan dieu du vent d'été' ('To invoke Pan, god of the summer wind'): see Raad (2005) 40.

[4] Power (2013) 240. Franklin (2013) argues that the early dithyrambs established by Arion in Corinth might have been performed to the accompaniment of the kithara: cf. Koller (1962).

[5] On the syrinx as represented by an aulos here, see Power (2012a) 297–8; Griffith (2013) 271.

[6] Soph. *Ich. TGrF* F 314.124–337, On the possibility of an actual lyre appearing in some form here, see Power forthcoming. On the intensely musical focus of this passage, see Griffith (2013) 269–71.

[7] *Vit. Soph.* 5. On the use of a kithara in Soph. *Tham.*, see Wilson (2009) 75; Power (2012a) 298–30; 2013: 239.

in Euripides' *Antiope*, in which Amphion seems to have entered singing to his lyre (*TGrF* F 182a), before telling the chorus about the instrument's history (*TGrF* F 190–2). But these two examples seem to have been exceptions, and in extant tragedy, instead of a particular instrument being central to a protagonist's character, different types of musical sound are usually referred to in the choral songs, which would have been accompanied by the aulos.[8] Like Pan's syrinx in Mourey's play, such descriptions of instrumental music, which are especially common in the later work of Euripides, would be enacted through the performance of aulete in the theatre. The result would therefore be a two-way affective interaction between words and music: the verbal description transforms the instrumental sound heard by the audience; at the same time the physical nature of that sound (its tune, tuning, volume, pitch, rhythm, and timbre) can suggest a layer of meaning not otherwise present in the words themselves.[9]

Such mimetic effects would have been particularly successful when the instrument described had some acoustic and/or cultural affinity with the one performed, as in the case of the urban aulos and the syrinx, its rustic cousin.[10] We can see the close association of these two instruments in the use of the word syrinx to refer—at least in texts from the mid-fourth century BC onwards—to a device that could somehow raise the pitch of the aulos (whether it was some sort of mechanism fitted to it or like the 'speaker hole' of modern woodwind instruments is disputed).[11] Aristoxenus, for example, writes that 'when the syrinx is pulled down, the highest note of him who plays the syrinx, compared with the lowest of him who plays the aulos, would exceed the stated limit' (*τῆς σύριγγος ὁ τοῦ συρίττοντος ὀξύτατος πρὸς τὸν τοῦ αὐλοῦντος βαρύτατον μεῖζον ἂν ποιήσειε τοῦ ῥηθέντος διαστήματος*, 1.20–1).[12] We do not know if an aulete would

[8] On the aulos as the primary musical accompaniment of tragedy, see esp. Wilson (1999) 76, with full bibiography; also Wilson (2008) 185–6.

[9] Cf. Phillips in the introduction to this volume on an 'intermedial' approach to ancient Greek music.

[10] Cf. Allan (2008) 324–5: 'If the *αὐλός*-player in the theatre ever attempted to imitate other instruments mentioned in a play, the *σῦριγξ* will have been . . . among the easiest.'

[11] On the nature of the syrinx device, see esp. West (1992b) 86, 102–3; Hagel (2012).

[12] Cf. Ps.-Aris. *De aud.* 804a14; Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1137f4–1138a6; Plut. *Non posse vivi* 1096b. *συριγμός* also refers to the hissing of a snake, and at the Pythian auletic contest it seems to have traditionally represented the dying serpent killed by Apollo, for which auletes tended to use the pitch-raising device called a syrinx: see Xen. *Symp.*

have made use of such a device in a tragic performance, but the vocabulary associated with it (*σύριγξ*, *συριγμός*, *συρίζω*) suggests that musicians imitated—or, more importantly, were *perceived* as imitating—the sound of the syrinx on the aulos.[13]

The syrinx as an instrument referred to in a play's text seems to be a latecomer to Athenian tragedy, mostly appearing in a cluster of plays by Euripides from the last two decades of the fifth century. The rarity of references to this long-used instrument in earlier tragedy may initially appear rather surprising, yet, unlike the aulos and lyre, the syrinx does not seem to have played a significant part in Athens: it is rarely represented in vase painting except in the hands of Pan, suggesting that, for many Athenians, it was associated more with the rustic imaginary than with everyday urban life.[14] The herdsman's syrinx must still have been a recognizable sound for the audience of tragedy, especially for those who came to the theatre of Dionysus from more rural parts of Attica and beyond. In the archaic period at least, its music seems to have been part of wedding celebrations as well: the Muse Calliope plays it on both the François Vase (*c.* 570 BC) and the Sophilos Dinos (*c.* 580 BC).[15] But given the general lack of evidence for this instrument having much prominence in classical Athens, it is perhaps more surprising that it should appear in any marked way in tragedy at all. The sudden frequency with which it is referred to in Euripides' later plays corresponds, however, with his experimentation with the much-discussed 'New Musical' trends toward the end of the fifth century, and coincides with an increase in extended descriptions of *μουσική* (music, song, dance) in his work in general.[16]

6.5; Strab. 9.3.10. The term's technical meaning is therefore inextricably tied to its acoustic one, which links the sound of the *syrinx* as an instrument to whistling or hissing noises.

[13] Writing many centuries later, Achilles Tatius compares the two instruments, seeing the syrinx as a combination of auloi: 'The syrinx is in reality many auloi, and each reed is an aulos, while all the reeds together pipe (*aulousi*) just as one aulos' (*ἡ σύριγξ αὐλοὶ μέν εἰσι πολλοί, κάλαμος δὲ τῶν αὐλῶν ἕκαστος· αὐλοῦσι δὲ οἱ κάλαμοι πάντες ὥσπερ αὐλὸς εἷς*, 8.6.3).

[14] On the syrinx in Greek (especially Athenian) life, see West (1992b) 110–12.

[15] It also appears in this context in the hymeneal third stasimon of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis* (see pp. 157–8), but its inclusion there may be based on the epic account of the wedding of Peleus and Thetis in the *Cypria*: see West (1992b) 110 n. 12.

[16] On the 'New Music' in general, see esp. Csapo (2004); (2011); D'Angour (2006a); (2007); (2011): 184–206; LeVen (2013); (2014). On Euripides and the 'New Music,' see esp. Csapo (1999–2000); (2008); (2009); Steiner (2011).

The syrinx is mentioned in two extant tragedies prior to the 420s: *Prometheus Bound*, of which the authorship and date are far from certain (though the play seems likely to have been composed before the final quarter of the fifth century),[17] and Euripides' *Alcestis*, an unusual 'prosatyric' play to which I will return towards the end of this discussion. In the former play, Io, in her frantic monody, imagines Argus is still pursuing her, and hears the sound of pipe-playing:

> ὑπὸ δὲ κηρόπλαστος ὀτοβεῖ δόναξ
> ἀχέτας ὑπνοδόταν νόμον·
> ἰὼ ἰὼ πόποῖ, ποῖ μ᾽ ἄγουσι τηλέπλαγκτοι πλάναι;

> And in accompaniment the clear-sounding, wax-moulded reed booms forth a tune that brings sleep. *Iō, iō, popoi*! Where are my far-roaming wanderings taking me? ([Aesch.] *PV* 574–6)

These lines must refer to Hermes, who in some accounts is said to have lulled Argus to sleep by playing his syrinx before killing him.[18] As I mentioned above, this performance presumably would have been staged in Sophocles' satyr play *Inachus*: two of the surviving fragments draw attention to the sound of Hermes' pipe-playing;[19] Lloyd-Jones suggests that Hermes challenged Argus, who apparently came on stage 'singing', to a musical competition.[20] In the satyr play the sound of the aulos could have represented that of Hermes' syrinx, which the actor might then only mime playing.[21] Similarly, in *Prometheus Bound*, though it is possible that the syrinx might have been briefly used as a small visual prop, it is far more likely, given the brevity of the reference to it here, that Io's monody would have been accompanied by the aulos, the main instrument of the theatre. While hearing this vivid description of the loud pipes with their dangerously soporific noise, the audience would therefore simultaneously hear the sound of the aulos, which would momentarily represent the syrinx. This metamusical moment suggests that the accompanying tune of

[17] The *terminus ante quem* of 424 BC is based on echoes of *Prometheus Bound* in Aristophanes' *Knights*: see Griffith (1977), esp. 9–13 for a discussion of the play's date; cf. Sutton (1983); Flintoff (1986).

[18] Cf. Bacch. 19.35–6; Ovid, *Met*. 1.682–714.

[19] Soph. *TGrF* F 269c7 (σύριγγος δὲ κλύω), 296c21–4 (the chorus guesses that Hermes is the source of the sound).

[20] Lloyd-Jones (1996) 115–16.

[21] A suggestion made by Power (2012a) 297–8.

the aulos (here imagined as a syrinx) could have played an important role in Io's monody, appearing to stir her to madness, or at least reflecting her frantic state. As Peter Wilson has demonstrated, its tune assumes a similarly destructive and maddening force in Euripides' *Heracles*, from the moment when Lyssa proclaims that she will 'pipe you down with fear' (*καταυλήσω φόβωι*, 871).[22]

In a performance, then, the *μουσική* that Io describes would overlap or merge with the *μουσική* produced by the aulete in the *orchestra*, so that, in this combination of syrinx and aulos, the audience would in effect hear two registers of instrumental sound. We are often prompted in more modern performances to imagine the sound of an instrument as something else, whether it be the flute as panpipes, as in Debussy's *Syrinx*, a keyboard glockenspiel as Papageno's magic bells in Mozart's *The Magic Flute*, or even an oboe as a duck in Prokofiev's *Peter and the Wolf*. Bruce Smith discusses a similar auditory experience in early modern theatre, in which 'sound . . . is important not so much for what it *is* as for what it *signifies*. What audiences actually heard in the theatre and what they *imagined* they heard may not always have been the same thing.'[23] He gives an example from Act Five of Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, when the printed text includes the stage direction for trumpets, hautboys, and drums, while the messenger describes a much wider range of instrumental and vocal sound, thereby inviting the audience to hear imagined as well as physical and perceptual phenomena through a process of metonymy.[24] Sound Studies scholar Don Ihde similarly describes an audience's reception of a sound in the theatre as a synthesis of imagined and perceived sound, a form of 'auditory polyphony'.[25] So in Io's monody in *Prometheus Bound* the audience would hear not only the aulos as the syrinx, but also a combination of both instruments at once.

It is primarily in the later plays of Euripides, particularly the choral odes, that we find multiple occurrences of such mixing or layering of the aulos in the theatre and the syrinx in the words of a song. After *Alcestis* and *Prometheus Bound*, the syrinx appears in *Electra*, which (if we accept its dating on metrical grounds to around 420) is his earliest extant tragedy to display a strikingly self-conscious and extended engagement with *μουσική*.[26] As Eric Csapo has shown, the

[22] Wilson (1999–2000). [23] Smith (1999) 242 (emphasis original).
[24] *Coriolanus* F1623: 5.4.49–52. [25] Ihde (2003) 62.
[26] On this dating of *Electra*, see Cropp and Fick (1985) 23, 60–1; Cropp (1988) l–li.

first stasimon (432–86) includes imagery typical of the 'New Music' and new dithyramb, as the chorus sings of the 'aulos-loving' (*φίλαυλος*, 435) dolphin 'whirling' (*εἱλισσόμενος*, 437) around the prows of the Greeks' ships as they go to Troy.[27] When it describes Achilles' armour in the second half of the ode, its language is full of allusions to choreography, so that the ecphrasis appears to come alive through its performance. Musical imagery continues in the second stasimon, which the chorus begins by picturing Pan piping on his syrinx as he brings the golden fleece from the mountains to Argos (Eur. *El.* 699–706):

ἀταλᾶς ὑπὸ †ματέρος Ἀργείων† [*1st Str.*]
ὀρέων ποτὲ κληδὼν 700
ἐν πολιαῖσι μένει φήμαις
εὐαρμόστοις ἐν καλάμοις
Πᾶνα μοῦσαν ἡδύθροον
πνέοντ', ἀγρῶν ταμίαν,
χρυσέαν ἄρνα καλλίπλοκον 705
πορεῦσαι. πετρίνοις δ' ἐπι-
στὰς κᾶρυξ ἰαχεῖ βάθροις·
Ἀγορὰν ἀγοράν, Μυκη-
ναῖοι, στείχετε μακαρίων
ὀψόμενοι τυράννων 710
φάσματα †δείματα.
χοροὶ δ'† Ἀτρειδῶν ἐγέραιρον οἴκους.

θυμέλαι δ' ἐπίτναντο χρυσήλατοι, [*1st Ant.*]
σελαγεῖτο δ' ἀν' ἄστυ
πῦρ ἐπιβώμιον Ἀργείων· 715
λωτὸς δὲ φθόγγον κελάδει
κάλλιστον, Μουσᾶν θεράπων,
μολπαὶ δ' ηὔξοντ' ἐραταὶ
χρυσέας ἀρνὸς †ἐπίλογοι†
Θυέστου· κρυφίαις γὰρ εὐ- 720
ναῖς πείσας ἄλοχον φίλαν
Ἀτρέως, τέρας ἐκκομί-
ζει πρὸς δώματα· νεόμενος δ'
εἰς ἀγόρους ἀυτεῖ
τὰν κερόεσσαν ἔχειν 725
χρυσεόμαλλον κατὰ δῶμα ποίμναν.

[27] Csapo (2003) 71–3; (2009).

> From beneath its tender †mother in the Argive† mountains, as the rumour remains among grey-haired tales, once Pan, guardian of fields, blowing on well-fitted reeds sweet-strained music, brought forth the golden-fleeced lamb. And standing on a stone platform, the herald cries out: 'Make your way to the agora, to the agora, Myceneans, to see the blessed royals' prodigies, †terrors†.' †And choruses† began to honor the house of the Atreidae.
>
> Altars of beaten gold were spread, and through the Argives' city the fire on the altar was gleaming. And the sound of the *lōtos* pipe resounds, most beautiful, the Muses' servant, and lovely songs were swelling forth, †in praise† of the golden fleece of Thyestes: for having persuaded the dear wife of Atreus in secret union, he carries the portent out to his house. And coming into the agora he shouts that he has the horned, golden-woolled sheep at his home.

In the opening strophe the description of Pan's *μουσική*, along with its simultaneous enactment in the theatre, makes the initial depiction of pastoral simplicity particularly vivid: as the chorus sings of the god playing his syrinx, the audience would hear the tune of the aulos.[28] The image of the syrinx with its 'sweet-strained music' (*μοῦσαν ἡδύθροον*, 703) shapes the audience's reception of the sound of the aulos, so that this can momentarily represent for them Pan's piping. The metonym of 'well-fitted reeds' (*εὐαρμόστοις . . . καλάμοις*, 702) contributes to this merging of described and performed *μουσική*, since *κάλαμοι* were associated with the aulos as well as with the syrinx.[29] This mimetic effect helps to transport us to a peaceful, bucolic scene, far from the imminent bloodshed of the dramatic present.

The crossover between described and performed *μουσική* continues into the antistrophe. As in the preceding strophe, the chorus places particular emphasis on instrumental noise—now that of the *lōtos* pipe, a name often given to the aulos in Euripidean tragedy: 'the sound of the *lōtos* pipe resounds, most beautiful, the Muses' servant' (*λωτὸς δὲ φθόγγον κελάδει / κάλλιστον, Μουσᾶν θεράπων*, 716–17). This description of the aulos comes in exact responsion with the lines in the strophe describing the syrinx, further encouraging

[28] Gagné and Hopman (2013) 8 also note this mimetic effect: 'When [the chorus] sings of Pan blowing sweet music in his harmonious pipes, a direct link is established between the sound of the poetic reeds and the sound of the aulos in the orchestra.'

[29] Syrinx associated with *κάλαμοι* (instead of *δονάκες*): Eur. *IA* 577, 1038; *El.* 702; *IT* 1125–7; Ar. fr. 719 (*καλαμίνην σύριγγα*). Aulos and *κάλαμοι*: Theophrastus 4.6; Ar. fr. 144; Theoc. *Id.* 5.6–7; Ath. 4.78, 4.80.5–6.

a sense of merging between the two instruments.[30] We can assume that the tune of the auletic accompaniment would be similar (or even identical) for both the strophe and antistrophe, yet its sound is imagined as two separate but closely related instruments within the same song. The transition from there to here, from country to city, mountains to Argos, is thus enacted musically through the transition from the rustic syrinx to the urban aulos. It also brings us from then to now, from the carefree, pastoral past to the more disturbing dramatic present; this shift may have a particularly powerful effect now that the described sound matches the aulos-playing in the here and now of the performance. The movement back towards the adultery and murder in Argos becomes clear through the language of the song as well, as Csapo has shown: the reality of the dramatic situation first intrudes through the prominently positioned *Θυέστου* in line 720 (Thyestes has the fleece, not Atreus); the chorus then explain how Thyestes stole the fleece after luring Atreus' wife to bed.[31]

It is surely no coincidence that the syrinx makes this unprecedentedly marked appearance at this point in Euripides' career, when he starts to engage with the so-called 'New Music'. It is also not surprising that it should appear in connection with the aulos, which is at the centre of much of the discourse surrounding new musical trends in Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. One of the characteristics of the aulos that is most emphasized in Greek texts, whether positively or negatively, is its mimetic flexibility: Pindar, for example, repeatedly calls it or its tune 'all-sounding' (*πάμφωνος*), thereby referring not only to the loudness of its music but also to its perceived ability to represent anything;[32] in *Pythian* 12, Athena invents the 'many-headed *nomos*' (*κεφαλᾶν πολλᾶν νόμον*, 23) for the aulos so that she can imitate (*μιμήσαιτ'*, 21) Euryale's dying wail.[33] According to the conservative criticism of new styles of *μουσική* in Plato's *Laws*, imitation of different types of sounds in general seems to have been a popular trend among musicians of this period: the Athenian Stranger complains that the Muses 'would never combine the cries of beasts and of humans and of instruments and all kinds of noises into the same

[30] For further discussion of the effects created by stanzaic responsion, see the pieces by Phillips and Thomas in this volume.

[31] Csapo (2009) 98.

[32] Pind. *Ol.* 7.12; *Pyth.* 12.19–21; *Isth.* 5.27. On the mimetic powers of the aulos, see esp. Barker (1984) 51; Wilson (1999) 87–93.

[33] On the possible role of musical mimesis in *Pythian* 12, see esp. Phillips (2013).

piece, as a way to represent one thing' (*θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι*, 669c8–d1). The famously 'mimetic' aulos could most easily appear to imitate all these things: from bestial cries, like those of the serpent in performances of the *Pythikos nomos* or of Scylla, whom, according to Aristotle, bad auletes would enact by physically dragging the chorus leader around, to other instruments, of which the syrinx would presumably be one of the most straightforward to represent—conceptually, acoustically, and visually.[34]

The mimetic powers of the aulos are linked to its reputation (at least from the late fifth century onward) for complex modulation, an association that is neatly expressed by Socrates' condemnation of it as 'the most many stringed' (*πολυχορδότατος*) instrument in Plato's *Republic* (399c7–d9):

οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολυχορδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν.
οὔ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται.
τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων ὅσα πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν.
οὐ φαινόμεθα.
τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξηι εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα;
δῆλα δή, ἦ δ' ὅς.
λύρα δή σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σύριγξ ἄν τις εἴη.

'Well then, we won't need many-stringed and panharmonic [instruments] in our songs and melodies.'
'No,' he said, 'it doesn't seem so to me.'
'Then we won't support craftsmen of *trigōnoi* [triangular harps] or *pēktides* [a harp played with the fingers] or any [of the instruments] that are many-stringed and polyharmonic.'
'Apparently not.'
'What then? Will you admit aulos makers and aulos players into the city? Or isn't this the most many-stringed [instrument], and aren't the panharmonic ones themselves actually an imitation of the aulos?'
'Clearly,' he said.
'You have left,' I said, 'the lyre and the kithara as things that are useful in the city; and in the fields the shepherds would have some sort of syrinx.'

[34] Arist. *Poet*. 1461b31–2. For a description of the *Pythikos nomos*, see Poll. 4.84.

Though πολυχορδότατος primarily refers to the versatility of the aulos in shifting between different scale forms, the application of an adjective more suited to the kithara also suggests its flexibility in assuming different instrumental identities. It even seems to encourage imitation as well as being imitative itself, a trait which makes it appear doubly threatening to the city they are constructing: other 'panharmonic' instruments (presumably meaning those which can flit between different ἁρμονίαι) are in turn an imitation (μίμημα, 399d5) of the aulos.[35] Interestingly, Socrates then states that the only type of pipe to be permitted in the city is a type of syrinx for shepherds to play in the countryside (399d7–9). The singular σύριγξ here may suggest only a simple pipe rather than the plural panpipes, but the contrast with the aulos effectively demonstrates the perceived closeness and distance between the two instruments rather as the second stasimon of Euripides' *Electra* does, but in the reverse order: the rustic syrinx is to replace the urban aulos as another type of pipe(s), but one which seems far less dangerous.

The syrinx therefore enters the theatre through the sound of the aulos, exploiting and showcasing the latter's perceived mimetic ability. Indeed, the syrinx almost always appears in Euripides' tragedies either along with the aulos or in such a way that the aulos is expected or at least strongly suggested instead. In *Troades*, for example, when Hecuba performs her own version of a parodos with her 'chorus-less cries' (ἄτας . . . ἀχορεύτους, 121), she vividly remembers the arrival of the Greek ships at Troy, accompanied by the sound of auloi and syrinxes (Eur. *Tro*. 122–30):

πρῶιραι ναῶν, ὠκείαις
Ἴλιον ἱερὰν αἳ κώπαις
δι᾽ ἅλα πορφυροειδῆ καὶ
λιμένας Ἑλλάδος εὐόρμους 125
αὐλῶν παιᾶνι στυγνῶι
συρίγγων τ᾽ εὐφθόγγων φωνᾶι
βαίνουσαι †πλεκτὰν Αἰγύπτου
παιδείαν ἐξηρτήσασθ᾽†,
αἰαῖ, Τροίας ἐν κόλποις 130

[35] Cf. Wilson (1999) 93 on the aulos as 'the model of musical mutiplicity'. On the 'aulization' of the kithara, especially from the late fifth century onward, see Power (2013) 243–4.

> Prows of ships, which with swift oars to holy Ilium over the dark purple sea and the fair harbours of Hellas, to the hateful paean of auloi and the voice of fine-sounding syrinxes, travelling, †you hung the twisted handiwork of Egypt†—*aiai*—in the bays of Troy. . . .

It is likely that the aulete, even if not yet present on stage, would at this point already be playing in accompaniment to Hecuba's anapaests, particularly given the paradoxically choral character of her monody, stressing the absence of *χορεία* in the aftermath of Troy's destruction: not only does she present her song as one which replaces a parodos, but her address to the ship's prows is more typical of a choral ode (the first stasimon of Euripides' *Electra*, which I mentioned above, similarly begins with a hanging apostrophe to the 'famous ships' (*κλειναὶ νᾶες*, 432) heading to Troy).[36] When she sings of the Greeks' musical accompaniment, 'the hateful paean of auloi and the voice of fine-sounding syrinxes' (*αὐλῶν παιᾶνι στυγνῶι / συρίγγων τ' εὐφθόγγων φωνᾶι*, 126–7), the sound of the aulos in the theatre would therefore represent that of both instruments, producing a particularly vivid sound picture of the invasion. Even here, however, we can see a difference in the conceptualization of the two instruments' sound: the more threatening aulos against the 'fine-sounding' syrinx.

Even when a syrinx is described in a song without any explicit mention of an aulos, the sound of the auletic accompaniment in performance might introduce a similarly foreboding tone, producing a dissonance as well as a crossover between described and performed sound. In *Ion*, one of the numerous accounts of Creusa's rape and Ion's birth is brought to life when the chorus sings of the daughters of Aglauros dancing on the Acropolis, singing to the accompaniment of Pan's syrinx (Eur. *Ion* 491–506):[37]

> *ὦ Πανὸς θακήματα καὶ*
> *παραυλίζουσα πέτρα*
> *μυχώδεσι Μακραῖς,*
> *ἵνα χοροὺς στείβουσι ποδοῖν* 495
> *Ἀγλαύρου κόραι τρίγονοι*

[36] Cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1451–64; *IT* 1123–37. On the apparent postponement of *χορεία* in *Troades*, see Weiss (2018) 106–10.

[37] On the repeated accounts of this scene, see Weiss (2008) 41–5; (2012) 39–40. Pan is also represented as a chorus leader as he plays on his syrinx in *Hom.h.Pan* 14–26.

στάδια χλοερὰ πρὸ Παλλάδος
ναῶν συρίγγων
ὑπ᾽ αἰόλας ἰαχᾶς
†ὕμνων† ὅτ᾽ ἀναλίοις 500
συρίζεις, ὦ Πάν,
τοῖσι σοῖς ἐν ἄντροις,
ἵνα τεκοῦσά τις
παρθένος μελέα βρέφος
Φοίβωι πτανοῖς ἐξόρισεν
θοίναν θηρσί τε φονίαν 505
δαῖτα, πικρῶν γάμων ὕβριν.

O resting place of Pan and rock that lies near the cavernous Long Rocks, where three daughters of Aglauros step [in] choruses, over the grassy courses before the temple of Pallas, to the accompaniment of the shimmering cry of the syrinx, †singing†, when you play your syrinx in your sunless caves, Pan, where a wretched maiden bore a child to Phoebus and cast it out as a meal for birds and bloody feast for wild beasts, the violent fruit of her bitter union.

While it sings of this other dancing group, the dramatic chorus is itself singing and dancing to the sound of another pipe, the aulos, with the result that the audience is invited to merge the two performances, to see (and hear) one as the other; the syrinx in the song thus becomes the aulos in the theatre (and vice-versa). The audience is encouraged to perceive the aulos as a syrinx, and hear in its sound Pan's piping, so that they can be vividly transported to the scene that is such a crucial moment of Creusa's (and Athens') past. The description of Pan's syrinx-playing heightens the scene's rusticity, but the actual sound of the aulos may underscore quite how profoundly disturbing it is. This impression is created verbally by the long enjambment, which begins with such an apparently peaceful, bucolic image, finally ending in line 506 with the word *ὕβρις*, which, though referring to the abandoned baby, strongly suggests the violence of the rape itself.

The aulos is doubly suggested in this passage of *Ion*, not only through the crossover of the syrinx in the song and the aulos in the theatre, but also through the suggestive nature of the chorus' language. It describes the syrinx's sound as *αἰόλος*, which suggests a synaesthetic mix of sight and sound, meaning both 'nimble, quick-moving, changing' and 'glittering, shimmering'. In this respect it is very like the adjective *ποικίλος* and noun *ποικιλία*, which, as Pauline LeVen has shown, capture a combination of the visual and aural

effects of μουσική.[38] As Csapo in particular has demonstrated, in critical discourse concerning new musical trends ποικιλία not only refers to musical complexity but also becomes a sociopolitically charged term, as 'a symbol for plurality, changeability, innovation, openness, liberation, inclusiveness and mixing'.[39] Like *poly*-compounds (such as πολυχορδότατος), ποικιλία seems to have been especially associated with the aulos, as the famous fragment of Pratinas' satyr play suggests: there the chorus describes its tune as the 'breath of a spotted [ποικίλος] toad' (τὸν φρυνεοῦ ποικίλου πνοὰν ἔχοντα, fr. 708 *PMG* 10)—a description which may also refer to the aulete's bulging cheeks, the result of his circular breathing.[40] In the performance of this choral song ποικίλος could have a further metatheatrical reference, possibly pointing to the aulete's costume with its typical decoration of πάσματα, which seem to have resembled large sequins. The adjective αἰόλος and related words also seem to have been among the buzzwords of the new musical trends in the fifth century: Timothy Power has recently suggested that when Hermes in Sophocles' *Ichneutai* is said to be 'lifted up' by the lyre's αἰόλισμα (ξύμφωνον ἐξαίρει γὰρ αὐτὸν αἰόλισμα τῆς λύρας, *TGrF* F 314.327), this term alludes to the increasing complexity of new styles of kithara music.[41] So in Euripides' *Ion*, though the chorus sings of the rustic syrinx, what the audience would hear and see was the innovative aulos, a much more apt candidate for the similar-sounding adjective αἰόλος, both in terms of its tune and broader conceptualization, and perhaps also as a result of the aulete's elaborate costume.

In both *Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Helen*, the chorus mentions the syrinx while describing the female protagonist's escape by sea, when we would expect the musical accompaniment to be the aulos instead: this, not the syrinx, was typically played for the rowers of a trireme; it is also part of the dithyrambic imaginary, linked with dolphins,

[38] LeVen (2013). On the semantics of ποικιλία and related words, particularly in relation to the composition of a song, see Nagy (1996), esp. 59–66.

[39] Csapo and Wilson (2009) 291–2; cf. Csapo (2004), esp. 227–30; LeVen (2013) 240–1; (2014) 101–3.

[40] This fragment suggests that ποικίλος/ποικιλία could already be a charged term even in the late sixth or early fifth century, to which it is traditionally dated. Some have proposed a later date (and therefore another, otherwise unattested Pratinas as its poet) on account of the fragment's highly metamusical performance criticism, but there seems to be little reason to doubt its authenticity as belonging to Pratinas of Phlious: for a review of this debate, see Griffith (2013) 273 n. 57.

[41] Power forthcoming.

Dionysus, and maritime travel and trade.[42] In *Helen*, the syrinx appears in the third stasimon, when, after imagining the sea journey of Helen, its former χορηγός, back to Sparta, the chorus expresses its wish to fly away with strongly choreographic and musical language (Eur. *Hel.* 1478–94):

δι᾽ αἰθέρος εἴθε ποτανοὶ
γενοίμεθ᾽ ὅπαι Λιβύας
οἰωνῶν στιχάδες 1480
ὄμβρον χειμέριον λιποῦ-
σαι νίσονται πρεσβυτάτου
σύριγγι πειθόμεναι
ποιμένος, ἄβροχά θ᾽ ὃς
πεδία καρποφόρα τε γᾶς 1485
ἐπιπετόμενος ἰαχεῖ.
ὦ πταναὶ δολιχαύχενες,
σύννομοι νεφέων δρόμωι,
βᾶτε Πλειάδας ὑπὸ μέσας
Ὠρίωνά τ᾽ ἐννύχιον, 1490
καρύξατ᾽ ἀγγελίαν
Εὐρώταν ἐφεζόμεναι,
Μενέλεως ὅτι Δαρδάνου
πόλιν ἑλὼν δόμον ἥξει.

If only we could be flying through the air, where the rows of birds from Libya go, leaving the wintry rain, obeying the syrinx of the eldest, the shepherd who, winging his way over the unwetted and crop-bearing plains of the earth, cries out. O long-necked winged creatures, partners of the clouds in [your] racing, go beneath the Pleiades in midcourse and Orion in the night. Announce the news as you land by the Eurotas, that Menelaus, having taken the city of Dardanus, will come home.

The chorus longs to be transformed into Libyan birds (most likely cranes) migrating to Greece, following its syrinx-playing shepherd leader in 'rows' (στιχάδες, 1480), which might evoke the typical v-formation in which these birds were known to fly, and could also be quite easily represented in the chorus' own choreography.[43] It is even possible, as Deborah Steiner suggests, that the chorus' wish to be

[42] On this network of associations, see Csapo (2003); Kowalzig (2013a).

[43] Their identification as cranes is suggested by the migration described here from Northern Africa, where eastern European cranes tend to winter: see Arnott (2007) 80. Their v-formation is noted in Plut. *Mor.* 967b–c, 979a; Ael. *NA* 3.13; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 2.49.125; Phil. *Her.* 11.4.

these birds could evoke the Athenian γέρανος (crane) dance that Theseus was said to have invented and, according to Callimachus, Plutarch, and Pollux, was performed at Delos; sources differ as to whether the dance's choreography was circular or linear.[44] What is important here, however, is that the Athenian audience might readily associate cranes with χορεία in general, and so link the chorus' description of its movement with the dancing being performed in the theatre. The choral identification of these birds is further made evident through the direction in line 1489 that they should fly beneath the Pleiades, the archetypal star chorus.[45]

Given the depiction of Helen in her role as chorus leader in the previous antistrophe (1465–77) and her ship's journey to Greece described in the opening strophe (1452–64), the syrinx-playing crane whom the chorus wishes to follow to Sparta here must represent Helen herself, their absent χορηγός who has left them behind.[46] As we have seen, however, the image of this instrumentalist can simultaneously have a metatheatrical reference and be linked to the aulos player accompanying the chorus' dance: the acoustic image of the syrinx representing the cranes' cry would merge with the tune of the aulos being played in the theatre, creating a particularly vivid sound picture.[47] The aulete could therefore visually assume a role similar to that of the χορηγός whom the chorus describe, adding to the epiphanic effect of their performance: Helen can be imagined to be there with them, represented by their aulos-playing leader.

In *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the syrinx appears twice, both times in the context of maritime travel: in the first stasimon, when the chorus vividly imagines the journey of the 'strangers' (Orestes and Pylades) from Argos to Tauris; then in the second stasimon, when, as in *Helen*, it describes the female protagonist's escape by sea, though this turns out to be a purely imaginative journey that will not in fact take place. When simply read as text, the first occurrence of a syrinx-related

[44] Steiner (2011) 314–15. The γέρανος dance is described in Call. *H*.4.310–13; Plut. *Thes*. 21; Poll. 4.101; cf. also Luc. *Orch*. 34.

[45] Cf. Padel (1974) 237; Steiner (2011) 316–17. On the Pleiades as a chorus of stars, see Csapo (2008) 266–7.

[46] On Helen's gradual departure from the chorus as she heads toward the choral role she will soon resume in Sparta, see Murnaghan (2013).

[47] See also Steiner (2011) 311–12 on the merging of the aulete with the syrinx-playing crane-leader here.

word may initially seem simply to indicate the sound of the ship's steering oars as they cut through the water (Eur. *IT* 422–38):

πῶς τὰς συνδρομάδας πέτρας,
πῶς Φινεΐδας †ἀύ-
πνους† ἀκτὰς ἐπέρα-
σαν, παρ᾽ ἅλιον αἰγιαλὸν ἐπ᾽ Ἀμφιτρί- 425
τας ῥοθίωι δραμόντες,
ὅπου πεντήκοντα κορᾶν
Νηρήιδων ⟨‿ ˘⟩ χοροὶ
μέλπουσιν ἐγκύκλιοι,
πλησιστίοισι πνοαῖς, 430
συριζόντων κατὰ πρύμναν
εὐναίων πηδαλίων,
αὔραισιν νοτίαις
ἢ πνεύμασι Ζεφύρου,
τὰν πολυόρνιθον ἐπ᾽ αἶ-
αν, λευκὰν ἀκτάν, Ἀχιλῆ- 435
ος δρόμους καλλισταδίους,
ἄξεινον κατὰ πόντον;

How did they pass the running together rocks, how the †unsleeping† shores of Phineus, running along the sea-shore on Amphitrite's surf, where choruses of fifty Nereid maidens sing in a circle, as the guiding steering-oars pipe forth at the stern with sail-filling gusts, with southerly breezes or Zephyr's breaths, to the land with many birds, the white shore, Achilles' fine running courses, across the unhospitable sea?

When performed in the theatre, however, the 'piping' or 'whistling' (*συριζόντων*) of the oars would simultaneously be produced by the auletic accompaniment. The participle further suggests the aulos as a result of the preceding description of the chorus of fifty Nereids singing in a circle, since this evokes the performance of a dithyramb, which was likewise danced by fifty choreuts in a circular formation to the sound of the aulos;[48] the image also combines with the *χορεία* being simultaneously performed in the theatre. The emphasis on breath in these lines (*πνοαῖς* in 430, *πνεύμασι* in 434) suggests the blowing of pipes (those of the aulos or syrinx) as much as it does gusts of wind.

[48] On the circular formation of the dithyramb, see D'Angour (1997). On the association of Nereids (especially fifty of them) with the dithyramb, see Csapo (2003).

In the second stasimon of *Iphigenia in Tauris* the syrinx also appears as an accompaniment to naval travel, this time alongside the kithara in a multilayered soundscape. Singing of Iphigenia's escape by sea, the chorus imagines her on a ship with Pan and Apollo as divine and musical escorts (Eur. *IT* 1123–33):

καὶ σὲ μέν, πότνι᾽, Ἀργεία
πεντηκόντερος οἶκον ἄξει·
συρίζων θ᾽ ὁ κηρόδετος 1125
Πανὸς οὐρείου κάλαμος
κώπαις ἐπιθωύξει,
ὁ Φοῖβός θ᾽ ὁ μάντις ἔχων
κέλαδον ἑπτατόνου λύρας
ἀείδων ἄξει λιπαρὰν 1130
εὖ σ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ γᾶν.
†ἐμὲ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ λιποῦσα
βήσηι ῥοθίοις πλάταις. . . .

And you, lady, an Argive ship with fifty rowers shall bring you home, and the wax-bound reed of Pan, the mountain god, will blow and shout out to the oars, while Phoebus the prophet, holding the noisy seven-stringed lyre, will sing and lead you safely to the gleaming land of Athens. †But me you shall leave here and make your way with splashing oars . . . .

Like the fifty Nereids in the previous ode, the fifty-oared ship encourages us to equate the oars with the fifty choreuts dancing a dithyramb, yet it is not an aulete but Pan with his syrinx who accompanies the rowing—though of course in the performance of their song it would in fact be the aulos that would 'shout out' (*ἐπιθωύξει*, 1127) to the choreuts, who are assimilated with the rowers as well as the oars. Through the crossover between this image of dithyrambic *μουσική*, with its indirect suggestion of the aulos, and the chorus' own performance to the accompaniment of the aulos in the theatre, it seems to enact Iphigenia's journey itself. In this play such a mimetic performance is ironic, serving as a stark contrast with the chorus' own journey to Tauris on a slave ship, which it laments in the previous antistrophe (1106–22), though it perhaps also looks forward to the women's own departure for Greece at the end of the drama, following Athena's instructions at 1468–9. Unlike Helen, Iphigenia is unsuccessful in her attempt to escape with Orestes and Pylades, and will in fact end up in Brauron rather than Athens (1462–7), so the chorus' performance here also ironically represents

a fiction, inducing the audience temporarily to suspend disbelief and imagine a journey that will not actually take place.

Like the syrinx, Apollo's 'seven-stringed lyre' (ἑπτατόνου λύρας, 1129) belongs to the imagined μουσική of the song. The audience, however, would nonetheless hear loud musical noise (κέλαδον, 1129) as a result of the auletic accompaniment, which would merge with and represent the sound the chorus describes, even though the lyre seems so different—acoustically, visually, and conceptually—from the reed pipes. We have already seen that the aulos was long associated with mimetic flexibility, and that Socrates' description of it as 'most many-stringed' (πολυχορδότατος) in Plato's *Republic* may suggest that it could be imagined even to imitate a stringed instrument like the lyre. The dithyrambist Melanippides may in particular have exploited its mimetic flexibility, if his *Marsyas* narrated the musical contest between Apollo on the lyre and Marsyas on the aulos: rather than this involving an actual kithara extraordinarily being played on stage, as John Boardman suggests, the aulos itself, along with the chorus' song, could have represented the god's music.[49] There may be a similar mimetic effect at the start of the third stasimon of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*, when the chorus sings of the aulos, kithara, and syrinxes playing at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis (1036–9): here the sound of the aulos (as well as the chorus' own song and dance) works metonymically as a (re)enactment of all three instruments, thereby transporting the audience back to the wedding celebrations

[49] Boardman (1956). His argument that the dithyramb included an enactment of Marysas' transformation from aulete to kitharode relies on a series of late fifth-century vase paintings that show Marsyas playing Apollo's lyre; cf. Csapo (2004) 213. For a more cautious approach to Melanippides' *Marsyas*, see Power (2013) 240–2: he points out that there is little evidence for the inclusion of lyre music in the dithyramb, but nonetheless suggests that 'Melanippides, if he did narrate the "conversion" of the champion of the aulos, [could] already have encoded in his dithyramb a critique of contemporary *kitharoidia*, in particular its increasing flirtations with Dionysiac music (the aulos), themes, and histrionics' (242). If the kithara was not typically brought on stage in the performance of dithyrambs, then the aulos might have played a similarly mimetic role in Melanippides' version of the story of the lyre singer Linos, though we do not know if this was in fact a dithyramb: Melanippides was most associated with the dithyrambic genre (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.3; *Suda* M 454), but in Ps.-Plutarch's *De musica*, just after he is called 'the composer of dithyrambs' (τὸν τῶν διθυράμβων ποιητήν, 1141d2), comes the fragment from Pherecrates' *Cheiron* in which Music complains that he 'loosened me up with his twelve strings' (χαλαρωτέραν τ' ἐποίησε χορδαῖς δώδεκα, 1141e3), thereby seeming to refer expicitly to his kithara music instead: see Barker (1984) 93.

it describes. At the same time, the chorus thus seems to perform its own, horribly ironic *ὑμέναιος* for Iphigenia and Achilles, whom the audience knows will never be married.[50]

This sort of musical experimentation in *Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Iphigenia in Aulis* suggests that Euripides was particularly interested in creating mimetic effects through the aulos toward the end of the fifth century. But the third stasimon of *Alcestis*, which was produced in 438 BC, demonstrates that he was doing so much earlier in his career as well, even if most of the surviving examples come from around 420 onward. The chorus begins this song by remembering Apollo's stay at Pherae, when he exchanged his kithara for the syrinx (Eur. *Alc.* 569–87):

ὦ πολύξεινος καὶ ἐλευθέρου ἀνδρὸς ἀεί ποτ'
οἶκος,
σέ τοι καὶ ὁ Πύθιος εὐλύρας Ἀπόλλων 570
ἠξίωσε ναίειν,
ἔτλα δὲ σοῖσι μηλονόμας
ἐν νομοῖς γενέσθαι,
δοχμιᾶν διὰ κλειτύων 575
βοσκήμασι σοῖσι συρίζων
ποιμνίτας ὑμεναίους.

σὺν δ' ἐποιμαίνοντο χαρᾶι μελέων βαλιαί τε
λύγκες,
ἔβα δὲ λιποῦσ' Ὄθρυος νάπαν λεόντων 580
ἁ δαφοινὸς ἴλα·
χόρευσε δ' ἀμφὶ σὰν κιθάραν,
Φοῖβε, ποικιλόθριξ
νεβρὸς ὑψικόμων πέραν 585
βαίνουσ' ἐλατᾶν σφυρῶι κούφωι,
χαίρουσ' εὔφρονι μολπᾶι.

O house of a hospitable and ever generous man, even Pythian Apollo of the lovely lyre deigned to dwell in you and submitted to become a shepherd in your pastures, playing on his syrinx wedding songs for your herds on the slanting hillsides.

And, in joy at his songs, both spotted lynxes began to be shepherded, and, leaving the vale of Othrys, a tawny troop of lions came, and the dappled fawn, stepping beyond the tall fir trees, danced to your kithara with its light foot, rejoicing in the joyful song.

[50] See Weiss forthcoming for a full discussion of the merging of performed and imagined *μουσική* in this song.

Though the character Apollo is no longer on stage, he seems to be present through the crossover of his piping as described by the chorus in the opening strophe and that of the aulete heard by the audience. As in the second stasimon of *Iphigenia in Tauris*, however, this sound picture is multilayered, including the kithara as well as the syrinx: in the antistrophe Apollo's characteristic instrument reappears, as the chorus sings of him as an Orpheus figure, charming wild beasts with his music-making, to which they dance in a chorus (χόρευσε, 583). The syrinx has turned into the kithara, but the aulos, to which the dramatic chorus is dancing, represents both, producing the epiphanic effect of Apollo's presence in the theatre.

The third stasimon of *Alcestis* demonstrates that this sort of instrumental mimesis in tragedy was not confined to the so-called 'New Music' of the late fifth century. It may not be a coincidence, however, that this passage appears in a play which, as has often been noted, contains many satyric traits, from its position as the fourth drama in Euripides' tetralogy to the scene of Heracles' drunkenness.[51] Since, as Mark Griffith has recently shown, metamusicality seems to have been a hallmark of satyr drama, this early experimentation with the representation of different instruments' sounds in a tragedy may therefore also be a result of Euripides' mixing of the two genres.[52] Unfortunately, however, too few of Euripides' plays survive from the 430s for us to know the extent to which *Alcestis* was unusual in sharing these elements with satyr play.

Nonetheless, the pattern that emerges from the extant Euripidean tragedies, with the exception of *Alcestis*, is one of increasing experimentation with different musical effects in the latter part of his career. Almost all the references to the syrinx in surviving tragedy date from around 420 or later, and they all make use of the aulos being played in the theatre, drawing on its conceptualization as a highly mimetic instrument. Such exploitation of the two instruments' mimetic relationship reaches its peak with a rather confusing few lines in the first

[51] On *Alcestis* as 'satyric' or 'prosatyric', see esp. Marshall (2000); Slater (2005); Shaw (2014) 94–105. For a more sceptical approach to this sort of generic classification, see Mastronarde (2010) 56–7.

[52] Griffith (2013); cf. Power forthcoming. This sort of cross-fertilization between satyr drama and tragedy may have resulted partly from the generic boundaries between them being more fluid than we tend to assume: Mastronarde (2010) 57 points out that such elements would not necessarily have been recognized as 'inherently satyric and non-tragic' by fifth-century audiences.

stasimon of one of Euripides' very last plays, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, which was produced posthumously, probably in 405 BC.[53] After some gnomic speculation regarding moderation and virtue in love (543–72), the chorus describes how Paris arrived at the Judgement scene on Mount Ida (573–81), and then pictures him standing before Helen's palace, sparking the love between them and so setting the Trojan War in motion (582–6). The depiction of destructive love and strife in this latter scene (intensified through the wordplay of *ἔρως* and *ἔρις*) contrasts markedly not only with the statements in praise of restrained love in the first strophic pair, but also with the preceding image of pastoral calm and simplicity, which includes the particularly vivid detail of Paris playing on his syrinx (573–8):

> †ἔμολες, ὦ Πάρις, ἧιτε σύ γε†
> βουκόλος ἀργενναῖς ἐτράφης
> Ἰδαίαις παρὰ μόσχοις, 575
> βάρβαρα συρίζων, Φρυγίων
> αὐλῶν Οὐλύμπου καλάμοις
> μιμήματα †πνέων†.

†'You came, Paris, to the place where† you were reared as a herdsman among the shining white heifers of Mount Ida, piping foreign tunes on the syrinx, †breathing† on the reeds imitations (*mimēmata*) of the Phrygian auloi of Olympus.'

Translations of lines 576–8 vary. Andrew Barker suggests 'breathing imitations of Olympus on the reeds of Phrygian auloi', but notes that 'it is not clear which instrument Paris is playing here'.[54] David Kovacs understands the objective genitive going with *μιμήματα* to be the auloi rather than Olympus, and so translates these lines as 'imitating upon your reed pipe / the Phrygian aulos of Olympus'.[55] James Morwood and Chris Collard, in their commentary on *Iphigenia in Aulis*, give the translation 'playing your barbarian tunes and, as you breathed on the reeds, imitating the Phrygian pipe of Olympus', but then note that the literal translation is 'breathing imitations of Olympus on the reeds of your Phrygian pipe'.[56] Any precise translation of these lines is made even more difficult due to the fact that we

[53] According the scholion on Ar. *Ran.* 66–7, *Iphigenia in Aulis* was produced alongside *Bacchae* and *Alcmeon in Corinth*.
[54] Barker (1984) 92. [55] Kovacs (2002) 223.
[56] Collard and Morwood (2017).

could also understand Olympus not as the semi-legendary Phrygian musician associated with the invention of the aulos, but as Mount Olympus in Phrygia, in which case the translation would be 'breathing imitations of Phrygian auloi on the reeds of [Mount] Olympus'. Moreover, not only is the word order problematic, but, as Barker points out, it is unclear whether Paris is playing the syrinx or the aulos here.[57] Since the syrinx is traditionally associated with herdsmen (though not necessarily Paris), we expect the participle *συρίζων* in line 576 to have the specific meaning of 'playing the syrinx', yet here it seems to refer to a performance on the aulos as well.

But to focus our efforts on the sole, precise meaning of these lines would be to miss the metamusical play at work in this song. As a result of the other examples of instrumental mimesis that I have discussed here, we can see that Paris is playing *both* instruments, for while the chorus sings of him imitating the aulos with his syrinx, the audience hears the aulos imitating the syrinx; words and music combine to create a doubling effect whereby both instruments can be experienced at once. As in the first stasimon of *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the verb *συρίζω* as it is used here encompasses the playing of both the syrinx and the aulos, rather as *φόρμιγξ* and *φορμίζω* in the Homeric epics and Hymns can refer to different types of lyre, not just the phorminx.[58] If auletes did occasionally use syrinx devices to raise the pipes' pitch in performances of tragedy, these lines might contain this extra metamusical reference as well. All the possible translations of these lines can therefore be correct, and their broadly suggestive ambiguity is surely deliberate, exploiting the perceived intimacy between the two instruments. Such an explicit pointer to instrumental mimesis in this play from the end of Euripides' life comes as the climax of his musical experimentation with the sounds the aulos could produce—or be imagined to produce.

This final example from *Iphigenia in Aulis* also demonstrates that Euripides seldom produces these mimetic effects for their own sake, nor just to display his virtuoso engagement with new musical trends. Rather, such mimesis always has a particular dramatic function: here the combination of the two instruments recreates both the foreign, Phrygian soundscape of Mount Ida and the sense of bucolic

[57] Barker (1984) 92 n. 198.

[58] As in *Hom.h.Merc.*, in which Hermes' invention is variously called a chelys lyre, phorminx, and kithara.

innocence just before the stirrings of war; the shift to ἔρις in the following lines then brings us back towards the situation at Aulis, and also underscores the certainty of Iphigenia's death, without which there would be no Trojan War. But the dramatic effects of this sort of interaction between words and music also result from it *not* always being a strictly mimetic process. There remains a disconnect between the two instruments even as they coincide, since the verbal description of sound does not fully transform the actual sound of the aulos that the audience hears in the theatre, and consequently the auletic accompaniment can add an ominous tone to the syrinx it is meant to represent. We saw in the case of *Electra* the contrast between the two sounds, both real and imagined, as the transition from the rustic syrinx to the urban aulos with its more threatening associations helps to return us to the murder at Argos, while in *Ion* I suggested that the sound of the aulos could add a discomforting tone as the chorus shifts from Pan's pipe-playing to the rape of Creusa and her exposure of her baby. In *Iphigenia in Aulis* the appearance of the aulos once again works as a contrast to the pastoral, carefree syrinx, heralding a shift back towards the problems of the dramatic present. Whether or not the aulos is explicitly mentioned, then, its sound as an accompaniment to song has a presencing effect, bringing the syrinx and the scene in which the syrinx is played into the theatre, even while it can problematize that imagined sound through its physical representation. At the same time, the syrinx becomes a vehicle for Euripides not just to spotlight the aulete's performance, at a time when this was becoming increasingly virtuoso, but also to exploit the many strands of the auletic imaginary.[59]

[59] On the professionalization of auletes through the fifth century, see esp. Wilson (1999).

7

Lyric Atmospheres

Plato and Mimetic Evanescence

Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi

De la musique avant tout chose,
Et pour cela préfère l' Impair
Plus vague et plus soluble dans l'air,
Sans rien en lui qui pèse ou qui pose.[1]

Nothing less than a manifesto about the eminent role of music in poetry, these verses by Paul Verlaine, a key figure of French Symbolism, embody in their intricate sonorities the very essence of what they mean to convey: the ethereality and buoyancy of words. As the symbolist movement imagined it, the musicality of language was to be fully attained in flexible and supple metrical arrangements that dissolve the compactness of verbal matter. Words, and with them signification, become misty entities, their vagueness—here endorsed by Verlaine—to be understood as similar to the blurred outlines of otherwise familiar objects in a hazy landscape. The misty air that envelopes them softens out their contours; although still recognizable, they become part of a more unified, albeit evasive and uncanny, universe.

Such ideas may be representative of nineteenth-century concerns about the musical potential of poetic language but, apart from their

[1] Paul Verlaine, *Art Poétique*, published in 1884 in the collection *Jadis et naguère*. Precisely because the sonic effects of the poem are so central to its ideas and atmosphere, it is almost untranslatable. For clarity's sake, I offer here an utterly unambitious translation into English: Music first and foremost, / Therefore prefer the metre odd, / More soluble and vaguer in the air, / With nothing in it that weighs or halts.

distinctive ideological load, they are far from alien to issues that were either latent or explicitly addressed in antiquity. For instance, how unusual verbal constellations may enhance sonic effects and challenge conventional modes of signification seems to have been a practice pursued by the so-called New Music and its successive (and varying) waves in the last part of the fifth century and the first part of the fourth century BC.[2] Later on, practices of blurring, indeed softening, the sonic contours of individual words, thus enabling the emergence of an expanded sonic environment, were well studied by ancient literary critics like Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[3]

Hence, classicists have much to contribute to a broader historical picture that, starting from such vigorous modern proclamations as, for instance, Verlaine's, can bring into the discussion relevant issues debated in antiquity. In this chapter I should like to focus on one particular set of issues. First, the idea that sonority and amplified musicality in poetry create a mental environment in which plain sense-making subsides, giving way to alternative modes of sense perception. More specifically, I should like to discuss the view that the sonic environment of poetry may operate as a dissolving medium, somehow disintegrating the semantic concreteness of words while at the same time emitting a certain atmosphere or mood that envelopes the listener. Finally, I contend that in some of Plato's dialogues interesting versions of this broader issue are either openly addressed or treated as an implicit struggle that results sometimes in negative, while other times in particularly creative, responses. In either case they illuminate neglected but exciting aspects of the philosopher's encounter with *μουσική* and the verbal arts.

ATMOSPHERES

Air is phonetically highlighted in Verlaine's stanza. The word itself appears at the end of the third line (*plus soluble dans l' air*), but the

[2] On the language of the New Music see for instance Csapo (2004), esp. 216–29; Ford (2013) 313–31; LeVen (2014) 151–88.

[3] I am referring primarily (but not exclusively) to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' analysis of the polished style (*γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις*) where he includes Sappho among others. See D. H. *De comp*. 23. For a general approach to the emphasis put on the sonic texture of language in Greek thought see for instance Porter (2010), esp. 365–404.

sonic structure of the second line with the words *préfère* and *l'Impair* operates as its double echo. Thus the verbal arrangement of the stanza almost mimics the way air transports sound: one is reached by the echo before one reaches the source that creates it. This is just an indicative instance of the many insights that air and airiness stirred in poetic endeavours of the period. Given that the poem is entitled *Art Poétique* and that the lines quoted above form its first stanza, one may clearly sense the emphasis put by Verlaine on atmosphere primarily in its literal but certainly in its metaphorical meaning as well.

It is tempting to contemplate along the same lines one of the most interesting vase paintings associated with Sappho and her circle in antiquity. On a hydria displayed in the National Archaeological Museum of Athens a seated woman, who is surrounded by three standing ones, is holding a book roll displaying four legible words: *θεοὶ, ἠερίων ἐπέων ἄρχομαι*. The genitive *ΣΑΠΠΩΣ* inscribed on the vase has been generally interpreted as designating this seated (and reading) woman. Thus the vase, dated between 440 and 430 BC, seems to represent an Athenian fantasy of Sappho about to read and perform her own poems in the company of other women.[4] The vase poses many questions that have received a wide range of stimulating answers but the one that is relevant to our discussion is the phrase inscribed on the scroll and especially the syntagma *ἠερίων ἐπέων*. *Ἠερίων* is an attempt to render in Ionic dialect what in Sappho's Lesbian-Aeolic would have been *ἀϝερίων*, meaning *aerial*, *ethereal*.[5] Interestingly, two other words, *ἔπεα* and *πτερόε<ν>τα* are written on the left and right rolled parts of the scroll respectively. It has recently been suggested that the juxtaposition of the familiar Greek epic phrase *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* (winged words) with the unfamiliar *ἔπεα ἠέρια* (aerial, ethereal words) is probably a meaningful juxtaposition on the part of the painter, perhaps to be explained as a contrast

[4] On the hydria see Edmonds (1922) 1–14. For a relatively recent extensive discussion of this vase see Yatromanolakis (2007) 153–64 with further bibliography.

[5] On the Ionicization of *ἠερίων* see Edmonds (1922) 4 who thinks it indicates the familiarity of the painter with Homeric language. Yet the Ionic form *ἠέριος* clearly meaning *airy*, *air-like* is encountered in the Hippocratic corpus (*Vict.* 10). The semantics of the Homeric *ἠέριος* is ambiguous, meaning either 'of the early morning' or 'wrapped in mist', 'in the air' for which see *LfrgrE* s.v. For a further defence of the meaning of *ἠέρια* as an alternative of *πτερόεντα* (thus meaning 'in the air') see Immerwahr (1964) 47 and n. 1.

between male and female poetry or between an epic expression and a melic one.[6]

Given the uniqueness of the phrase ἔπεα ἠέρια in the extant Greek corpus no conclusive argument can be made as to its exact connotations. Yet there is no doubt that although the adjectives πτερόεντα (winged) and ἠέρια (aerial, ethereal) evoke similar associations, their semantic priorities are different. The former's semantic priority is on the very medium that enables flight, namely the wings or feathers that render words similar to birds or arrows.[7] Thus the phrase is clearly meant to evoke associations of movement and directionality.[8] On the contrary, the latter's semantic priority, indeed its exclusive focus, is on air itself, on the ethereal substance of words, the aerial matter they are envisioned to consist of.

If so, one should probably comprehend the word ἠέρια primarily in its most literal semantic range, very much along the lines Hippocrates describes *air* in his treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*. More than in any other Hippocratic work, air in this treatise comes up time and again as the often invisible yet quintessential substance that enfolds earthly matter and affects every aspect of organic life; the changing ratios of its consistency modulate the ways in which it is perceived, largely—but not exclusively—by vision. After all, Greek often employs the same word to refer both to plain air and to its transmutation into mist or fog, both of which are regularly denoted by Hippocrates by the word ἠήρ.[9]

This is probably the semantic range in which the word ἠέρια (aerial, ethereal) is to be understood in the phrase ἔπεα ἠέρια in the aforementioned Athenian depiction of an imaginary Sappho and her circle on a fifth-century hydria. Especially in a culture where poetry is performed orally and perceived aurally, words may indeed be sensed as having the transparency of atmosphere and the lightness of air, by way of which they reach the ears of the listeners. But there is more to the phrase ἔπεα ἠέρια for, despite their intangibility, words, like air,

[6] In discussing the interesting juxtaposition of ἠέρια with πτερόεντα Yatromanolakis (2007) 162 is inclined to interpret the former as 'lofty'. Though this interpretation cannot be excluded, I think the juxtaposition (and perhaps opposition) of the two phrases in terms of poetic genre is more likely to put a semantic emphasis primarily on the airy quality of the melic ἔπεα and not on their loftiness.

[7] On these associations see for instance Kirk (1985) 44; Latacz (1968) 27–32.

[8] On the directionality of the Homeric phrase see Martin (1989) 26–37.

[9] See for instance Hp. *Aër.* 6.10; 8.30–3.

may be felt—momentarily at least—as affecting one's whole biology. Above all, like air, the verbal fabric of poetry may at times be sensed like a diaphanous layer surrounding, indeed enfolding, the listener. Although one would hope that the line *θεοί, ἠερίων ἐπέων ἄρχομαι* may represent the beginning of a poem composed by Sappho and lost to us, for the particular set of questions tackled in this chapter its authenticity does not affect its importance. In other words, even if the line was not Sappho's but instead captured the way Sappho's poetry was perceived in Athenian elite circles, the issue at stake remains the same. Was there a particular aspect in the composition and performance of such melic poetry that would make its verbal texture, its *ἔπεα*, be sensed the way air and atmosphere are?

Perhaps the ethereality that poetry's peculiar music can create along with the responsiveness that such poetry elicits are recurrent ideas emerging under differing cultural circumstances and agendas. Such issues bring us closer to the way in which relatively recent debates about the role of aesthetics have revived and expanded the concept of *Stimmung*. Usually translated into English as *mood* or *atmosphere*, *Stimmung* became central in musical and more broadly aesthetic ideologies of the nineteenth century, reaching its peak at the turn of the century.[10] Originating from realizations about music's peculiar affectivity and the listeners' responsiveness to it, it has also been understood (and translated) as *tuning* or *attunement* and associated with Romanticism. In the twentieth century its Romantic origins receded while the concept reemerged quite forcefully in philosophical debates, especially in the work of Martin Heidegger.[11]

This is not the place to discuss the various debates over the twentieth century about whether or not and how to employ the concept of *Stimmung* or the subtle nuances that have been claimed to differentiate this concept from the concepts of *mood* or *atmosphere*. It is important to stress, however, that especially over the last two decades, there have been vigorous attempts to widen the territory of aesthetics by exploring the broader field where all three notions (*Stimmung*, mood, and atmosphere) belong, namely that of sense modalities and perception. Although 'atmospheres are indeterminate as regards their ontological status' as Böhme put it, and although 'we are not sure whether we should attribute them to the objects or

[10] Wallrup (2015) 1–12.
[11] Wallrup (2015), esp. 15–68 and 69–109.

environments from which they proceed or to the subjects which experience them', '*they seem to fill the space with a certain tone of feeling, like a haze*'.[12]

The metaphor of *haze* takes us back to the various metamorphoses of air, to be contemplated primarily as a natural phenomenon before it is regarded as a concept befitting less concrete yet all-pervasive modes of aesthetic experience. In his relatively recent work on *Stimmung*, Gumbrecht stresses the key role that acoustic stimuli play in the creation of atmospheres while also asserting that hearing 'involves the entire body' and that 'every tone we perceive is a form of physical reality that "happens" to our body and, at the same time, "surrounds" it'.[13] More importantly, Gumbrecht brings up the interrelation, indeed the deeper affinities, between experiencing a certain soundscape and experiencing a certain state of atmosphere, namely weather. 'Being affected by sound or weather, while among the easiest and least obtrusive forms of exprerience, is, physically, a concrete encounter (in the literal sense of en-countering: meeting up) with our physical environment.'[14]

This is an interesting turn in recent attempts to revive and expand theories of *Stimmung* while also maintaining and elaborating on what has always been its core, namely music and musicality. When it comes to verbal compositions, there is a clear focus on the way prosodies can create atmospheres and modulate moods.[15] Prosodic textures have of course always been essential in all verbal art, yet, as noted earlier, there are moments in the histories of cultures where, under differing agendas and practices, the concreteness of words is made to (or thought to) evaporate, yielding to purer forms of sensory perception. In recent history, the lyric poetry that was generated within the so-called Symbolist movement, with Verlaine's *Art Poétique* as emblematic, represents a typical moment of such endeavours. As has been suggested, 'to understand the atmospheric relationship of the ideas and to understand that atmosphere is more important than the simple explication of the theme is to comprehend Verlaine and the basic aesthetic principle of Symbolism'.[16] Interestingly, Greek lyric poetry and its performance seem to have posed relevant questions and, as it turns out, Platonic thought presents a most intriguing response to the challenges such questions triggered in antiquity.

[12] Böhme (1993) 114, italics mine. [13] Gumbrecht (2012) 4.
[14] Gumbrecht (2012) 4. [15] Gumbrecht (2012), esp. 5 and 13.
[16] Hertz (1987) 105.

WORDS, MELODY, RHYTHM

Although composers such as Claude Débussy were keen on setting contemporary lyric poems to music, Symbolism's preoccupation with the role of music in poetry focused predominantly on the musicality and harmony emanating from the phonetic handling of language itself.[17] In archaic and classical times, however, lyric poetry, with the various melic genres at its core, was sung and accompanied by actual music. This well-attested and well-known fact should inform the ways in which we may look for the tensions occasionally erupting between an emphasis on the semantics of words, on the one hand, and the sensory thrust, on the other, generated by the sonic fabric of language and greatly amplified through actual music. The relationship between words and music in melic poetry and, more specifically, the role of meaning in melic compositions are central issues in the *Republic* and, as we will see, come up in other works as well.

In the third book of the *Republic*, after the much-discussed section on *lexis* comes full circle, a new thematic section is introduced in 398c. This new section is dedicated to what Socrates calls *ᾠδῆς τρόπος καὶ μελῶν,* in other words the manner of *song* and *μέλη*, namely lyric poetry and performance.[18] Soon we are given a very clear definition of *μέλος*:

> *πάντως δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε ἱκανῶς ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστιν συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.*
>
> 'At all events' I said, 'presumably, to start with, you have enough of an understanding to say that lyric verse consists of three elements: words, melody, rhythm?' (tr. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy)

Interestingly, in the course of the discussion that takes place between this introductory definition of *μέλος* and the marked end of the section in 403c we hear no fewer than three times that words—for which the term used is *λόγος*—should always play the primary role in the case of *μέλος* while *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμός* should just follow it. The first such statement comes immediately after Socrates has defined *μέλος* (398d), the discussion at that point focusing on the verbal

[17] On Débussy's interest in setting poetry into music in relation to the symbolist aesthetic see for instance Hertz (1987) 85–133.

[18] On this section of the *Republic* see for instance Barker (1984) 128–38; Moutsopoulos (1989) 67–80; Pelosi (2010) 32–67.

aspect of laments and dirges, of which the corresponding ἁρμονίαι have been banned earlier in Book 3. The second statement is made in the context of the broader discussion about the appropriate rhythms to be practised in musical education—here elaborate rhythms and movements are rejected while those of 'an orderly and manly life' are recommended. 'In view of this', we are told, 'the metrical foot and melody must follow the verbal expression (λόγος) and *not* the λόγος to follow the *metre* and *melody*' (400a). Finally, in the same book and thematic section, still as part of the discussion about the foundational role of μέλος in the ideal musical training, we are reminded once again of the priority of λόγος and its decisive role in the shaping of the proper μέλος (400d):

> And another aspect of what is good rhythm and bad rhythm and what isn't: the first resembles and matches fine language [λέξις], the other does the opposite, and the same applies to what is melodious and what isn't, if rhythm and melody match the words [λόγος], as was said just now, and *not* the other way round.'
>
> 'Yes indeed' he said 'these must match the words [λόγος].'
>
> (tr. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy)

The primacy or, more accurately, the supremacy of the verbal component in melic compositions over the other two, rhythm and harmony, appears to be a consistent, often implicit, concern in several Platonic dialogues, but its emphatic appearance three times in this section of the *Republic* within a few pages is remarkable. The emphasis might indicate, of course, Plato's hostility towards current Athenian musical practices, some of which were probably associated with the legacy of the so-called new musical experimentations that were prevalent in the last part of the fifth century. It does seem indeed that, among other bold undertakings, such experimentations would appear to favour rhythm and harmony over and above λόγος.[19] Yet apart from the consequences of the 'new musical' legacy, I think that Plato's anxiety was additionally caused by a tendency that was naturally ingrained in the experience of μέλος in general. I am referring to the inherent tendency of the purely musical components of μέλος, namely rhythm and harmony, to overpower its verbal component.

Quite a few instances in the Platonic corpus reveal Plato's awareness of this deep-rooted prevalence of harmony and rhythm. The

[19] On this issue see n. 2.

following one comes from the same section of the third book of the *Republic*, soon after Socrates' last warning regarding the necessity for the supremacy of *λόγος* (401d–402a).

> *ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ᾽ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ᾽ ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι᾽ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς;*
>
> 'In that case, Glaucon,' I said, 'isn't the training in *μουσική* most sovereign for these reasons, in that rhythm and melody above all plunge into the innermost soul and take a most vigorous hold of it, bringing with them the beauty of form; and, if one is trained correctly, they make him beautiful and good in form; if not, isn't the result the opposite? And furthermore he who has been brought up as he should have been, will be most acutely aware of what has been omitted and not well made, or not well nurtured, and he would rightly disparage it and approve and rejoice in what is beautiful, allow it into his soul, feed on it and become a good, fine man. On the other hand would he rightly reject and hate what is shameful even while still young, and before he is able to reason these things out, and, because he has been brought up in this way, when reason does come would he welcome it because he recognizes its utter fitness for him?' (tr. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy adapted)

The deep immersion of rhythm and harmony into the innermost part of the soul and their vehement grasping of it, we are told, play a determining role in one's formation. At the same time, what is emphasized here is not only the physical and mental potency of rhythm and harmony but also their antecedence in respect to *λόγος*—understood in this case not just as language but as fully fledged discursive capacity.

It is precisely this dominant rootedness of rhythm and harmony, I claim, eloquently and powerfully acknowledged by Plato himself here, that haunts his thought and turns *μέλος* into a field of profoundly ideological contestation. To put it differently, underneath Plato's repeated warning that in melic genres *λόγος* ought to have the absolute priority, with rhythm and harmony second in order, one

senses the fear of a deep-seated order, both natural and cultural, that may in fact be exactly the opposite. What, then, does the deep-rooted dominance of harmony and rhythm, of which Plato himself is aware, really threaten in his rigorous, *λόγος*-ruled, melic decorum? I will attempt to give an answer to this question in three movements, going through three sets of passages from different dialogues, which highlight different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon. The three sets of passages come from the *Republic*, the *Laws*, and finally, the *Phaedrus*.

STIMMUNG AND THE RESIDUE OF WORDS

The first passage comes in the third book of the *Republic* (411a–b) and, although it is located in a later section of that third book, where Socrates largely focuses on gymnastic training, it is indirectly, at least, linked to the overall discussion about *μέλος* in that book:

> *οὐκοῦν ὅταν μέν τις μουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἃς νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῇ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ 'μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν'.*
>
> Then whenever anyone lets music entrance his soul with its piping, and lets it pour into his soul through his ears, as though through a funnel, the sweet and soft and mournful *ἁρμονίαι* that we were discussing just now, and when he uses up the whole of his life humming, enraptured by [lit. 'brightened by', *γεγανωμένος*] the song, then to begin with, if he has anything of the spirited element in him, this man will temper it like iron, and make useful what was useless and hard. But if he persists in entrancing it without ceasing, he will eventually dissolve it and melt it away, till he pours away his spirit, and cuts, as it were, the sinews from his soul, and makes of it a 'feeble warrior'.
>
> (tr. A. Barker 1984, slightly modified)

This is a remarkable return to an issue that seemed to have been resolved once and for all in an earlier section of the third book, when the so called *θρηνώδεις*, *μαλακαί* (soft), and *sympotic ἁρμονίαι* were

erased from (ἀφαιρετέαι) the ideal education as unworthy (ἄχρηστοι, 398e). There is no question, I think, that the sweet, soft, and mourning ἁρμονίαι Socrates talks about here are the ἁρμονίαι associated with melic poetry and that the setting he has in mind is predominantly a sympotic setting (398c). I have extensively discussed elsewhere the cultural and performative subtext of this key passage and have shown that the verb μινυρίζειν (of which we have the participle μινυρίζων in this passage) is often associated in Greek texts with the hushed, subdued quality of melic or melic-like singing.[20] In the Platonic scholia and in Byzantine lexicographical sources, the verb is glossed as mourning or as low-voiced, subdued singing (ἠρέμα ἀείδειν). The first meaning (mourning) is indeed encountered in earlier texts, but by the end of the fifth century, and especially in Aristophanes, the verb is used mainly to denote soft, barely articulated singing, almost whispering, humming, or murmuring and is associated with μέλος in particular. As far as the other participle in this passage is concerned, γεγανωμένος, I have suggested that in addition to the usual interpretation as 'enraptured' or 'entranced' we have to take into account the literal meaning of the verb γανόω, which means 'polishing' of certain materials, including metals, and is well captured in the scholia to Plato's *Republic* as λελαμπρυσμένος, meaning brightened, sparkling.[21] I had then claimed that, for a modern reader, the combination of the semantics of being 'enraptured' *and* 'brightened' 'sparkling' can be more fully understood through James Joyce's conceptualization of the 'luminous, silent stasis of aesthetic pleasure'.[22]

The present focus on the relationship between λόγος and music in Platonic views of μέλος, however, helps us shed light on additional semantic aspects. More specifically, μινυρίζειν represents what I should like to call the *vocal residue of language when language has been infiltrated by melody*. Murmuring is the faint vocal echo of the words that are now dim reminiscences of their articulated, discursive, state. This hushed, melodious, quality of the vocal is what remains from μέλος in such conditions. In such cases, then, the semantics of the verbal component tends to vanish, as it yields to the melodious, musical texture of the song.

[20] For a detailed analysis and discussion of relevant texts see Peponi (2012) 20–3.
[21] *Scholia in Platonem* (Greene) *ad Rep*. 411, bis; Hesychius s.v.; Photius s.v.
[22] Peponi (2012) 14–17.

Without doubt, Plato himself saw this low-voiced, hushed, vocalization of ᾠδή as both the cause and the result of an essentially slumberous state of consciousness. Prolonged indulging in this enraptured humming is seen by him as threatening to completely liquefy and melt the θυμός while cutting off the sinews from the soul. This imagery of slackening and feebleness in the Platonic text captures very graphically the sense of a somniferous, self-absorbed mood, permeating and spreading over one's whole existence. This brings us back to the concept of *Stimmung*, especially as it has been reinterpreted and enriched over the last decades. The concept can indeed capture quite effectively the distinctive atmosphere that was allegedly generated by certain types of melic performances in antiquity. Though it is not unlikely that this atmosphere had enough potency to spread all over the public space of a theatre or an odeion, it is reasonable to think that intimate environments had the capacity to provide a more proper venue for this type of experience, where meaning in its discursive form as λόγος yielded to less solid and more indefinite modes of perception and feeling that tended to act by enfolding and cocooning the listener. It is likely that what Plato calls soft and sympotic harmonies and the poetry that went with them had a special effectiveness in pouring out this type of atmosphere and in creating this type of ambience. His juxtaposition of the low-voiced murmuring of the song with its sparkling effect (denoted by γεγανωμένος) is an effective way to capture this special lyric mood as an aura diffused inside and around the person who indulges in this state.

SOUND AND THE NON-MIMETIC ABYSS

Prolonged exposure to this type of atmosphere, induced by the performance of certain melic genres, is thus clearly perceived as intensifying an all-pervasive state of sensuousness while discouraging engagement in straightforward cognitive activity. Although clearly aware of its allure, we can foresee that Plato would consider such a condition of consciousness unacceptable. As the solidity of λόγος evaporates, signification, along with the representational—that is mimetic—capacity of poetry, tends to recede. Despite the well-known and thoroughly discussed perplexities Plato brought up in several dialogues concerning the dangers of mimesis, he was indeed

in favour of the representational essence of mimesis, provided that it was the type of mimesis he considered proper. In his last work, the *Laws*, this becomes clearer than ever. The approved *μουσική* of the *Laws* (including choral, namely melic, song-and-dance) is conceived of as profoundly and utterly mimetic.[23] This should *not* be surprising. Once musical practices are allowed in the Platonic city, they have to adapt to the approved sets of significations and meanings. Mimesis, then, understood here as a system of representation, is the very vehicle that guarantees them.

Which brings us to the next passage, from the second book of the *Laws* (669c–670a). The passage can be read as yet another Platonic attack against the legacy of the New Music and its experimentations.[24] The Athenian interlocutor mentions the dangers of assigning unbefitting tunes and gestures to the wrong type of individual or collective musical agents. He also talks about the unacceptable mixture of different sources of sounds, such as animal and human cries—all of which can be read as variations on themes already discussed in the *Republic*.[25] But the most astounding assertion here is the last part of the passage (669d–e):[26]

> *ταῦτά γε γὰρ ὁρῶσι πάντα κυκώμενα, καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ᾽ αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων·*
>
> And in the midst of all this confusion, he will find that the poets also divorce rhythm and movement from the *μέλος* by putting tuneless words into metre, and rob *μέλος* and rhythm of words [*ῥήματα*] by using stringed instruments and pipes on their own. When this is done, it is extraordinarily difficult to know what the rhythm and harmony without *λόγος* are supposed to signify and what worth-while mimetic enactment they depict. (tr. J. Saunders adapted)

[23] On mimesis as an acceptable practice in the *Laws* see for instance Pl. *Lg*. 655d–656a; 668b; 795e–796c; 816a.

[24] On this see also Kowalzig (2013b) 185–6 and n. 49.

[25] In terms of its hints at the various and varying New Musical practices this passage is complementary to *Rep*. 397a–c.

[26] Text printed as in Burnet (OCT).

This is the most direct acknowledgment of the positive effects of mimesis in Plato's thought. Despite some hesitance in the past regarding the diction and meaning of the passage, it is very clear that what may appear as lack of mimetic transparency is thought to cause cognitive chaos.[27] Furthermore, it is clear that the presence of *ῥήματα* and *λόγος* is precisely what provides the assurance, or rather the comfort, of an uncontested mimetic referent.

In other words, what is described here is a crisis very particular to melic genres. For, clearly, it is only in the case of *μέλος* that rhythm and harmony can act in this self-determining, one may say emancipated, manner. Contrary to epic poetry, dramatic dialogues, and longer elegiac narratives, all of which are evidently tied to the verbal and thus make immediately apparent what may be wrong about them from a Platonic perspective, in the case of *μέλος* the prevalence and, potentially, the autonomy of the purely musical components may cause other types of cultural destabilization. For, by promoting diffused atmospheres and moods rather than concrete sets of ideas or even emotions, they are hard to pinpoint, let alone to manipulate.

If our analysis is legitimate, we can now appreciate a remarkable formulation, located earlier in the same section of the *Laws* (669b):

> *μὴ τοίνυν ἀπείπωμεν λέγοντες τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ᾗ χαλεπόν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑμνεῖται περὶ αὐτὴν διαφερόντως ἢ τὰς ἄλλας εἰκόνας, εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης πασῶν εἰκόνων.*
>
> Let us not hesitate, then, to mention the point wherein lies the difficulty of music. Just because it is more talked about than any other form of representation (*εἰκών*), it needs more caution than any (*εἰκών*).
>
> (tr. R. G. Bury)

In this passage *εἰκών* is usually translated as *representation*.[28] This is a fairly satisfactory translation yet it misses the semantic priority that the term *εἰκών* puts on *visual* representation in particular. In other words, Plato's choice of the term *εἰκών* here is deliberately marked. Its emphatic employment twice builds upon the Athenian's effort to capitalize on the idea that *μουσική* belongs in a system of *τέχναι εἰκαστικαί* (667d). This is a remarkable twist in Platonic theory.

[27] On textual and interpretive issues see England (1921) 325–7. For other aspects of this section of the *Laws* and its relation to broader concerns about musical *ēthos* see more recently the interesting discussion by Pelosi (2010) 59–67.

[28] See also Saunders (1970) 109, who translates it as 'artistic representation'. Yet Pangle (1980) 51 stays closer to the original by translating it as 'image'.

Although it is well known that Plato (and for that matter Aristotle as well) was striving to point out affinities between poetic and visual arts, in this case we are met with a formulation that goes much beyond similarities or analogies. Instead, what Plato attempts to do here is to create a complete equation. In brief, *μουσική* is not just *like* an *εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη*. Quite surprisingly, it is identified as one of them (668a):

> *οὐκοῦν μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν;*
> We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?
>
> (tr. R. G. Bury)

Three points are crucial here. First, the term *εἰκαστικός* appears very rarely in Plato's works—in fact it appears only seven times in the entire Platonic corpus. Second, it only appears in the *Sophist* (five times) and in this part of the *Laws* (twice). Third, in the complicated argument of the *Sophist* the terms *εἰκαστικός* and *εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη* designate visual arts in particular—specific issues of perspective and symmetry are brought up along with explicit references to painting and sculpture.[29]

What prompted, then, this singular emphasis not simply on the representational but more specifically on the *eikastic*, visual, quality of *μέλος* in the *Laws*? My answer is that it is precisely Plato's anxiety about the *non-representational* potential of *μέλος*, its capacity to provide pleasure beyond fixed systems of signification, that haunts his theoretical apparatus in this part of the *Laws*. To put it in a different way, precisely because the lack of mimetic referent is understood by Plato to be a socially and culturally destabilizing condition, he insists here on describing *μέλος* as the most evident and intelligible case of mimesis, *not just* as analogous to the visual arts but, quite extraordinarily, as *one of* them.

Despite the fact that New Musical experimentations—which, we should not forget, used a variety of *melic* forms as their vehicle—increased

[29] Pl. *Sph*. 235e–236a. On the term *εἰκαστικός* as well as the differentiation between eikastic/phantastic mimesis in the *Sophist* see Halliwell (2002), esp. 61–8. It should be noted that the conceptual differentiation between *eikastic* and *phantastic* mimesis in the *Sophist* does not affect the point made here. The visual force of the term *eikastic* is unquestionable. Furthermore, if we understand the term *eikastic* in the *Laws* according to its definition in the *Sophist* (235d–e)—namely as an *exact* visual reproduction of an original model—then Plato's need to turn *μουσική* into an unambiguous, and thus cognitively unproblematic, representation comes across even more clearly.

the fear of mimetic and representational destabilization, Plato was absolutely aware that the non-representational potential of μέλος along with the dissolution of its semantic constituent were always lurking, even in more traditional types of performance. As we saw earlier, his unique description of the listener of the soft, lament-like, and sympotic ἁρμονίαι in the third book of the *Republic*, eternally murmuring the melody while enveloped by its atmosphere, fully indicates precisely this awareness.

AN ECOLOGY OF MELOS

In order to effectively understand atmosphere as a metaphor, one has to conceive of it in its most literal, physical, sense. This is why earlier in this chapter I referred to the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* as a text that fully captures the ways in which *air*, to be generally understood as *atmosphere*, envelopes and affects organic matter. I should now like to suggest that Plato's *Phaedrus* is the Platonic work par excellence where lyric poetry is best conceptualized, or rather sensed, *as* atmosphere, while atmosphere in its most literal meaning modulates the dialogue from the beginning to the end. To put it differently, nowhere else in Plato is the osmotic action between physical atmosphere, on the one hand, and atmosphere as mood or *Stimmung*, on the other, made so perceptible. And nowhere else in the Platonic corpus is lyric poetry so consistently and creatively used in order to emblematize precisely this osmotic action.

The fact that the dialogue is rich in references to lyric poetry is well known and thoroughly studied, thus unnecessary to repeat.[30] The specific point made here, though, is that understanding the role of atmosphere as an integral part of aesthetic experience helps us better grasp not only the reason why lyric poetry is indeed so central in this particular Platonic dialogue but also the reason why it permeates its text in so many different ways. More specifically, it has been noted, in some cases with great insight, that lyric poetry is far more present in this dialogue than the sum of the explicit references to lyric poets

[30] See for instance Ferrari (1990) 86–112; Demos (1999) 65–88; Pender (2007) 1–57; Capra (2014) 27–87.

encountered in it.[31] That is, in addition to the passages where lyric poets are mentioned by name, the text brims with allusions to lyric compositions. An ancient reader of the *Phaedrus* familiar with the poetry performed in sympotic settings would probably sense the presence of even more lyric allusions spread throughout the text. Why is *μέλος*, then, so constitutive in the layering of this dialogue, both on its surface and in its subtext?

The answer to this question lies precisely in Plato's general awareness that lyric poetry with *μέλος* at its core, perhaps over and above any other genre, tends to create a state of consciousness where the concreteness of verbal matter may recede, giving way to less palpable yet wholly pervasive moods or atmospheres that are perceived in various sense modalities. This is precisely the phenomenon that makes its appearance in the *Phaedrus* as well, only here in a predominant and remarkably resourceful way that befits the peculiarities of the dialogue. Indicative of Plato's inventiveness and, more particularly, of the way physical and lyric atmosphere are meant to mutually enhance and redefine one another is the following passage, that comes in an early stage of the dialogue (235b–e):

ΣΩ. τοῦτο ἐγώ σοι οὐκέτι οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι πιθέσθαι· παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσί με, ἐάν σοι χαριζόμενος συγχωρῶ.

ΦΑΙ. τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἤ που Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλήρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννενόηκα, εὖ οἶδα, συνειδὼς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν· λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου. ὑπὸ δὲ νωθείας αὖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέλησμαι, ὅπως τε καὶ ὧντινων ἤκουσα.

SO: You go too far: I can't agree with you about that. If, as a favour to you, I accept your view, I will stand refuted by all these people—wise men and women of old—who have spoken or written about this subject.

PH: Who are these people? And where have you heard anything better than this?

[31] See Pender's analysis in Pender (2007) 1–57.

> SO: I can't tell you offhand, but I am sure I've heard better somewhere; perhaps it was the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon or even some writer of prose. So, what's my evidence? The fact, my dear friend, that my breast is full and I feel I can make a different speech, even better than Lysias'. Now I am well aware that none of these ideas can have come from me—I know my own ignorance. The only other possibility, I think, is that I was filled through the ears, like an empty jar, by the streams of others, though I am so stupid that I've forgotten where and from whom I heard them.
>
> tr. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (slightly adapted)

I have used the term *atmosphere* throughout this chapter to capture the diffusion and evaporation of meaning that may take place in the experience of lyric. Perhaps Plato preferred the idea of liquefaction instead of evaporation. For it cannot be coincidental that both times he refers to *μέλος* as susceptible to diffusion, in the *Republic* and in this famous passage of the *Phaedrus*, he uses slightly different metaphors of liquidity—both times he talks about liquids pouring into one's self. In the first case, in the *Republic*, he employed the metaphor of the ears as the funnel through which the soft *ἁρμονίαι* pour into one's soul; in the second case, in the *Phaedrus*, it is the very body of Socrates, his chest, that is filled like a jar with the streams (*νάματα*) coming from elsewhere. But in both metaphors, the one of ethereality and evaporation, and Plato's own, the one of liquefaction, it is the same idea that is captured: the dissolution of the solidity of words as concrete signifying units.

One may think that the two metaphors represent slightly different registers of the body's sensorium. As I mentioned earlier, airiness and evaporation suggest that one's whole existence is surrounded and enfolded by a certain mood elicited by the volatility of words. Plato's imagery of liquefaction, on the other hand, suggests that one's inner body is filled with their fluid essence. Interestingly, then, while the compactness of words dissolves, perception is in both cases conceptualized in terms of a peculiar, inner or outer tactility. Yet in the *Phaedrus* this peculiar moist tactility of others' words reaching Socrates' inner body like streams (*νάματα*) is nothing but an integral, indeed organic, part of the ecosystem within which the entire dialogue takes place. For water fills the place as part of its pronounced ecology. The two interlocutors are sitting, or rather reclining, at the banks of the river Ilisus. The words for water (*ὕδωρ*, *ὑδάτιον*), river (*ποταμός*), stream (*νᾶμα*) punctuate the text from the beginning to

the end.[32] Much before we hear of the streams filling Socrates' body, we hear him say how delightful and proper it is for this time of day and season to wet one's feet in the water. And, far from accidentally, *νᾶμα*, which is used here to describe the dissolved essence of words reaching Socrates' inner body, resurfaces at the end of the dialogue as a description of the place, now called *Νυμφῶν νᾶμα*.[33]

Water is absolutely essential to both the literal and the metaphorical atmosphere of the *Phaedrus*. In the aquatic habitat of the dialogue the liquefied words of *μέλος* drench its verbal web. The reader senses their refreshing presence like the water that strokes the barefoot Socrates on a summer's day.

[32] Pl. *Phdr.* 229a; 229b; 230b; 235d; 242a; 242b; 278b.
[33] Pl. *Phdr.* 278b.

8

Aristotle on Music for Leisure

Pierre Destrée

In *Politics* 8 Aristotle writes (1338a9–24):

> It is evident that we should learn and be taught certain things that promote leisured activity. And these subjects and studies are undertaken for their own sake, whereas those relating to work are necessary and for the sake of things other than themselves. For this reason, our predecessors assigned music a place in education [...] music is for pursuit in leisure (*πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν*), which is evidently the very reason our predecessors included it in education. For they give it a place among the leisured pursuits they considered appropriate for free people.[1]

As several interpreters have stressed, what Aristotle calls music 'for pursuit in leisure' (or in 'cultivated leisure') is to be taken as the most valuable 'kind' of music (I deliberately put 'kind' into inverted commas for the moment).[2] The main reason for this is that this 'kind' of music is supposed to be, more than the other kinds, part and parcel of perfect happiness. But several difficulties remain as to its exact meaning and status. First, is it different from the three sorts of *ἁρμονίαι* or *μέλη* that Aristotle examines at the end of his treatise: *ἠθικὰ μέλη*, which aim at the moral improvement of the youth; *πρακτικὰ μέλη*, 'invigorating' songs, or tunes, for relaxation; and *ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη*, aiming at *katharsis*? Secondly, what does Aristotle mean when he rather

[1] I quote C. D. C. Reeve's translation of the *Politics*, sometimes slightly modified.

[2] See esp. Nightingale (2004) 240–52; see also Depew (1991) 367; Ford (2004). The ethical reading Carnes Lord has defended in his 1982 book (see esp. 84–5) has been, I think definitely, refuted by Too (1998) 87–90 and Nightingale (1996) 39–42; but see Jones (2012) for a very interesting and forceful reassesment of Carnes' ethical reading.

obscurely says that this 'kind' of music 'contributes something to φρόνησις' (1339a25–6)? And thirdly, since becoming a good judge of this 'kind' of music seems to be the central aim of the musical education given to young people, what does this imply as to its meaning and importance? These are the main questions I deal with in this paper.

*

Before I review these difficulties and try to give a solution to them, I will briefly turn to the origin of Aristotle's educational program. It is commonly assumed that Aristotle had Plato's *Laws* at the back of his mind when writing these particular books of the *Politics*; there is a great number of similar ideas, and he regularly uses almost the same words and expressions found in the *Laws*. But few scholars have recognized that, despite such similarities, Aristotle's approach to music is *toto caelo* different from Plato's. One may even get the impression, as I propose one in fact should, that Aristotle either refers to or quotes almost verbatim certain key passages from the *Laws* and the *Republic* only to draw from them a completely different conclusion.

In a recent paper, Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi has provocatively contended that Aristotle 're-aestheticized' music and dance after Plato 'de-aestheticized' them in the *Laws*.[3] For the Plato of the *Laws*, indeed, the citizens themselves must be part of χορεῖαι, i.e. should dance and sing, during the whole course of their lives, even when they are getting old. For the oldest citizens, he even recommends that wine be generously poured so they can be reinvigorated and hence capable of taking part in χορεῖαι. For Aristotle, on the other hand, music should be learned and played by children only and never by adult citizens, who are expected to enjoy music played by others. Plato also holds that people enjoy music and dance, but (as Peponi forcefully observes) this is not an aesthetic pleasure, in that for him music and dance are not meant to be enjoyed as a spectacle as was commonly the case (and which is something that Aristotle will commend). The pleasure they are meant to derive comes from μίμησις in the active sense of the term, as it is the citizens themselves

[3] Peponi (2013b). On Plato's views on the aesthetics of music in the *Laws* under ethical constraints, see also Gülgönen (2011) and Rocconi (2012); and on Plato and Aristotle's respective views, see Schoen-Nazzaro (1978). For Plato's views on lyric poetry see Peponi (this volume).

who are urged to be active performers of mimetic music and dance. There is, however, a key proviso, namely that the sort of music and dance they perform should be the sort that aims at improving them morally. For if the right sort of music is played (in the *Republic*, Plato says that this is music in the Dorian and Phrygian ἁρμονίαι, 399a), and this music 'represents' moral virtues, especially courage and temperance, performers are supposed to become virtuous: they become courageous and temperate, having enacted and thus incorporated such values. Moreover, since performing this music through singing and dancing is enjoyable, it is to be supposed that performers will learn to appreciate these virtues, and get pleasure from practising them in the real world; this pleasure is in turn the best possible motivation to practise virtues. And since no one is capable of achieving perfect virtue, all citizens will need to practise such music again and again throughout their lives.

To be sure, Aristotle also takes music to be an important, even crucial part of moral education, and with this in mind he follows Plato in having all children, i.e. all future citizens, learn to play an instrument. But while Aristotle agrees with Plato that, by learning to play an instrument such as the lyre, one thereby learns the virtues, he strongly opposes the idea of having citizens play an instrument throughout their lives: citizens 'should engage in performance while they are young and stop performing when they are older' (1340b36–8).[4] And furthermore, if on Aristotle's view one values music, that is, the kind of music that aims at παιδεία, for its moral utility, it remains something

[4] True, at the very end of his treatise, Aristotle seems to admit that the older citizens should continue at least to sing: 'And each individual should undertake what is more possible and more suitable for him. But possibility and suitability are determined by one's stage of life. For example, it is not easy for people exhausted by age to sing harmonies that are strained—nature recommends the relaxed harmonies at their stage of life. That is why some musical experts rightly criticize Socrates because he rejected the relaxed harmonies for the purposes of education, not because they have the power that drink has of producing Bacchic frenzy, but because like drink they make us weak. So, with an eye to that future stage of life—old age—children *should* take up harmonies and melodies of this relaxed sort' (1342b17–27). But it is the only place where he seems to recommend this. Curiously enough, when he talks about communal meals (*Pol.* 7.1329b22–1330a8), Aristotle does not mention such a singing together, as Plato would have done. It may be the case that in fact the paragraph I have just quoted does not represent Aristotle's own views, but is part and parcel of Aristotle's critique of Plato. Note that Susemihl and Newman have strongly suggested that this last bit of our extant text should be considered an interpolation; see Newman (1902) 571–2.

that is merely useful; a thing only acquires its full value when it is appreciated for itself. This is the main normative principle that leads to the distinction Aristotle makes between music for παιδεία—for the inculcation of moral virtue—and music for διαγωγή. While we value music for its utility in pursuit of παιδεία, we only value it fully and for its own sake when it is played for our leisure and not for any ulterior goal. Music for leisure must be a 'kind' of music that is appreciated for itself, and not—as is the case with music for παιδεία—for the sake of something else.[5]

*

After this brief introductory presentation of the main bone of contention between Plato and Aristotle, let us have a closer look at how Aristotle, as I suggest, uses Plato's propositions while drawing a very different, and in fact the opposite, conclusion. One of the clearest instances is the following passage, which in effect constitutes the starting point of his educational programme (1337b25–32):

> Reading, writing, and drawing are taught because they are useful for life and have many applications (ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους), gymnastics is taught because it contributes to courage, but in the case of music a problem immediately arises. Nowadays, most people take part in music for the sake of pleasure. But those who originally included it as a part of education did so, as has often been said, because nature itself aims not only at the correct use of work (ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς) but also at the capacity for noble leisured activity (σχολάζειν καλῶς): this is the starting point for everything else (αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων μία).

As Aristotle makes clear at the outset, leisure must be the highest aim in education, and music is one activity particularly suitable for that aim. Philosophy will provide that too, and no doubt at a superior level to music, but there is no mention of philosophy in Book 8, which focuses on the education of the young. The other traditional activities to be taught to children are fundamentally directed at utility (with the exception of drawing to which I will come back in a moment). These activities are undertaken for the sake of some specific goal. One of

[5] We might think that there is no reason why, say, a conductor of an orchestra should not enjoy music for its own sake. But given Plato's insistence that one must perform music, namely by singing and dancing, in order to improve oneself, we can understand why Aristotle emphasizes that in order to fully appreciate music for itself we must be spectators of or listeners to music instead of being actual performers.

Aristotle's recurring examples is gymnastics, which is useful because it prepares a youth for courage by enabling him to acquire strength and endurance. Now what should strike us, as readers familiar with Plato's *Laws* (as Aristotle's readers certainly were), is the following sentence, which sounds rather curious in its context: 'Nowadays, most people take part in music for the sake of pleasure.' This is in effect an idea we find repeated again and again by Plato, who condemns people who think that what makes music valuable is just pleasure (see especially his radical condemnation of the 'New Music' which on his account aims at pure sensory pleasure).[6] Clearly Plato also thinks that music is pleasurable, but what makes it valuable and worth teaching to the young is not its pleasurable effects per se, but the way it conveys the right representations of virtue. So here Aristotle endorses Plato's harsh rebuttal of such a hedonistic justification of musical education. But the main idea he will develop from this premise is rather different, and even opposed to what Plato proposes.

As I noted earlier, Plato's view is that the right way to engage in music, and the very reason why younger people must learn it, is for moral purposes. As he explicitly says in the *Laws*, gymnastics is to the body what music is to the soul: 'In practice, instruction will fall into two categories: gymnastics for the body, and music for the sake of a well-ordered soul (*εὐψυχίας χάριν μουσική*)', (795d6–8).[7] In both cases, the aim should be the health of the part each is concerned with. It can hardly be a coincidence that Aristotle insists here, at the very beginning of his analysis of music (where in fact he is not yet talking about different kinds or purposes of music, but about the value of music in general), on the way one should think about the value of gymnastics: this amounts to an implicit but strong condemnation of Plato's approach to music. As Aristotle forcefully states (this is something he has argued for in Book 7), leisure is 'the

[6] See esp. Rep. 404e, which summarizes his rejection of the New Music, which he compares to sophisticated cuisine: 'There complexity engendered intemperance (*ἀκολασίαν ἡ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν*), didn't it, and here it engenders illness, whereas simplicity in musical training engenders temperance in the soul, and in physical training health in the body?' See also *Laws* 2.657b, and more generally 657e–659c for the critique of pleasure as the criterion for judging art works. On Plato and New Music, see most recently D'Angour (2006a) and Csapo (2011).

[7] It is true that *μουσική* for Plato also includes dance and songs, but the main concern in the whole passage (*Laws* 7.795d–797a) is music *sticto sensu*. On gymnastics and music, see already *Rep.* 403c–405a.

only principle of everything', i.e. the final aim one must seek in every decision or activity that one chooses or recommends. And since Aristotle logically adds that 'our nature itself aims not only at the correct use of work but also at the capacity for noble leisured activity', education should provide the young, that is to say the future citizens of the best possible city, with the capacity of using both work time and leisure time correctly. And indeed, Aristotle will eventually (from chapter 5 onwards) differentiate the two domains of music that correspond to these two areas of life: music for *παιδεία*, and music for leisure. But as he makes crystal clear right at the beginning of his inquiry into education (without even mentioning music for *παιδεία*), when talking about the benefit of a musical education in general, the crucial thing to focus on is 'the right way to spend one's leisure time'. So, properly understood, music must be, at least primarily, for the sake of leisure; more precisely, musical education must primarily be directed at making people able to enjoy leisure properly.

Plato does not actually use the words *σχολή* or *ἀσχολία* in the same sort of context, but interestingly enough it is an idea that is very much present in several passages. The following passage from the *Laws* reveals Plato's position, which is emphatically different from what Aristotle will argue (7.806d–807d):

> Now that our citizens are assured of a moderate supply of necessities, and other people have taken over the skilled work, what will be their way of life (*τρόπος τοῦ βίου*)? . . . Now, do such leisured circumstances leave them no pressing work to do, no genuinely appropriate occupation (*τοῖς δὴ ταύτῃ κεκοσμημένοις ἆρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖόν τε ἔργον καὶ παντάπασι προσῆκον*)? Must each of them get plumper and plumper every day of his life, like a fatted beast? No: we maintain that's *not* the right and proper thing to do . . . So we must insist that there is something left to do in such a life, and it's only fair that the task imposed, far from being a light or trivial one, should be the most demanding of all. As it is, to dedicate your life to winning a victory at Delphi or Olympia keeps you far too busy to attend to other tasks; but a life devoted to the cultivation of every physical perfection *and* every moral virtue (the only life worth the name) will keep you at least twice as busy. (mod. tr. Saunders—his italics.)

Once citizens are supplied with all necessities and do not need to work, they are left with the question of how to live their leisured life. The only correct answer, as Aristotle will also say, is that they need to try to find the right occupations. According to Plato, these suitable occupations will consist solely in the cultivation of physical perfection

and moral virtue. For Aristotle, such a way of spending one's leisure time is not what we would properly understand by the term 'leisure'. As several interpreters have pinpointed, Aristotle uses the term σχολή in two rather different senses: it may refer to a life stocked with all the bare necessities, as Plato understands it as well; but in its proper sense, which Aristotle seems to be the first to propose, σχολή refers to the leisure time in which activities are done for their own sake, and never for the sake of something else, as virtuous or political activities obviously are (e.g. courage in war is used for the sake of peace).[8] For that reason, properly speaking, the virtuous or political life should be named ἀσχολία, 'lack of leisure', since those moral or political activities are part of the citizens' day-to-day 'work life', or 'business' (which is the common meaning of ἀσχολία).

Returning to music, one can clearly see why Plato is so keen to defend the moral functions of music. If the appropriate leisured life of the citizens of a perfect city should consist in 'a life devoted to the cultivation of every physical perfection and every moral virtue', the only music Plato can think of for educating the young towards such a life cannot but be music for moral improvement—in the same way as gymnastics should be conceived as aiming at physical improvement. But for Aristotle it is the other way round. If the appropriate leisured life, according to his view, is a life where activities must be performed for their own sake, without any practical consequences (such as helping one to become morally better or, as he will say later, to relax from hard work), and if music is to count among such activities, then music must be enjoyed for its own sake, and not—at least not primarily—for any external goal such as moral improvement, or relaxation.

Before getting to the heart of what Aristotle will eventually call 'music for leisure' at *Pol.* 8.5, and the problems this poses, let me add one more remark on his implicit rejection of Plato's moralistic conception of music. As we shall see, Aristotle is well aware that he is proposing a new conception of σχολή, as well as a new conception of music for διαγωγή. Nevertheless, he is also keen to add that such a conception is in fact rooted in ancient views of music that precede Plato; this is clear from his remark that people 'originally included music as a part of education' in the framework of leisure. And indeed, a little further down, he returns to this point, warmly praising Homer for having a similar conception (1338a21–32):

[8] See esp. Solmsen (1964); Demont (1993); and Nightingale (1996).

> What remains, then, is that music is for pursuit in leisure (*ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν*), which is evidently the very reason our predecessors included it in education. For they give it a place among the leisured pursuits they considered appropriate for free people. Hence Homer's instruction to 'call the bard alone to the rich banquet'. And he goes on to mention certain others who 'call the bard that he may bring delight to all'. Elsewhere, Odysseus says that the best leisured pursuit (*ἀρίστην διαγωγήν*) is when men are enjoying good cheer and 'the banqueters seated in due order throughout the hall, give ear to the bard'. It is evident, then, that there is a certain kind of education that sons must be given not because it is useful or necessary but because it is noble and suitable for a free person (*ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν*).

Such an emphasis on Homer, and more generally such high praise for something 'ancient', is sufficiently rare in Aristotle to be worthy of attention. And indeed, the appeal to Homer must have triggered in his readers an awareness of the whole sequence in which the above quoted lines occur:

> Then Odysseus, of many wiles, answered him, and said: 'Lord Alcinous, renowned above all men, verily this is a good thing (*τόδε καλόν*), to listen to a minstrel such as this man is, like unto the gods in voice. For myself I declare that there is no greater fulfilment of delight than when joy possesses a whole people, and banqueters in the halls listen to a minstrel as they sit in order due, and by them tables are laden with bread and meat, and the cup-bearer draws wine from the bowl and bears it round and pours it into the cups. This seems to my mind the fairest thing there is (*τοῦτό τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν εἴδεται εἶναι*).' (*Od.* 9.1–11 tr. A. T. Murray)

What Homer says here is integrated into Aristotle's scheme: the best or 'most beautiful' thing is for free men to spend their leisured life in activities such as listening to music sung and played by musicians in the context of social meetings like the symposium. But if it is true that this audience is also well aware of Plato's work, I think there is much more than just an argument from authority here, as if Aristotle wanted to defend his own conception of *σχολή* and the music that suits this by his appeal to Homer. In effect, people well acquainted with the harsh rebuttal of Homer's poetry in *Republic* 2 and 3 cannot but be reminded that in one quite remarkable passage, Plato refers to the very same passage from Homer. In Plato, however, only the verses describing the serving of food and wine are quoted (2.390a–b):

> What about making the wisest man (σοφώτατον) say that the best thing of all (κάλλιστον πάντων), as it seems to him, is when 'The tables are well laden with bread and meat, and the wine-bearer draws wine from the mixing bowl, brings it, and pours it in the cups'? Do you think that hearing things like that is suitable for inculcating self-mastery in young people? (tr. Reeve)

It is remarkable, especially when one contrasts this with Aristotle's own use of the same passage, that Plato only focuses on the food and wine, and does not even mention music. Notable also is the rather ironic way he presents the 'the wisest man': Odysseus, the hero who in fact teaches us how to become intemperate! Needless to say, Aristotle would have said that Odysseus was truly wise in considering that listening to music is the appropriate activity for free and truly happy men.

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So far, Aristotle has only presented music in a general way, and has stressed the idea that music should be an activity which is part of a leisured life. Now what about the musical education that is supposed to be given to the young, future citizen of his ideal city? This is the question Aristotle will review in chapters 5 and 6 (after reviewing gymnastics in chapter 4). And first of all, he wants to stress on that music has various aims: it can be enjoyed for the sake of relaxation, as he already said, for the sake of παιδεία or moral education of children, and for the sake of leisure (1339a11–26):

> As for music, we have mentioned some of the problems in our earlier discussion, but it will be well to take them up again now and develop them further, in order to provide a sort of prelude to the arguments that might be made in an exposition of the subject. For it is not easy to determine what the power of music is, or why one should take part in it. Is it for the sake of amusement and relaxation (παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως), like sleep and drink?[. . .]Or should we believe instead that music contributes something to virtue (ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν), on the grounds that, just as gymnastics gives us a body of a certain quality, so music has the power to give us a character of a certain quality, by instilling the habits that enable us to enjoy ourselves in the right way? Or does music contribute something to leisure and to intelligence, for indeed this must be set down third in addition to the possibilities we have talked about (ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν—καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων)?

On first reading, Aristotle seems to present music for διαγωγή *en passant* as a third possibility, while he seems to lay emphasis on music

for παιδεία. And indeed he will later insist, as he proposes here, on the idea of music's being helpful in enabling people to learn to enjoy virtuous emotions (1340a18–28):

> But rhythms and melodies contain the greatest likenesses of the true natures of anger, gentleness, courage, temperance, and their opposites, and of all the other components of character as well. The facts make this clear. For when we listen to such representations our souls are changed. But getting into the habit of being pained or pleased by likenesses is close to being in the same condition where the real things are concerned. For example, if someone enjoys looking at an image of something for no other reason than because of its shape or form, he is bound to enjoy looking at the very thing whose image he is looking at.

This sounds exactly like what Plato says in both the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Since music is naturally enjoyable, and provided it consists in a mimesis of virtuous emotions, one may suppose that the recipient will enjoy being emotionally involved in this mimesis (whatever this might actually consist in) and that he will enjoy acting virtuously in exactly the same way one enjoys seeing someone having previously enjoyed looking at a portrait of that person. But as I noted above, Aristotle does not hesitate to compare this to gymnastics. This kind of music must forge the ἦθος of the soul in the same way as gymnastics are supposed to mould the qualities of a body. Given what Aristotle has just said in his general presentation of music, it can hardly count as something laudatory; although it is something required for becoming a morally good citizen, the aim of this music remains purely practical. There must be another sort of music that corresponds to another 'benefit' which would not be practical in the way gymnastics and music for παιδεία are: Aristotle makes this clear when he points out that 'we must set out a third possibility in addition to the ones we have been discussing'. By this, Aristotle firmly states the conclusion of the central argument he has been defending all along: leisure activities are the best human activities that provide perfect happiness, and since music must be part of happiness, there must be a 'kind' of music that perfectly suits leisure time.

Before turning to what exactly this 'kind' of music is supposed to consist in, let us first consider the question of why the young should learn to play an instrument. Why shouldn't learning to listen to music be enough? After all, music gives each person a natural pleasure; slaves and even some animals can enjoy music (1340a2–3; 1341a15–17). So it

does not seem necessary to be a musician oneself in order to be able to enjoy music. Aristotle himself raises this central question, beginning with the problem of music for παιδεία (1339a42–b4):

> Why should they learn it themselves, rather than being like the Spartans, who enjoy the music of others in the right way and are able to judge it? For the Spartans do not learn it themselves, but are still able, so they say, to judge which melodies are decent (χρηστά) and which are not.

The main consideration at issue here is how to become a judge of music. This is the aim of musical education, as Aristotle will forcefully repeat again and again throughout this text. Like Plato, the Spartans rightly thought music should play an important role in the inculcation of virtue; but unlike Plato, they thought that one does not need to learn to play an instrument oneself in order to do so, and to become able to judge between morally good and bad music. This, Aristotle repeats, is simply not the case: 'It is difficult if not impossible for people to become excellent judges of performance, if they do not take part in it' (1340b23–5).

But what does this judgement consist in? At this level, there is no aesthetic judgement, but simply the ability to discern which music is morally good or bad, that is, which music is an imitation of good or bad qualities. And since music is supposed to be an imitation of good or bad emotions, we need to be educated in music in the same way that we learn how to become virtuous. It might be thought that just learning how to make such distinctions by learning to listen to music would be sufficient. But Aristotle is convinced that just as one must learn how to become virtuous by practising virtuous actions, so too the active practice of music (namely by learning to play an instrument) is the best and easiest way to become a good judge of music. This entails becoming a good judge as to what sort of music should count as suitable music for παιδεία.

This conception, to be sure, exactly reflects Plato's position as seen in the *Laws* (2.668c + 2.669a–b):

> So it looks as if a man who is not to go wrong about a given composition must appreciate what it is, because failure to understand its nature—what it is trying to do and what in fact it is a representation of—will mean that he gets virtually no conception of whether the author has achieved his aim correctly or not . . . So anyone who is going to be a sensible judge of any representation—in painting and music and every other field—should be able to assess three points: he must know, first,

> what has been represented; second, how correctly it has been copied: and then, third, the moral value of this or that representation produced by language, tunes and rhythms. (tr. Saunders)

Now if what I have argued for so far is on the right track, becoming such a good judge in the realm of music for *παιδεία* cannot be the final aim of musical education; rather, that process must be directed at becoming a good judge in the realm of music for leisure. I return now to the passage I quoted from 8.5, where Aristotle asked why the young should learn to play an instrument, and expands the terms of his discussion (1339b4–10):

> The same argument also applies if music is to be used to promote well-being and the leisured pursuits appropriate to someone who is free (*πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον*). Why should they learn it themselves rather than benefiting from the fact that others practice it? In this regard, we may consider the conception we have of the gods; for Zeus himself does not sing or accompany poets on the lyre. On the contrary, we even say that musicians are vulgar craftsmen, and that a true man would not perform music unless he were drunk or amusing himself.

Why should one learn to play an instrument in the case of music for leisure? Why should we not be able to enjoy others playing music without ourselves having to know how to play? If it is true that Zeus, our paradigm of happiness, is supremely happy and that he enjoys music without playing an instrument himself, why should our young citizens learn to play? And is it not the case that we should consider it unfitting and disreputable that free citizens should play musical instruments? Aristotle does not pursue this issue here, but explicitly postpones the problem, before returning to it at 8.6 (1340b20–5):

> We must now discuss the problem we mentioned earlier of whether or not the young ought to learn to sing and play an instrument themselves. It is not difficult to see, of course, that if someone takes part in performance himself, it makes a great difference in the development of certain qualities, since it is difficult if not impossible for people to become excellent judges of works being performed, if they do not take part in it (*μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους*).

On a first reading, it might seem that Aristotle is merely repeating his previous argument: as is the case with music for *παιδεία*, one must learn to play an instrument if one wants to become of good judge of music. But it seems to me that what Aristotle now has in mind is

totally different from what he said before in the context of music for *παιδεία*. In this scenario, being a good judge obviously does not mean being able to discriminate between the morally good kind of music and the morally bad kind, which is how Plato conceives the process of judging music. Aristotle explicitly talks about *ἔργα* to designate the musical pieces as they are being performed. A little further on, he adds the following (1340b35–9):

> [S]ince one should take part in performance in order to judge, for this reason they should engage in performance while they are young and stop performing when they are older, but be able to judge which melodies are beautiful and enjoy them in the right way (*τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς*), because of what they learned while they were young.

Again, it is tempting to read this from a Platonic perspective, especially given that *τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν* is the expression Plato uses to designate the art of judging which music expresses virtues, or 'noble actions', and which does not. But reading the passage in that way would contradict what Aristotle has defended so far. For he has claimed forcefully that, when they have become adults, citizens must devote their leisure time to enjoying music for its own sake; if *τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν* were to amount to discriminating between which songs are morally good and which are not, this would totally undermine the 'for their own sake' criterion. The expression here should be taken as conveying a meaning much closer to what modern critics, at least since Hume, would call something like a judgement of taste, namely a judgement about how beautiful such and such a piece of music is, or how artistically well performed a specific musical performance is.

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Now what exactly is to be judged? Or more precisely, which qualities or which properties are these well-formed judges of music supposed to focus on? But first of all, to return finally to our initial question, what 'sort' of music shall we suppose Aristotle is talking about when he refers to 'music for leisure'?

Crucial to these questions is a feature of the argument to which interpreters have not paid sufficient attention. At the end of his treatise, when Aristotle reviews the kinds of songs, or tunes, that have been studied and classified by 'philosophers of music' (i.e. people who are professional critics of musical styles and performances), he does not

name any special song that would correspond to such 'music for leisure'. Indeed, these songs, or tunes, should correspond to the two other kinds of music he mentioned earlier, plus *katharsis* (which he just named a few lines below, at 1341a21–4): the 'moral songs' (ἠθικὰ μέλη) are those that should be used in educational music, the 'invigorating songs' (πρακτικὰ μέλη)[9] for relaxation music, and the 'inspirational', or 'ecstatic songs' (ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη) for music that aims at some emotional *katharsis*. Since he seems to endorse this classification, and he does not name or propose any other sort of melody, it follows that the melody proper to the music for leisure must be one of these three. But which one?

One might be tempted to consider that 'invigorating melodies' would be a good candidate. As Aristotle seems to be saying when he presents these songs, or tunes, the aims of music that correspond to these are moral education (παιδεία), purgation or purification of emotions (*katharsis*), and—I quote Andrew Barker's translation—'thirdly . . . amusement for the sake of relaxation and relief from tension' (τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν, 1341b36–41), apparently considering διαγωγή to form one aim with ἄνεσις and ἀνάπαυσις. But as several commentators have noticed, not only is the Greek of the last part of the sentence odd (one would expect something between πρὸς διαγωγήν and πρὸς ἄνεσιν), but also this reading would completely undermine the very firm and clear distinction Aristotle repeatedly made earlier between διαγωγή and relaxation.[10] Indeed, διαγωγή, as he previously stated (1339a14–26; 1339b15–19), is not to be confused with relaxation and its means, παιδία, i.e. amusement (which is, very confusingly, the term that is used by Barker to render both διαγωγή and παιδία). Whatever that rather awkward last bit of the sentence may amount to (I have in fact suggested that πρὸς διαγωγήν should be best considered a gloss),[11] it seems quite unreasonable, given Aristotle's insistence on that distinction, to conflate them in one rather blurred ensemble, and conclude that those invigorating songs should be part of music for leisure. Additionally, Aristotle said that

[9] This is often translated 'for action' *vel sim.*, but these songs, according to what Aristotle says here, should certainly not be employed for any moral ends. The term must refer to 'movement' and 'action' in a very broad sense, and perhaps to dance too, not to action in the specific Aristotelian sense of 'moral action'.

[10] On this passage and its difficulties, see esp. Schütrumpf's detailed note (2005: *ad loc.*).

[11] See Destrée (2017).

this music is for relaxation after hard work, and when he reviews the 'invigorating songs' that correspond to music for relaxation, he repeats that these songs are adressed to βάνανσοι, i.e. proletarian, working people—so clearly not 'free' citizens who do not work and spend their life enjoying leisured activities.[12] True, Aristotle writes that 'since theatre audiences are of two kinds, one free and generally educated, the other boorish and composed of vulgar craftsmen, hired laborers, and other people of that sort, the latter too must be provided with competitions and spectacles for the purposes of relaxation' (1342a18–22), which could imply that free and educated people may also be offered such kind of spectacle. Admittedly, from the way the sentence is written one cannot reliably infer whether Aristotle means this, or rather the fact those free people also need spectacles for some other purpose, such as leisure. For the sake of consistency, I think the latter is more plausible; but even if Aristotle meant the former, namely that even 'free' people also need spectacles for their relaxation, that would not imply that this sort of music should be part of spectacles where leisure, not relaxation, is at stake.

As to 'inspirational', or 'ecstatic' songs, one may also be tempted to take them as a possible candidate for music for leisure. For Aristotle insists that everyone, not only deeply unbalanced people (τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς), can enjoy them (1342a11–14). But saying that everyone, including 'free' citizens may from time to time be in need of some sort of 'curative' music concert to regain their emotional balance, does not mean that *katharsis* should be part of leisure: spectacles that are supposed to end up with some sort of emotional purification are simply another venue for enjoying music. Moreover, and more crucially, as Aristotle had stressed ealier, this cathartic (or as he there says, 'orgiastic') music is to be played on an aulos (1341a21–4), while the musical instrument the citizens are supposed to learn to play in their youth is the lyre, not the highly emotive aulos which is not suitable for decent citizens. Since Aristotle insisted that one must learn to play an instrument in order to become a good judge in music for leisure, and that that instrument should be the lyre and not the aulos, it would be very strange if he now considered music for aulos to be the sort of music one should listen to for leisure.

[12] I read with Sauppe (followed also by Ross and Barker) πρακτικά at 1342a15 instead of MSS καθαρτικά. Following Schütrumpf (see his very helpful note *ad loc.*), I take 1342a16–28 to be the explanation of how those 'reinvigorating songs' contribute to relaxation.

Thus, the only possible candidate for music for leisure must be the 'ethical songs', or rather, as Aristotle says, the 'most ethical songs', or 'tunes' (*ἁρμονίαις . . . χρηστέον . . . πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις*, 1342a1–3), i.e. the Dorian tune which is 'the steadiest and has a more courageous character than any other' (*περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον*, 1342b12–14), and other such tunes—one may think of the Hypodorian which the *Problemata* present as having 'a magnificent and steadfast character' (*ἡ δὲ ὑποδωριστὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον*, 19.922b14–15) and also perhaps the Lydian one which is supposed to give some 'order', or 'orderliness' (*τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστί*, 1342b31–2).[13] This conclusion follows naturally from our earlier observations: since the only music children must learn to play is 'ethical' music, it must also be true that if they learn this in order to become good judges of music when they get older, the music they are supposed to enjoy during their leisure time must be that same sort of music. Now we also noted that Aristotle opposes Plato in relation to the aim of leisure activities, which must be undertaken for their own sake, and not for any external reason such as moral education or improvement. Taking these two requirements into account, the implication of Aristotle's argument is as follows: music for leisure must consist in listening and enjoying the same kind of music, i.e. 'ethical songs', but under another description. Now that they have become judges of that sort of music, adult citizens can enjoy it *qua* music for leisure, that is, for its own sake.[14]

[13] On this, Aristotle resolutely opposes Plato, who considered those tunes to be effeminate, not worth a decent citizen (see *Laches* 188d–e; *Rep.* 398d–e; and for a defence of Plato's view on this, see Ps-Plutarch, *De mus.* 15–17). Relying on *Laws* 7.802e, where Plato talks about tunes (without naming them) that are supposed to help men to acquire 'magnificence and courage' (*τὸ δὴ μεγαλοπρεπὲς οὖν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν*), and those that fit women for their acquiring 'moderation and restraint' (*πρὸς τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον*), one may infer that for Aristotle, moderation and restraint is what these 'feminine' tunes should offer to young male citizens too, perhaps as a sort of balance to magnificence and courage they get from more 'male' tunes, such as the Dorian. (On the meaning of *κόσμιος*, see *Pol.* 6.1321b7–8, where *πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον* seems to refer to the discipline and orderliness of the city, or the citizens).

[14] Perhaps one might compare this, mutatis mutandis, to the music of composers such as Bach, or to take some more contemporary composers, Arvo Pärt, Krzysztof Penderecki, or Olivier Messiaen. If you are a serious, committed Christian, I suppose you might take this music, as these composers themselves have certainly taken it, as both capable of forming the young to the Christian faith and religious contemplation,

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What does this amount to exactly? Aristotle unfortunately does not say explicitly, but there are a few passages which give us a clue as to what he may have had in mind or what he may (or should) have elaborated on. When presenting what should and should not be taught to the young, Aristotle emphasizes two main points. First, as we have seen, he argues that the young should not be taught to play simply any kind of music, but only the kind that suits παιδεία. More precisely, they should not be taught to play the emotional aulos, nor the more difficult kinds of instruments which professionals play, such as the kithara (1341a19), and other instruments (*pectis*, *barbitos*, as well as *heptagonon*, *trigonon*, and *sambuke*, 1341a40–b1). Secondly, they should do so in order to be able to enjoy music properly, and not in the way uneducated people, or even slaves or certain animals, enjoy it (1341a9–17):

> This could be achieved where lessons in music are concerned if the students do not exert themselves to learn either what is needed for professional competition or the astonishing or out-of-the-ordinary works which have now made their way into competitions and from there into education, but learn the ones not of this sort only up to the point at which they are able to enjoy noble melodies and rhythms, and not just the common charm of any music, which appeals even to some of the other animals, and to the majority of slaves and children as well.

We have seen that judging in the case of music for leisure amounts to appreciating a good performance of music in the same way as we nowadays talk of connoisseurship in music. Connoisseurs do not only enjoy the 'common charm of music'; they also enjoy music for its intrinsic qualities, or the qualities of the performance. But contrary to what we moderns might be tempted to say on Aristotle's behalf, this cannot apply to each and every sort of music, not even to the more complicated kinds. Here one must recognize, however reluctantly, that Aristotle seems to share Plato's condemnation of the so-called 'New Music' that was being played on a number of more technically demanding instruments which were not the ones young citizens were supposed to learn to play. And as we may infer from the last quotation, this is because he thinks, like Plato, that such music is only emotional, and gives a purely sensual pleasure. Aristotle does not talk

and as constituting the right sort of music a Christian adult might enjoy for its own sake.

explicitly about this 'New Music', but one may guess that his reasons for condemning it are similar to those he puts forward when condemning the use of the aulos.[15] His main reason is that this instrument, however perfectly it may be suited to stirring the emotions in the case of music for katharsis, and however much pleasure it gives, must be rejected from the musical curriculum for young citizens because it does not develop their intelligence. Other, more demanding instruments are like the aulos in this regard, in that they 'enhance the pleasure of people who listen to their practitioners' (1341a40–b1); in other words, they give sensual or emotional pleasure and nothing else. He then adds that 'the story told by the ancients about the aulos is also plausible. They say that Athena invented the aulos, but discarded it. There is nothing wrong with saying that the goddess did this out of annoyance at how aulos-playing distorted her face, but the more likely explanation is that the aulos does nothing to promote intelligence, whereas we attribute knowledge and art to Athena' (1341b2–8).

This last detail is of great interest for our problem, especially since it may sound, at least from a Platonic perspective, rather unexpected. What one would have expected is that such instruments do not teach moral virtue as Plato would have said, and as indeed Aristotle told us a few lines above. Here the reason why the aulos should not be part of the musical education of the young is that it prevents the exercise of their intelligence, the term intelligence (*διανοία*) here being associated with science (*ἐπιστήμη*), the activity to which the most gifted citizens of Aristotle's ideal city are expected to devote themselves. It also resonates with the only description, however brief, Aristotle gives us of the 'music of leisure' that he advocates: this is a music 'for intelligence' (*πρὸς φρόνησιν*, 1339a25–6). But what does he mean by this phrase?

Several interpreters have understood *φρόνησις* here as if Aristotle meant practical wisdom or prudence.[16] And since I have argued that the only kind of melody that could correspond to this music is the

[15] An external proof for Aristotle's traditionalist attitude vis-à-vis New Music comes of course from his pupil Aristoxenes' explicit condemnation of it and nostalgic praise of the 'ancient music'. See further Power (2012b).

[16] Reeve translates it 'practical wisdom'; Lord, 'prudence'. See however Kraut, who rightly states that 'making music is a way of exercising the virtue of wisdom, and this role is to be distinguished from the contribution it makes to the ethical virtues' (1997: 178), where 'wisdom' is to be taken as a theoretical virtue.

moral one, this may seem like the safest reading. But this interpretation would totally contradict what Aristotle has argued for, namely that music composed to be listened to in leisure must not have any practical consequence or benefit. It is only when enjoying this music that the citizens of his ideal city can really enjoy their leisure, a type of activity that is opposed to their work time which includes political business as well as more general moral concerns. Therefore, as I have proposed, enjoying music as a leisure activity must entail enjoying these 'ethical songs' from another perspective. Which perspective? As Aristotle says here, from the perspective of *φρόνησις* or, according to the Athena passage, *διανοία*, that is 'theoretical' intelligence. But how should we interpret this proposition?

One interpretation consists in claiming that enjoying music in leisure time should be supposed to enhance our intelligence, that is, help citizens to train themselves intellectually in order to become philosophers properly speaking.[17] But again this would contradict what Aristotle has said. Listening to this music for the sake of enhancing the intelligence as a preparatory way toward philosophical contemplation would prove something useful, that is, for the sake of a further end, not something that is worthwhile in and of itself. If we stick to Aristotle's own logic and his emphasis on leisured activities that are undertaken for their own sake, the only coherent way of reading this is to consider such music for leisure to be an activity through which our 'theoretical' intelligence exercises its power.

Aristotle does not elaborate on this theme, as crucial as it must have been for him. But the following passage may hold a clue as to how he conceived the question of how music for *διαγωγή* related to intelligence (1338a40–b4):

> Furthermore, it is clear that children should be taught some useful subjects (such as reading and writing) not only because of their utility, but also because many other areas of study become possible through them. Similarly, they should be taught drawing not in order to avoid making mistakes in their private purchases or being cheated when buying or selling products, but rather because it makes them contemplate the beauty of bodies (*ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους*). It is completely inappropriate for magnanimous and free people to be always asking what use something is.

[17] This has been defended by Depew (1991): see esp. 371–4.

As Aristotle repeats again and again, education must aim at some utility, but should not aim at this exclusively. As we have seen, a 'free' education given to 'free' men must also include subjects that are learned in order to be able to enjoy certain activities for their own sake. All this he argues (implicitly) against Plato, who vigorously defended a musical education which only aims at moral improvement. (We may even see in the last sentence just quoted—'It is completely inappropriate for magnanimous and free people to be always asking what use something is'—a rather harsh, ironic rebuttal of Plato). But this passage may also help us to grasp what Aristotle may have hinted at when saying that music for διαγωγή is music for intelligence. Indeed the reason why children must learn drawing is because acquiring that skill will help them to contemplate beautiful bodies properly; they will thus become good judges who will properly appreciate the beauty of bodies. Since this is to be taken as an analogy of musical education, one should conclude that musical education must be taken as helping citizens to enjoy the beauty of music properly. 'Beauty', as Aristotle states in his *Metaphysics*, consists essentially in order, symmetry, and definiteness (*Met.* M 3, 1078a36–b1). We can infer then that the way music for διαγωγή must be enjoyed just consists in that: the intellectual enjoyment of its order, symmetry, and definiteness.[18]

[18] I presented an ancestor of this paper at the Oxford meeting that Armand D'Angour and Tom Phillips organized in July 2014. I am very grateful to them for their kind invitation, and to them and their audience for their comments. Special thanks are due to Andrew Barker for his very challenging critiques of some of my views (to which I hope to have responded in a convincing way), and to David Creese and the Editors for their insightful suggestions on a penultimate version of this chapter.

9

Sounds You Cannot Hear

Cicero and the Tradition of Sublime Criticism

James I. Porter

> Is it her singing that enchants us, or is it not rather the solemn silence that envelops her weak little voice?
>
> F. Kafka, 'Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse'

I want in this essay to sketch out a convergence of interests that at first glance may seem unlikely: between Cicero's treatise *Orator* and Greek euphonistic literary criticism, between Platonism and materialism, and between the sound of the voice and the sound of a voice you cannot hear. My aim will be to show how these specific contrasts end up flowing into a theory of the sublime that has significant parallels with the treatise *On the Sublime* attributed to Longinus. My triple thesis, which is both historical and conceptual, runs as follows. It is that the Longinian sublime is constituted in part by a synthesis of the very contrastive sources I just named; that both Cicero and the euphonist critics known as the *κριτικοί*, who are reported by Philodemus before him, anticipate central aspects of Longinus' theory; and finally that Cicero may be dependent on the *κριτικοί* for part of his theory but not necessarily for the convergences just described. That is, the *κριτικοί* arrive the same point, at the same supreme aesthetic value as Cicero arrives at in his *Orator*, but by way of an opposite route. He takes the high road of Platonism, they take the low road of linguistic materialism; but they meet in the same place, in a theory of the sublime, which presses the limits of language and of aesthetic and rhetorical theory to a radical extreme.

One upshot of this kind of pressure being applied to limits of language, aesthetics, and rhetoric is that language is driven into a realm that resembles music more than words, a condition that in the cultures of Greece and Rome is regularly expressed by the notion that prose, which is spoken, comes to resemble poetry, which is sung. The voice has a 'musicality' of its own that is consistently enchanting and often sublime.[1] Another is that silence plays a greater role than can be imagined, both in the production and reception of sound. On the receiving end of things, what one does *not* hear is as important as what one hears: in such cases imagination overtakes listening. On the producing end of things, sounds *disguise* the process of sound-production: here, art is the art of dissimulating an experience of sound that has no obvious correlate in the sounds that go into the experience.

These complications of the auditory experience were well known among critics and rhetoricians, who regularly analysed and exploited the fact that some of the most compelling listening experiences rest on inaudible foundations, on sounds you cannot hear. The same can be said of the musical theorists who paved the way for later theories of the read and spoken voice: sound made rhythmic is constituted by intervals that cannot strictly be heard. I believe that these insights are rooted in the song cultures of antiquity themselves starting with Homer, for example in his description of the Sirens, whose seductive songs are never actually heard, let alone reported. In the place of sound or song, what the Sirens offer is the *promise* of song. And therein lies their seductive allure, and their unsurpassed sublimity.[2]

At most a sketch of the argument will be possible here. I will begin with Cicero, who sets up the problem, and then I will turn to the euphonist critics known to us from Philodemus as *οἱ κριτικοί*. Longinus will be appearing backstage and in the wings throughout.

[1] Gorgias was one of the first to explore this possibility, but he was by no means the first. See Arist. *Rh.* 3.1–9. On the history of 'the music of the voice' in antiquity, see Porter (2010) ch. 6.

[2] *Odyssey* 12.184–201. See Salecl (1998) ch. 3, esp. 60–1, for a powerful reading of the Sirens as a condensed emblem of the sublime voice of Homer's poetry *tout court*—a point that was firmly grasped by Kafka in his extraordinary parable 'The Silence of the Sirens' (reprinted in Steiner and Fagles, eds. (1962) 98–9). Further, Vermeule (1979) 203; Pucci (1979); (1987) 209–13; Schur (2014). It is noteworthy that a number of the visual depictions of the Sirens from antiquity show them playing musical instruments (a lyre or a syrinx) rather than singing.

CICERO'S IDEAL ORATOR

Cicero's *Orator* (46 BCE) opens with a quandary that it subsequently circles around. The request by Marcus Junius Brutus for a fuller account of the *summus* and *perfectus orator* prompts in Cicero the following reflection: How can we tell what is the best form of oratory given the variety of good orators in the world? What is it about them all that makes them good? The quandary conceals a paradox: what they share exists in no concrete orator; the perfection that they variously exhibit is incomplete except in an ideal form that appears nowhere empirically; and it is in virtue of this ideal that we judge existing orators to be good (that is, as less than perfect).[3] Unless Cicero can provide an account of the ideal form of oratory, the general standard for judging orators will appear arbitrary. If he succeeds, how will any aspiring orator not be discouraged from inevitably falling short? (3).

Let us look more closely at the paradox that lies at the heart of *Orator*, as this is announced in section 7: 'in delineating the perfect orator *I shall be portraying such a one as perhaps has never existed.* Indeed I am not inquiring who was the perfect orator, but what is the unsurpassable ideal which *seldom if ever appears throughout a whole speech but does shine forth* (*eluceat*) *at some times and in some places, more frequently in some speakers, more rarely perhaps in others.* But I am firmly of the opinion that nothing of any kind is so beautiful as not to be excelled in beauty by that of which it is a copy, as a mask is a copy (*imago*) of a face.' Cicero's ideal of the *summus orator* is Platonic philosophically speaking but not aesthetically speaking (10: *has rerum formas appelat ἰδέας . . . magister Plato*).[4] It is an idea that leads the mind to ever higher heights of aesthetic imagination, not to the abandonment, *à la* Plato, of the aesthetic domain in the name of a

[3] *Quaeris . . . quod eloquentiae genus probem maxime et quale mihi videatur illud, quo nihil addi possit, quod ego summum et perfectissimum iudicem* (*Or.* 3); cf. 55. I follow Kroll's revised text of Jahn (Kroll (1913)) and Hubbel's Loeb translation. Similarly, Quint. 1.1.19: 'Such a person has perhaps never yet existed; but that is no reason for relaxing our efforts to attain the ideal (*ad summa tendendum est*)'; tr. Russell.

[4] It is no doubt this odd disjunction that causes Kroll in his commentary (1913) to berate Cicero for sloppy philosophizing; see Kroll *ad Or.* 8, where he calls the appeal to Platonism 'feuilletonistisch'.

metaphysical one. But Cicero's ideal is Platonic in a further sense: it leads the mind to abandon the senses and every sensuous image of beauty in the very imagination of a more perfect aesthetic beauty. Confronted with a statue of Phidias or a painting by Apelles, no matter how unsurpassed these may seem, we can always 'imagine (*cogitare*) something more beautiful'. What we see is what the artist saw. We view the vision he had. And the content of that vision is an 'intellectual ideal,' a *cogitata species*, or a mental form (9).

This last move neatly saves Cicero from a circularity. Or else it defers it. Instead of having to explain how it is that we can judge any one work of art according to a standard that no work of art physically embodies, he only needs to explain how it happens that artists and viewers come to have in their minds the same ideal standards of beauty. For that, we have to consult Plato and the later Academy;[5] Cicero takes us no further. But he is not out of the woods yet. The ideal is an idea because it exists only in the mind. But as Cicero says, the ideal, *illud quo nihil esse possit praestantius*, 'does shine forth (*eluceat*) at some times and in some places, more frequently in some speakers, more rarely perhaps in others'. This is perhaps a contradiction. But it is this stance, I want to suggest, that brings Cicero into contact with Longinus.

The Longinian sublime manifests itself in the same erratic and fitful way as Cicero's ideal: it is never seen but only glimpsed. Unlike 'experience in invention and ability to order and arrange material', which 'cannot be detected in single passages', sublimity, Longinus writes, 'produced at the right moment (*καιρίως*), tears everything apart like a thunderbolt, and exhibits the orator's complete power at a single blow (*εὐθὺς ἀθρόαν δύναμιν*) and with a single sublime stroke (*ἑνὶ ὕψει*)' (*Subl.* 1.4; 36.2).[6] Invention and arrangement are imperceptible at a glance because they require a long view of the whole. Sublimity is a quality of style that appears (*ἐκφαινομένην*) in moments (*ἐκ ἑνὸς ἢ ἐκ δυεῖν*); it can *only* 'be detected in single passages'. But it appears so suddenly, so overwhelmingly, and so blindingly as to be felt more than perceived: to use a Longinian metaphor, *ὕψος* hides, so to speak, in its own light, in its very own effulgence (cf. 15.11; 17.2).

[5] See Long (1995) for Cicero's philosophical credentials.

[6] Translations of Longinus are from Russell, in Russell and Winterbottom (1972), with occasional adaptations, as here.

If ὕψος cannot be 'perceived,' what are its recognizable features? And through what faculty can it be 'detected'? Longinus' treatise *On the Sublime* (περὶ ὕψους) is an attempt to answer these questions. And it exhibits some of the very same paradoxes that Cicero's treatise on the sublime orator does. In fact, in his odd conjoining of Platonism and oratory, Cicero will help us to identify more closely what it is about the sublime that is so peculiarly constitutive of it.

Both authors are describing, in effect, a kind of beauty that lies beyond the senses, but one that, they allow, can only be imagined or felt through the senses. Longinus will emphasize, for instance, that sublimity, though it is detectable only at moments, nonetheless endures beyond the moment by virtue of its impact on the mind and the memory: what 'endures only for the moment of hearing (ἀκοῆς) is not really sublime . . . Real sublimity contains much food for reflection (ἀναθεώρησις), is difficult or rather impossible to resist, and makes a strong and ineffaceable impression on the memory' (7.3). It is a φαντασία (7.1). Sublimity has the quality of an experience that is anchored in a literary moment (*this* text *here*), yet its true legitimation comes in the repeatability of that experience in a reader's mind. The sublime is, at least in its pretensions, textually idiosyncratic and canonically universal.[7] Both aspects are essential to the ever elusive sublime, which reflects in its core the instabilities of its momentary anchorage (cf. 2.2).

Sublimity is not something you can hear, nor is it simply a matter of meaning, because it exists beyond the dimensions of both. 'Sublimity', Longinus writes, 'is an echo (ἀπήχημα) of a noble mind.' And echoes are both fleeting and uncertain, and an attenuation of sound (καὶ φωνῆς δίχα). For Longinus, sublimity resides in Ajax's *silence* in the Underworld, in the words he fails to speak (9.1), or in Sappho's 'broken tongue' (10.2), or in the interrupted syntax of Demosthenes' periods (ὑπερβατά; 18; 22), or else in the larger periodicities of the physical world that gape terrifyingly and sublimely in the imagination (9.5–8, 35.3–4). It is its character as ἀπήχημα, as 'irresistible' emotion, shock, and grandeur (πάθος, ἔκπληξις, and μέγεθος), that renders the Longinian literary sublime, in its irrationality, irreducible to sound or to meaning. ὕψος has a greatness that is greater than either; and it is disclosed in the gap, which Longinus never wearies of pointing to,

[7] See Porter (2001).

that yawns fitfully between the two orders of sound and meaning. The idea (ἔννοια) evoked by Ajax is expressed nowhere: it merely illuminates the Homeric passage in which it occurs with a diffuse light. That light, as Longinus elsewhere more readily concedes, is the light of the voice (φράσις) that 'illuminates thought' (30.2). And well-turned language, on Longinus' axiology, is 'man's natural instrument': it 'penetrates not only the ears but the very soul' (39.3). With this last comment, Longinus is getting at the realm of what he calls the 'conceptions (ἰδέας) of words, thoughts, objects, beauties, and harmonies' (39.3), by which he is designating not these things, but their sublime echo (their ἰδέαι). The terminology is faintly Platonic, but the application is un-Platonic. And this wavering evocation of Plato is exactly paralleled in Cicero, as we just saw. Let us look a little closer at Cicero's position.

Confronted with the task of drawing up an account of perfect eloquence, Cicero's problem is not just the question of how anyone can have 'a mental picture (*species*) of eloquence' (19), but the conundrum of how anyone can *imagine sound*. In setting up a Platonic ideal of the orator Cicero is establishing a paradox, the paradox of sound you cannot hear but can only imagine, for the ideal, he writes, 'cannot be perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can nevertheless grasp it by the mind and the imagination' (*quod neque oculis neque auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potest, cogitatione tamen et mente complectimur*, 8). What is the Platonic idea of sound or of the voice? Perhaps there is such a thing, although I have to confess I do not quite know what it could signify except in a pejorative and spectral sense, as in the case of the 'Protean' voice that is exemplified by Ion or Gorgias (*Ion* 541e; Gorgias, *Helen*). Of course, a Platonic ideal of rhetoric is by itself something of a contradiction in terms. One need only think of Plato's strictures on the correct speaker (ὁ ὀρθῶς λέγων) in Book 3 of the *Republic*: 'variations' in the voice of the 'correct' speaker 'are not to be great': harmonic and rhythmic modulations, accomplices of mimetic effects, are to be reduced to a bare minimum, and so on (397b). Similar restrictions are laid on the musical voice in the same work, e.g. at 399d, where polyharmonic modalities and modulations are criticized. The target here, as Mladen Dolar says, is not the voice as heard but 'the voice beyond words': 'the wind instruments [discussed by Plato] have the vicious property that they emancipate themselves from the text, they are substitutes for the voice as the voice beyond

words'.[8] It is precisely this separation that is spectrally represented by the euphonist theories to be considered below. The 'Protean' voice of rhetoric must be rejected. Plato requires a 'rift (*discidium*) between the tongue and the intellect', as Crassus puts it in *De oratore*. Cicero will have none of this Platonic rift, which he calls 'absurd' in that same work: *absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendum* (3.61).

In contrast to Plato, Cicero's ideal of oratory is emphatically and richly *vocal*. Indeed, only the orator's utterances are speech in the proper and full sense of the word (*Or.* 61–4). We might say that Cicero gets around Plato's strictures by turning them inside out. Instead of letting the Protean voice go, he sets out to capture and identify it completely (and all the *vocis mutationes* [55]), in part by describing it and in part by idealizing it. He makes of the voice a Platonic Form, the *forma eloquentiae* (19; cf. 100: 'we have him now, Brutus, the man whom we are seeking, but in imagination, not in actual possession [*sed animo non manu*]'). And that is a paradox, leading to a crucial tension in his programme.[9] Instead of minimizing the phenomenal voice and reducing it to its perfect yet abstract form as Plato does, Cicero goes the other way: his goal is to translate the phenomenal voice into its perfected ideal without sacrificing any of its palpable qualities. For Cicero, the logic of perfect oratory is one of absolute excess, but it is an excess *of* vocality—its extrapolated ideal. Faced with Phidias or with verses of Homer, 'we can, in spite of their beauty, imagine (*cogitare*) something more beautiful'. And further: 'With our ears we catch only the copy', but 'with our minds we conceive the ideal of perfect eloquence' (10). These copies do not shed their phenomenal richness. Rather, they point to an even greater richness than they can ever contain. Cicero is in effect establishing a Platonic idea (or ideal) of inaudible music, of music you cannot hear, of sound that exists beyond sound, of what might be called *the sublime form of the voice in all of its phenomenal richness*. I want to dwell a little on this idea and ideal of the sublime voice, not because of its intrinsic interest alone, but because of the curious fact about Cicero's treatise, namely that in spite of its idealizing tendency, it goes on to devote a good part of itself to the phenomenon of the voice and its sound, to the radical meaning of *eloquentia* and of *ῥητορική* (and *Orator* is in this respect unique amongst his rhetorical

[8] Dolar (2006) 45–6.

[9] Cf. Panofsky (1924) 6 and Long (1995) 50–2.

writings). The orator's mouth is always open, even if it only utters ideal words.

Cicero is in search of the ideal of the *empirical* voice. As he himself acknowledges, we cannot take his search in a literal way: 'for it is not an eloquent *person* (*eloquentem*) about whom I speak, nor anything subject to death and decay (*neque quicquam mortale et caducum*), but that absolute quality (*illud ipsum*), the possession of which makes a man eloquent. And this is nothing but eloquence itself (*eloquentia ipsa*), which we can behold only with the mind's eye' (101; tr. adapted).[10] The very purity of the object searched for marks it as Platonic, though the meaning of 'Platonic' here has changed considerably. Cicero is in search of the immortal (and sublime) quality of the voice beyond the voice, that which was the common lure of poets, rhetors, and literary critics in antiquity, and not simply the musicality of the voice that would cause Strabo to say that pedestrian prose writing, denuded of poetic adornments and metre, is like speech that has stepped down from a certain height (*ἀπὸ ὕψους τινός*) onto the ground (1.2.6), but that *je ne sais quoi* which renders the voice seem somehow more than itself, what Cicero calls 'that breath of life (*spirit [us] anim[i]*) which usually makes . . . passages seem more impressive when spoken than when read' (130).

In pursuing this elusive object, Cicero is inserting himself into a long-standing tradition that is old as Greek literature. The gap between the voice and its fullest realization is named as early as Homer and Hesiod, as Derek Collins has shown. Hesiod distinguishes between *ὄσσα*, which is the divine voice, from *κλέος*, *ἀοιδή*, or *αὐδή*, which are its translations into humanly intelligible language.[11] The familiar Homeric contrast between divine and human names suggest this kind of distinction already, as does the example of the Sirens who were mentioned above. Collins makes the further intriguing claim, which is speculative but just possibly true, that divine *ὄσσα* has no sound for humans at all: it is a sound we cannot hear, and a sublime one at that. A secular, philosophical version of this paradox is found in Gorgias' conception (or conceit) of *λόγος* as a purely theoretical entity that is without echo or resonance.[12] 'If *ossa* is the dynamic and

[10] Kroll *ad loc.* notes the Platonic allusion of 'mind's eye'.

[11] Hes. *Th.* 10, 22, and 31; cf. *Hom.h.Herm* 4.443–4; Collins (1999).

[12] Porter (1993) 287 with nn. 53 and 289. Cf. Pucci (1977) 28, cit. Collins (1999) 250 n. 24.

powerful sound of voice, a quality that only divine singing can control as beautiful song, . . . *opa*, names the pleasing or affecting qualities of voice, . . . especially the musical sound or tone of [a singer's] voice.'[13] In a word, the poet's voice, fashioned after divine voice through *afflatus*, *always promises something more than what you can hear or comprehend*: this 'more' is the voice's sublime quality. The critics analysed in the present essay study the residual echoes of this quality in a post-Homeric world. It is this search that brings Cicero into contact with the *κριτικοί* before him and with Longinus after him, that is, with the tradition of sublime criticism. These critics, I am contending, were among the very few in antiquity who showed themselves willing to confront this elusive quality of the voice in a direct, theoretical way. When Cicero says that Demosthenes 'does not always satisfy my ears, so greedy and insatiate are they and so often do they yearn for something *vast and boundless* (*aliquid immensum inifinitumque*)', he is expressing a desire that is common to all these theorists of the sublime voice (104; 130).

It is quite likely that Cicero has derived his theory of the voice from the so-called *κριτικοί*, or Hellenistic euphonist literary critics known to us only from Philodemus in large part by way of Crates of Mallos. Like Crates, they posited the faculty of hearing—'the ear'—as the supreme arbiter of literary excellence (hence their name, '*κριτικοί*').[14] At the very least, both Cicero and the euphonists, Crates and his *κριτικοί*, are dipping into the same well, as Wilhelm Kroll was the first to observe.[15] Let us rehearse briefly some of the hard evidence for this connection before considering some of its implications.

CICERO AND THE *KPITIKOI*

Cicero refers to literary critics once, approvingly, as reductive euphonists, according to whom poets *vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt* (68).[16] These are in all likelihood the *κριτικοί* named by Philodemus. Cicero's own theory, insofar as it treats of sound, is similarly (that is,

[13] Ford (1992) 176. Cf. ibid., 184–95, detailing further sublime aspects of divine speech evoked through mortal poetry.

[14] Porter (1995a). [15] Kroll (1907); Pohl (1968).

[16] See Maslowski (1978).

reductively) euphonistic. He appears to be translating the Hellenistic theory into Roman rhetoric, though probably he is not the first.[17] Like the κριτικοί, Cicero values aural pleasure (*voluptas aurium*) as the goal of oratory in its character as sound that is heard. And this is linked for both Cicero and the κριτικοί to the psychagogic effects of oratory (*Or.* 203; 168).[18] Like the κριτικοί, he credits the ear, not the mind, with the capacity to judge stylistic qualities (*aures sunt iudices*; *iudicat enim sensus*) (162; 183),[19] and these include not only euphonious qualities but compositional ones at the level of the period and even at the level of meaning, for these are linked: 'the *ear* expects the words to bind the sentence and its meaning (*sententia*) together' (168).[20] This is a powerful statement and not at all at odds with the claim made by some of the κριτικοί that it is the ear and not the mind that judges meaning. Cicero's statement merely subordinates the effects of meaning to the instrumentality of sound, for as Crates would say, meaning reaches the mind *as* sound.[21] Is meaning, for Cicero, apprehensible through 'the mind's eye'? Perhaps in some contexts, but not those in which style (φράσις) and the voice are preeminent, 'for to present ideas without order and rhythm in the language is to be speechless (*infantia* [*est*]) (236).

Again, as with the κριτικοί, the sense of hearing is in charge of judging (literally, of 'knowing') rhythm, the criterion of which is aural pleasure (*voluptas*) and not abstract reason (*ratio*) (162; 183). Further, euphony is one of the functions of the art of joining words together, σύνθεσις (149), and Cicero knows that μετάθεσις is the experiment by which the euphonic qualities of σύνθεσις can be appraised on a sound-based aesthetics (81; 84).[22] On the other hand, euphonic qualities are various, and the κριτικοί appear to have been inconsistent in their location of these: are aural pleasure and poetic quality to be found in the μετάθεσις, in the supervenient euphony, or in the supervenient rhythm?[23] The problem was hotly

[17] Rightly, Kroll, *ad* 149: 'während Cic. hier nur an diesen [sc., an den Klang] denkt', in contrast to Theophrastus' doctrine of 'aesthetically pleasing words' (καλὰ ὀνόματα).

[18] See e.g. Phld. *Poem.* 1 Janko cols 109, 133, 159, 161–2, 166, 209. All future references to *On Poems* 1 are to Janko's edition = Janko (2000).

[19] Cf. *Or.* 68, 149, 153, 162, 168, 199, 202–3.

[20] Cf. Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.146 on the role of the ear; and cf. Aristid. 2.248.21 (*ap.* Kroll *ad loc.*).

[21] Porter (1995a) 93–9. Cf. Porter (1989) 156 nn. 43 and 46.

[22] Porter (1995b) 143 n. 138.

[23] Porter (1989) 174–5 ('Appendix A'); Porter (1995a) esp. 100–4.

debated, as Philodemus' writings indicate (see below). Cicero knows of this problem, too (*Or.* 181–2):

> Is this rhythmical effect in prose produced solely by rhythm or also by a certain harmonious arrangement and by the character of the words (*vel compositione quadam vel genere verborum* [translating, in effect, *ποίᾳ τινι συνθέσει ἢ ποίᾳ τινι λέξει*])? Or does each have its own particular field, so that rhythm appears in time intervals, harmonious arrangement in sounds, and the character of the words appear as a certain beauty and embellishment of style? Is harmonious arrangement the source of all and does this produce rhythm and the so-called figures and embellishments of style, which, as I have said, the Greeks call *σχήματα*? But as a matter of fact these three are not identical [. . .]. Harmonious arrangement differs from both because it is wholly concerned with the dignity and charm of words (*vocum*) [viz., words *qua* pleasurable sound; see *voce iucundum* in the ellipsis above].

Finally, in taking a stand on the apparent debate over analogy and anomaly, Cicero takes up the cause of anomaly, as the debate has been misdescribed, or rather (in his own terms), the cause of conventionality.[24] And like Crates before him, the empirical sense of hearing, refined through practice (*τριβή*), is the arbiter of such questions too.[25] Analogously, euphonism for both Crates and Cicero is not grounded in nature, as one might expect (and as the Stoics might be imagined to argue), but in custom, convention, habit, and art. And so when Cicero says, 'I am glad to follow custom which favours the ear', or that 'custom, untaught, is . . . an artificer of sweet sounds', he is restating this radical plank of the euphonist program (157; 161; cf. 172). In a nutshell, the core of Cicero's theory of sound gives us the core of the doctrines dear to the *κριτικοί* and known to us only through Philodemus.[26]

There are, to be sure, differences. Cicero's ideal orator is not a mouthpiece of euphonism, and his treatise is intended as a complete account of the art of rhetoric: 'no essential topic will be omitted' (54). And so, in Cicero we find inclusions and concessions (say, to meaning) that at first sight are incompatible with the radical euphonism of

[24] On the alleged analogy/anomaly controversy, see Blank (1982).

[25] Porter (1995a) 93.

[26] Being 'untaught' means being a 'natural' resource, and does not preclude the conventions of art, instruction habituation, and practice (in the language of the euphonists: *τριβή*, *τέχνη*, and the like). See *Or.* 51 (p. 215 at n. 32 below); *Or.* 58 (p. 216 below).

the *κριτικοί*, which subordinates sense to sound (e.g. *Or.* 236). So far as we know, the euphonist critics who value sound over meaning do not advocate the study of 'the older logic of Aristotle, or the newer logic of Chrysippus' as a foundation to rhetoric or its evaluation, the way Cicero does—though he is admittedly overstating his case for the sake of dignifying his ideal: his orator must exhibit 'greater clarity' than even a philosopher! (115–17). On the other hand, it isn't at all clear that Crates' definition of the *κριτικός* eliminates such knowledge from his own ideal of the 'perfected art of grammar' (*ἡ ἐντελὴς γραμματική*), which is to say 'criticism' (*κριτική*).[27] Cicero's insistence on decorum is likewise a convention that radical euphonism dispenses with more readily.[28] But Cicero's position is no less radical than that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Comp.* 11, 38.13–15 or *Dem.* 47, in both passages applying musical terminology to the irrational effects of spoken sound), or than Longinus', who holds that sublime effects 'depend as much on the harmony [viz., *σύνθεσις*] as on the thought [i.e., "meaning"]' (39.3). On the other hand, when it comes to effects of sound, *decorum* simply means whatever is appropriate to and conducive to aural pleasure or other aesthetic effects, and on this score we find complete agreement among the *κριτικοί* too.

Even here, some of the apparent differences evaporate on closer inspection. 'No word has force apart from a thing' Cicero says at one point, but then he quickly adds that the rejection or approval of a word crucially depends on the way it is expressed (72). It isn't clear that a *κριτικός*, apart from Heracleodorus, wouldn't agree with either half of this statement. Certainly Crates would: it is 'not the sound itself without the sense' but the two 'combined' that enchant a reader, even if sound is aesthetically preeminent. Meanwhile, allegorical meanings have a force that is all their own; they simply coexist with sounds on a distinct level of appreciation that may nonetheless be enhanced by euphonic considerations.[29] Still, Cicero typically shows a casualness towards meaning, whose criterial value he readily acknowledges, unlike the *κριτικοί*, who do not, at least in our experience of them. Thus, 'the individual word wins approval which has the best sound (*optime sonat*) *or* best expresses the idea' (80). Similarly, 'the

[27] Sext. *M* 1.44, cf. 79: 'the whole range of linguistic science (*λογικὴ ἐπιστήμη*)'; 248: *κριτική*.

[28] Cf. Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 46.

[29] Porter (1995a) 96–8; Porter (1992) 111–13.

audience notice these two things and find them pleasurable—the words *and* ideas' (197). But even here, he follows up this last thought with another worthy of Crates (but also paralleled in Longinus): attention to 'words and ideas' causes inattention to rhythm; and rhythm intensifies the pleasure taken in words and ideas (197–8). This is a corollary of the theme, familiar from Crates, of 'distraction' or *τὸ ἀποσπᾶν*: sound distracts from sense, typically by isolating the sound and focusing all of one's aesthetic attention, though in some cases distraction can enhance the apprehension of meaning in such a way that permits us to say, not that we understand meaning, but that we '*hear*' how meaning *sounds*.[30]

Cicero can make such claims because in the last analysis 'the whole essence of oratory is to embellish (*illuminare*) meaning' (136; cf. 44 and 236). Embellishment takes precedence: Cicero's values can be read off the relative weight that he gives to his topics, which is visible in the amount of space that he allots to each. His discussion of sonority (*elocutio*) takes up the greater bulk, a good three-quarters, of *Orator*. The first two parts of oratory (invention and arrangement of subject matter) he dispatches in a few sections, eagerly turning to questions of style and expression understood in their relation to sound[31] (the former 'require less art and labour,' 51),[32] thus replicating the biases of the *κριτικοί* and, as we saw earlier, of Longinus too. It is only natural that whenever due attention is paid to musical embellishments and for as long as it is, the aural dimension tends to subordinate meaning, morals, and other considerations: it points to a purely aesthetic dimension. For as Dionysius says, in defiance of Plato (*Rep.* 3.398d9; 400d11–e1), 'music requires that the words should be subordinate to the melody and not the melody to the words' (*Comp.* 11, 41.18–19). This claim is not as radical as the thesis that sound powerfully distracts from the sense, but neither is it incompatible with it.

Some of the differences between Cicero and the *κριτικοί* are to be explained by differences in object: the *κριτικοί* are mainly literary critics (it is in this context that he names them, if that is what he is doing), though they frequently extend their principles to oratory, which they then tend to treat as a kind of poetry, as will Cicero and

[30] Porter (1995a) 94–5. Cf. *Subl.* 41.2: '. . . just as songs distract an audience from the action and compel attention for themselves (*ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφέλκει καὶ ἐφ' αὑτὰ βιάζεται*)'.

[31] *Or.* 162; cf. 149, and *passim*.

[32] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 34.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus later.[33] What is remarkable, on the other hand, is the extent to which Cicero integrates the lessons of literary euphonist criticism into his views on rhetorical theory, effectively bracketing and suspending the issue of subject matter. The reason is to be found in the common starting-point of their inquiries: 'the voice possesses a marvellous quality (*mira natura*)' (57); it has a musicality to it ('even in speech, there is a sort of singing [*cantus*]'): 'therefore let art follow the leadership (*ducem*) of nature in pleasing the ear' (58).

We can overhear in this last claim Crates' similar claim about the ἡγεμονία of sounds in critical judgement.[34] 'Certainly natural excellence of voice is to be desired', Cicero holds in protest against Plato, and 'the superior orator will therefore vary and modulate his voice; now raising and now lowering it, he will run through the whole scale of tones' (59). Some of this is a commonplace in rhetorical discourse: even Aeschines discusses ὁ τόνος τῆς φωνῆς in Demosthenes, meaning Demosthenes' use of pitches.[35] What the antiquity of the topos points to are the common sources of literary and rhetorical criticism in the ancient theory of music and of poetry as music, which is to say the reciprocal influences of musical theory on poetic theory and vice versa, a point that has been made in the past but which is too easily neglected, though the tide is slowly turning.[36] We would do well to recall Westphal's prophetic reminder from 1861: 'A further reason for the neglect of rhythm [in modern scholarship] lies in the *erroneous notion that the writings of the ancient rhythmicists are primarily*

[33] Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 199, where Heracleodorus treats Demosthenes, Xenophon, and Herodotus as poets, not as prose writers. Cf. Nardelli (1983) 108. Cic. *Or.* 67 (on Plato and Democritus) and 37–8 and 183 (for the general principle); Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 24, 121.10–21; *Comp.* 26, 135.20–136.4. (All references to Dionysius are to Usener–Radermacher's edition.)

[34] Phld. *Poem.* 5 col. 16.5 Mangoni; *Poem.* 1 cols 114.14 and 132.19; *Poem.* 2, *P. Herc.* 994 col. 21.23 N = Tr. A col. 21 Sbordone; cf. 994 col. 25.4 N = Tr. A col. 25 Sbordone. References to treatises ('Tr.') A, B, and C are to Sbordone (1976), with Arabic numerals replacing Sbordone's Roman numerals. See Westphal (1861) 21 on the figure of the ἡγεμών, or the 'tactangebender Musikdirector'.

[35] *In Ctesiph.* 209–10. A slow evolution in the poetical and musical tradition is suggested by later allusions to, e.g. Pratinas, who speaks of the 'tense' and the 'relaxed' ἁρμονία (Ath. 624f).

[36] Kroll (1907); Costil (1949); Pohl (1968); Porter (1989) 174 n. 139; Janko (2000) 173. Interest in aural aesthetics in classics and elsewhere is resurgent. See the essays by Page and Dillon in Jaeger, ed. (2010); Dillon (2012); Butler (2015); Steiner (2015); Gurd (2016); Butler and Nooter, eds (2017).

directed to music, and not to the rhythm of poetry as well.'[37] To underscore the point once again, it is the insistence on the musicality of language that is the driving inspiration of the euphonist analysis of poetry and of rhetoric, and which brings both to the brink of the sublime. The sublime, I want to suggest, names what is so problematic—but also completely defensible—about this insistence on the irrational aspects and effects of language.

Were there space, we would want to discuss the various sources shared by Cicero and the *κριτικοί*, starting with Hieronymus of Rhodes (fl. mid-third century CE), whom Cicero credits with the view that 'there is rhythm in prose', the same as 'those of poetry' (*Or.* 180; 166–7; 185),[38] and leading back to the earliest theories of the literary voice in Aristoxenus (whose rhythmic theory Cicero follows), and even prior to Aristotle (for example, Gorgias' pupil Licymnius), for instance the *ἁρμονικοί* mentioned by Plato, Aristotle, and Aristoxenus.[39] And we would want to consider what the *κριτικοί* made of rhythm (a subject about which we know too little).[40] We know that the *κριτικοί* made claims about *εὐρυθμία* parallel to their claims about euphony; they operated with a notion of the *σύνθεσις* of rhythms (*σύνθεσις τῶν ῥυθμῶν*); and they credited the ear with the capacity to judge the particulars (*κατὰ μέρος*) of rhythmic shapes.[41] Perhaps rhythm was treated in a missing section of *On Poems*.[42] This loss, if it is one, is greatly to be rued, because here we would undoubtedly have had a direct link to the work of the musicologists of the fifth and fourth centuries.[43] The connection to rhythm is a natural one; the later critics are after all trying to capture the 'music' of language, what

[37] Westphal (1861), 3; emphasis in original.

[38] On Hieronymus, see Porter (2010) 339–41.

[39] Arist. *Rh.* 3.2, 1405b6–8 with Porter (2010) 314–15. Arist. *Pol.* 8.5, 1339b18 shows that music theory had already been applied to the analysis of literary style (Kroll (1907) 93). On the fifth-century *ἁρμονικοί*, see Plat. *Rep.* 531a–b; Arist. *Po. An.* 78b–79a.

[40] See Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 101 (a glimpse only).

[41] Phld. *Poem.* 2, *P. Herc.* 1676 col. 3.2 = Tr. C col. 14 Sbordone; *P.Herc.* 994 fr. 19.7–13 N = Tr. A col. b Sbordone; Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 101.2–8 Janko.

[42] Cf. Phld. *Poem.* 1 cols 101 and 151 Janko; *Poem.* 5 col. 27.2 Mangoni.

[43] Heraclides of Pontus, treated by Philodemus, seems to be a mediator of fifth-century views of musicality in poetry (see n. 46 on Hippias) collected by Glaucus of Rhegium ([Plut.] *De mus.* 1131F and 1132E). Heraclides correlated musical and literary styles in his lost treatise, *On Music* (fr. 163 Wehrli). See Porter (1989) 166 at n. 94 and Janko (2000) 134–8 for discussion.

Dionysius calls, in a nice *συμπλοκή*, *τὸ τῆς μέλος φωνῆς*.[44] Still, given that the music of language is not exactly a property of language, because it is a quality that lies beyond language, we can never expect anything more than analogies, which is all that we in fact get.[45] Aristoxenus gives us the first clear attestation of such an analogy between the two kinds of *σύνθεσις*, musical and linguistic, although he was probably preceded by Hippias and others.[46] I would like to close by looking at one such analogy in Cicero, which will bring us back to Longinus and help to clarify the notion, which no doubt is still mysterious, of sound you cannot hear.

In section 187, Cicero writes the following: 'If one passage is constrained and choppy and another is diffuse and flowing, *this cannot proceed from the nature of the letters* [i.e., from their *sound*], but from the varied arrangement of long and short intervals (*intervallorum*); and since prose, which is an intertwining and blending of these intervals, is at times sedate, and at times rapid, such a phenomenon as this must depend on rhythm.' How does one hear rhythm? In rhetorical theory, intervals can variously stand for differences in pitch and tone, for differences in time, or for silent pauses.[47] *Intervalla* in

[44] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11, 43.5–6. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 48, 233.1–2 on tone and time (*μέλος καὶ χρόνος*) as generally characterizing whatever lies musically beyond the parts of speech.

[45] See e.g. *Dem.* 2: 'The style of Lysias . . . bears the same relation to that of Thucydides as the lowest to the highest note on the musical scale.' Cf. *Comp.* 11, 40.8–16.

[46] Aristox. *Harm.* 27.18–20 compares the construction of melody with the *synthesis* of letter-sounds in language, a striking predecessor to the *κριτικοί*. See Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11, *passim*, and esp. pp. 40.17–41.1 On Hippias, see DK 86A11 and 12 (Hippias was the first to inquire *περί τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν*). Isoc. *Antid.* 46–7 is explicit about the musicality of speech-making.

[47] *intervalla, distinctio, et vocis genera permulta* (Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.146), rendered by Pease (*ad loc.*) as 'differences of pitch . . . ; representing Greek *διαστήματα*'. Hubbell oscillates between 'differences of tone, of pitch, and of key'; and Pease adduces *De or.* 3.186 (*quod intervallis distinguuntur*), where '*distinctio* is apparently used of rhythm', but there is disagreement as to the meaning of *distinctio* and *intervallum* there too. Strangely neglected is a further meaning of 'pause'. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 38, 210.23–211.4, where temporal duration (*χρόνος*) is in the first instance not rhythmic but phonic (a gap of silence, a pause) that is filled in 'by musical and metrical writers' with semivowels so as to avoid harsh effects of hiatus and by rhetors with a pause (cf. *interpuncta intervalla, morae respirationesque delectant* at *Or.* 53). Of course, 'pause' (*ἀνάπαυσις*) could signify both silence and rhythmical gap-fillers in rhythmical theory (see e.g. Hermog. *Id.* 2, 259.25–260.3 Rabe, cit. by Kroll (1913) *ad Or.* 181). Finally, 'silences' occur between any two sounds that cannot be phonically blended, such as *ν* and *χ* in *ἐν χορόν* (*Comp.* 22, 101.12–21). Typically, the focus is not on letters

the present passage refers, however, to the *χρόνοι*, or quantities of time, of Aristoxenian rhythmic theory, whose proportional relations constitute rhythmical relations, and which (as Cicero says) have nothing to do with metrical feet (193–4).[48] The point here is that the ear, when it attends to rhythm, listens not to the absolute sound of letters or even of syllables but to proportions of time designated by the rhythmic pulses of arsis and thesis, that is, to *relations*.[49] Two features on this theory stand out: on the one hand, the minimal, indivisible character of the intervals (detectable and measurable only by the ear), a model with clear parallels in harmonic theory (*τὸ ἐλάχιστον τῶν συμφώνων διαστημάτων*) and in its close relative, the phonic differences of euphonic literary theory (*φυσικαὶ διαφοραί τῶν φώνων*),[50] and on the other what we may call the epiphenomenal or supervenient character of rhythm: like euphony, which supervenes on synthesis, rhythm emerges from the interplay of these quasi-abstract relational elements (durations of time) in varied proportions and tempos (viz., intervals), as an appearance (*φαντασία*) in the mind of the auditor.[51] And yet, what intervals signify, in rhetorical theory at least, are a threat of *rupture*.[52] And it is this play with gaps—first

(a poor rendering of *στοιχεῖα*) so much as it is on sounds that are characterized by *δυνάμεις*, viz. the chromatic elements of the voice; periods, in turn, are merely punctuations of the breath (*πνεῦμα*) (*Comp.* 22, 110.21–111.1).

[48] The distinction (mentioned at *Comp.* 17, 68.7–12) is pre-Aristoxenian. See Norden (1971 [1909–18]), 1:53 on this 'law' of rhythmic prose: 'die Rede darf nie metrisch, muß aber immer rhythmisch sein'.

[49] A point that Theophrastus would try to palliate. See Barker (1989) 111; and Theophrastus *ap.* Porph. *In Harm.* (Barker, (1989), 113 and 117). Cf. *Or.* 67 on measuring rhythmical qualities by the ear, in the way that Aristoxenus prescribed.

[50] Aristox. *Harm.* 20.7–8; Phld. *Poem.* 5, col. 27.20–9 Mangoni (Crates); Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 14, 49.1. The two terms *διάστημα* and *διαφορά* are conjoined in Polyb. 38.5.

[51] The language is remarkably stable over the centuries. See Aristox. *Harm.* 8.23 (*κατά γε τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασίαν*), 9.2–3; 10.11–21; 48.22, with Barker (2007), 143–4; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22, 110.8–9 (*. . . οὐκ ἐῶντα τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἑνὸς κώλου συνεχοῦς λαβεῖν φαντασίαν*); Porph. *In Harm.* 31.18–21 Düring: 'The notes, because they are closely successive [though bounded by 'gaps' (*διαστήματα*) that are "small and *cannot be apprehended* (*ἀκατάληπτα*)"] create *the appearance of a single sound* (*ἑνὸς ἤχου ποιοῦνται φαντασίαν*) stretched out over some amount of time' (tr. Barker (1989), 236). The language also appears in atomistic accounts of perception, e.g. Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 49; Lucr. *DRN* 4.794–8. The underlying idea goes back to the Presocratics' theories of perception. Cf. Theophr. *Sens.* 63 (Democritus); on Empedocles, see Porter (2010) 152–4. Further, Richter (1974) 279 with n. 58.

[52] *Comp.* 25, 109.14–20: juxtaposed vowels 'interrupt' the flow of sound, 'whereas it is continuous and smoothly blended sounds that produce an euphonious effect'.

among the elements of time or sound, for these are distinguished relatively and not absolutely, and then between these and their synthetic perception—that opens up the prospect of larger aesthetic effects. The point is that when you look for the sources of sound, what you find is a series of gaps. To put this in its most provocative form, we might say that sound is an arrangement of silent gaps.

GAPS

Longinus will make much of such gaps. As he writes about three verses from Euripides' lost *Antiope*, while establishing the critical remark that 'it is in the σύνθεσις rather than in the sense that Euripides' greatness appears,' 'the words are propped up by one another (they are ἐξερείσματα) and rest on the intervals (τῶν χρόνων) between them; set wide apart like that, they give the impression of solid strength' (40.3–4; tr. Russell).[53] As Russell glosses the meaning of σύνθεσις here, what is meant is 'putting the words together in an effective and euphonious order', that is, their ἁρμονία. The synaesthesia of the visual metaphor, which recalls Dionysius of Halicarnassus,[54] not only reflects the passage beyond linguistic perception of the sort we have been discussing throughout. It also rests on the translation of voice into time ('producing on the hearer the effect not of speech but of rhythm') and then into space (41.2).[55] Let us simply emphasize the concept of 'impression' and further ask ourselves how intervals *sound*. Such intervals, architectonic spacings 'that give rise

[53] Literally, 'with a view to,' hence: 'for the sake of creating the appearance of solid strength [or "grandeur"]' (πρὸς ἑδραῖον . . . μέγεθος).

[54] *Comp.* 22, 96.10–22 and esp. 20, 91.3–92.3 (see Porter (2016) 407). Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 38, 210.9–14. An ancestor for the construction-metaphor: Phld. *Poem.* 2, *P. Herc.* 994 cols 34–6 N = Tr. A cols 34–6 Sbordone (where εὐπαγές again figures). Such analysis, in addition to playing with (and estranging) the perceptual modes of aesthetic apprehension, lays emphasis on the constructed quality of the object that is being simultaneously presented as seamless. The passage from natural sound to art and technique (see p. 220–4) is already contained in the figure of built dimensions, indicating that no passage ever really occurs.

[55] The spatial and temporal dislocations can take on a further significance, namely as a reminder of the pastness and of the (broken) monumentality of the poems under consideration. This is the classicistic element of the euphonist agenda, on which see Porter (2005b).

to a delay (ἀναβολή) and interruption (ἐγκοπή) of the rhythm', are for Dionysius of Halicarnassus the hallmark of the austere style, for instance in Pindar and Aeschylus (*Comp.* 22). The sublime, by contrast, is not reducible to a style, for it is the quintessence of every style. It is their common impossibility.

Take the example of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. His ideal is a synthesis of austere and smooth styles, virtually acknowledged to be impossible.[56] But then so are all three kinds of synthesis: these are ideal, never purely instantiated (*Dem.* 37)—*as is euphony itself*. The point is rarely grasped, but Dionysius is remarkably explicit about this fact. In chapter 18 of *On the Composition of Words*, Dionysius speaks of rhythmic purity in its ideal form (κατ' εὐχήν): what he means is that pure and unadulterated euphony is a desideratum that is never met by language.[57] Elsewhere, the emphasis is on the artificial disappearance (ἀφανίζειν) of natural dysphony and the artificial appearance (φαίνεσθαι) of euphony (*Comp.* 18, 73.21; 16.67.3–14; 26.136.21).[58] The point is that euphonic σύνθεσις is in actual terms a *pis aller* relative to its ideal goal of perfect euphony. As a consequence, the ear must be *deceived* and *cheated* into an illusion or intimation of (impossible) euphony.[59] It is this recognition that gives the concept of οἰκονομία, the technical management of the appearances and effects of language, its fullest meaning.[60] The sublime is the height of this deception.

Dionysius is a special case who deserves to be treated separately. But where he shows himself to be a sublime critic is to be found in his most characteristic and culminating critical gesture: it is in his hunt for concealed phonic features, for instance *incomplete* metrical patterns, *missing* syllables and tempi, disguised resolutions, and the like, made so by writers who 'cause us to forget the metre' and 'prevent

[56] Cf. *Dem.* 37, 209.14–210.1; *Dem.* 50, 236.19–21; and *Comp.* 21, 95.14–96.1 (etc.) with Porter (2016) 220–3.

[57] Styles have no pure existence; they are always mixed, and hence named after a 'dominant'. So, e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 37, 209.14–210.1. This is true for Demetrius as well. See Porter (2016) 221–4; 259.

[58] Cf. *Comp.* 16, 67.3–4: 'we must try to cover up (ἀφανίζειν) the natural defects of the inferior letters by interweaving, mixing and juxtaposing', etc.

[59] Cf. on the smooth style, see *Comp.* 23, 111.18–112.17 and 113.16 on its quality of being 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλός), for the same reasons as outlined here.

[60] *Comp.* 18, 74.3, where the functions of οἰκονομεῖν ('arranging,' 'managing' compositional qualities) and διακλέπτειν ('cheating' or 'deceiving' the ear) are linked.

us from recognizing' the rhythm (*Comp.* 26, 136–7),[61] and which Dionysius' sharp ear can detect like few others and his pen can supply again, in a resounding demonstration of his point—that the music of language lies just below the threshold of what you can hear (*Comp.* 25). Cicero attests to the precedence of this critical manoeuvre.[62] But more broadly we might say that the mind's—or is it the ear's?—'completion' of missing sound is emblematic of the euphonistic phenomenon in general. At least in speech, which 'has no measures of rhythmical intervals [viz., beats] like those given by the piper [in poetry], the whole periodic form (*species*) of the sentence is rounded out and brought to a finish in a way which can be judged only by the pleasure of the ear' (*Or.* 198). The sound is never in itself complete; it is 'completed' in a *species*—an image—that exists only for a listening subject, one who strains after inaudible harmonies. It is in this potential for a missing element that listening becomes sublime and that rhetoric becomes (in Cicero's words) ideal.

The essence of euphony for Crates and the *κριτικοί* is likewise sublime, but with an interesting variation. For them, the pursuit of the unrivalled excellence of sound moves in two directions at once. The one is the search for pure sound, 'the sounds themselves' (*περὶ τῶν ἤχων αὐτῶν*), which is to say, *the purity of sound itself in its material and phenomenal character* (*Poem.* 1, col. 83). Literally taken, this route leads to a focus on *φωνήεντα*, that is, on self-sounding *vowels*, 'for nothing is supported upon these (*ἀπερεί|[δεται]*) but the sound itself (*αὐτὸς ὁ ἦχος*)' (col. 84.4–6). The radical autonomization of sound, beyond even the notion of 'simple sound' (*ἁπλῆ φωνή*),[63] beyond even the separation of sounds from their attached meanings,[64] and (optimally) involving the fewest physical strictures of the mouth (as Dionysius shows),[65] produces not only striking

[61] Cf. *Comp.* 25, 127.10–11: '. . . has concealed its identity (*πεποίηκεν αὐτὸ ἄσημον*)'. said of a resolved elision that disguises 'a complete elegiac pentameter'.

[62] *Or.* 67: 'For everything which can be measured by the ear, *even if it does not make a complete verse*—that is certainly a fault in prose—is called rhythm.' This shows that Dionysius' practice is inherited. A collection of trimeters from Isocrates' speeches (Spengel (1828) 153) shows that the practice was widespread; see Kroll (1913) *ad Or.* 190.

[63] Phld. *Poem.* 2, *P.Herc.* 994 fr. 20.25 N = Tr. A col. c Sbordone. See at n. 67 below.

[64] Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 114.10–15 and 115.1–3.

[65] *Comp.* 14, 50.12–52.13: vowels when long are the most attractive 'because they are sounded for a long time'; short vowels are inferior to long vowels 'because they lack volume (*ὅτι μικρόφωνά τε ἐστί*) and restrict the sound'; alpha is most open and *least supported* by the structure of the mouth; upsilon is the second to least euphonic of

architectural imagery, which underscores the limits to which euphonist description takes itself, but pure pleasure, and even ecstasy: 'it compels our nature to be exalted (*μεταιω[ρεῖσθαι)*'.[66] But this is the utopic domain of sonic fantasy. Pure sound as such, vocalic sound, does not exist in language. And so, 'if we add another of the letters' to the pure sound of a vowel 'difference' (*διαφορά*) invariably sets in; the mouth has to move and change its shape; gaps (interruptions) intervene.[67] The analytical pursuit of euphony is in fact a recognition of such differences in sonority, blent to a sphere of consonance on another level. The reason behind this insight is the recognition that language is the contingent effect of letters in synthesis: euphony lies beyond the reach of reality; it is an effect that paradoxically disguises its own impossibility. This insight, incidentally, is Platonic, but not exclusively so.[68]

Hence the second direction of the pursuit, which is holistic and systematic rather than vocalic: this is the study of sounds in combination, in euphonic clusters. What is recovered on this approach is the system of sounds in their joint complexity; but what is *lost* is precisely the vocalic purity of sound.[69] 'Just as in an instrument, and even more so in a bow, [so too] there will be no harmony *in the whole* (*τ[οῖς] ὅλοις*)' unless there is 'relaxation and tension' (so Crates, Phld. *Poem.* 1 cols 93–4). Crates' theory of *στοιχεῖα* on this second approach—and Crates generally seems to have theorized the teachings of his euphonist predecessors in a rigorous and novel way—is a view about the *relations* that obtain among the letters and the sound-effects thereby produced 'in the whole'. But we can go further, for his theory, I believe, is about the difference between letters as *στοιχεῖα* (strictly,

these vowels: the lips contract, the sound is choked and made 'thin'; iota is last, most restricting 'the column of breath' (*τὸν αὐλὸν τοῦ πνεύματος*), etc.

[66] Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 84.17–20 (Pausimachus, a *κριτικός*).

[67] *Poem.* 1 col. 84.7–9; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22, 104.3–6: 'The process of the mouth's altering from one shape to another that is neither akin to it nor like it entails a lapse of time, during which [or "by which" (Usener)] the smoothness and euphony of the arrangement is *interrupted* (*διίσταται*).'

[68] 'Audible sounds which are smooth and clear, and deliver a single series of pure notes (*τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος*), are beautiful not relatively to something else, but in themselves, and they are attended by pleasures implicit in themselves' (*Phlb.* 51d6–9; tr. Hackforth). Plato is doubtless re-characterizing prior euphonist theory, not innovating. He is also performing a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*, by reducing the idea of absolute sound to an inaudible extreme: sound becomes, *per impossibile*, its own Form. See Porter (2010), 88–9.

[69] Hence the recognition that all three kinds of synthesis are ideal, never purely instantiated; see at n. 56 and Pohl (1968) 151.

these *have no proper sound*; rather, they represent phonic possibilities, much like phonemes) and letters as sounded in discourse and organized in poems and poem-like sentences, whereby phonemes are 'realized' (ἀποτελεῖσθαι).[70] And yet, this second approach to euphony is likewise productive not merely of pleasure but of ecstasy, through a kind of Longinian compulsion (ἐνθουσιῶ; [ἐ]πικρ[α|τ]ῇ ἡμῶν).[71] Whence does the pleasure come? That is the mystery of (irrational) sound *beyond the rational system of sound*. Or else—to turn this the other way around—it is the search for *the hidden reasons* (αἴτιαι), the art and artistry, within the irrational effects of sound.[72] The sublimity of euphonic criticism lies precisely in this complementarity that never quite adds up. It is, so to speak, the 'gap' at the heart of this critical system.[73]

It never adds up because, we might say, sublimely born sound (εὐγενὴς φωνή)[74] borrows from the features of material sound even as it exceeds those features. For all its phenomenal immediacy, euphony is harder to trace back to its hidden causes than rhythm, which is at least patterned and mathematically so. The specificity of sound is elusively of the moment and 'punctual' (*this* sound *here*); it is grounded in its material coordinates but distributed over their σύνθεσις. Euphonic criticism is thus a science of the impossible; the theory is so highly staked upon the 'absolutism' of the poetic particular (the view that sound is ἴδιον, proper to its location, not κοινόν, or shared) that it becomes difficult to compare particular sounds with one another, let alone to discern their exact reach.[75] Dionysius' criticisms range over whole strophes at times, but he can also treat a 'combined'

[70] This is why there are disputes in antiquity as to just how many letters of the alphabet (viz., primary sounds) there are. See *Comp.* 14, 50.1–11; Sext. *M* 1.11; schol. Dion. Thrax, xl.6–8; xl.22; 32.25–33.5; 474.20–3; 496.17–18 Hilgard; and Porter (1989) 177, where the soundlessness of the 'elements' of euphonism is discussed—a forerunner to some of the thesis of the present essay.

[71] [ἐ]πικρ[α|τ]ῇ ἡμῶν: p. 225 below; ἐνθουσιῶ: *Poem.* 2, *P.Herc.* 994 col. 7.8 N = Tr. A col. 7 Sbordone; Phld. *Poem.* 1 cols 158.21 and 162.13 for θεάζειν and ἐνθεάζειν, verbs which justify Philodemus' calling his opponents Corybants in the hallowed tradition of Plato. See Porter (2016) 239–46 for a fuller discussion.

[72] See Phld. *Poem.* 1 col. 123.22–7.

[73] See Porter (1995b) 113; cf. Pohl (1968) 137.

[74] The phrase makes a phonetic pun on εὐφωνία, as Asmis (1992) 167 rightly points out.

[75] See n. 41.

sound as an *ἰδία φωνή*.[76] This leads to the problem of generalizing over cases (how can you compare two or more sounds if each lays an absolute claim on our attention?) and to the bias against rules (*θέματα*), which Cicero also resists (*Or.* 36; 43; 237), as does Longinus. On their view, there can be no science that governs absolute particulars. But the same insight also leads to a further problem—namely, that to pursue sound in its purity, as rigorously as the euphonist critics do, is nearly fatal to the object pursued. This danger affects all of sublime criticism, and is its ultimate allure.

There are other, more immediate but also more superficial connections to be made between the *κριτικοί* and the Longinian sublime. Sounds dominate us by arousing us to exaltation (*ἐ]πικρ[α|τ]ῇ ἡμῶν, εἰς ⌊τ⌋ὴν ἐπι⌊π⌋ρέπειαν ἀνακ[ι]νεῖν*)—so Crates (*Poem.* 1, col. 114.16–17).[77] Similarly Longinus, when he treats the fifth source of sublimity, *σύνθεσις* ('*ἁρμονία*'), which encompasses 'the combination and variety of sounds' and which can suggest (*κινοῦσαν*), if not *produce*, various ideas in the mind as well as effects of beauty and melody, 'charming' the hearer and holding complete domination over her mind (*ἡμῶν τῆς διανοίας ἐπικρατοῦσαν*, 39.3).[78] Crates' view that poetry must use the emotions as allies (*τοῖς δὲ*] *π‹ά›θεσιν* (Hausrath: *τοῖς δ'*] *ἤθεσιν* Janko) *συμμά|[χοις χρ]ῆσθαι τὴν πόη|σιν*) (*Poem.* 1 col. 132.21–3), where 'emotions' are elsewhere clearly marked as psychagogic,[79] further recalls Longinus' view that 'figures are natural allies (*συμμαχεῖ*) of sublimity and themselves profit wonderfully from the alliance (*ἀντισυμμαχεῖται*),' and that 'sublimity and emotion are a defence and a marvellous aid (*ἐπικουρία*)' in rhetorical writing (17.1–3).[80] But ultimately the hallmarks of the sublime are, as Longinus himself says and shows, elusive and hard to name. It is

[76] *Comp.* 14, 53.2–3: the simple sound of zeta is combined (*σύνθετα*) from sigma and delta.

[77] See Janko *ad loc.* for discussion.

[78] There may an echo with Heracleodorus here as well, another *κριτικός* who held that only language treated with artifice (*τὰ πεποημένα*) 'moves' the hearer, not language without artifice (*τὰ οὐ πόητα*) (Phld. *Poem.* 2, *P.Herc.* 1081 fr. 23 N = Tr. C fr. n Sbordone). See Porter (1992) for Crates' place in the sublime tradition, which in literary criticism is invested in the sublimity of *art*, not of randomly occurring sounds.

[79] *Poem.* 1 col. 136.14–20 (where both character and emotion seem to surface, possibly in a contrast).

[80] Porter (1995b) 147, cf. 110.

above all the confrontation with elusiveness that marks the presence of the sublime.

Crates and the *κριτικοί* resemble the curious and eponymous character from a tale by E. T. A. Hoffmann, Councilor Krespel ('Rat Krespel'), who is in search of the perfect sound. He builds violins that he plays only once and then lays aside (all for the sake of relishing the pure and original immediacy of their sound, which is by definition unrepeatable), and he acquires others only to dissect them for what they conceal within:

> I am totally convinced that something special lies within the inner structure [of the violin], and that if I took it apart into its constituent pieces it would reveal a secret that I have long been in search of.[81]

The thing (the instrument, the structure) is 'dead' in itself (*dies tote Ding*), like the letters of the Greek alphabet described by Antiphanes in the fourth century as universally *aphona*, 'voiceless'.[82] Plato, too, knows the distinction, for instance in the *Phaedo*:

> One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body (*ἀσώματον*), beautiful (*πάγκαλον*) and divine in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical (*σώματα*), bodily (*σωματοειδῆ*), composite (*σύνθετα*), earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists . . . that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed because it would be impossible for . . . the harmony . . . to be destroyed before that which is mortal, he would say that the harmony itself still must exist and that the wood and the strings must rot before the harmony can suffer (*τι παθεῖν*).
>
> (85e–86a; tr. Grube)

Plato's predicament is not dissimilar to Krespel's, or to that of the euphonists for that matter. He knows that harmony (musical beauty) is an epiphenomenon of a corporeal event, even if harmony also transcends the body that gives rise to it initially, and in doing so it seems to approach the status of the divine. But the nature of aural decay, so to say, renders Plato suspicious of the analogy from which this brief glimpse of musical harmony emerges, namely that between

[81] 'Ganz überzeugt bin ich, daß in der innern Struktur etwas Besonderes liegt und daß, wenn ich sie [sc., die Violine] zerlegte, sich mir ein Geheimnis erschließen würde, dem ich längst nachspürte' ('Rat Krespel', in Hoffmann (2001) 48).

[82] Antiphanes, *Sappho* fr. 196 K-A.

the soul and musical harmony. Socrates and his interlocutors ultimately decide that the soul is not a harmony (95a), owing to the epiphenomenalism that such an analogy presupposes: musical harmonies supervene on physical parts and are themselves constituted of those parts; the soul must be qualitatively and causally distinct from the mortal parts in which it provisionally takes up residence. 'Does not the nature of each harmony depend on the way it has been harmonized?,' Socrates asks. And 'do you think it natural for a harmony, *or any other composite*, to be in a different state from that of the elements of which it is composed?' (93b; 93a).

In insisting upon the composite (*συγκειμένη*) nature of musical harmony (92b1),[83] Plato has rendered harmony a material object, one akin to the lyre and its strings in their composite, physical, bodily, earthy, and 'mortal' condition. In doing so he is showing himself to be *even more materialist and more reductionist* than the later materialistically inclined euphonists. For Plato, eager as he is to immortalize the soul and to render all else 'heavy, ponderous, [and] earthy' (81c), sound (harmony) cannot be allowed to be materially different from its parts. The euphonists diverge from Plato in at least two respects, but in both cases because they are operating with a cleavage within sound that is unavailable to him: where he speaks of *harmonia*, they speak of the *σύνθεσις* (combination, aggregate) of the letter-sounds *and* the euphony that the letter-sounds give rise to. Plato's gold standard, by contrast, is the unrepeatable pure note that, to be arrived at, must be segregated not only from other notes but also from the conditions of its production.

First, for them *sound is not clearly a composite entity*. There is, as we just saw, the *σύνθεσις* of the letter-sounds, and then there is the euphony that 'appears on its surface' of the letter-sounds. A debate raged amongst the *κριτικοί* as to which of these two entities ought to provide the criterion of poetic excellence, but nowhere do we get the slightest impression that euphony is just the synthesis of the elements of individual sounds, as if one could tie all the sounds of a word or verse into a neat sum and call this its euphony. (Another way of underscoring this difference is to think of *σύνθεσις* as a verbal noun rather than what linguists call a resultative noun: it represents the combining of sounds, not their (blended) combination, which under

[83] The premise is slipped in rather unexpectedly, then never relinquished in the subsequent arguments.

the best of conditions will be euphonious.) Rather, sound strikes the ear as a collective φαντασία in a form that can no longer be analysed into its original parts. Indeed, a well-made euphony will, precisely, conceal its original parts, as we saw, and some of the most interesting effects of euphony are no more than sound-effects that conceal the fact that they *have no original parts*—they are a mere confection in the ear of an auditor, a pure *illusion* of sound, like a false echo or a referred pleasure or pleasurable pain.

Second, for the euphonists *sound is and is not material*. Here, the euphonists can prevaricate in a way that Plato cannot because of the aforementioned cleavage within sound that is available to them but unavailable to him. Nowhere in their writings is it suggested that euphony and σύνθεσις are materially reducible to each other, no doubt because their intuition was to assume that euphony, being literally ἐπιφαινομένη ('appearing on the surface'), has the consistency of an appearance; its materiality may therefore be different from that of the material cause of the appearance, or it may not be, depending upon one's ontology. The euphonists don't take a clear stand on this issue, and so we can only make guesses on their behalf. In terms that are closer to their own (seeing how expressions equivalent to *material* are not quite part of their working vocabulary), euphonious sound is and is not reducible to the constituent parts (the sounds) that comprise it. At any rate, the euphonists are less interested in pursuing ontologies than they are in pursuing the mechanisms by which aesthetic sounds come to be produced or released in prose and poetry.

The pursuit of the euphonists, too, is as much of the *sound of soundlessness* as it is of sound. Recall that the final object of Crates' critical analysis is *not the sound of poems* but *the art* (ὁ τῆς τέχης λόγος) by which that sound is released.[84] We might say that what Crates is after is not sound but the *structure* of sound (εὔκρατος ἁρμονία; Karin Pohl in her dissertation rightly speaks of '*lautliche Struktur*').[85] And yet, given the desperateness of the search, the elusiveness of the object, but also its quasi-materiality and the insistence upon the absolute location of the structural properties of sound, we might say that what Crates, at least half the time, is in fact after is

[84] Phld. *Poem.* 5 col. 28 Mangoni; Porter (1995a) 99.

[85] Pohl (1968) 152–3. Dionysius speaks of εὔκρατος ἁρμονία at *Comp.* 24, 120.11–12.

the 'sound of the structure' itself (what Webern, the composer, refers to as the *Strukturklang*, as opposed to the *Klangstruktur*).[86] Either way, *qua* vocality or *qua* sound in relation, it is this 'voice' behind and beyond the actual dimensions of vocality and sonority that is the ultimate object of the euphonist critic's quest. Their search is for the sublimity of sound. As Longinus writes, ἁρμονία, composition in its capacity to generate euphony, 'echoes the sublimity', ἡ ἁρμονία τῷ ὕψει συνηχεῖ (39.4). It does not echo *the sound*; it echoes what lies *beyond* sound, and resounds with it.[87] The material sublime of sound is, we might say, made out of a sublime material, namely one that points us to this quality of voice that lies beyond sound itself.[88]

Longinus knows of Cicero's sublimity: he adduces him in a σύγκρισις with Demosthenes and Plato: 'Demosthenes has an abrupt sublimity; Cicero spreads himself, . . . like a spreading conflagration' (12.3–4); Plato's 'smooth style' has a 'soundless flow' (ἀψοφητὶ ῥέων) and is combined with grandeur (13.1). Does Longinus know of Cicero's sublime theory of 'eloquence which rushes along with the roar of a mighty spring, which all look up to and admire, and which they despair of attaining' (*Or.* 97)?[89] Longinus' recognition of the rhetorical sublimity of Plato is in line, at least, with Cicero's like appraisal (13.4; *Or.* 62 and 67). There is a sly rhetoricization of Plato here: in both authors Plato is being stood on his head.[90] Which brings us back to our problem: what does Plato's sublime style, beyond the reaches of the voice (ἀψοφητί), *sound* like?

There is much more that could and should be said. In particular, the parallels between Cicero, Longinus, and the κριτικοί could be multiplied, and a deeper understanding of their various critical projects could be attempted.[91] I have tried to suggest that euphonic

[86] Žižek (1997) 47.

[87] Cf. Longinus' central thesis that 'the sublime is an echo of a noble mind' (9.2). See Groddeck (1995), 70: 'Das Erhabene ereignet sich zwischen Reden und Hören, oder—anders gewendet—in dem seltsamen Raum zwischen Text und Lektüre.'

[88] Similarly, language expressively delivered, with *vocis mutationibus*, reaches into the resources of the body beyond the strictly linguistic: *est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia* (*Or.* 55).

[89] Cf. *Or.* 39; 66; 67 (Kroll *ad loc.* compares *Subl.* 13.1).

[90] See *Or.* 10, where *ille non intellegendi solum sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato* has point; cf. also 51 and 63 on the style of the philosophers.

[91] Cicero also knows, for instance, the thunderbolt metaphor as applied to Demosthenes (*Or.* 234; *Subl.* 34.4), with antecedents in Aristophanes (*Ach.* 530–1; *Or.* 29). Cicero prefigures the agonistic (but also Longinian) commonplace that ambitious

criticism points to a dimension beyond its apparent resources in sound: those of us working on Philodemus have perhaps been talking *too much about sound*! And if we take Dionysius as our cue, we have been talking too much about euphony and not enough about *dissonance* (ἀντιτυπία), or about the *interruption* of consonance (ἀναβολή, ἐγκοπὴ τῆς ἁρμονίας), of which hiatus is but one instance.[92] I might add that sublime criticism is also bound up with the critical and ideological aspects of aesthetic criticism in antiquity, another aspect we tend to neglect.[93] Thus, a sensuous aesthetics needn't be grounded in naturalism, or even in the senses, even if it makes strategic use of the postulates of naturalism to loosen the grip of deeply seated (and naturalized) *conventions* of aesthetic perception and criticism. That is one way of making sense of the difficulty of the critics I have been discussing here: the paradox of soundless sound, the passage from *Klangstruktur* to *Strukturklang*, is a provocation to think beyond the limits of aesthetic discourse itself. Cicero's polemics against his Atticist opponents has a similar, pulling-up-the-rug-from-under-them aspect to it; and his view has lasting if unsettling implications for rhetorical theory as well.[94]

But a more immediate motivation for the theory these critics share is to be found in the very situation of literary criticism. The focus on the voice as a substance that is simultaneously an abstract and spiritual entity (a *spiritus* or πνεῦμα) recalls the perpetual problem of Greek literary culture: how to breathe life into the lifeless matter of a text. Readers, Longinus writes, are 'possessed by a spirit (πνεῦμα: breath or voice) not their own'; sublimity makes 'a kind of lustre bloom upon our words as upon beautiful statues; it gives things life (ψυχήν) and makes them speak (φωνητικήν)' (13.2; 30.1). 'Books,'

writers will risk greatness despite its impossibility as they try to rival the best writers (*Or.* 3–4). And he recognizes sublimity as the true source of poetic marvel (*grandior, excelsior, magnificentius, fulmina, gravis acer ardens*, etc.: *Or.* 15–16, 97–9, 119, etc.); see Porter (2016) 280, 386, 612, for these and other parallels.

[92] Comp. 20, 91.13–14; 22, 102.8; 103.5–6; 109.16–17; cf. Comp. 22, 104.5–6 (cit. n. 67 above).

[93] See Porter (1994), 81; Porter (1995b), 136; Porter (2006).

[94] Kroll (1913) 5 is partly right: 'ein überaus geschickter literarischer Fechter'. Despite ibid., 7 n. 1, Cicero invokes a preexisting sublime tradition that percolates through the whole awareness of literary and rhetorical criticism and theory in antiquity and that eventually crystallizes in works explicitly devoted to the topic, of which those by Caecilius and Longinus have conventionally been the only recognized instances. See Porter (2016).

Cicero writes, recalling a theme that, as we saw, occurs in Hieronymus of Rhodes, 'lack that breath of life (*spiritu illo*) which usually makes . . . passages seem more impressive when spoken than when read' (*Or.* 130).[95] And it is probably the euphonist Pausimachus who says, 'But when the <verses> of Homer are read out (ἀναγινώσ| κητ]α̣ι), all <the events> appear greater and more beautiful (πάντα μ[ε]ίζω | καὶ κα]λλίω φ[αίνε]ται). . . . '[96] But how does a *written* text *sound*? The κριτικοί and Longinus offer us, among other things, a theory of reading, a way of reading the voice buried in the voiceless script of Greek texts from the distant past. The written text has a sound that cannot be heard.[97] Bringing out its hidden music while respecting its precious concealment is the difficult task of sublime criticism.

[95] See Porter (2010) 330–40 on ἔμψυχος. The related term πνεῦμα, used in the sense of the breath of the musical voice, is found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, e.g. *Comp.* 14. Aristoxenus may be the proximate origin of the term (Kroll (1907) 97), but he was by no means the first to πνεῦμα in this sense.

[96] *Poem.* 1 col. 43.9–12.

[97] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 22, 177.21–178.2: 'If, then, the spirit (πνεῦμα) with which Demosthenes' pages (τοῖς βιβλίοις) are still imbued after so many years possesses so much power (ἰσχύν) and moves his readers in this way (ἀγωγόν), surely to hear him delivering his speeches at the time must have been an extraordinary and overwhelming experience (ὑπερφυές τι καὶ δεινὸν χρῆμα).' The epithets are all Longinian. In *Comp.* 22, 99–100 Dionysius preserves Pindar fr. 75 S-M, which prominently thematizes the voice as *echo* (cf. ibid., 11, 42.1–3, treating the sound of silence). Cf. also Dio *Or.* 36.27, where Dio's interlocutors, the rude Borysthenians ask him to approximate Plato's 'nobility of expression (φράσις)': 'for if we understand nothing else, we do understand at least his language because of our long familiarity with it, for it has a lofty sound (οὐ σμικρόν), not far removed from the *voice* of Homer (τῆς γε φωνῆς . . . οὐδὲ πόρρω τοῦ Ὁμήρου)'.

10

Disreputable Music

A Performance, a Defence, and their Intertextual and Intermedial Resonances (Plutarch Quaest. conv. *704c4–705b6)*

Andrew Barker

Even if we read it 'straight', without burrowing into its intertextual cellarage, the beginning of *Quaest. conv.* 7.5 (704c4–705b6) is remarkable enough. It describes a performance of music of which Plutarch heartily disapproves, and continues with a speech arguing in defence of music of that sort. After this comes a second and much longer speech (705b7–706e11) in which this disreputable kind of music is criticized on moral grounds, most of which are fairly familiar; but that speech falls outside the scope of the present chapter. References to unseemly music are common enough in ancient literature, but performances of it are seldom described in such vivid detail, and reasoned defences of such music are even rarer. But the passage becomes even more interesting if we explore its underground territory, that is, its implicit allusions to well-known earlier writings, and try to understand the relation between the basement and the upper storeys. Most of this chapter is an attempt to follow some of the indications in the text which give access to this hidden substratum; and I shall offer some thoughts about the ways in which they encourage us to interpret what Plutarch has actually written.[1]

[1] On the value of intertextuality in interpreting the *Quaest. conv.*, see Ruffy (2012) 12–15.

But the chapter has a second purpose too, hinted at by the word 'intermedial' in its title. This text is of course not designed to be sung or musically accompanied; unlike some kinds of poetry, its meaning is not modified by being expressed through musical performance. On the other hand, it is the account of a musical performance that sets the scene for the subsequent discussion. Although the explicit focus of the speeches that follow is on the merits and defects of certain *types* of music rather than on that particular performance, what provides the occasion for the discussion is the live performance itself; the speeches take their cue from the performance, and from the emotionally charged ways in which it affected its hearers (including, of course, the speakers themselves). This holds especially of the speech we shall examine here, not just because it immediately follows the performance, but more importantly because it is this performance in particular that the speaker is principally trying to defend. He is anxious to disarm criticism of the music the symposiasts have just heard (for whose presentation he is partly responsible), and of their reactions to it.

Now plainly the dialogue's readers do not hear the music. I want to suggest, however that they become, as it were, a 'virtual audience' of the performance Plutarch has described. His colourful depiction of it presents them with a scenario which their own experiences enable them to recreate in their imaginations, and thus invites them to respond to the speeches in the light of their own past experience of music as well as of texts. Echoes of the performance, as their experiences have led them to envisage it, resonating in their aural imagination while they read the speeches, will channel influences through a non-textual medium into their reception of what they read. This input from musical experience into the interpretation of the text is not, perhaps, an instance of precisely the kind of 'intermediality' discussed in the Introduction to this volume, but the relation between them is evidently close; in both cases something conveyed through one cognitive or perceptual medium affects our responses to something conveyed through another. But however plausible this suggestion may be, it is of no great interest unless we can apply it in illuminating ways to the study of the text we are scrutinizing. Can we in fact do so? If so how, and how, if at all, do influences of this sort interact with those of the recurrent intertextual allusions? That is the second group of issues which this chapter will try to address, but the passage's intertextual intricacies need to be identified and examined in their own right before we consider them.

INTERTEXTUAL ALLUSIONS

(a) The Performance

ἐν Πυθίοις Καλλίστρατος, τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἐπιμελητής, αὐλῳδόν τινα πολίτην καὶ φίλον ὑστερήσαντα τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τοῦ μὲν ἀγῶνος εἶρξε κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἑστιῶν δ᾽ ἡμᾶς παρήγαγεν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον ἐσθῆτι καὶ στεφάνοις, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγῶνι, μετὰ τοῦ χοροῦ κεκοσμημένον ἐκπρεπῶς. καὶ νὴ Δία κομψὸν ἦν ἀκρόαμα τὸ πρῶτον· ἔπειτα διασείσας καὶ διακωδωνίσας τὸ συμπόσιον, ὡς ᾐσθάνετο τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐγκεκλικότας καὶ παρέχοντας ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ὅ τι βούλοιτο χρῆσθαι καὶ καταυλεῖν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν, ἀποκαλυψάμενος παντάπασιν ἐπεδείξατο τὴν μουσικὴν παντὸς οἴνου μᾶλλον μεθύσκουσαν τοὺς ὅπως ἔτυχεν καὶ ἀνέδην αὐτῆς ἐμφορουμένους· οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακειμένοις ἔτι βοᾶν ἐξήρκει καὶ κροτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεκινοῦντο κινήσεις ἀνελευθέρους, πρεπούσας δὲ τοῖς κρούμασιν ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν.

[704c4] In the course of the *Pythia*, Callistratus, the president of the Amphyctyons, prevented an aulode—a citizen and a friend—from registering for the contest, in compliance with the regulations, because he was late. But when he entertained us to dinner, he brought him to the symposium, splendidly decked out, along with the *χορός*, in the costume and wreath he would have worn in a contest. And what we heard at first was indeed most impressive. [d] But then, when he'd taken the measure of the symposium and sounded it out, seeing that most of those present had yielded to pleasure and would let him play whatever he liked, casting spells on them with his piping and indulging his licentious tastes, he completely unmasked himself [or 'stripped off'] and performed music far more capable than any wine of intoxicating people who drink it up carelessly and without restraint. They weren't even satisfied with chanting and clapping while they reclined; in the end most of them leaped up and danced together with movements quite unfit for free men, though perfectly suited to *those* instrumental sounds and tunes.

The musician is not a guest of the normal sort. The party seems to be in full swing when he arrives, wreathed and in his musician's finery, along with a *χορός* (whose identity poses problems to which I'll return immediately), and the first part of his performance, we are told, was

most impressive, a κομψὸν ἀκρόαμα (704c9–d1); later, however, his presence becomes thoroughly disruptive. In a general way, this is a very familiar theme. I have no doubt at all that Plutarch designed it as a deliberate and none too subtle reminder of Alcibiades' irruption into the party in Plato's *Symposium*; and as we'll see in due course, the *Symposium*, especially but not only the Alcibiades passage, is the most important of the texts underlying the description that follows.[2]

The reference to a χορός, however, is a little puzzling. We would expect a musician's χορός to be a group of singers or dancers who took part in the performances in which he took the starring role, and would have done so at Delphi if they had not been disqualified. But Plutarch gives no indication that the disqualification affected a choral performance; on the contrary, it was apparently just this one musician who was due to register but failed to do so on time, and who was therefore prevented from competing, presumably as a soloist. Again, if this χορός is a group of performers, there would seem to be no point in mentioning them unless they are actually involved in the music-making at Callistratus' symposium; yet as far as we can tell from Plutarch's account, they are not. It is therefore tempting to suppose that the word χορός is being used here in a non-musical sense, as it not infrequently is, in which it refers to a prominent individual's entourage, his band of followers and supporters. To suppose that it has this meaning here may strain our credulity, but perhaps Plutarch did indeed intend readers to construe it in that sense, while enjoying the ambiguity created by its presence in this largely musical context (I shall return to this point in Part 2).

For the present I shall leave the question of the identity of the χορός unresolved. But given that it has no musical role in the scenario, we may wonder whether there is any detectable reason—apart from the general context of musical activity—for Plutarch's choice of this word. Perhaps there is. Alcibiades' retinue in the *Symposium* is not called a χορός, but that of a star performer in another Platonic dialogue is indeed so described; it is that of the sophist Protagoras, mentioned in the course of the narrative introducing the dialogue

[2] Plutarch introduces his preface to the *Quaest. conv.* with an allusion to the *Symposium* (at 613d), and it seems to have been much in his mind throughout its composition: as Frieda Klotz remarks, 'the *Symposium* is a crucial model for the *Table Talk*' (Klotz (2014) 212; her essay can be recommended as a thought-provoking study of the work as a whole).

named after him (*Prt.* 315b). And what the sophists depicted in that passage produce—especially in the booming and unintelligible utterances of Prodicus—could very aptly be described as a *κομψὸν ἀκρόαμα*. Further, one of the key features of sophists in Plato's dialogues, especially Protagoras and Gorgias, is that their speeches are (in Plutarch's words) a *κομψὸν ἀκρόαμα τὸ πρῶτον* but *only τὸ πρῶτον*: when critically assessed they are worthless and potentially pernicious.[3] Exactly the same is true of the performance of Plutarch's musician, as we shall see. We might usefully remember that there is a strong link between this part of the *Protagoras* and the *Symposium*; with the exception of Aristophanes, all the main characters of the *Symposium* are there in the *Protagoras*, listening to the sophists in Callias' house. (Apart from Socrates himself, Aristophanes is the only one of them who is not implicitly tarred with the brush of sophistry either here or in the *Symposium*, or indeed anywhere else in the dialogues.) If I am right in construing Plutarch's words as pointers to the *Protagoras*, they will suggest that there is a marked affinity between the musician's performance and the dangerous teachings of the sophists. The superficiality of his charms may also be suggested by the allusion to his magnificent costume; we can find a similar use of this motif in an oration by the Platonizing emperor Julian, for instance, where he says that the people who will be impressed by a kitharode's costume and the appearance of his splendid instrument are just children, or men and women with the mentality of children (*Or.* 3.7).

The allusions to this part of the *Protagoras* direct us back to the *Symposium*, and to Plutarch's implicit references to it. He drops a broad hint even before describing the musician's dramatic entrance; he had been disqualified from competing in the Pythia because he was late in registering for the contest, *ὑστερήσαντα* (704c5).[4] Late arrival is a minor motif in the *Symposium*; Socrates is late, having been detained by a communication from his *daimonion*, and Alcibiades only arrives when the evening is well advanced. And whereas

[3] The adjective *κομψός* and its cognates are common in Plato; not always, but very often, they are used ironically, to suggest that the things so described look or sound impressive at first sight but are in fact sophistic or absurd. Examples in *Rep.* include 405d, 436d, 460a, 489b, 499a (where it is coupled with *ἐριστικά* and unfounded *δόξα*), 572c. See. e.g. *Gorg.* 521e, referring back sarcastically to Callicles' usage at 486c; *Crat.* 426a; *Phd.* 101c; *Lach.* 197d; *Tht.* 171a; *Phaedr.* 230c.

[4] The rules about late registration were probably as strict in the *Pythia* as they seem to have been at Olympia, on which see Poliakoff (1987) 19–20.

Socrates' influence on the company is wholly edifying, Alcibiades' uninvited invasion (*Smp.* 212d–213a) immediately disrupts the sobriety of the gathering; and towards the end of the dialogue, after another late invasion by uninvited party-goers, the symposium descends into a bout of uninhibited drinking and revelling (223b). In much the same way the musician's performance, evidently not right at the beginning of the party, causes the complete breakdown of civilized decorum among the guests in the house of Callistratus.

I shall say no more about the description of the musician's entrance and the admirable music which he presents *τὸ πρῶτον*. While doing this, it turns out, he has been watching the audience's reactions and sizing them up, as it were, *διασείσας καὶ διακωδωνίσας τὸ συμπόσιον*;[5] and we might be reminded of Ion the rhapsode keeping a calculating eye on his audience while expressing the extremities of Homeric passion and grief. If they're weeping he'll be laughing all the way to the bank, and if they're laughing he may find himself in serious financial trouble (Plato, *Ion* 535e). But perhaps there's nothing to be made of that. The verb *διακωδωνίζειν* is uncommon enough to attract attention,[6] but there is nothing in its earlier occurrences, as far as I can see, that would be relevant to the present discussion. By contrast, the innocent-looking expression *τὸ συμπόσιον* might be significant. Of course in one sense it is perfectly appropriate—after all, this *is* a symposium—but its precise usage here, as a collective noun for the *participants* at a symposium, strikes me as unusual and

[5] The translation of this phrase in the Loeb edition, 'shaking the hall and filling it with resounding noise', not only gives *τὸ συμπόσιον* a most improbable sense, but also misses the connection of the two verbs with processes of testing and assessing. *διασείειν* is used in the sense 'to sift', as in 'sifting the wheat from the chaff'. *διακωδωνίζειν* is commonly used of making a coin 'ring' to check whether it is genuine, and there are some intriguing explanations of the origin of this and similar usages. A scholium on Ar. *Birds* 842 explains that people went round the guard-posts at night and rang a bell (*κώδων*), which the guards had to answer to show that they were awake (perhaps, the scholiast adds, Aristophanes' allusion is a parody of an episode in Euripides' *Palamedes*). This explanation reappears at *Etym. magn.* 273.47, which interprets *διακωδωνίζειν* as 'to test and assess', and offers two other possible explanations, deriving it either from the practice of ringing a bell to test the mettle of fighting quails, or from the use of the same technique to assess the 'nobility' or courage of horses, by seeing whether or not it frightens them.

[6] The *TLG* records some ninety occurrences in Greek literature, but the great majority are from very late sources.

rather odd.[7] We would surely have expected something like *τοὺς ἀκουόντας* or *τοὺς παρόντας*, and the substitution of *τὸ συμπόσιον* invites our curiosity. Could we possibly interpret it as Plutarch's way of waking up his less perceptive readers to the fact that it's 'the' *Symposium*, Plato's *Symposium*, that should be in their minds? It is impossible to be sure, but I suggest that it's a colourable hypothesis.

The musician's assessment of his audience shows him that they are putty in his hands, and that in their pleasure at his music they will let him do whatever he likes, *καὶ καταυλεῖν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν*, casting spells on them with his piping (*καταυλεῖν*) and indulging in unrestrained licentiousness (704d2–4). Here we must stray away from the *Symposium* again for a moment; *καταυλεῖν* occurs only three times in Plato, twice in the *Republic* and once in the *Laws*, and it's the *Republic*'s usages that are significant here. At 411a we find the verb in Socrates' depiction of a person who risks doing serious damage to himself 'when he allows (*παρέχῃ*, as in Plutarch) music *καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς* by pouring sweet and soft and mournful tunes through his ears as if through a funnel'.[8] Later, at 561c–d, Socrates catalogues the diverse recreations of the 'democratic' individual, who makes no distinction between good and bad pleasures, and at the top of the list are episodes in which he is *μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος*, fuddled with drink and spellbound by the piping of the aulos. Thus even without the explicitly pejorative connotations of Plutarch's *ἀκολασταίνειν*, Plato's treatment of the verb *καταυλεῖν* would be enough to sound a note of warning. The fact that the audience's pleasure will allow the musician to do whatever he likes corresponds exactly to the 'democratic' man's indiscriminate openness to pleasures of any sort, which allows him to wallow in any and all of them.

The next clause unmistakably takes us back to the *Symposium*, in what is perhaps the most important allusion of them all: *ἀποκαλυψάμενος παντάπασιν ἐπεδείξατο τὴν μουσικὴν παντὸς οἴνου μᾶλλον μεθύσκουσαν τοὺς ὅπως ἔτυχεν καὶ ἀνέδην αὐτῆς ἐμφορουμένους* (704d4–6). The musician metaphorically strips himself naked and reveals what he's really up to, with a display of the kind of music that is more inebriating even than wine, for those who swallow it without due caution. In the *Symposium* Alcibiades famously likens Socrates

[7] Teodorsson (1996) 66 identifies parallel uses of the word in Plutarch at *Quaest. conv.* 710c and *Sept. sap.* 157d, and rather less plausibly at *Sept. sap.* 164d.

[8] On this passage, see further Peponi (this volume) pp. 172–4.

to an aulete, specifically the aulete Marsyas, and starting with his image of the statuettes of *silēnoi* nested inside one another like Russian dolls (*Smp.* 215a–b), he describes the process of uncovering the treasures he contains by peeling off layer after layer. Later, in his vivid account of his encounters with Socrates, both he and Socrates are both metaphorically and literally stripped naked. They strip down for wrestling, and Alcibiades snuggles up to Socrates in bed, but in neither case does he get the reaction he expected; the Socrates he unveils is solid virtue and wisdom right to the core (217b–219d). What Plutarch presents when the musician abandons his respectable guise is an inversion of Plato's revelations about Socrates; it is more like a 'candid camera' shot of Alcibiades in one of the more shamelessly unregenerate phases of his chaotic career.

I suggest that this is the key to the whole description. It portrays a set of actions and reactions in which everything that Plato stands for in the sphere of music and ethics is turned upside down, and the allusions to the dialogues tell us that that is what it is. Resonances of other passages in Plato can also be found without difficulty, parallels in the *Republic*, for instance, of Plutarch's evocation of the *κινήσεις ἀνελευθέρους* to which the music impels the symposiasts at 704d6–10 (notably *Rep.* 400b, cf. 395c, 401b). Disorderly music and indiscriminate drinking are rejected in the preliminaries to the *Symposium* (176a–e), and their proper control and conjunction is a major topic in the *Laws*. One might consider also the various Platonic depictions and discussions of *μανία*, from which drinking (rather curiously) eventually rescues the company at 704e1, and other passages too might justifiably be cited. But I shall leave the musician's performance there.

(b) The Defence Speech

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπαύσαντο καὶ κατάστασιν αὖθις [704E] *ὥσπερ ἐκ μανίας ὁ πότος ἐλάμβανεν, ἐβούλετο μὲν ὁ Λαμπρίας εἰπεῖν τι καὶ παρρησιάσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους· ὀρρωδοῦντι δ' ὅμως αὐτῷ μὴ λίαν ἀηδὴς γένηται καὶ λυπηρός, αὐτὸς ὁ Καλλίστρατος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον παρέσχε τοιαῦτά τινα διαλεχθείς· 'Ἀκρασίας μέν', ἔφη, 'καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολύω τὸ φιλήκοον καὶ φιλοθέαμον· οὐ μὴν Ἀριστοξένῳ γε συμφέρομαι παντάπασι, ταύταις μόναις φάσκοντι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τὸ 'καλῶς' ἐπιλέγεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὄψα καλὰ καὶ μύρα καλοῦσι καὶ καλῶς γεγονέναι λέγουσιν δειπνήσαντες ἡδέως καὶ πολυτελῶς. δοκεῖ δέ μοι*

μηδ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίᾳ [F] *δικαίᾳ τὰς περὶ θέαν καὶ ἀκρόασιν εὐπαθείας ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὡς μόνας ἀνθρωπικὰς οὔσας, ταῖς δ᾽ ἄλλαις καὶ τὰ θηρία φύσιν ἔχοντα χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι καὶ μουσικῇ πολλὰ κηλεῖται τῶν ἀλόγων, ὥσπερ ἔλαφοι σύριγξιν, ἵπποις δὲ μιγνυμέναις ἐπαυλεῖται νόμος, ὃν ἱππόθορον ὀνομάζουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρός φησι κεκινῆσθαι πρὸς ᾠδήν*

ἁλίου δελφῖνος ὑπόκρισιν·
[705A] *τὸν μὲν ἀκύμονος ἐν πόντου πελάγει*
αὐλῶν ἐκίνησ᾽ ἐρατὸν μέλος·

ὀρχούμενοι δὲ τοὺς ὤτους αἱροῦσι, χαίροντας τῇ ὄψει καὶ μιμητικῶς ἅμα δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε τοὺς ὤμους συνδιαφέροντας. οὐδὲν οὖν ὁρῶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς ἴδιον ἐχούσας, <ἢ> *ὅτι μόναι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσιν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι τοῦ σώματος καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καταλήγουσιν· μέλος δὲ καὶ ῥυθμὸς καὶ ὄρχησις καὶ ᾠδὴ παραμειψάμεναι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπερείδονται τὸ ἐπιτερπὲς καὶ γαργαλίζον. ὅθεν οὐδεμία τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἀπόκρυφός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σκότους δεομένη καὶ τῶν τοίχων 'περιθεόντων', ὡς* [β]*οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ στάδια ταύταις καὶ θέατρα ποιεῖται, καὶ τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν θεάσασθαί τι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἐπιτερπέστερόν ἐστι καὶ σεμνότερον, οὐκ ἀκρασίας δήπου καὶ ἡδυπαθείας ἀλλ᾽ ἐλευθερίου διατριβῆς καὶ ἀστείας μάρτυρας ἡμῶν ὅτι πλείστους λαμβανόντων.*

When they had finished, and the drink had brought them back to calm, [e] as if from a fit of madness, Lamprias wanted to say something and speak his mind to the young men; but since he was worried that he would be too stern and harsh, Callistratus himself provided a prelude, as it were, in roughly the following words.

'I too believe that the love of things heard and seen is exempt from *akrasia*; but I don't altogether agree with Aristoxenus, when he asserts that it is only these pleasures that are called *kalai*. For people call foods and perfumes *kala*, and say that things have gone *kalōs* when they have dined enjoyably and sumptuously. Nor do I think that Aristotle exempted enjoyment of things seen and heard from *akrasia* [f] for the right reason, that is, on the grounds that they are specific to humans, whereas creatures with the nature of wild beasts also experience and share in the others. For we see that music also enchants many of the irrational animals, as for instance deer are enchanted by Panpipes; and people play the pipe-tune they call the *hippothoros nomos* to mating mares. And Pindar says that "the dolphin of the sea answers" in response to song, the dolphin [705a] "which the

> lovely melody of *auloi* arouses in the wave-less open sea." People catch owls by dancing, as they delight in the sight and imitate it by moving their shoulders back and forth in time with it. So I don't see anything peculiar in pleasures of these sorts, except that they are pleasures of the soul, while the others are pleasures of the body and come to an end in the body. But melody and rhythm and dance and song travel past sense-perception and deposit delightful titillation in the part of the soul that experiences pleasure. Hence no pleasure of this sort is secret and needs the cover of darkness and of walls 'running around' it, as [b] the Cyrenaics say. On the contrary, stadia and theatres are built for them, and watching and listening to something in company with many people is more enjoyable and honourable; and thus we have a great many witnesses to the fact that it is not *akrasia* and self-indulgence, but a pastime fit for people who are free and civilized.'

When the performance is over and everyone has settled down, Lamprias feels like giving the young folk a piece of his mind, but hesitates to cast himself as a carping curmudgeon, and Callistratus comes to the rescue with a speech which, we are told, provides 'as it were an *ἐνδόσιμον*' (704e1–5). *ἐνδόσιμον* is an interesting word, the nominal form of an adjective commonly connected with music. It can refer to a prelude to a song, or sometimes (as in Aristotle at *Rhet.* 1414b24 and 1415a8) to something like the 'key-note' of a melody; and these musical uses are often deployed metaphorically, to refer to some other kind of introduction or starting-point. But here, clearly enough, Callistratus' speech in defence of allegedly disreputable music can hardly be the key-note for Lamprias' subsequent speech for the prosecution, and perhaps we should not assign it any musical significance. What it does is to give Lamprias a 'pretext' for his intervention, by supplying him with an argument to which he can respond.[9] In this way his denunciation of such music will not come across as a direct reproof to the symposiasts; instead it will follow the civilized conventions of a decorous Plutarchan symposium, in which a second speaker regularly provides a counter-argument to a thesis propounded by the first.[10]

[9] This seems to correspond to Plutarch's regular use of the word (which appears in his writings eight times in the singular and once in the plural); an *ἐνδόσιμον* is something that provides a pretext or 'way in' for some further action.

[10] Roskam (2009) 377 describes Callistratus' intervention as 'adding fuel to the flames', which strikes me as missing the point.

Something rather remarkable happens at this point in the passage, precisely at the moment when we move from the description of the performance to the speech in its defence. So far the text has been studded with allusions to Plato's dialogues, but now we leave the Academy behind and enter the world of the Lyceum. Callistratus marks the transition right at the beginning of his speech, and he does so in two ways. First, he associates himself with people who deny that the love of things heard or things seen can lead to the vice of ἀκρασία, that is, to an inability to resist the temptation of damaging over-indulgence in such experiences ('ἀκρασίας μέν', ἔφη, 'καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολύω τὸ φιλήκοον καὶ φιλοθέαμον', 704e6–7). His thesis, essentially, is that giving free rein to one's love of sights and sounds can do no harm, and that in this context the notion of over-indulgence simply does not apply. But of course the most famous φιλοθεάμονες and φιλήκοοι in Greek literature are the 'lovers of sights and sounds' who are contrasted unfavourably with philosophers towards the end of Book V of Plato's *Republic* (475d–476b). Socrates does not accuse them of ἀκρασία (a noun that appears nowhere in Plato), but by implicitly associating himself with them Callistratus clearly puts a substantial distance between himself and Plato's followers.

At the same time, secondly, he signals the transition to a Peripatetic milieu, an environment to which Plutarch's attitude seems at best ambivalent.[11] 'I too (καὶ αὐτός),' he says, in the sentence quoted above, 'believe that the love of things heard and seen is exempt from ἀκρασία'; and it soon becomes clear that when he says 'I too', the others with whom he shares this view are Peripatetics. He associates himself with them at first in a rather back-handed way, by disagreeing explicitly with two of their most eminent representatives, Aristoxenus and Aristotle himself. Aristoxenus had apparently claimed that only visible and audible things are described as καλά;[12] Callistratus rejects this thesis and offers phrases referring to food and perfume to prove his point (704e7–11). No doubt Aristoxenus was aware of such usages, but would have treated them as vulgar

[11] For a useful but perhaps over-cautious survey of Plutarch's treatment of Aristotle see Sandbach (1982) and on *Quaest. conv.* in particular Oikonomopoulou (2011). Lopes (2009) 419 points out that Plutarch's frequent citation of Aristotelian scientific doctrines in *Quaest. conv.* does not show that he accepted them, and adds: 'for the most part these "quotations" are used either to get a discussion started . . . or, less frequently, they are simply refuted'.

[12] Aristox. fr. 74 Wehrli; cf. fr. 73.

solecisms; his real contention, I suppose, was that the adjective can only *properly* be applied to things that we see or hear.[13] But Callistratus does not explain how his view on this issue is relevant to his claim about ἀκρασία. Its only detectable effect is to assimilate lavish feasting and luxuriating in delicious scents to the same evaluative category as the pleasures of sights and sounds, since all, equally, can be regarded as κάλα. Does he mean to imply that they too are exempt from accusations of ἀκρασία? The implication would hardly pass muster with a Platonist, or (we may suppose) with respectable citizens of Delphi assembled at Callistratus' symposium.

Callistratus' disagreement with Aristotle is more qualified and more interesting; he agrees with his conclusion—which is indeed essential to his position—but not with the reason he gives for it (704e11–f3). Here the obvious references are to two parallel passages on σωφροσύνη in the *Ethics* (*EN* 3.10, 1117b–1118b, *EE* 1230b–1231a). The conclusion, as Callistratus expresses it, is that indulgence in the pleasures of sight and hearing cannot amount to ἀκρασία; Aristotle's reason, which Callistratus disputes, is that these pleasures are the only ones peculiar to human beings, whereas those in which overindulgence can lead us astray, betraying our human nature, are those which we share with other animals.

Aristotle does indeed say something like this, but Callistratus is playing fast and loose with him none the less. His own explanation of the distinction between pleasures that can involve us in ἀκρασία and those that cannot is that the former are purely bodily while the latter penetrate to the soul; and he asserts that the pleasures of sight and hearing belong to the latter class (705a3–8). Here too he seems to be crossing swords with Aristotle, since this passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* treats the pleasures of sight and hearing as bodily (1118a1–9). But elsewhere in Aristotle's discussions of what we see and hear, implicitly in other passages of the *Ethics* and very overtly in his study of music in Book 8 of the *Politics*, it is perfectly clear that these pleasures also have effects on the soul; and perhaps the apparent contradiction with the passages on σωφροσύνη in the *Ethics* can be

[13] He is not alone in taking this view. A short time after Plutarch, Ptolemy champions the same thesis, though for emphatically un-Aristoxenian reasons, in a fascinating passage of his *Harmonics* (3.3, 93.11–94.1 Düring); and it has some affinities with Aristotle's assertion in Book VIII of the *Politics* that among the objects of sense-perception, only those that are audible possess ἦθος (*Pol.* 1340a28–b10; cf. [Arist.] *Pr.* 19.27). But of course that is not quite the same proposition.

resolved, though I'm not sure how that would be done. We may also note that in Callistratus' version the issue is to do with ἀκρασία, whereas Aristotle does not mention ἀκρασία in these passages; the failing to which he makes the relevant allusions is ἀκολασία.[14] But perhaps in the present context that is not very important.[15]

What is more interesting is that the Aristotelian ingredients of the defence speech don't end with these explicit references. Aristotle asserts in both versions of the *Ethics* that animals other than humans do not take pleasure in things they see or hear *as such*.[16] They respond to them only as indications, for instance, of a potential meal; and the *Eudemian Ethics* explicitly denies that animals are capable of perceiving εὐαρμοστία, the quality that makes sounds musical, or κάλλος, beauty in general (1230b36–1231a4). Callistratus devotes the next nine lines of his speech to a series of examples designed to show that this is untrue, and that animals do derive pleasure directly from their visual and auditory experiences (704f3–705a3).[17] Deer, horses, and dolphins respond enthusiastically to music, he says, and owls delight in the sight of dancing, waggling their shoulders back and forth in imitation (μιμητικῶς) of what they see—a phenomenon apparently exploited by the Greek counterparts of Papageno.[18] My point is that two of the four examples are taken straight from Aristotle. I have found nothing relevant about the dolphin in his writings, or about horses and the ἱππόθορος νόμος to which Callistratus refers (704f6),[19] but the others originate in the *Historia animalium*

[14] This point is noted by Sandbach (1982) 220. He concludes that Plutarch may not have had direct access to the text of the *Ethics*, but his grounds for this conclusion are thin. He notes also that ἀκρασία appears in relevant contexts at [Arist.] *Pr.* 28.2, 3, and 7.

[15] In substituting ἀκρασία for Aristotle's ἀκολαστία Callistratus might be exercising a little social tact. Acquitting them of ἀκρασία suggests that the symposiasts have high moral standards, and reassures them that in responding to the music as they did, they were not abandoning them. Acquitting them of ἀκολαστία, by contrast, would be relevant only if they might plausibly be suspected, however unjustly, of lacking such standards altogether, and being prone to unbridled licentiousness.

[16] They derive pleasure directly only from experiences of touch and taste. Aristotle's contentions are repeated, with minor variations, at [Arist.] *Pr.* 28.7.

[17] Plutarch may have had some sympathy with this position. It would chime with his attribution to animals of some degree of reason and moral sensitivity, on which see Newmyer (2014) 226–31.

[18] For other references to these phenomena see Teodorsson (1996) *ad loc.*

[19] Plutarch mentions this *nomos* again at *Coniugalia praecepta* 138b; I have not been able to identify the source of his information. Clement of Alexandria, in his allusion to the practice of using aulos music to encourage mares that are being mated, remarks that the μουσικοί call this music ἱππόθορος, and the fact that he refers to οἱ

(*HA* 597b21–9, 611b26–31);[20] and the information that Aristotle provides would be enough by itself to support this part of Callistratus' argument. We might also note that in Book 8 of the *Politics* he seems to deny what he had said in the *Ethics*, asserting that music of a popular sort is enjoyed 'even by some of the animals', as well as by 'the common run of slaves and children' (*Pol.* 1341a15–17).

It appears, then, that Callistratus has constructed his argument by exploiting inconsistencies between passages in Aristotle's writings, using Aristotle to confute Aristotle, and I'm not sure what we should make of that. Here again, indeed, as in the comments on Aristoxenus, it's not immediately clear how this Peripatetic excursion is supposed to help in establishing the thesis that Callistratus is trying to sustain, that is, that the pleasures of sight and hearing cannot lure us into ἀκρασία. This is a thesis of whose truth he must evidently try to convince us, but it seems to make no difference to his argument whether the reason for it is the one given by Aristotle or his own, which is that only the pleasures of sight and hearing 'are pleasures of the soul, while the others are pleasures of the body and come to an end in the body' (705a5–6). Or, if it does make a difference, it must be because his explanation embraces the view that these pleasures affect the soul as well as the body. But if that is the point, it would appear to give a valuable hostage to fortune, since it offers a Platonist just the opening he needs to launch on his counterarguments. This might just possibly be what Plutarch meant when he described Callistratus as providing Lysias with an ἐνδόσιμον. If it were, 'key-note' would be an apt translation after all; Callistratus' contention is a point on which both parties agree, and on which Lamprias can safely rely in his rebuttal.

Even so, Callistratus could have used his thesis to his advantage, and perhaps he implicitly does. He insists, as he must, that auditory and visual pleasures are exempt from ἀκρασία, but so far he has offered no arguments in support of that position. But if we elide, as he does, the difference between ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία, or assume that

μουσικοί rather than to people in general suggests that it was a term coined by musical specialists. Perhaps it was used *only* by them, and was not current in ordinary usage or among horse-breeders themselves.

[20] Sandbach (1982) 225–7 is devoted to showing that Plutarch knew the *HA*, citing e.g. *De sol. an.* 973a, 979c–e, 981f. He presents *inter alia* a list of Plutarchan allusions to the *HA* in which Aristotle is not explicitly named, but it does not include the present passage.

in this connection what applies to one of them applies to both, he could have extracted a perfectly good explanation from the passages of the *Ethics* to which his remarks apparently refer. There, Aristotle offers the view that these failings arise only in connection with bodily pleasures, whereas those that involve the soul are not subject to them (though excessive indulgence in pleasures of the soul can properly be criticized for other reasons, *EN* 1118a3–9); and it would have been easy for Callistratus, armed with his thesis that the pleasures of sight and hearing impinge on the soul, to point out that Aristotle's restriction of ἀκρασία and/or ἀκολασία to bodily pleasures will entail that his own position is correct. In fact it will do so more straightforwardly than it can on the basis of Aristotle's way of distinguishing auditory and visual pleasures from the others. It is therefore odd that he does not make this rather obvious move.

But perhaps, in a sense, he does. Perhaps he assumes that the relevant passages of the *Ethics* are so familiar that his well-educated audience will have seen the point immediately, without any tedious exposition of it from him. After all, in the first part of our passage, Plutarch does not tell us that he is implicitly referring to Plato, and still less does he expound the contents of the relevant bits of the dialogues; he expects his readers to pick up the allusions for themselves. Callistratus could be pursuing the same strategy here. But there is a difference, and it makes it rather more puzzling that he does not make the crucial doctrine explicit. If, dull-witted as we are, we fail to notice the Platonic allusions in the account of the musician's behaviour, we can still read it as a perfectly coherent and intelligible narrative. By contrast, if Callistratus' remarks are not seen to be underpinned by the Aristotelian thesis associating ἀκολαστία and/or ἀκρασία with bodily pleasures and no others, they will apparently add up to nothing at all. In that case it seems rather imprudent of him to have left his audience to fill in the gap for themselves. Nevertheless he does so, and in this case the implicit allusion makes an essential contribution to our reading of the text.

Callistratus' foray into Peripatetic territory ends at 705a8, and at the beginning of the next sentence we find the connective ὅθεν, 'hence'. What follows, then, is a collection of facts that can be accounted for on the grounds that indulgence in auditory and visual pleasures is immune to the charge of ἀκρασία. Specifically, it is this that explains why people do not find it necessary to conceal their susceptibility to these pleasures under the cloud of darkness, and why,

on the contrary, they build stadia and theatres in which they can be enjoyed to the full and in public: *ὅθεν οὐδεμία τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἀπόκρυφός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σκότους δεομένη καὶ τῶν τοίχων 'περιθεόντων', ὡς οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ στάδια ταύταις καὶ θέατρα ποιεῖται* (705a9–b2). To see and hear things in company with many others, Callistratus continues, is more pleasurable and honourable, *σεμνότερον*, than doing so alone. Hence he can call on a multitude of witnesses (*μάρτυρας ἡμῶν ὅτι πλείστους λαμβανόντων*) to the fact that indulgence in these pleasures is not a symptom of *ἀκρασία* or of pathological susceptibility to pleasure, but is proper to a liberal and civilized way of life (705b2–6).

Here we seem to have returned to the Academy. Plato's references to people who indulge pleasures of which they are ashamed, but do so only in private, as at *Laws* 655d–656b, might be exploited to give respectable authority to the use that Callistratus makes of these points. But he gives the game away with his references to public theatres and to the evidence of a great many witnesses, not to mention his nod to the hedonistic Cyrenaics. The theatres point us to the Athenian's denunciations of popular 'theatocracy' in the *Laws* (700e–701a), and the appeal to all these witnesses plainly reminds us of Socrates' comparisons of his method of argument with that of Polus in the *Gorgias* (471e–472c, 473e–474b, 475e–476a); Polus thinks that the more witnesses he can call on the better, whereas Socrates values the testimony of one person only, the person with whom he is currently in debate. But in any case we hardly need to hunt for specific passages in the dialogues. The attitude that a Platonist of any variety will take to the opinions of *οἱ πόλλοι* is entirely familiar, and at least from a Platonist perspective, the observations that Callistratus uses to illustrate the implications of his view and to provide evidence in its support in fact undermine it fatally.

We might think of the continuous undercurrent of allusions in this passage as a surreptitious running commentary on the written text, a murmur of voices (especially Plato's) in the background, passing judgement on what Plutarch explicitly reports and guiding the reader's interpretation of it. Its role in the description of the musician's performance is not strictly essential; it serves mainly to emphasize and justify the unfavourable view of it which the text itself already conveys. But Plutarch could hardly have given Callistratus a speech which overtly subverted itself, and here the implicit allusions have a much more important function, exposing the emptiness of his

arguments and destabilizing the thesis he champions, and so making us ready to accept the contrary views which Lamprias expounds in the sequel. And more generally, of course, if we acknowledge and identify the ghostly presences that haunt the passage, we shall enrich our appreciation of its meanings, and of the literary sophistication with which Plutarch has composed it.[21]

INTERMEDIALITY

At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the symposiasts' reception of the speeches that follow the musician's performance should be thought of as mediated by their experience of the music he performed and of their own responses to it. I also suggested that something similar might be said of the readers of Plutarch's dialogue, or at any rate readers in Plutarch's own era. Even though they were not present to hear this particular performance, they are likely to have had similar experiences of their own, memories which would have been awakened by the highly coloured account presented here. Music they had heard in the past, echoing in the ear of memory, would have given substance to the descriptions in the text, and would have been the principal reference-point for their interpretation of the speeches. In this brief final section[22] I would like to explore this second suggestion a little further. In the closing paragraphs I shall say a little—but only a little, since I can only skim the surface of the concept here—about how it relates to the concept of intermediality developed by theorists of various persuasions in recent decades.[23]

Consider, first, Plutarch's account of the performance itself. It conjures up vivid images, and eloquently expresses the attitude of the writer, but at the same time it is curiously unspecific. The pieces of music are not named or assigned to their composers; we are not even told to which genres they belonged, only that the content of the first part of the programme was admirable and that of the second part

[21] For some further reflections on this passage see Barker (2016).

[22] My thanks to Tom Phillips for encouraging me to engage with this issue, and for his helpful comments on my attempts to do so.

[23] For a valuable overview of intermediality, and a painstaking analysis of the forms it can take, see Wolf (2002) which also contains an ample bibliography of earlier studies.

disgraceful, provoking its audience to thoroughly unseemly behaviour. Uncertainties about the identity of the music are compounded by the ambiguity of the word χορός, which we noticed earlier. Did the music include contributions by a group of singers or dancers, or indeed dancing singers? That seems to be the natural implication of the allusion, but it is destabilized by the absence of any reference to choral activity in the sequel. So perhaps the χορός is simply the musician's fan-club, like the χορός that attended Protagoras; but there's nothing in the text to confirm or confute that hypothesis either.

There is another uncertainty of an even more troublesome sort. At the beginning of the passage the musician is described as an αὐλῳδός, that is, a solo singer who performs to the accompaniment of an aulos-player. But this identification fails to mesh convincingly with Plutarch's account of his performance. No accompanist is mentioned, and the musician is not said to have conferred with anyone else at the moment when he decides to abandon musical respectability. He seems to be performing and taking decisions entirely on his own. Nor is his activity described as singing. His deplorable music includes κρούματα, a word that most often refers to the sounds of an instrument but might be intended in the sense 'rhythms', and μέλη, which means 'melodies' or 'tunes' regardless of whether they are vocal or instrumental. But the third component regularly listed among the ingredients of music, that is, the words, is obtrusively missing, despite the fact that according to Plato the words of a song should take the lead in determining the character of the music; the other elements in the piece take their cue from them, and when music lacks words its ethos is extremely hard to identify.[24] Plutarch seems—whether deliberately or not—to be undermining his initial statement that the musician is a singer. He has also planted in the text two hints which positively encourage the reader to think of the performance as purely instrumental; one is the reference to κρούματα, and the other is his use of the verb καταυλεῖν to evoke the musician's 'spell-binding' effect on his audience. Neither of these settles the issue conclusively, since

[24] Plato *Rep.* 398c–d; *Laws* 669e. In the same passage of the *Republic*, however, Glaucon assigns a distinct ethos to each of the ἁρμονίαι in its own right, without reference to any words that may be set to melodies formed within its framework (398e–399c), and Socrates implies that the same could be done with rhythms (399e–400c). Our passage of Plutarch implies that a complex made up of melody and rhythm alone nevertheless has a determinate ethos, and that the absence of words does not prevent us from detecting it.

both, like the allusion to a χορός, are infected with ambiguity.[25] But the idea that the musician is not an αὐλῳδός after all, but an instrumentalist and specifically an aulete, is further encouraged by the fact that the most prestigious and famous musical event in the Pythian contest was the competition for solo aulos-players, and if indications to the contrary were lacking, we would naturally assume that it was from this competition that the musician had been disqualified. In an earlier version of this chapter I argued on grounds of these sorts that Plutarch *must* have meant that the musician was an aulete, and that the word αὐλῳδόν must therefore be an error, and should be emended to αὐλητήν. As one of the anonymous readers of this volume has pointed out to me, however, it isn't easy to see how the corruption could have happened, and I am now inclined to think that the manuscript text should stand. In that case it seems impossible to decide what sort of musician this is; we are pulled in one direction by his explicit designation as an αὐλῳδός, and in the other by the cluster of indications we have been reviewing.

To sum up these points, then, the ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in Plutarch's account leave the specifically musical aspects of the performance indeterminate, and this indeterminacy opens up a space to be filled out of the readers' own resources. One might put it more strongly: the text's resistance to being pinned down to any definite representation of the musician (or musicians), or of the music that was performed, releases readers from the obligation to imagine, at second hand, something they have not heard; it positively invites them to bring their own experiences and memories to bear on their interpretation of Plutarch's brief narrative, and, more importantly, to keep them in mind as they read the subsequent speeches. No matter what types of remembered music run through their heads when they envisage the good and bad pieces discussed in the text, they are at liberty to draw freely on them when assessing the merits of the speakers' arguments.

Readers' memories of past experiences of music bring with them memories of their own responses to these experiences. When they consider Callistratus' speech for the defence and the case for the

[25] The sense of the verb καταυλεῖν is never far from that of enchanting or affecting a person by means of aulos-playing, though it can also be used metaphorically to refer to enchantments in which the aulos does not literally play a part, as e.g. at Plato *Rep.* 411a.

prosecution subsequently presented by Lysias, these recollections may prompt them, like the symposiasts themselves, either to feel embarrassed at the shameful way they have reacted, or alternatively to pride themselves on reacting in ways proper to a respectable human being; and these stirrings of their consciences or their self-esteem will modify their responses to the speakers' arguments. Thus Callistratus' insistence that even non-rational creatures take pleasure in music suggests that in this respect human beings are no different from animals, and that their enjoyment of music is unconnected with their distinctive rationality. Reflection on their own experiences might lead readers to reject this implication, or to recognize its cogency and—perhaps—to find it troubling. Similarly, Callistratus' allusion to the behaviour of owls and the hunters who set out to catch them invites the thought that music can lure us into a trap, with disastrous consequences; and the fact that horse-breeders use music to induce mares to submit to mating might be construed as a hint that by by-passing our rational faculty it can entice us into acting in ways contrary to our better judgement. Readers recalling their own musical experiences might therefore be inclined to wonder whether they too have sometimes fallen prey to such musical 'entrapment' and been tempted into injudicious behaviour. In a rather different vein, Callistratus' appeal to the testimony of the multitudinous witnesses assembled in the theatres might chime discordantly with their own experiences. They might for instance recall a performance which they had thought admirable, but to which the crowd in the theatre had perversely responded with cat-calls and hails of rotten vegetables; and anyone who now re-lived the disgust they had felt at the time for these demonstrations of bad taste would be strongly disinclined to follow Callistratus in putting his faith in the opinions of 'the many'.

The preceding paragraph is littered with words such as 'may' and 'might', and this is inevitable. We can be sure that anyone present on an occasion of the sort that Plutarch describes would have listened to the speeches against the back-drop of the performance they had heard. It's also indisputable, I think, that the vagueness and ambiguities of Plutarch's description of the performance provide an open opportunity for readers to fill the gaps in the way I have suggested. Again, it seems certain that audiences for comedies in classical Athens drew on their memories of other performances while they listened; otherwise the comic dramatists' musical spoofs and satirical characterizations of musicians would have fallen on stony ground.

But if we ask whether remembered music was ringing in the ears of contemporary readers of Plutarch's dialogue, and whether they actually brought it to bear on their assessment of what they read, these are questions we simply cannot answer. My suggestion that they 'might' have done so is a suggestion and no more.

Is it possible, finally, to relate these observations and suggestions to the concept of intermediality, and if so, how? If we consider the artifact with which Plutarch has presented us (that is, the written text of the dialogue) simply by itself, it is clear that intermediality plays no part at all. The text is not delivered through the medium of music; nor does it modify its allusions to music by giving them—for example—a rhythmic or metrical form reminiscent of those familiar from musical compositions.[26] What we find is something that is not strictly a case of intermediality at all, but (in Wolf's terms) of 'intermedial reference'; it refers to music, but without being 'iconically affected' by its reference, or mediated through the filter of the music it mentions. Wolf distinguishes two principal types of intermedial reference. 'Such reference . . . can point to another medium in general—in which case it could be seen as a parallel to what in intertextuality theory is called "system reference"; alternatively, intermedial reference can also point to an individual work transmitted in another medium—in which case the term "individual reference", which is also derived from intertextuality theory, would be applicable.'[27]

The distinction between system reference and individual reference, however, is less clear-cut than it might appear. Imagine a scene in a novel in which someone walks along a corridor and hears music coming through an open door. If (a) we are told only that the character hears music, we are evidently in the presence of system reference. But the author might have made the reference more specific: (b) the music is a piano concerto, or more specifically still, (c) one of Mozart's piano concertos. Still further along the continuum between system reference and individual reference, the author might have chosen to tell us (d) that it is Mozart's C Major piano concerto, or again (e) that it is the slow movement of that concerto; or it might be identified even more closely (f) as the plangent descending sequence that recurs thematically in the concerto's slow movement.

[26] This would be what Werner Wolf calls 'intermedial imitation': Wolf (2002) 24–5.

[27] Wolf (2002) 23.

If the reference the novel provides takes the form of (d), (e), or (f), some of the novel's readers will be familiar with this concerto and some will not. The responses of the latter to the text are bound to be unaffected by past experiences of the music itself, but those of the former might very well be so affected, and the more specific the reference becomes, the more likely it becomes that memories of the music will intervene in their reception of what they read. If the novelist's allusion takes the form of (f), it is in fact hard to believe that readers who know the music well will be able to resist recreating the sequence in their mental ear, thereby enriching the atmosphere of the scene that the novel depicts. When they do so, a form of intermediality evidently comes into play; and since its intervention depends on a contribution which the reader may or may not provide, and is not inherent in anything actually contained in the novel, we might distinguish it from other forms by calling it 'potential intermediality'.

Although the dialogue's references to music are not strictly parallel to any of (a), (b), and (c), they are closer to the 'system reference' end of the spectrum than the ones we have just been considering. If the notion of potential intermediality is applicable in their case too (which is roughly what I have suggested), it must be applied in a rather different way. Plutarch's account of the episode in which both good and bad music are performed offers some clues about what the music was like, but the vagueness and ambiguities we noted above leave most of the details open. Some readers will have had experiences which they could call upon to fill in the gaps, and some, perhaps, will not; and of those who have had such experiences, some will reactivate them in their memories as they read and some will not. Those who do so will, in effect, be converting Plutarch's 'system references' into 'individual references', removing the generality of Plutarch's descriptions by identifying the referents with particular instances that fall within their scope. In so doing, they, like their counterparts among the readers of our hypothetical novel, will bring an intermedial dimension to their engagement with and appreciation of the text. It therefore seems as legitimate to locate potential intermediality in the Plutarchan dialogue as it is to do so in the scene in the novel. But the two cases differ in one significant respect. The text of the novel determines the identity of the music through which its potential intermediality can be actualized, and no other music will serve the purpose. By contrast, Plutarch's text indicates no more than the music's general characteristics, leaving its identification with any

individual compositions or performances to be determined by the reader. The 'potential' which readers may or may not actualize is therefore of a looser sort, and it resides in them as much as it does in anything Plutarch has written. Nevertheless, insofar as the text admits the possibility of intermedial intervention in a reader's reception of it—and indeed, in my view, positively invites such intervention—the concept of potential intermediality is applicable here too; and by recognizing this fact we can enlarge our understanding of the range of responses to the dialogue that were available to Plutarch's contemporaries.

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